EP1058918A1 - Method for protecting the identity of objects and device for performing the method - Google Patents
Method for protecting the identity of objects and device for performing the methodInfo
- Publication number
- EP1058918A1 EP1058918A1 EP98920474A EP98920474A EP1058918A1 EP 1058918 A1 EP1058918 A1 EP 1058918A1 EP 98920474 A EP98920474 A EP 98920474A EP 98920474 A EP98920474 A EP 98920474A EP 1058918 A1 EP1058918 A1 EP 1058918A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- capsule
- chip
- identity
- loop
- terminal
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
- G08B13/14—Mechanical actuation by lifting or attempted removal of hand-portable articles
- G08B13/1445—Mechanical actuation by lifting or attempted removal of hand-portable articles with detection of interference with a cable tethering an article, e.g. alarm activated by detecting detachment of article, breaking or stretching of cable
- G08B13/1454—Circuit arrangements thereof
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/02—Mechanical actuation
- G08B13/12—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires
- G08B13/126—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a housing, e.g. a box, a safe, or a room
- G08B13/128—Mechanical actuation by the breaking or disturbance of stretched cords or wires for a housing, e.g. a box, a safe, or a room the housing being an electronic circuit unit, e.g. memory or CPU chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/22—Electrical actuation
- G08B13/24—Electrical actuation by interference with electromagnetic field distribution
- G08B13/2402—Electronic Article Surveillance [EAS], i.e. systems using tags for detecting removal of a tagged item from a secure area, e.g. tags for detecting shoplifting
- G08B13/2428—Tag details
- G08B13/2434—Tag housing and attachment details
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B13/00—Burglar, theft or intruder alarms
- G08B13/22—Electrical actuation
- G08B13/24—Electrical actuation by interference with electromagnetic field distribution
- G08B13/2402—Electronic Article Surveillance [EAS], i.e. systems using tags for detecting removal of a tagged item from a secure area, e.g. tags for detecting shoplifting
- G08B13/2428—Tag details
- G08B13/2448—Tag with at least dual detection means, e.g. combined inductive and ferromagnetic tags, dual frequencies within a single technology, tampering detection or signalling means on the tag
Definitions
- the present invention concerns a method for protecting the identity of objects.
- the practice of applying protective seals made from sealing wax to documents, particularly to letters and parcels, has been known for centuries. Their purpose is not only to identify the originator or the sender, but also to safeguard the integrity of the enclosure of such documents and thereby to protect such objects against access by unauthorized persons, i.e., to prevent forgery, in short, to protect the identity of the objects.
- This kind of seal is usually combined with a safety loop that consists of a section of wire and is installed on the measuring instrument in such a manner that the loop will have to be cut or the seal has to be broken in order to remove the safety loop that prevents access to the enclosure of the measuring instrument.
- a safety loop that consists of a section of wire and is installed on the measuring instrument in such a manner that the loop will have to be cut or the seal has to be broken in order to remove the safety loop that prevents access to the enclosure of the measuring instrument.
- the meter reader will need to involve an additional person to witness the evidence of tampering or else risk to have the case dismissed for lack of sufficient proof.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a method for protecting the identity of objects as well as of persons, which assures that the danger that a forgery or a misuse could occur without being recognized is practically eliminated.
- the inventive method that solves this problem is essentially characterized by the use of a micro-electronic chip that is fastened to the object to be secured and that cannot be separated from the object without destroying detail elements essential to its function.
- the chip is designed such that nonerasable data that define its identity and thus the identity of the object, such as the place and time of the securing procedure, details about the persons involved in the procedure, etc. , can be stored by means of a terminal through carrier- frequency transmission, and at least a part of the data can subsequently be interrogated via the terminal by authorized persons to check whether manipulations took place with the intention of adversely affecting the identity of the object.
- the security device If the security device is accessed by authorized persons and a change is made in the object in the intervening time interval, the corresponding new data can be stored and interrogated in analogous fashion.
- a falsification can be recognized from the fact that the respective identity has either not been issued or is a duplicate of a previously issued identity.
- chip is to be understood in the broadest possible sense. It includes electrical, electronic as well as optical modules which, based on a program for identity protection, control the component elements which are found in any electronic or optical computing system.
- a chip of this kind is fastened to a vehicle (the vehicle being the object to be protected) or to an essential part of the same such as an engine block and if the data that define the identity of the vehicle or the engine block are stored in the chip through carrier-frequency transmission by means of the terminal, then this chip, as it forms a single unit with the object that is defined by its data, is an essential and continually available means for identifying the object.
- the inventive method can also be successfully used in the same manner to protect the identity of objects in the form of documents, such as letters and parcels, in that the previously used wax seal is replaced by the aforementioned chip which is firmly attached to the cover of the letter or parcel. After the chip has been attached to the object, the non-erasable data on the chip that define the identity of the object can be interrogated only by authorized individuals by means of the terminal .
- the invention further extends to a device for performing the inventive method.
- This device is essentially characterized by the distinguishing elements stated in claim 2.
- the term "antenna” as used in this claim and in the further context is to be understood in the broadest sense, including in the sense of a transponder. If the object whose identity is to be protected is, e.g., a valuable boat, a valuable passenger automobile or a valuable truck or even only its engine, the device in a particularly suitable embodiment of the invention is distinguished by the characteristics defined in claim 7.
- the capsule containing the chip for protecting an object is connected to the latter in such a manner that it will be easy to bring the terminal sufficiently close to the object. In these normal cases, it is particularly practical to form the antenna that is connected to the chip by embedding it in the neutral material of the capsule, preferably a polymer, as a part of the capsule-chip unit.
- an antenna which is arranged outside of the capsule and connected with the chip in the manner stated in claim 9.
- This kind of an antenna which is galvanically coupled with the chip and arranged separately outside of the capsule is practical in unfavorable spatial conditions where the terminal cannot be brought into the immediate vicinity of the capsule even for a short time.
- the non-erasable data on the chip that confirm the identity of the vehicle in accordance with the vehicle documents can be called up from the outside by activating the terminal.
- a capacitor is connected to the chip in the manner characterized in claim 10.
- a more elegant possibility of exchanging data between the chip and the terminal is available if the device is designed according to the characteristic elements of claim 11.
- a battery of the kind provided in claim 11 can be in the form of a so-called long-life battery, i.e., a battery of sufficient capacity to last for a long time, considering the small amount of power needed for a data transmission. A longer lifetime is achieved if in the data interrogation, the data transmission is performed by using a carrier-frequency based energy transmission to the chip.
- a battery that is located inside the capsule and is rechargeable, according to claim 12 with inductively transmitted energy f om outside the capsule, preferably from the terminal. It is especially advantageous if the battery is integrated into the capsule as an environmentally compatible plastic or foil battery.
- the examples described above are of the kind where the intended faultless identity protection is already assured by using the chip in a unitary arrangement together with its enclosing capsule and firmly attached to the object to be protected.
- a further embodiment of the invention is applicable, comprising the distinguishing elements of claim 14.
- the integrity of the loop is ascertained as long as the relationship between the emitted and the returned signal data remains the same. Also, if the signal data emitted at one end of the loop return in the form of light signals at the other end of the loop, the integrity of the loop is likewise assured. It has proven to be very practical if the identity-protection loop is designed in accordance with the characteristic elements of claim 15.
- the light conductor comprises a glass fiber cable.
- an arrangement with the characteristics of claim 17 is very advantageous.
- a further technical refinement can be advantageous in which the light intensity measured at the receiving end of the loop is compared with the light intensity at the other end of the loop.
- the conditions are further tightened if the light signals are polarized.
- a temporary opening of the identity-protection loop in order to illegally access the secured object is impossible under these conditions, not only because of the time that will be needed, but not available, for the repair, but also because of the fact that the original polarity and light intensity cannot be restored at the receiving end.
- the carrier base that is formed, e.g., of a polymer material and on which the chip is mounted is inevitably destroyed so that the entire capsule-chip unit cannot be used again; this, too, gives assurance against an unauthorized intrusion into the identity protection.
- the invention is, of course, not restricted to the module elements that have been developed in the past decades for the production of "electronic tags". Rather, it is possible to also use in the production of seals the particularly compact elements that are made from biological molecules, i.e., to make use of the latest breakthroughs in the field of computers (Scientific American, March 1995) .
- the identity-protection loop is designed instead as a semiconductor chain that is connected with the chip and has the form of a delay chain with a plurality of delay circuit elements, the number of which determines the point in time when the pulse that originated from the chip, after traveling through the delay chain, arrives back at the chip.
- This semiconductor chain is preferably based on a polymeric carrier material and thus is flexible like a light conductor.
- the delay time is altered by any change in the number of links in the chain, e.g., by the short-circuiting of time-delay elements. This will be recognized by the chip and interpreted as an intrusion into the identity-protection loop, i.e., as a "breaking of the seal tag" .
- the electronic circuit of the seal can, of course, be operated in a passive as well as an active mode. In order to operate the semiconductor chain in the passive mode, the carrier frequency may be reduced to a suitable clock frequency by means of a frequency divider.
- the chip can also register the exact time of the intrusion. If the chip can be supplied with position data from a terminal that incorporates the GPS (Global Positioning System) functions, this makes it possible to also determine and register the location of the intrusion in addition to the time.
- the aforementioned semiconductor chain can also be designed as a pure resistor chain. For the determination of the delay time, it has proven to be particularly advantageous if the characteristic elements of claim 19 are employed.
- the identity-protection loop can, as described above, be designed as a light conductor or as a semiconductor chain in the form of a delay line. A further alternative, in which the characteristic elements of claim 33 are employed, has proven to be very advantageous.
- a device for performing the method according to claim 1 is presented in various embodiments wherein a relatively expensive capsule-chip unit is employed which, when used in combination with an identity-protection loop, in the closed condition will permit no opening of the capsule for separating the two ends of the identity-protection loop without causing the destruction of the loop or the capsule-chip unit.
- a separation i.e., opening of the loop
- the relatively inexpensive device representing this variation of the invention in which this possibility is realized is essentially characterized by the distinguishing elements of claim 34.
- Each of the two ends of the identity-protection loop that is formed by a semiconductor chain is, as a matter of practicality, connected with the associated snap fastener through electrical contacts. Alternatively, the connection can also be made by optical means. It should be mentioned that this less expensive snap fastener version, too, by using a kind of barbed hook on the ball-shaped part that forms one part of the snap fastener, can be designed so that after closing the snap fastener the possibility of reopening is precluded, except by forcing the device and accepting its destruction.
- Fig. 1 represents a schematic cross-sectional view of a capsule with the inserted ends of an identity-protection loop that is formed by a semiconductor chain
- Fig. 2 represents a circuit schematic of a semiconductor chain that forms an identity-protection loop
- Fig. 3 represents a diagram to illustrate the delayed propagation of a pulse in a periodically operated semiconductor chain
- Fig. 4 represents a cross-sectional view similar to Fig. 1 with an identity-protection loop that is formed by a light conductor
- Fig. 5 represents a schematic view of a GPS display indication of a GPS recorder that is connected with the capsule-chip unit
- Fig. 6 represents a top view of one of the snap fastener parts that is formed by a spring component
- Fig. 7 represents a top view of the snap fastener part of Fig. 6 with a portion broken away to illustrate the chip that is located behind it,
- Fig. 8 represents two snap fastener parts of a matching pair attached to the corresponding ends of an identity-protection loop.
- Fig. 1 shows a cylindrical capsule 1 of a neutral material that does not interfere with the function of the identity-protection loop, e.g., a polymer.
- the capsule is assembled from two capsule parts 2 and 3 into which the respective ends 4 and 5 of an identity-protection loop are inserted.
- the identity-protection loop in the illustrated example is in the form of a delay line that is formed by a semiconductor chain.
- the latter comprises, e.g., a sequence of transistors 6 as well as associated R-C elements 7 serving as delay elements.
- the number of the chain links arranged along the semiconductor chain in the form of R-C elements 7 and transistors 6 determines the travel time T of a pulse from end 4 to the other end 5 of the identity-protection loop.
- This travel time T of the chain which is an identifying characteristic of the identity loop, is measured at the initialization of the chip and is written into the chip. Given that with every change in the number of chain links the delay, and thereby the travel time, is changed, it is possible to determine by any comparison of the actually measured travel time with the stored characteristic travel time whether the identity-protection loop has remained intact or whether a change in the number of chain links, e.g. , by short-circuiting, has occurred.
- a clock signal is used for controlling the pulses of a pulse chain.
- This clock signal is obtained through frequency division, using the carrier-frequency available from the terminal, as indicated schematically by "clock" in Fig. 3.
- clock Associated with each of the clock intervals 1 , 2 , 3 ... on the X-axis is a corresponding delay t of, e.g., 10, 20, 30 ... milliseconds on the Y-axis.
- t e.g., 10, 20, 30 ... milliseconds on the Y-axis.
- the larger part 2 of the capsule contains a chip 8 , an antenna 9, as well as a battery 10.
- connector sleeves 11 and 12 for the connection of the respective ends 13 and 14 of the identity-protection loop are firmly imbedded in the plastic material, e.g., epoxy resin, of the capsule 1.
- the end 13 of the loop with the connector sleeve 11 already forms an integral unit with the plastic material of capsule 1.
- the opposite, free end 14 of the loop runs coaxially with connector sleeve 12 and also with part 3 of the capsule and remains axially movable relative to the latter until the parts are fixedly connected.
- a tubular guide 15 is helpful, which is provided with a step 16 to limit the travel into the connector sleeve 12 so that the end 14 of the loop at its extremity does not bear against the bottom 17 of the connector sleeve.
- the chip 8 but also the antenna 9 and the battery 10 are each electrically connected on one side with the electrically conductive connector sleeve 11 and on the other side with the also conductive connector sleeve 12.
- the two parts 2 and 3 of the capsule can be solidly connected with each other by means of a quick-setting adhesive.
- a conical adhesive container 18 is attached at one end of the guide 15, which passes coaxially through the container.
- Adjoining the container 18 is a cylindrical guide 19 which, in a manner not specifically shown, extends into a central opening of part 3 of the capsule, so that part 3 can move along guide 19 in the direction towards part 2 of the capsule. Facing the sloped surface of the adhesive container 18 is a correspondingly sloped exterior surface 20 of part 2 of the capsule. Surface 20 has sharp protrusions 21. Likewise, protrusions 22 of the same kind are provided on the surface portion of part 3 that faces part 2.
- the walls of the adhesive container 18 that contains the quick- setting adhesive are pierced, i.e., destroyed by the protrusions 21 and 22 when the connection of parts 2 and 3 is closed, so that the adhesive is released and flows to the peripheral area of the part 3 of the capsule, i.e., a cone-shaped contact surface 23, and to the corresponding contact surface 24 of the part 2 of the capsule.
- the parts that are essential to its function are protected against any intrusion from the outside and thus no longer accessible to manipulations by unauthorized individuals. Any attempt, e.g., to open one of the ends of the identity-protection loop, the equivalent of breaking a conventional lead seal, would cause irreparable and immediately recognizable damage to the functionally essential components.
- the identity-protection loop is formed by a light-conductor as the conductive core.
- Chip 8 is again mounted on a polymer film 25 or the like with conductive traces by which the chip communicates with the two ends 4 and 5 of the light conductor, which comprises a glass fiber cable, through light sources 26 and light-sensing semiconductors 27.
- the light conductor is welded to a prism 28 that is arranged above the light source, and at its other end 5 it is likewise welded to light sensor 27 through a prism 29.
- the free end of the light conductor can be inserted concentrically into the cylindrical capsule, similar to the example of the semiconductor chain, and connected to a closed unit by adhesive bonding of the larger part 2 of the capsule with the other, smaller part 3.
- the capsule 1 in either embodiment in practice has a length of about 25 mm and a diameter of less than 20 mm.
- the identity-protection loop takes the form of a semiconductor chain in accordance with Figures 1 and 2 , so also when using a loop consisting of a glass fiber cable, there is assurance that intrusions by unauthorized individuals will necessarily cause the destruction of functionally essential parts of the capsule-chip unit 1, and that such intrusions will be immediately recognizable.
- the required energy is supplied by the battery 10, so that this "seal tag" represents an active unit.
- the power supply is provided by a capacitor (not shown in the drawing) receiving energy during an active transaction through power emission from the terminal.
- the mobile terminal used for the surveillance of the capsule- chip units and (if applicable) their associated identity- 10 protection loops enables on the one hand the aforementioned wireless transmission and storage of data in the chip as well as the recall of the data stored in the chip for the purpose of an identity check.
- the GPS recorder shown in a frontal view in Fig. 5 makes it possible to determine and register the exact location of the intrusive manipulation in the identity-protection loop, i.e., the "breaking of the tag", by means of a special, appropriately equipped transportation terminal.
- the latter determines in accordance with the known state of the art the current GPS location and writes it to the identity-protection chip. The previous location is thereby overwritten. If the object under surveillance is removed from the surveillance range of the transportation terminal or in case of an identity violation, the last stored location remains on the chip.
- This function can be operated in a passive as well as an active mode.
- the required event timing function can be provided in the electronic circuitry of the capsule-chip unit or the terminal.
- Figures 6 through 8 serve to illustrate another embodiment, in which a snap fastener of the customary design with two fastener components 33 and 34 is being used.
- the fastener component 33 a spring module with inserted spring 35 in the illustrated example, takes on the function of a comparatively simple embodiment of the capsule. Namely, as shown in Fig. 7 but partially covered by the fastener component, said fastener component 33 comprises the associated chip 8 which is accessed by contacts 36.
- an opto- coupler 37 comprising, e.g., a light source in the form of a light emitting diode or a light sensor, as also employed in the example of Fig. 4.
- the fastener part 34 in the shape of a spherical element comprises, e.g., the light source in the form of a light emitting diode that is located at the tip of the ball-shaped projection.
- this light source works together with the light sensor 37 of Fig. 7.
- Fig. 8 shows the conductive traces 38 that run along the semiconductor chain of the identity-protection loop, the ends 4, 5 of which can be connected to each other through the snap faster 33, 34.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
- Crystals, And After-Treatments Of Crystals (AREA)
- Electrical Discharge Machining, Electrochemical Machining, And Combined Machining (AREA)
- Basic Packing Technique (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Encapsulation Of And Coatings For Semiconductor Or Solid State Devices (AREA)
- Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP1998/001251 WO1999045512A1 (en) | 1998-03-05 | 1998-03-05 | Method for protecting the identity of objects and device for performing the method |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1058918A1 true EP1058918A1 (en) | 2000-12-13 |
EP1058918B1 EP1058918B1 (en) | 2002-06-26 |
Family
ID=8166888
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP98920474A Expired - Lifetime EP1058918B1 (en) | 1998-03-05 | 1998-03-05 | Method for protecting the identity of objects and device for performing the method |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1058918B1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2002506237A (en) |
AT (1) | ATE219849T1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU761006B2 (en) |
DE (1) | DE69806272T2 (en) |
ES (1) | ES2178833T3 (en) |
HK (1) | HK1033704A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO1999045512A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2411466B (en) * | 2004-02-26 | 2006-09-20 | Brian Edward Causton | Security tag with tell-tale capability |
DE102004036049A1 (en) * | 2004-07-24 | 2006-02-16 | Leopold Kostal Gmbh & Co. Kg | Arrangement for a motor vehicle comprises microprocessor and or memory on a circuit board with attached inaccessible voltage source for supply independent of on board circuit |
EP1839287A1 (en) | 2005-01-14 | 2007-10-03 | Matthew Henderson | A transponder bolt seal and a housing for a transponder |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
AU588957B2 (en) * | 1986-01-03 | 1989-09-28 | Lend Lease Corporation Limited | Inventory control system |
US5528228A (en) * | 1994-09-08 | 1996-06-18 | Wilk; Peter J. | Protective device for storage and transport containers |
FR2728991A1 (en) * | 1994-12-28 | 1996-07-05 | Robin Veronique Roulleaux | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF PROPERTY, IN PARTICULAR AGAINST THEFT |
US5656996A (en) * | 1996-03-13 | 1997-08-12 | Global Associates, Ltd. | Electronic security bonding device |
GR1002609B (en) * | 1996-04-11 | 1997-02-18 | �.�.�.�. �.�., ������� ����/����� �������.& ��������������... | A comformable intelligent tag. |
-
1998
- 1998-03-05 JP JP2000534982A patent/JP2002506237A/en active Pending
- 1998-03-05 DE DE69806272T patent/DE69806272T2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-03-05 AT AT98920474T patent/ATE219849T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1998-03-05 AU AU73325/98A patent/AU761006B2/en not_active Ceased
- 1998-03-05 EP EP98920474A patent/EP1058918B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-03-05 ES ES98920474T patent/ES2178833T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-03-05 WO PCT/EP1998/001251 patent/WO1999045512A1/en active IP Right Grant
-
2001
- 2001-06-07 HK HK01103936A patent/HK1033704A1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO9945512A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1058918B1 (en) | 2002-06-26 |
JP2002506237A (en) | 2002-02-26 |
DE69806272T2 (en) | 2003-03-06 |
HK1033704A1 (en) | 2001-09-14 |
ATE219849T1 (en) | 2002-07-15 |
DE69806272D1 (en) | 2002-08-01 |
ES2178833T3 (en) | 2003-01-01 |
AU7332598A (en) | 1999-09-20 |
WO1999045512A1 (en) | 1999-09-10 |
AU761006B2 (en) | 2003-05-29 |
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