EP1035517B1 - Procédé de protection d'un module de sécurité et ensemble pour mettre en oeuvre ledit procédé - Google Patents

Procédé de protection d'un module de sécurité et ensemble pour mettre en oeuvre ledit procédé Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1035517B1
EP1035517B1 EP00250064A EP00250064A EP1035517B1 EP 1035517 B1 EP1035517 B1 EP 1035517B1 EP 00250064 A EP00250064 A EP 00250064A EP 00250064 A EP00250064 A EP 00250064A EP 1035517 B1 EP1035517 B1 EP 1035517B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
security module
voltage
line
processor
functional unit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP00250064A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1035517A3 (fr
EP1035517A2 (fr
Inventor
Peter Post
Dirk Rosenau
Torsten Schlaaff
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
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Francotyp Postalia GmbH
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Filing date
Publication date
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Publication of EP1035517A2 publication Critical patent/EP1035517A2/fr
Publication of EP1035517A3 publication Critical patent/EP1035517A3/fr
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Publication of EP1035517B1 publication Critical patent/EP1035517B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00233—Housing, e.g. lock or hardened casing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00266—Man-machine interface on the apparatus
    • G07B2017/00298—Visual, e.g. screens and their layouts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00266—Man-machine interface on the apparatus
    • G07B2017/00306—Acoustic, e.g. voice control or speech prompting
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
    • G07B2017/00346—Power handling, e.g. power-down routine
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00362—Calculation or computing within apparatus, e.g. calculation of postage value
    • G07B2017/00395—Memory organization
    • G07B2017/00403—Memory zones protected from unauthorized reading or writing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00959—Cryptographic modules, e.g. a PC encryption board
    • G07B2017/00967—PSD [Postal Security Device] as defined by the USPS [US Postal Service]

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for protecting a security module, according to the type specified in the preamble of claim 1, and an arrangement for carrying out the method, according to the type specified in the preamble of claim 3.
  • a postal security module is in particular for use in a franking machine Mailing machine or computer with mail processing function suitable.
  • Modern franking machines like those from the US 4,746,234 known thermal transfer postage meter, employ a fully electronic digital printing device.
  • Applicants' T1000 meter has a microprocessor surrounded by a secure housing having an opening for delivering a letter.
  • a mechanical letter sensor microwaveswitch
  • the franking imprint includes previously entered and stored postal information for conveying the letter.
  • the control unit of the franking machine carries out a software billing, exercises a monitoring function, possibly with regard to the conditions for a data update, and controls the reloading of a port value credit.
  • thermal transfer franking machine has already been in US 5,606,508 ( DE 42 13 278 B1 ) and in US 5,490,077 proposed a data entry option using smart cards.
  • One of the smart cards loads new data into the postage meter machine and a set of further smart cards allows a setting to be made according to stored data by inserting a chip card.
  • the data loading and the setting of the franking machine can thus be more convenient and faster than by keyboard input.
  • a franking machine for franking mail is provided with a printer for printing the postage stamp on the mail, a controller for controlling the printing and peripheral components of the postage meter, a bill unit for settling postage, at least one nonvolatile memory for storing postage data , equipped with at least one non-volatile memory for storing safety-relevant data and with a calendar / clock.
  • the non-volatile memory of the safety-related data and / or the calender / clock is usually powered by a battery.
  • security-relevant data (cryptographic keys and the like) are saved in nonvolatile memories. These memories are EEPROM, FRAM or battery backed SRAM.
  • Known franking machines often also have an internal real time clock (RTC), which is powered by a battery.
  • RTC real time clock
  • encapsulated modules containing integrated circuits and a lithium battery. These modules must be replaced and disposed of at the end of the life of the battery as a whole. From an economic and ecological point of view, it is better if only the battery needs to be replaced.
  • the security case must be opened and then closed again and sealed, because the security against fraud is essentially based on the secure housing, which encloses the entire machine.
  • EP 660 269 A2 US 5,671,146
  • any required repair of a franking machine is then difficult on site, if the access to the components is difficult or limited.
  • the secured housing will in future be reduced to the so-called postal security module, which can improve the accessibility to the other components.
  • the battery of the security module it would also be desirable that these be relatively simple can be replaced.
  • the battery must be outside the security range of the franking machine.
  • a potential attacker is able to manipulate the battery voltage.
  • Known battery-powered SRAM and RTC have different requirements with regard to their required operating voltage. The voltage required to hold data from SRAM is below the required voltage for operating RTC.
  • the remote data center specifies a time credit or a period of time, in particular a number of days, or a specific day up to which the franking device can report by means of a communication connection. After unsuccessful expiration of the time credit or the deadline, franking is prevented.
  • Security modules are already known from electronic data processing systems ago. To protect against burglary in an electronic system is in EP 417 447 B1 already proposed a lock, which includes power supply and signal detection means and shielding in the housing.
  • the shielding means is made of encapsulating material and conductive means to which the power supply and signal detection means are connected. The latter responds to a change in the line resistance of the line means.
  • the security module contains an internal battery, a voltage switch from system voltage to battery voltage, a power gate and a short-circuit transistor as well as other sensors. When the voltage falls below a certain limit, the Power Gate responds. If the line resistance, temperature or radiation is changed, the logic will react.
  • the output of the short-circuit transistor is switched to L level, whereby a memory stored in the cryptographic key is deleted.
  • the life of the non-replaceable battery and thus of the security module for use in franking devices or mail processing machines is too small.
  • a larger mail processing machine is, for example, the JetMail®.
  • a franking print is here produced by means of a stationary ink jet printhead in a non-horizontal approximately vertical letter transport.
  • a suitable design for a printing device was already in the DE 196 05 015 C1 proposed.
  • the mailing machine has a meter and a base. If the meter is to be equipped with a housing so that components are more easily accessible, then it must be protected by a postal security module fraud attempts, which at least performs the settlement of postal fees. To exclude influences on the program, has already been in the EP 789 333 A2 under the title: Postage meter proposed to equip a security module with an Application Specific Integrated Circuit ASIC, which has a hardware A réelleaji. The user circuit also controls the print data transfer to the print head.
  • franking machines are also modular. This modularity allows the exchange of modules and components for various reasons. Thus, e.g. defective modules are replaced and replaced by checked, repaired or new modules. Since the utmost care is required in the exchange of assemblies containing safety-relevant data, the replacement usually requires the use of a service technician and measures that prevent its functioning in case of improper use or unauthorized replacement of a security module. The latter is very expensive.
  • the invention has for its object, with little effort to ensure protection against an unauthorized manipulated security module when the security module is arranged interchangeable.
  • the exchange should be possible by anyone in the simplest possible way.
  • the invention is based on the functional units to determine the exchange and use of a security module of a postage meter, mail processing device or similar device to To provide the users of the various devices with a guarantee about the correct functioning of the security module and thus of the entire device.
  • An exchange of a safety module is detected at least and subsequently signaled as a condition if the safety module is plugged in again and supplied with a system voltage.
  • the changes in the state of the security module are detected by means of a first functional unit and by means of a battery supplied by a detection unit, which has a resettable latching.
  • the first functional unit can evaluate the respective state when it is supplied with system voltage again.
  • the reinitialization in connection with communication by means of a remote data center is performed by the first functional unit after a dynamic mating detection has been carried out successfully, during which information is exchanged during the detection of the first functional unit via a current loop of the interface unit Transmission proves the proper installation of the safety module.
  • the activation of functional units of the safety module is done by resetting them.
  • the first functional unit is a processor connected to the other functional units which is programmed to determine the respective status.
  • the second functional unit is a voltage monitoring unit with resettable latching and the third functional unit is a non-latching detection circuit with resettable latching.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the security module 100 with the contact groups 101, 102 for connection to an interface 8 and with the battery contact terminals 103 and 104 of a battery interface for a battery 134 shown.
  • the security module 100 is potted with a hard potting compound, the battery 134 of the security module 100 is interchangeably disposed outside of the potting compound on a printed circuit board.
  • the circuit board carries the battery contact terminals 103 and 104 for connecting the poles of the battery 134.
  • the security module 100 is plugged into a corresponding interface 8 of the motherboard (motherboard) 9.
  • the first contact group 101 communicates with the system bus of a control device and the second contact group 102 serves to supply the security module 100 with the system voltage.
  • the first and / or second contact group 101 and / or 102 are / is designed for static and dynamic monitoring of the plugged in the security module 100.
  • the supply of the security module 100 is realized with the system voltage of the motherboard 9 and the pins P1, P2 and P4, a dynamic and static non-detection detected by the security module 100.
  • the security module 100 has, in a manner known per se, a microprocessor 120 which contains an integrated read-only memory (internal ROM) with the special application program (not shown), which is approved for the franking machine by the postal authority or the respective mail carrier.
  • a conventional read-only memory ROM or FLASH memory can be connected to the internal data bus 126.
  • the security module 100 has, in a manner known per se, a reset circuit unit 130, a user circuit ASIC 150 and a logic PAL 160 which serves as the control signal generator for the ASIC.
  • the reset circuit unit 130 or the user circuit ASIC 150 and the logic PAL 160 as well as possibly further - not shown - memory are supplied via the lines 191 and 129 with system voltage Us +, which is supplied from the motherboard 9 with the franking device turned on.
  • system voltage Us + which is supplied from the motherboard 9 with the franking device turned on.
  • the system voltage Us + is also applied via a diode 181 and the line 136 at the input of the voltage monitoring unit 12.
  • a second operating voltage U b + is supplied, which is available via the line 138.
  • the negative terminal battery contact terminal 104 is connected to ground. From the battery contact terminal 103 lying on the positive pole, battery voltage is supplied via a line 193, via a second diode 182 and the line 136 to the input of the voltage monitoring unit.
  • a commercial circuit can be used aschrosumsohalter 180.
  • the output of the voltage monitoring unit 12 is connected via a line 138 to an input for this second operating voltage U b + of the processor 120, which leads at least to a RAM memory area 122, 124 and there guarantees non-volatile storage as long as the second operating voltage U b + in the required height is applied.
  • the processor 120 preferably includes an internal RAM 124 and a real-time clock (RTC) 122.
  • the voltage monitoring unit 12 in the security module has a resettable latching, which can be queried by the processor 120 via a line 164 and reset via a line 135. For a reset of latching, the voltage monitoring unit 12 switching means on The reset is not triggered until the battery voltage has risen above the predetermined threshold.
  • the lines 135 and 164 are each connected to a pin (pins 1 and 2) of the processor 120.
  • Line 164 provides a status signal to processor 120, and line 135 provides a control signal to voltage monitoring unit 12.
  • the line 136 at the input of the voltage monitoring unit 12 also supplies an unplugged detection unit 13 with operating or battery voltage.
  • the unplugged detection unit 13 outputs on the line 139 a status signal to a pin 5 of the processor 120, which gives an indication of the state of the circuit.
  • the processor 120 queries the state of the unplugged detection unit 13 via the line 139.
  • the processor may reset the unplugged detection unit 13 with a signal output from the pin 4 of the processor 120 via the lead 137.
  • a static check is made for connection.
  • ground potential is queried via a line 192, which is present at the connection P4 of the interface 8 of the postal security module PSM 100 and can only be interrogated when the security module 100 is inserted correctly.
  • ground potential of the negative pole 104 of the battery 134 of the postal security module PSM 100 is placed on the port P23 of the interface 8 and is thus interrogated at port P4 of the interface 8 via the line 192 of the unplugged detection unit 13.
  • the processor 120 At the pins 6 and 7 of the processor 120 is a line loop, which is looped back to the processor 120 via the pins P1 and P2 of the contact group 102 of the interface 8.
  • the processor 120 For dynamic testing of the connectedness of the postal security module PSM 100 to the motherboard 9, the processor 120 generates alternating signal levels at quite irregular time intervals at the pins 6, 7 and looping them back through the loop.
  • the postal security module PSM 100 is equipped with a long-live battery, which also allows monitoring of the use, without the security module is connected to a system voltage of a postal processing facility. Proper use, operation, installation or installation in the appropriate environment are those to be tested by the functional units of the safety module Properties. An initial installation is made by the manufacturer of the postal security module. Thus, after this initial installation, it is only necessary to check whether the postal security module is disconnected from its field of application (post-processing device), this usually taking place during an exchange.
  • the monitoring of this condition is performed by the unplugged detection unit 13.
  • a voltage level is monitored via the ground connection at pin 4 of the interface unit 8.
  • this ground connection is interrupted and the unplugged detection unit 13 registers this process as information. Since for each separation of the security module 100 from the interface unit 8, the storage of this information by the special battery-powered circuitry is ensured, an evaluation of this information can be done at any time, if a restart is desired.
  • the regular evaluation of this unplugged signal on the line 139 of the unplugged detection unit 13 allows the processor 120 to delete sensitive data without, however, altering the accounting and customer data in the NVRAM memories.
  • the current state of the postal security module with the deleted sensitive data can be understood as a maintenance condition, in which usually the replacement, repair or otherwise is made.
  • the processor 120 prevents in the maintenance state a core functionality of the postal security module, which consists for example in the billing and / or calculation of a security code for the security marking in a security print.
  • the postal security module PSM is first inserted and electrically connected to the corresponding interface unit 8 of a mail processing device. Then the device is switched on and thus the postal security module is again supplied with system voltage Us +. Due to the special condition, the proper installation of the postal security module must now be rechecked by its functional unit. For this purpose, a second stage of a test (dynamic plug-in detection) is provided. Via one between the first functional unit (processor 120) and the current loop 18 of the interface unit 8 made operative connection information is exchanged, the error-free transmission provides evidence of proper installation. This is a prerequisite for a successful restart.
  • a test dynamic plug-in detection
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a postage meter, which is equipped with a chip card read / write unit 70 for reloading change data by chip card and with a printing device 2, which is controlled by a control device 1.
  • the control device 1 has a motherboard 9 equipped with a microprocessor 91 with associated memories 92, 93, 94, 95.
  • the program memory 92 contains an operating program for at least printing and at least safety-related components of the program for a predetermined format change of a portion of the user data.
  • the RAM RAM 93 is used for volatile intermediate storage of intermediate results.
  • NVM 94 non-volatile memory is used for non-volatile caching of data, such as statistical data organized by cost center.
  • the calendar / clock module 95 also contains addressable but non-volatile memory areas for the non-volatile intermediate storage of intermediate results or also known program parts (for example for the DES algorithm).
  • control device 1 is connected to the chip card write / read unit 70, wherein the microprocessor 91 of the control device 1 is programmed, for example, to load the payload N from the memory area of a chip card 49 for their application in corresponding memory areas of the franking machine ,
  • a first chip card 49 inserted in a slot 72 of the chip card write / read unit 70 allows reloading of a data record into the franking machine for at least one application.
  • the smart card 49 contains, for example, the postage for all the usual postal carrier services according to the tariff of the postal authority and a post carrier code to generate a stamp image with the franking machine and to stamp the postal items according to the tariff of the postal authority.
  • the control device 1 forms the actual meter with the means 91 to 95 of the aforementioned motherboard 9 and also includes a keyboard 88, a display unit 89 and an application-specific circuit ASIC 90 and the interface 8 for the postal security module PSM 100.
  • the security module PSM 100 is about a control bus to the aforementioned ASIC 90 and the microprocessor 91 and via the parallel ⁇ C bus at least with the means 91 to 95 of the motherboard 9 and connected to the display unit 89.
  • the control bus carries lines for the signals CE, RD and WR between the security module PSM 100 and the aforementioned ASIC 90.
  • the microprocessor 91 preferably has a pin for an output from the security module PSM 100 interrupt signal i, other connections for the keyboard 88, a
  • the serial interface SI-1 for the connection of the chip card read / write unit 70 and a serial interface SI-2 for the optional connection of a MODEM by means of the MODEM can be used to increase the credit stored in the non-volatile memory of the postal security device PSM 100.
  • the postal security device PSM 100 is surrounded by a secured housing. Before each franking imprint, a hardware settlement is carried out in the postal security module PSM 100. Billing is independent of cost centers.
  • the postal security agent PSM 100 can be designed internally as in the European application EP 789 333 A3 was described in more detail.
  • the ASIC 90 may include a serial interface circuit 98 to a post-stream powered device, a serial interface circuit 96 to the sensors and actuators of the printing device 2, a serial interface circuit 97 to the print control electronics 16 for the printhead 4, and a serial interface circuit 99 to one has the printing device 20 in the post-stream downstream device.
  • a serial interface circuit 98 to a post-stream powered device a serial interface circuit 96 to the sensors and actuators of the printing device 2
  • a serial interface circuit 97 to the print control electronics 16 for the printhead 4 and a serial interface circuit 99 to one has the printing device 20 in the post-stream downstream device.
  • a variant for the peripheral interface can be removed, which suitable for several peripheral devices (stations). It is entitled: Arrangement for communication between a base station and other stations of a mailing machine and their emergency shutdown.
  • the interface circuit 96 coupled to the machine base interface circuit 14 provides at least one connection to the sensors 6, 7, 17 and to the actuators, such as the drive motor 15 for the roller 11 and a cleaning and sealing station RDS 40 for the ink jet printhead 4 , as well as to the label dispenser 50 in the machine base.
  • the basic arrangement and the interaction between the inkjet printhead 4 and the RDS 40 are the DE 197 26 642 C2 removable, entitled: Arrangement for positioning an ink jet printhead and a cleaning and sealing device.
  • One of the arranged in the guide plate 20 sensors 7, 17 is the sensor 17 and is used to prepare the pressure release during letter transport.
  • the sensor 7 is used for initial letter recognition for the purpose of triggering the letter transport.
  • the transport device consists of a conveyor belt 10 and two rollers 11,11 '.
  • One of the rollers is equipped with a motor 15 drive roller 11, another is the follower tension roller 11 '.
  • the drive roller 11 is designed as a toothed roller, according to the conveyor belt 10 is designed as a toothed belt, which ensures the unambiguous power transmission.
  • An encoder 5, 6 is coupled to one of the rollers 11, 11 '.
  • the drive roller 11 is firmly seated with an incremental encoder 5 on an axis.
  • the incremental encoder 5 is designed for example as a slotted disk, which cooperates with a light barrier 6, and outputs via the line 19 an encoder signal to the motherboard 9 from.
  • the individual printing elements of the print head are connected within its housing with a print head electronics and that the print head for a purely electronic pressure can be controlled.
  • the pressure control is based on the path control, whereby the selected stamp offset is taken into account, which is entered by keyboard 88 or if necessary by chip card and stored in memory NVM 94 non-volatile.
  • a planned imprint thus results from stamp offset (without printing), the franking print image and possibly further print images for advertising clichés, shipping information (optional prints) and additional editable messages.
  • the nonvolatile memory NVM 94 has a plurality of memory areas. among them are those that non-volatile store the charged postage fee tables.
  • the smart card write / read unit 70 consists of an associated mechanical support for the microprocessor card and contact unit 74. The latter allows a secure mechanical support of the smart card in the read position and clear signaling of reaching the reading position of the smart card in the contacting unit.
  • the microprocessor card with the microprocessor 75 has a programmed read capability for all types of memory cards or smart cards.
  • the interface to the franking machine is a serial interface in accordance with the RS232 standard.
  • the data transfer rate is min. 1.2 K baud.
  • the power supply is switched on by means of a switch 71 connected to the mainboard. After the power supply has been switched on, a self-test function with a ready message takes place.
  • FIG. 3 is a perspective view of the postage meter from behind.
  • the franking machine consists of a meter 1 and a base 2.
  • the latter is equipped with a smart card write / read unit 70, which is arranged behind the guide plate 20 and accessible from the housing upper edge 22.
  • a chip card 49 is inserted from top to bottom in the insertion slot 72.
  • a supplied standing on the edge letter 3, which rests with its surface to be printed on the guide plate is then printed according to the input data with a franking stamp 31.
  • the letter feeding opening is bounded laterally by a transparent plate 21 and the guide plate 20.
  • the status display of the security module 100 inserted on the motherboard 9 of the meter 1 is visible from the outside through an opening 109.
  • the FIG. 4 shows a block diagram of the postal security module PSM 100 in a preferred variant.
  • the negative pole of the battery 134 is connected to ground and a pin P23 of the contact group 102.
  • the positive pole of the battery 134 is connected to the one input of the voltage changeover switch 180 via the line 193, and the system voltage leading line 191 is connected to the other input of the voltage changeover switch 180.
  • battery 134 is the type SL-389 / P for a lifetime up to 3.5 years or the type SL-386 / P for a lifetime up to 6 years with a maximum power consumption by the PSM 100 is suitable as a voltage switch 180, a commercial circuit of the type ADM 8693ARN be used.
  • the output of the voltage changeover switch 180 is connected via the line 136 to the battery monitoring unit 12 and the detection unit 13.
  • the battery monitoring unit 12 and the detection unit 13 communicate with the pins 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the processor 120 via the lines 135, 164 and 137, 139 in communication.
  • the output of the voltage changeover switch 180 is also connected via the line 136 to the supply input of a first memory SRAM, which becomes the non-volatile memory NVRAM of the first technology by the existing battery 134.
  • the security module communicates with the postage meter via the system bus 115, 117, 118.
  • the processor 120 may communicate via the system bus and a modem 83 in communication with a remote data center.
  • the billing is performed by the ASIC 150 and checked by the processor 120.
  • the postal billing data is stored in non-volatile memory of different technology.
  • the system voltage is applied to the supply input of a second memory NV-RAM 114.
  • the latter is a non-volatile memory NVRAM of a second technology, (SHADOW-RAM).
  • This second technology preferably comprises a RAM and an EEPROM, the latter automatically assuming the data contents in the event of system voltage failure.
  • the NVRAM 114 of the second technology is connected to the corresponding address and data inputs of the ASIC 150 via an internal address and data bus 112, 113.
  • the ASIC 150 contains at least one hardware abort unit for the calculation of the postal data to be stored.
  • Programmable Array Logic (PAL) 160 accommodates access logic to ASIC 150.
  • the ASIC 150 is controlled by the PAL 160 logic.
  • An address and control bus 117, 115 from the motherboard 9 is connected to corresponding pins of the PAL 160 logic and the PAL 160 generates at least a control signal for the ASIC 150 and a control signal 119 for the program memory FLASH 128.
  • the processor 120 executes a program stored in the FLASH 128.
  • Processor 120, FLASH 28, ASIC 150, and PAL 160 are interconnected via a module-internal system bus that includes lines 110, 11, 12, 126, 119 for data, address, and control signals.
  • the processor 120 of the security module 100 is connected via a module-internal data bus 126 to a FLASH 128 and to the ASIC 150.
  • the FLASH 128 is supplied with system voltage Us +. For example, it is a 128 Kbyte FLASH memory type AM29F010-45EC.
  • the ASIC 150 of the postal security module 100 supplies addresses 0 to 7 to the corresponding address inputs of the FLASH 128 via a module-internal address bus 110.
  • the processor 120 of the security module 100 delivers the addresses 8 to 15 to the corresponding address inputs of the FLASH 128 via an internal address bus 111
  • the ASIC 150 of the security module 100 is connected via the contact group 101 of the interface 8 to the data bus 118, to the address bus 117 and to the control bus 115 of the motherboard 9 in communication connection.
  • the processor 120 has memory 122, 124 to which an operating voltage Ub + from a voltage monitoring unit 12 is supplied via the line 138.
  • a real-time clock RTC 122 and the memory RAM 124 are supplied by an operating voltage via the line 138.
  • the voltage monitor unit (Battery Observer) 12 also provides a status signal 164 and responds to a control signal 135.
  • the voltage selector 180 as output voltage on the line 136 for the battery observer 12 and memory 116, passes that of its input voltages as a supply voltage which is higher than the other one , Due to the possibility of automatically feeding the described circuit as a function of the magnitude of the voltages Us + and Ub + with the larger of the two, during normal operation the battery 134 can be exchanged without loss of data.
  • the battery 134 of the security module 100 feeds in the rest periods outside normal operation in the aforementioned manner the real-time clock (RTC) 122 with date and / or time registers and / or the static RAM (SRAM) 124, which holds security-relevant data. If the voltage of the battery drops below a certain limit during battery operation, the voltage monitoring unit 12 connects the feed point for the RTC and SRAM to ground until reset. The voltage at the RTC and SRAM is then at 0V. As a result, the SRAM 124, which contains eg important cryptographic keys, is deleted very quickly. At the same time also the registers the RTC 122 is cleared and the current time and date are lost. This action prevents a potential attacker from stopping the postage meter internal clock 122 by manipulating the battery voltage without losing any security related data. This prevents the attacker from bypassing security measures such as long-time watchdogs.
  • RTC real-time clock
  • SRAM static RAM
  • the RESET unit 130 is connected via the line 131 to the pin 3 of the processor 120 and to a pin of the ASIC 150.
  • the processor 120 and the ASIC 150 are reset by a reset generation in the RESET unit 130 when the supply voltage drops.
  • the described circuit changes into a self-holding state in which it remains even when subsequently increasing the voltage.
  • the processor can query the state of the circuit (status signal) and thus and / or via the evaluation of the contents of the erased memory, conclude that the battery voltage has in the meantime fallen below a certain value.
  • the processor may reset the monitor circuit, i. "make sharp.
  • the unplugged detection unit 13 has to measure the input voltage line 192, which is connected via the plug of the security module and interface 8, preferably via a socket on the motherboard 9 of the postage meter to ground. This measurement is used for static monitoring of the arrangement and forms the basis for monitoring at a first stage. It is contemplated that the unplugged detection unit 13 comprises resettable latching means, the latching being triggered when the voltage level on a sense voltage line 192 deviates from a predetermined potential.
  • the evaluation logic includes the processor 120 connected to the other functional units, which is programmed to detect and change the respective state of the security module 100. The state of latching can be queried via the line 139 from the processor 120 of the security module 100.
  • the measuring voltage potential on the Line 192 corresponds to ground potential if security module 100 is properly inserted.
  • On line 139 is operating voltage potential. Ground voltage potential is present on the line 139 when the security module 100 is unplugged.
  • the processor 120 has a fifth pin 5, to which the line 139 is connected in order to query the state of the unplugged detection unit 13, whether it is switched to ground potential with latching. In order to reset the state of latching of the unplugged detection unit 13 via the line 137, the processor 120 has a fourth pin 4.
  • a current loop 18 is provided which also connects the pins 6 and 7 of the processor 120 via the plug of the security module and via the socket on the motherboard 9 of the postage meter machine.
  • the lines on the pins 6 and 7 of the processor 120 are closed only to a current loop 18 at a plugged into the motherboard 9 PSM 100. This loop forms the basis for a dynamic monitoring of the plugged-in safety module on a second level.
  • the processor 120 internally has a processing unit CPU 121, a real time clock RTC 122, a RAM unit 124, and an input / output unit 125.
  • the processor 120 is equipped with pins 8, 9 for outputting at least one signal for signaling the state of the security module 100.
  • I / O ports of the input / output unit 125 to which module-internal signaling means are connected, for example, colored light emitting diode LED's 107, 108, which signal the state of the security module 100.
  • the safety modules can assume different states in their life cycle. So, for example, to detect whether the module contains valid cryptographic keys. Furthermore, it is also important to distinguish whether the module is working or is defective. The exact type and number of module states depends on the implemented functions in the module and on the implementation.
  • the unplugged detection unit 13 comprises a voltage divider consisting of a series circuit of resistors 1310, 1312, 1314 and is placed between a tapped by a capacitor 1371 supply voltage potential and a Meßwoodspotential on the line 192.
  • the circuit is supplied via line 136 with the system or battery voltage.
  • the respective supply voltage from the line 136 passes through a diode 1369 to the capacitor 1371 of the circuit.
  • an inverter 1320, 1398 On the output side of the circuit.
  • the transistor 1320 of the inverter In the normal state, the transistor 1320 of the inverter is disabled and the supply voltage is effective via the resistor 1398 on the line 139, which therefore logic '1', ie H level in the normal state.
  • An L level on line 139 is advantageous as a status signal for unplug because then no current flows into pin 5 of processor 120, increasing battery life.
  • the diode 1369 preferably in conjunction with an electrolytic capacitor 1371, ensures that the circuit upstream of the inverter is supplied with a voltage over a relatively long period of time (> 2 sec), in which its function is ensured, even though the voltage on the line 136 is already high was turned off.
  • the voltage divider 1310, 1312, 1314 has a tap 1304 to which a capacitor 1306 and the noninverting input of a comparator 1300 are connected.
  • the inverting input of the comparator 1300 is connected to a reference voltage source 1302.
  • the output of the comparator 1300 is connected on the one hand via the negator 1324.1398 to the line 139 and on the other hand to the control input of a switching means 1322 for latching.
  • the switching means 1322 is connected in parallel with the resistor 1310 of the voltage divider, and the latching switching means 1316 is connected between the tap 1304 and ground.
  • the tap 1304 of the voltage divider is at the junction of the resistors 1312 and 1314.
  • the capacitor 1306 connected between the tap 1304 and ground prevents vibrations.
  • the voltage at tap 1304 of the voltage divider is compared in comparator 1300 with the reference voltage of source 1302. If the voltage to be compared at tap 1304 is less than the reference voltage of source 1302, then the comparator output remains at L level and transistor 1320 of the inverter is disabled. As a result, the line 139 now receives operating voltage potential and the status signal leads logically '1'.
  • the voltage divider is dimensioned so that at ground potential on the line 192, the tap 1304 carries a voltage which safely below the switching threshold of the comparator 1300 is located.
  • the connection is interrupted and the line 192 is no longer connected to ground, because the security module 100 has been detached from the socket on the motherboard 9 or interface unit 8 of the franking machine, the voltage at the tap 1304 is pulled over the voltage of the reference voltage source 1302 and the Comparator 1300 switches over.
  • the comparator output is switched to H level, and thus the transistor 1320 is turned on.
  • the line 139 is connected to ground potential and the status signal logic '0.
  • a transistor 1322 which is connected in parallel with the resistor 1310 of the voltage divider, a self-holding circuit of the unplugged detection unit 13 is realized.
  • the control input of transistor 1322 is switched to the H level by the comparator output.
  • the transistor 1322 turns on and bridges the resistor 1310.
  • the voltage divider is formed only by the resistors 1312 and 1314.
  • the switching threshold is increased so much that the comparator remains in the switched state when the line 192 again ground potential, because the security module was plugged again.
  • the state of the circuit can be queried via the signal on line 139 from the processor 120.
  • the unplugged detection unit 13 as circuit means comprises a line 137 and a latching resetting means 1316, the reset being triggerable by the processor 120 via a signal on the line 137.
  • the processor 120 can at any time via a user circuit ASIC 150, via a first contact group 101, via a system bus of the controller 1 and for example via the microprocessor 91 via modem 83 to contact a remote data center, which checks the billing data and optionally other data to the Processor 120 transmitted.
  • the user circuit ASIC 150 of the security module 100 is connected to the processor 120 via a module-internal data bus 126.
  • the processor 120 may reset the untagged detection unit if reinitialization could be successfully completed using the transmitted data.
  • the transistor 1316 is switched through via the reset signal on the line 137 and thus the voltage at the tap 1304 below the reference voltage of Source 1302 and disable transistors 1320 and 1322. When transistor 1322 is normally off, resistors 1310 and 1312 in series form the upper part of the above voltage divider and the switching threshold is lowered back to the original state.
  • the FIG. 6 shows the mechanical structure of the safety module in side view.
  • the security module is designed as a multi-chip module, that is, a plurality of functional units are interconnected on a printed circuit board 106.
  • the security module 100 is potted with a hard potting compound 105, wherein the battery 134 of the security module 100 is arranged outside of the potting compound 105 on a printed circuit board 106 interchangeable. For example, it is potted with a potting material 105 that signal means 107, 108 protrude from the potting material at a first location and that the circuit board 106 protrudes laterally with the inserted battery 134 a second location.
  • the printed circuit board 106 also has battery contact terminals 103 and 104 for connecting the poles of the battery 134, preferably on the component side above the printed circuit board 106. It is envisaged that for plugging the postal security module PSM 100 on the main board of the meter 1, the contact groups 101 and 102nd are arranged below the circuit board 106 (trace side) of the security module 100.
  • the user circuit ASIC 150 is via the first contact group 101 - in a manner not shown - in communication with the system bus of a control device 1 and the second contact group 102 serves to supply the security module 100 with the system voltage.
  • the security module is plugged onto the motherboard, then it is preferably arranged within the meter housing in such a way that the signal means 107, 108 near an opening 109 or projects into this.
  • the meter housing is thus advantageously designed so that the user can still see the status of the security module from the outside.
  • the two light emitting diodes 107 and 108 of the signal means are controlled via two output signals of the I / O ports to the pin 8, 9 of the processor 120. Both LEDs are housed in a common component housing (Bicolorleuchtdiode), which is why the dimensions or the diameter of the opening can remain relatively small and is of the order of the signal means. In principle, three different colors can be displayed (red, green, orange), of which only two are used (red and orange) green). To distinguish the state, the LEDs are also used flashing, so that 5 different state groups can be distinguished, which are characterized by the following LED states: LED off, red LED flashing, red LED, green flashing LED, green LED.
  • FIG. 7 is a plan view of the postal security module shown.
  • FIGS. 8a or 8b show a view of the security module respectively from the right and from the left.
  • the location of the contact groups 101 and 102 below the printed circuit board 106 is from the FIGS. 8a and 8b combined with FIG. 6 clear.
  • the postal device in particular a franking machine
  • the security module can also have a different design, which makes it possible, for example, it can be plugged onto the motherboard of a personal computer, which drives a commercial printer as a PC meter.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Power Sources (AREA)

Claims (12)

  1. Procédé destiné à protéger un module de sécurité avec les étapes suivantes:
    ● Serveillance de l'utilisation appropriée du module de sécurité (100) à l'aide d'une première (120), d'une deuxième (12) et d'une troisième unité fonctionnelle (13),
    ● Effacement des données sensibles dans le module de sécurité en raison d'un usage inapproprié ou d'un remplacement du module de sécurité (100) au moins à l'aide de la deuxième unité fonctionnelle (12),
    ● Blocage de la fonctionnalité du module de sécurité (100) à l'aide de la troisième unité fonctionnelle (13) durant un remplacement du module de sécurité (100)
    ● Réinitialisation du module de sécurité (100) à l'aide de la première unité fonctionnelle (120) de données sensibles préalablement effacées après un remplacement approprié du module de sécurité (100),
    ● Remise en service du module de sécurité (100) en déconnectant les deuxième (12) et troisième (13) unités fonctionnelles du module de sécurité (100).
  2. Procédé, selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que la réinitialisation en liaison avec une communication a lieu à l'aide d'une centrale de données éloignée de la première unité fonctionnelle après qu'une détection dynamique ait été effectuée favorablement, à savoir si le module de sécurité (100) est bien enfiché, des informations étant échangées, dont la transmission parfaite apporte la preuve de l'encastrement adéquat du module de sécurité (100), durant la détection via une liaison opérative établie entre la première unité fonctionnelle (120) et une boucle de courant (18) d'une unité interface (8), et en ce que la déconnexion des deuxième (12) et troisième (13) unités fonctionnelles du module de sécurité s'effectue par leur réinitialisation, la première unité fonctionnelle étant un microprocesseur (120), la deuxième unité fonctionnelle une unité de surveillance de tension (12) avec un auto-maintien réinitialisable et la troisième unité fonctionnelle étant un circuit de détection non enfiché (13) avec également un auto-maintien réinitialisable.
  3. Disposition destinée à effectuer le procédé selon la revendication 1 avec un module de sécurité qui est équipé d'une logique (120, 150, 160), de détecteurs avec une batterie (134) et des moyens d'alimentation avec une tension de système et d'un commutateur de tension (180), qui est relié par une première ligne (136) à une deuxième unité fonctionnelle réalisée sous forme d'une unité de détection non enfichée (12), laquelle produit une tension de régime sur une mémoire (122, 124) par une deuxième ligne (138), caractérisée en ce qu'une troisième unité fonctionnelle, réalisée sous forme d'une unité de détection non enfichée (13), présente des moyens de circuit (1310, 1316, 1322, 1324) pour un auto-maintien réinitialisable, ledit auto-maintien étant déclenché lorsque le niveau de tension s'écarte d'un potentiel prédéterminé sur une quatrième ligne de tension de mesure (192), et en ce que la logique comprend un processeur réalisé sous forme d'une première unité fonctionnelle (120), laquelle est reliée aux autres unités fonctionnelles et laquelle est programmée pour fixer et changer les états respectifs du module de sécurité (100).
  4. Disposition, selon la revendication 3, caractérisée en ce que l'unité de détection non enfichée (13) présente, en tant que moyen de circuit, une troisième ligne (137) et un dispositif de commutation (1316) pour une réinitialisation de l'auto-maintien, la réinitialisation du processeur (120) pouvant être déclenchée par un signal sur la troisième ligne (137).
  5. Disposition, selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 4, caractérisée en ce que l'unité de détection non enfichée (13) présente un diviseur de tension, qui comprend un couplage en série de résistances (1310, 1312, 1314) et est raccordé à une quatrième ligne (192) entre un potentiel de tension d'alimentation d'un condensateur (1371) pouvant être prélevé et un potentiel de tension de mesure, la tension d'alimentation étant amenée de la première ligne (136) par une diode (1369) sur le condensateur (1371), en ce que le diviseur de tension (1310, 1312, 1314) présente une prise (1304), à laquelle sont connectés un condensateur (1306) et une entrée n'effectuant pas d'inversion d'un comparateur (1300), en ce que ladite entrée n'effectuant pas d'inversion du comparateur (1300) est reliée à une source de tension de référence (1302), en ce que la sortie du comparateur (1300) est reliée d'une part par un négateur (1324, 1398) à une cinquième ligne (139), et d'autre part à l'entrée de commande d'un dispositif de commutation (1322) pour l'auto-maintien, le dispositif de commutation (1322) étant branché en parallèle pour la résistance (1310) du diviseur de tension, et en ce que le dispositif de commutation (1316) est branché entre la prise (1304) et la masse en vue de la réinitialisation de l'auto-maintien.
  6. Disposition, selon la revendication 5, caractérisée en ce que l'état de l'auto-maintien peut être interrogé du processeur (120) du module de sécurité (100) via la cinquième ligne (139).
  7. Disposition, selon la revendication 6, caractérisée en ce que le potentiel de tension de mesure sur la quatrième ligne (192) correspond au potentiel de masse et le potentiel de tension sur la cinquième ligne (139) au potentiel de tension de régime si le module de sécurité (100) est enfiché correctement, et en ce que sinon le potentiel de masse est appliqué sur la cinquième ligne (139) si le module de sécurité (100) n'est pas enfiché.
  8. Disposition, selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 7, caractérisée en ce que le processeur (120) présente des mémoires (122, 124), auxquelles est amenée une tension de service Ub+ d'une unité de surveillance de tension (12) via la deuxième ligne (138), en ce que le processeur (120) est alimenté en tension de système Us+ et présente un quatrième raccord (Pin 4), afin de réinitialiser l'état de l'auto-maintien de l'unité de détection non enfichée (13) par la troisième ligne (137), et présente un cinquième raccord (Pin 5), auquel est raccordée la cinquième ligne (139), afin d'interroger l'état de l'unité de détection non enfichée (13).
  9. Disposition selon la revendication 8, caractérisée en ce que le module de sécurité (100) présente un circuit de commutation utilisateur ASIC (150) et en ce que le processeur (120) est relié via un bus de données à l'intérieur du module (126) au circuit de commutation utilisateur ASIC (150), ce dernier restant en liaison de communication avec le bus de systèmes d'un dispositif de commande (1) via un premier groupe de contact (101).
  10. Disposition selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 9, caractérisée en ce que le module de sécurité (100) est scellé avec une masse de coulage (105) dure, en ce que la batterie (134) du module de sécurité (100) est disposée remplaçable en dehors de la masse de coulage (105) sur une plaquette (106), en ce que ladite plaquette (106) présente des bornes de contact de batterie (103 et 104) pour le raccord du pôle de la batterie (134) et un second groupe de contact (102) pour l'alimentation en tension de système du module de sécurité (100), et en ce qu'au moins un des groupes de contact (101, 102) soit formé en vue d'une surveillance statique et dynamique de l'état de connexion du module de sécurité (100).
  11. Disposition, selon la revendication 10, caractérisée en ce que le processeur (120) présente des raccords (Pins 6, 7) en vue d'une surveillance dynamique de l'état de connexion du module de sécurité, auxquels les lignes sont connectées, lesquelles sont reliées à une boucle de courant (18) si le module de sécurité (100) n'est pas enfiché.
  12. Disposition, selon l'une quelconque des revendications 3 à 11, caractérisée en ce que le processeur (120) du module de sécurité (100) est équipé de raccords (Pins 8, 9) en vue d'émettre au moins un signal pour la signalisation de l'état du module de sécurité (100).
EP00250064A 1999-03-12 2000-02-25 Procédé de protection d'un module de sécurité et ensemble pour mettre en oeuvre ledit procédé Expired - Lifetime EP1035517B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19912781A DE19912781A1 (de) 1999-03-12 1999-03-12 Verfahren zum Schutz eines Sicherheitsmoduls und Anordnung zur Durchführung des Verfahrens
DE19912781 1999-03-12

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EP1035517A2 EP1035517A2 (fr) 2000-09-13
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EP1035517B1 true EP1035517B1 (fr) 2008-08-20

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US (1) US6952777B1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1035517B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN1156801C (fr)
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DE (2) DE19912781A1 (fr)

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Publication number Publication date
EP1035517A3 (fr) 2000-12-20
CN1156801C (zh) 2004-07-07
EP1035517A2 (fr) 2000-09-13
CN1276579A (zh) 2000-12-13
US6952777B1 (en) 2005-10-04
DE19912781A1 (de) 2000-11-23
DE50015314D1 (de) 2008-10-02
AU2081100A (en) 2000-09-14

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