EP1031205A1 - Procede d'identification de traitres ayant livre des donnees privees - Google Patents
Procede d'identification de traitres ayant livre des donnees priveesInfo
- Publication number
- EP1031205A1 EP1031205A1 EP98961135A EP98961135A EP1031205A1 EP 1031205 A1 EP1031205 A1 EP 1031205A1 EP 98961135 A EP98961135 A EP 98961135A EP 98961135 A EP98961135 A EP 98961135A EP 1031205 A1 EP1031205 A1 EP 1031205A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- finite
- traitor
- traitors
- hyperplane
- key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
- G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
- G09C5/00—Ciphering apparatus or methods not provided for in the preceding groups, e.g. involving the concealment or deformation of graphic data such as designs, written or printed messages
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04L2209/606—Traitor tracing
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method according to the preamble of claim 1.
- a key point of the scheme described in this article is that the session key s used to encrypt the data is divided into t subkeys s, ..., s. Only with knowledge of all t parts can the session key S be reconstructed.
- Each of these sub-keys s lf . , , , s t is then encrypted with each encryption key from a set of encryption keys PK, and the entirety of these cryptograms is presented to the data as a so-called "access block".
- Each authorized subscriber U receives a subset of the encryption keys PK (U) ⁇ zPK, which enables him to calculate all subkeys s lf ..., s t .
- the task is to develop a method for identifying traitors of proprietary data, which enables and without doubt the identification of at least one traitor U (i.e. an authorized subscriber U who has unauthorizedly passed on one of his subkeys to a third person) j
- the method according to the invention is also based on the fact that the data to be encrypted are encrypted with a session key S.
- the session key S is divided into t partial keys s 1 , ... s t , all of which are required for the reconstruction of the session key S.
- Encryption key PK encrypted The entirety of these cryptograms is placed in front of the data to be encrypted as an access block.
- the method according to the invention includes a search scheme which differs from the search scheme of the method described above by its deterministic construction.
- Encryption key PK to the authorized subscriber U according to geometric structures and methods of finite geometry.
- PK U
- the authorized subscribers U are each represented as a point in a finite affine level.
- a finite affine level can be thought of as a Euclidean (i.e. "normal") level, which only contains a number of points.
- Such a finite affine plane is also called AG (2, q), where the number 2 is the dimension of a plane and the parameter q specifies the number of points that lie on a straight line in the plane.
- level q contains 2 points.
- Such levels can be constructed as a 2-dimensional vector space over the finite field GF (q), ie they exist for all prime powers q.
- GF finite field
- Each parallel family of the finite affine plane AG (2, q) contains q lines. In order to obtain a k-resilient procedure, the
- Session key (S) in t k 2 + 1 partial key s ⁇ r s. divided up. Now k 2 - + ⁇ 1 parallel pairs are selected. Each of the q (k 2 + 1) lines in these
- An encryption key from PK is assigned to parallel sets, and the partial key s is encrypted with all encryption keys belonging to the i-th parallel set. Each authorized subscriber U receives exactly those
- the authorized subscriber 1 receives the encryption keys k : and k 4 here , since the two straight lines which are assigned to these encryption keys go through his point.
- the scheme according to Fig. 1 is resilient, because the authorized subscriber U has at most one encryption key k ⁇ in common with every other authorized subscriber U, so his set of encryption keys does not cover any other set of encryption keys. If the authorized participant u were a traitor, he would have to have both of them
- the method according to the invention is also suitable for proving the unauthorized transfer of encryption keys by at most k authorized subscribers, that is, for proving a traitor in a coalition of at most k traitors.
- At least one of the traitors t / must donate at least k + 1 encryption keys so that a complete set of k 2 + 1 encryption keys for the pirate decoder come together. (Pigeon loft principle: if you distribute k 2 + 1 pigeons to just k beats, at least one k + 1 pigeon must sit in at least one loft)
- a set of (d-1) k 2 + 1 subspaces of dimension d-2 is selected, which have the property that at most d-1 of these subspaces intersect at a common point on the hyperplane H.
- the set of these subspaces is denoted by E.
- E can be constructed by considering a rational norm curve in the hyperplane H dual to the hyperplane H. You get H from H (and vice versa) if you get the
- a rational norm curve R of H can be considered as homogeneous coordinates
- R ⁇ (l, t, t:, ..., t d - '')
- TGGF (q) ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ 0,0,0, ..., 0,1 ⁇ are given.
- the points of R in H have the property that at most d-1 of them lie in a common hyperplane (of H).
- the points from R become hyperplanes of a set R, which have the properties that at most d-1 of these hyperplanes intersect in a common point.
- the set E is obtained by selecting (d-1) k 2 + 1 elements from R.
- Each authorized subscriber u is now assigned a point in in the finite projective space PG (d, q) that is not in the hyperplane H (after removing the hyperplane H, all of these points are in the finite affine space AG (d, q).
- PG finite projective space
- Each authorized subscriber U receives an encryption key if and only if the associated hyperplane H 'passes through its point.
- a traitor then knows at least one encryption key from an innocent authorized person
- the encryption key of the traitor £ / is determined by how many elements of the set E meet the straight line. This can be a maximum of d-1, since at most d-1 elements of E are at the intersection of
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
L'objectif de l'invention est de développer un procédé d'identification de traîtres ayant livré des données privées, qui permettent une identification non équivoque d'au moins un traître, c'est-à-dire d'un abonné autorisé (U) qui a transmis, de façon non autorisée, une de ses clefs partielles à une tiers personne. Selon l'invention, l'attribution des clefs de cryptage à un abonné autorisé (U) se fait selon des structures géométriques et des procédés de géométrie finie, de sorte que la caractéristique de résilience k nécessaire pour l'identification d'un traître (U) est garantie. L'identification sans équivoque d'au moins un traître (U) se fait au moyen d'un algorithme de recherche de traître. Le procédé selon l'invention convient aussi bien pour l'identification d'un traître individuel (U) que pour l'identification d'une coalition de k traîtres (U).
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19750779A DE19750779C1 (de) | 1997-11-10 | 1997-11-10 | Verfahren zum Identifizieren von Verrätern proprietärer Daten |
DE19750779 | 1997-11-10 | ||
PCT/EP1998/007045 WO1999025090A1 (fr) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-04 | Procede d'identification de traitres ayant livre des donnees privees |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1031205A1 true EP1031205A1 (fr) | 2000-08-30 |
Family
ID=7848908
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP98961135A Ceased EP1031205A1 (fr) | 1997-11-10 | 1998-11-04 | Procede d'identification de traitres ayant livre des donnees privees |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6760445B1 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP1031205A1 (fr) |
JP (1) | JP2001523018A (fr) |
AU (1) | AU1666799A (fr) |
DE (1) | DE19750779C1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO1999025090A1 (fr) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7746430B2 (en) | 2005-07-08 | 2010-06-29 | Fujitsu Limited | Reflective liquid crystal display device of lamination type wherein the difference in orientation regulating force results whether or not the orientation film is present |
Families Citing this family (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CA2318939C (fr) * | 1997-12-10 | 2004-05-11 | Thomson Licensing S.A. | Systeme d'acces conditionnel pour recepteurs numeriques |
JP3917507B2 (ja) * | 2002-01-28 | 2007-05-23 | 株式会社東芝 | コンテンツ提供側システム、ユーザ側システム、追跡システム、コンテンツ提供方法、暗号化コンテンツ復号方法、不正ユーザ特定方法、暗号化装置、復号装置及びプログラム |
FR2862149A1 (fr) | 2003-11-06 | 2005-05-13 | France Telecom | Procede de controle automatique des fraudes dans un systeme de transactions electroniques |
US8176568B2 (en) * | 2005-12-30 | 2012-05-08 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tracing traitor coalitions and preventing piracy of digital content in a broadcast encryption system |
US7970141B2 (en) * | 2006-09-13 | 2011-06-28 | The Regents Of The University Of California | Method and apparatus for tracing the source of decryption keys used by a decoder |
US8824685B2 (en) * | 2007-10-15 | 2014-09-02 | Sony Corporation | Method for detection of a hacked decoder |
US8108928B2 (en) * | 2008-06-20 | 2012-01-31 | International Business Machines Corporation | Adaptive traitor tracing |
US8122501B2 (en) * | 2008-06-20 | 2012-02-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Traitor detection for multilevel assignment |
US8422684B2 (en) * | 2008-08-15 | 2013-04-16 | International Business Machines Corporation | Security classes in a media key block |
US8571209B2 (en) | 2009-01-19 | 2013-10-29 | International Business Machines | Recording keys in a broadcast-encryption-based system |
US11615395B2 (en) * | 2019-12-23 | 2023-03-28 | Capital One Services, Llc | Authentication for third party digital wallet provisioning |
US11362816B2 (en) * | 2020-09-11 | 2022-06-14 | Seagate Technology Llc | Layered secret sharing with flexible access structures |
US11316673B2 (en) * | 2020-09-11 | 2022-04-26 | Seagate Technology Llc | Privacy preserving secret sharing from novel combinatorial objects |
Family Cites Families (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
IE56668B1 (en) * | 1984-06-15 | 1991-10-23 | Pelling Nicholas John M | An encoder/decoder |
US6549638B2 (en) * | 1998-11-03 | 2003-04-15 | Digimarc Corporation | Methods for evidencing illicit use of a computer system or device |
US6557103B1 (en) * | 1998-04-13 | 2003-04-29 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Army | Spread spectrum image steganography |
US6289455B1 (en) * | 1999-09-02 | 2001-09-11 | Crypotography Research, Inc. | Method and apparatus for preventing piracy of digital content |
-
1997
- 1997-11-10 DE DE19750779A patent/DE19750779C1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
1998
- 1998-11-04 US US09/554,177 patent/US6760445B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-11-04 EP EP98961135A patent/EP1031205A1/fr not_active Ceased
- 1998-11-04 AU AU16667/99A patent/AU1666799A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1998-11-04 WO PCT/EP1998/007045 patent/WO1999025090A1/fr not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1998-11-04 JP JP2000519971A patent/JP2001523018A/ja active Pending
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO9925090A1 * |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7746430B2 (en) | 2005-07-08 | 2010-06-29 | Fujitsu Limited | Reflective liquid crystal display device of lamination type wherein the difference in orientation regulating force results whether or not the orientation film is present |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE19750779C1 (de) | 1999-01-14 |
JP2001523018A (ja) | 2001-11-20 |
WO1999025090A1 (fr) | 1999-05-20 |
AU1666799A (en) | 1999-05-31 |
US6760445B1 (en) | 2004-07-06 |
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Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
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PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20000613 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE |
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RIN1 | Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected) |
Inventor name: UEBERBERG, JOHANNES Inventor name: SCHWENK, JOERG |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20030711 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN REFUSED |
|
18R | Application refused |
Effective date: 20031204 |