EP0824732B1 - Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor - Google Patents

Abstract

An electronic gaming device has one or more housings with at least one result-encryption key stored therein, as well as a portable article adapted for co-operating with the housing and with a set of authenticatable digital game data representative of a game stored therein. The portable article is made to co-operate with the housing. The set of game data is authenticated in the housing and stored in a working memory of the housing so as to authorise the progression of the game in the housing. After completion of at least part of the game, result information dependent on said game is encrypted in the housing by means of at least one result-encryption key, and the encrypted result information is stored in a result memory of the portable article, which then co-operates with a validation station capable of accessing the result-encryption key, whereafter said station verifies the result information.

Description

The invention relates to activation and anti-fraud protection of an electronic game device and the corresponding device.

We currently know different games, including games of chance, allowing a player to win sums of money upon payment of a starting bet. So for example in the game called "Loto" (registered trademark) the player checks a series of figures on a ticket which he has validated with an organization specialist by paying a price corresponding to the initial bet. A subsequent draw is carried out under control in a place chosen and, players in possession of a winning ticket can withdraw their earnings from a paying agency.

Other games include getting a ticket and scratching this one in designated places so as to discover information allowing to define if the ticket in question is winning or losing.

Compared to these classic games requiring a paper support, it has already been envisaged to propose, in the French patent n ° 92 13 239, a radically different concept of game device hazard.

According to this concept, there is a portable case intended for allow a player to perform one or more rounds of chance, success or failure in said tests conditioning a score or a gain level according to predetermined game rules. This housing then also constitutes the transaction element for the payment of the gain and includes all the elements necessary for the verification of it.

However, by design and especially for security reasons, each autonomous box can only be used one one and only time. This naturally poses an economic problem and ecological due to this unitary use combined with a estimated distribution of several tens of millions of units per month.

Besides the fact that this type of box can only be used only once, it is also associated with a unique type of game. However, the current gambling market shows that the lifespan of a type is usually short and these need to be renewed often which then leads the manufacturer of the case to design in constantly new external forms for the product as well as new software interfaces.

The invention aims to provide a solution to these problems.

An object of the invention is to propose a device game electronics capable of being used multiple times with possibly different types of play.

A very important problem inherent in such devices game lies in anti-fraud security, especially when certain types of play are associated with significant payouts.

The invention therefore aims to integrate this notion of security in a multi-application and multi-use game device.

The invention, according to claim 1, therefore firstly proposes an activation method and fraud protection of an electronic gaming device comprising at least one housing, as well as at least one portable object capable of cooperate with the housing. According to this process, we store in the box at least one encryption-result key and we stores a set of digital game data in the portable object authentifiable and representative of a game, the portable object is made to cooperate with the case. We verify within the box the authentication of the data set and we store this set of game data in a memory of work of the case, so as to authorize the progress of the game at level of the housing. Then, after at least part of the game, we encrypt within the box a result information dependent on said game, using at least said encryption-result key. We store this encrypted result information in a portable object result memory. Then, we make the object cooperate portable with a validation station having access to said key encryption-result, said station performing validation processing from at least said encrypted result information and said encryption-result key.

Thus, according to the invention, the digital data is deported game, that is to say the application or the game software, outside the electronic box and we incorporate it into a memory of an object portable which can come in different forms, such as card credit, domino, token, etc.

As for the electronic box, it can be sold a once and be usable multiple times with any portable object containing game software.

According to the invention, it is therefore the portable object which is intended for contain both the digital game data defining the game itself, as well as the result information allowing the player to validate this result so as to eventually touch his gain. In other words, the portable object constitutes here the element of transaction while the case is only used by the player for to play.

The concept of "encryption" must be interpreted very widely as "protection using cryptographic means". However, for the sake of simplification, only the terms encryption, decryption, encryption, decryption will be used in the rest of the text.

Result information that will be encrypted in the case before being transferred to the portable object, naturally depends on the nature of the game. This may for example be binary information from the type "won" or "lost", or even, for example, of a information representative of a gain level.

For security reasons, the dataset game digital stored in the portable object is authenticated from so as to allow verification of its authentication within the housing. Within the meaning of the present invention, the word "authentifiable" must be interpreted in a broad way including for example a storage in "clear" digital game data proper together to an authentication certificate obtained, from this data digital game, by an appropriate algorithm, or even a at least partial encryption of this set, or for example an encryption the authentication certificate.

Verification of data set authentication can be done before, during or after storage in the working memory of the case.

It should also be noted here that, according to the invention, all digital game data is transferred to the working memory of the case (in practice these data are by example read in the portable object then copied into the memory of work of the case) so that the cooperation between the portable object and the case could possibly be removed during the course of the game at the housing.

The invention therefore avoids the use of software means complex that would require the direct operation of the game software the portable object by the processing unit of the case without transfer in the memory of the case. Also, according to an embodiment of the process according to the invention, it is advantageously provided that the assembly of play data from a portable object be read through a serial protocol between the portable object and the case. Which allows minimize the hardware and software resources of the portable object. The game software is operated directly by the processing of the case directly in the working memory thereof.

Generally speaking, the validation processing carried out by the validation station must make it possible to determine and / or check the result information from the contents of the portable object. Indeed only this memorized content must be authentic to authorize a possible payment of a gain.

The validation processing carried out by the validation may include decryption of the result information encrypted and stored in the result memory of the portable object, at using the encryption-result key.

As a variant, this validation processing can be carried out different way. More specifically, we can store in the object portable, together with the encrypted result information, unencrypted result information, that is to say "in the clear". The station then verifies said result information by re-encrypting, using the encryption-result key, the unencrypted result information which is stored in the portable object and comparing this information from result re-encrypted with encrypted and stored result information in the result memory of the portable object.

In order to further increase security, it is advantageously expected that when the authentication of the game dataset of the portable object has been verified and that said assembly has been stored in the memory of the work of the case, any exploitation is prohibited subsequent by the case, of the set of game data of this object portable.

This especially helps prevent a player from training play a type of game, especially when it is actually a game of reflex.

Within the meaning of the present invention, the prohibition of any further exploitation must be understood in a very broad sense meaning for example that either the case can no longer read the whole or he can no longer verify his authentication. In other words, the case will then be unfit for play with this object portable.

The device according to the invention generally comprises several cases and several portable objects. Also, when authentication of the game dataset of one of the objects portable was checked and that said set was stored in the working memory of one of the boxes, we then forbid advantageously any subsequent exploitation by any of the housings, from the game dataset of this portable object.

According to an embodiment of the method according to the invention, we can authenticate the set of stored game data in the portable object by adding a linked authentication certificate unequivocally to digital game data. Verification authentication of the game dataset then involves a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the box and a comparison between the recalculated authentication certificate and the authentication certificate stored in the portable object.

Thus, one can prohibit any further exploitation of a set of game data by altering in the portable object corresponding, at least partially said certificate authentication and / or at least partially the game data proper. We can for this purpose consider modifying arbitrarily the value of some of the certificate bits authentication and / or some of the digital game data. Therefore, if a player tries to replay with the same portable object, the housing processing unit will recalculate a certificate authentication which will differ from the altered authentication certificate, which will prohibit any activation of the game.

Always with the aim of increasing security, in particular by Regarding the payment of possible winnings, we authorize advantageously the storage of the encrypted result information in the portable object that if one has previously prohibited any exploitation of the play data set for this portable object.

According to an embodiment of the method, it is possible to store in the box at least one game encryption key.

Authentication of the set of game data stored in the portable object can then include at least partial encryption of this set of game data, or information related to this data set game (e.g. authentication certificate), using the key encryption-game, and this, before reading by the processing unit of the case, from the game data set of the portable object. The verification of game dataset authentication then includes a decryption within the housing using the key game encryption. In other words, the encrypted transfer of the application, or associated authentication certificate, avoids loading of a fraudulent application inevitably leading to obtaining gain.

We can possibly only encrypt and decrypt only the certificate of authentication.

When an encryption-box key is stored in the box, you can store in the box the encryption-game key that has been previously encrypted using the encryption-box key. this allows further increase security and make it even more difficult the knowledge by a third party of the game encryption key.

The encryption-game key can be common to all the boxes and all portable objects. The encryption-box key is preferably different for each box. The encryption-box key a case is stored in it before storing the key of game encryption, for example during its manufacture. Otherwise, the set of game data for a portable object can be stored in this one, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with a information already at least partially encrypted, using the game encryption. In other words, during the factory production of portable objects, we can for example determine in situ the certificate corresponding authentication, encrypt the latter, and store in the portable object, before dissemination to the public, the game data proper followed by their encrypted authentication certificate.

Generally, the encryption-result key can be the encryption-box key, or the encryption-game key, or else be obtained from a combination of these two keys.

When the encryption-result key is the encryption-game key, any validation station knows this encryption-game key since it is common to all the elements of the device. However, when the encryption-result key is not known in advance by the validation, provision is made for storing in the cooperating portable object with the box, key information which is unequivocally associated with said encryption-result key, the validation station then having access to said encryption-result key by reading said information from key stored in the portable object.

So if for example the encryption-result key is the key to encryption-box, it can be advantageously provided to associate with each case an identifier defining it in a unique way, and thereby identifying the encryption-box key which has been stored in the case. A table of identifiers can for example be stored securely in a central computer to which are linked to all validation stations. The identifier of the case is then stored with the result information encrypted in the portable object. The validation station then having access to the identifier as well as to the lookup table can determine the encryption-result key and decrypt the encrypted result information.

The invention, according to claim 17, also relates to an electronic device According to a general characteristic of the invention, this device electronic game includes at least one housing, at least one object portable and at least one validation station. The portable object contains a game memory containing a data set of authentic and representative game of a game, a memory of result able to contain encrypted result information, a first communication interface able to cooperate with a communication interface communication-box, and a second communication interface able to communicate with a station-communication interface. The case includes a key memory containing at least one key encryption-result, a working memory accessible in writing and in reading, and a processing unit connected to these memories as well as to the communication-box interface. The processing unit is capable, during a cooperation between the communication-box interface and the first communication interface of the object, to check authentication of the game dataset stored in the object and to store said set in the working memory of so as to allow the progress of the game at the housing. Unity is also capable of encrypting a result information dependent on said game, using the encryption-result, and communicate this result information encrypted at the communication-box interface for sound purposes storage in the result memory of the object. The station validation includes means capable of determining said key encryption-result and processing means-station capable of reading the result information encrypted via the communication-station interface, during cooperation between the portable object and the station, and perform validation processing based on at least the information encrypted result and encryption-result key.

In the case where the electronic game device includes several boxes, several portable objects and several stations validation, any portable object is able to cooperate with any of the boxes and with any of the stations of confirmation.

According to one embodiment of the device according to the invention, the first communication interface of the portable object is a serial interface.

Furthermore, and for reasons of economy, it is possible to provide that the portable object has only one and same communication interface capable of cooperating with the interface of communication-box or with the interface of communication-station.

The processing station means may include decryption means-station capable of decrypting information from result encrypted for the purpose of its determination.

As a variant, the housing processing unit is able to also communicate unencrypted result information to the communication-box interface for the purpose of its storage in the object result memory. The treatment facilities are then further able to read the unencrypted result information via the communication-station interface. They then include means of encryption-station capable of encrypting said result information not encrypted using the encryption-result key, as well as means of comparison to compare the encrypted result information recalculated, with encrypted result information stored in the portable object result memory. This comparison allows to verify the result information.

When the authenticated game dataset is associated with an authentication certificate, the means of verification of authentication of this set of game data then comprise preferably certificate calculation means able to recalculate said authentication certificate within the housing, from the set of game data, and means of comparison suitable for compare the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in memory of portable object play.

According to one embodiment of the device, it is possible to provide encryption means capable of at least partially encrypting the set of authenticated game data, or related information to this set of game data (e.g. the certificate authentication), using at least one game encryption key. The key memory of the case is then able to contain this key of game encryption while authentication verification means of the game data set include decryption means connected to the key memory. These encryption means may not encrypt as the authentication certificate.

These encryption means can be incorporated into a manufacturing unit so as to deliver directly a set of game data at least partially encrypted or authentication certification already at least partially encrypted, which will be intended to be stored as is in the object portable. However, it can alternatively be provided that the means of encryption are incorporated into the portable object, especially when it includes a microcontroller containing software encryption means.

Similarly, the fact of providing an "intelligent" portable object, that is to say provided with a central unit for example, also allows incorporate in the portable object means allowing to prohibit any subsequent use of a set of game data from a portable object after a first use. This means, which can be done for example in software, so are for example able to change the value of some of the bits in the set of game data or its authentication certificate.

• la figure 1 représente très schématiquement l'architecture matérielle d'un objet portatif d'un dispositif selon l'invention,
• la figure 2 représente très schématiquement l'architecture matérielle d'un boítier du dispositif selon l'invention,
• la figure 3 représente très schématiquement l'architecture matérielle d'une station de validation du dispositif selon l'invention,
• les figures 4a et 4b illustrent schématiquement un mode de mise en oeuvre du procédé selon l'invention, et
• les figures 5 et 6 illustrent deux variantes de mise en oeuvre du procédé selon l'invention.

Other advantages and characteristics of the invention will appear on examining modes of implementation and embodiment of the invention, in no way limitative, and the appended drawings in which:

• FIG. 1 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a portable object of a device according to the invention,
• FIG. 2 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a housing of the device according to the invention,
• FIG. 3 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a validation station of the device according to the invention,
• FIGS. 4a and 4b schematically illustrate an embodiment of the method according to the invention, and
• Figures 5 and 6 illustrate two alternative embodiments of the method according to the invention.

The device according to the invention comprises several cases LV autonomous electronics, several OB portable objects and several ST validation stations.

As illustrated in FIG. 1, each portable object OB, by example a card of the smart card type, a token, or a module, includes, for example within an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) a microcontroller CPU connected via from a bus to a serial type ESC input / output interface, to a game memory MJ, as well as a result memory MR, such as a register.

As will be seen in more detail below, the game memory MJ, for example a read only memory, is intended to receive a digital game dataset, or game software, representative of a particular type of game.

The MR register is intended to receive a encrypted result information from the BT box after the progress of at least part of the game.

The ESC interface includes means of cooperation with an ESB homologous interface of the BT box (Figure 2) and an interface ESS counterpart to the ST station (Figure 3). These means of cooperation may consist of a mechanical connector or alternatively of means capacitive / inductive, or optical coupling.

As illustrated more particularly in FIG. 2, the electronic structure of the BT portable box is articulated around a UT processing unit, such as a microprocessor or a microcontroller. This UT processing unit is connected by via a bus to a working memory MT, accessible by write and read, for example a random access memory (RAM), to a program memory MM as well as to a standard memory of MC key which is a protected memory which can be a part of the memory MM.

The processing unit is also connected to a screen AF liquid crystal display and a keyboard Cl comprising for example movement control keys in two orthogonal directions. Finally, the processing unit is connected to a ESB communication-box interface able to cooperate with the ESC communication interface, which may for example include a mechanical connector arranged in a housing in which can be inserted the connector of the portable object. The ESB interface includes also serial / parallel conversion means connected to the bus internal of the case.

All of the means of this box is powered by autonomous AL power supplies such as batteries. All or part components of this housing can be made in the form of a Asic.

The working memory MT is dimensioned so as to be able to receive the game application stored in the MJ memory of the object while the memory MM contains the management program internal of the box (management of inputs / outputs, management of the keyboard, the screen, program for loading the application into the memory of job...).

According to the embodiment described with reference to the figure 3, each validation station ST includes a processing block based on a PR processor connected to an input / output interface ESS capable of cooperating with the ESC input / output interface of the object portable. In addition, the station is connected via a appropriate link to a central TB file containing information necessary, as will be seen in more detail below, for the verification of the result information contained in the portable object.

The station's PR processor incorporates software the different functional means necessary for the operation of this one (encryption, decryption, comparison, reading ...).

We will now describe in more detail, referring particularly in FIGS. 4a to 4b, a first mode of implementation work of the method according to the invention.

On a manufacturing site, the set of game data digital JE, forming the game application software, is processed by processing means including a certificate calculation algorithm well known SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) type authentication of the skilled person. The latter may, however, for more than details, refer to publication 180-1 of May 31, 1994 issued by FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards).

These calculation methods determine a certificate CTF authentication from logical functions operating on bits of digital game data (step 1). So for a block of 1 kilobyte of application, the authentication certificate includes example 120 bits.

From a Km game encryption key, common to all portable objects, to all cases and to all stations validation, encryption means, for example using the algorithm Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption CTF authentication certificate (step 2) so as to issue a CTFc encrypted authentication certificate. The digital data of game and the encrypted authentication certificate are then stored in the game memory MJ of the portable object (step 3).

The portable object is then ready to be distributed to the public.

As for the case, we store in the key memory MC of this, for example during its manufacture on site, a key to encryption-box Kf (step 4). The case is then also ready to be released to the public.

A player can get such a box from a station validation of the ST station type. During this operation, we do cooperate the housing and the station via interfaces respective communication so as to read (step 5) the encryption-box key Kf stored in the key memory of the box. These interfaces can be, especially when they are of the coupling type capacity / inductive, the same as the ESB and ESS interfaces. They can also be distinct from the latter, for example from mechanical type with connectors. The station's PR processor validation knowing the encryption key-game Km, (for example stored in the central file TB) then performs via DES type encryption means an encryption (step 6) of the key Km to using the encryption key / box Kf. This game encryption key encrypted under Kf, and referenced Kmc, is then stored (step 7) in the key memory of the case.

When the player wishes to play a particular game, he obtains from a specialized retailer a portable object containing the matching game software. The player then inserts the portable object in the corresponding housing of the housing so as to make the respective ESC and ESB interfaces of the object and the housing.

The decryption means, for example of the DES type, software incorporated into the UT processing unit of the housing decrypt the encrypted game key encryption Kmc. The processing unit reads the digital game data as well as the authentication certificate encrypted CTFc stored in the portable object, via a serial protocol via the ESB interface. The UT processing unit recalculates then an authentication certificate from digital data of game JE, decrypts the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc using of the encryption key Km, compare the authentication certificate recalculated and the authentication certificate stored so as to verify the authenticity of the game software (step 8).

The JE digital game dataset is stored in the working memory MT of the box so that it can be used subsequently and directly by the processing unit UT for the purposes execution of the game.

It should be noted here that, especially when using a SHA type certificate, software authentication verification JE play can be done either "on the water" or when the entire software has been transferred to the working memory MT, the latter solution requiring a larger memory capacity.

At this point, the box is fit for play and the player can play using its housing (step 9).

At the end of the game, or during it depending on the type of game employee or the outcome thereof, IFR result information is delivered by the game software, and it is encrypted (step 10) by the processing unit UT using an encryption-result key which is, in this case, identical to the Km encryption-game key. then obtains an IFRc encrypted result information which is transferred via the respective interfaces of the housing and the portable object so as to be stored (step 11) in the result memory MR of the object.

The player can then go to validate his result so as to possibly receive his gain.

To do this, the player removes the portable object from the case, and communicates to a validation station, which can be the same as the one from which he obtained his case, or another. Cooperation is then established between the portable object and the station. The station PR processor then reads from the result memory of the portable object (step 12) the IFRc encrypted result information and the decryption means of this station, for example of the DES type, knowing the Km encryption-game key, decrypt the IFRc information so as to get the IFR result information and allow the payment of the gain.

If the player later decides to play again, he just get another portable item containing a game of the same type or a different type and have it cooperate with its case to to play.

In the implementation variant illustrated in FIG. 5, and intended to increase the safety of the device, there is provided a alteration 20 of the object's CTFc encrypted authentication certificate portable after verification of software authentication game was performed by the processing unit of the housing. This alteration consists for example of a change in the value of some at minus bits of the authentication certificate.

By the way, before storing the encrypted result information IFRc in the result memory of the object, we check if this alteration has taken place (step 21). If so, allow the storage in the MR result memory and in the negative, we prohibits this storage.

Generally, the portable object is powered by through the box or the station. All the functions that have just been described in relation to the data stored or to store in portable object, including tampering with certificate authentication, can be done directly so software by the unit's processing unit. In this case, the portable object CPU microprocessor can be omitted. This being, the existence of such a microprocessor allows these operations to be carried out alteration (or invalidation) and verification of alteration then possible prohibition of writing the encrypted result information, directly at the portable object. Likewise, the existence of a microprocessor CPU on the portable object possibly allows a encryption of the game software on the portable object before transfer in the working memory of the case.

It is also possible that the encryption-result key used to encrypt the result information is not the game encryption key Km and is not known in advance by the validation station. he can to be so when the encryption-result key is simply the Kf encryption-box key. In this case, the mode of implementation illustrated in Figure 6 not only provides for the storage of IFRc encrypted result information in the result memory of the object (step 11) but also the storage, in this memory of result or in another memory (step 30) of key information ICR allowing later to determine the encryption-result key which was used to encrypt the result information.

This ICR information can for example be the key to encryption-result itself or an identifier of the box which is associated in a one-to-one way with the case and consequently with the key of encryption-box Kf which has been stored.

The processor of the validation station then reads (step 31) ICR key information and determines from a table of correspondence between the identifiers and the encryption-box keys, stored, preferably in a protected manner, in the TB file, the key encryption-result Kr (in this case the key Kf) which was used (step 32).

It can then be performed to decrypt the information of result (step 13).

This variant of the invention also makes it possible to identify precisely the boxes that led to winning games and possibly perform statistics. This offers a possibility additional detection of possible fraud if we notice that the same box very often leads to winning games.

Claims (29)

1. Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device including at least one housing (BT), as well as at least one portable article (OB) capable of cooperating with the housing, in which method at least one result-encryption key is stored in the housing and an authenticatable set of digital game data (JE) representative of a game is stored in the portable article, the portable article is made to cooperate with the housing, the authentication of the set of game data is verified (8) within the housing and this set of game data is stored in a working memory (MT)of the housing, in such a way as to authorize the running (9) of the game in the housing, then, after the running of at least a part of the game, a result information item (IFR) dependent on the said game is encrypted (10) within the housing with the aid at least of the said result-encryption key, and this encrypted result information item (IFRc) is stored (11) in a result memory (MR) of the portable article, then, the portable article is made to cooperate with a validation station (ST) having access to the said result-encryption key, the said station performing a validation processing (13) on the basis at least of the said encrypted result information item and of the said result-encryption key.
2. Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the validation process includes decryption of the encrypted result information items.
3. Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the unencrypted result information item is stored in the portable article , jointly with encrypted result information item, and in that the validation processing includes re-encryption of the unencrypted result information item stored in the portable article and a comparison of this re-encrypted result information item with the encrypted result information item stored in the result memory of the portable article.
4. Method according to one of Claims 1 to 3, characterized in that when the authentication of the set of game data of the portable article has been verified and the said set has been stored in the working memory of the housing, all subsequent utilization, by the housing, of the set of game data of this portable article is prohibited (20).
5. Method according to Claim 4, characterized in that, the device comprising several housings and several portable articles, when the authentication of the set of game data of one of the portable articles has been verified and when the said set has been stored in the working memory of one of the housings, all subsequent utilization, by any one of the housings, of the set of game data of this portable article is prohibited.
6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the set of game data stored in the portable article is authenticated by appending thereto an authentication certificate (CTF) linked in a one-to-one manner with the said set of game data (JE) and in that the verification of the authentication of the set of game data includes a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the housing and a comparison between the recalculated authentication certificate and the authentication certificate stored in the portable article.
7. Method according to Claim 4 or 5 taken in combination with Claim 6, characterized in that all subsequent utilization of a set of game data is prohibited by altering, in the corresponding portable article, at least partially the said authentication certificate and/or at least partially the set of game data.
8. Method according to one of the preceding claims taken in combination with Claim 4, characterized in that the storage of the encrypted result information item in the portable article is authorized (21) only if all subsequent utilization of the set of game data of this portable article has been previously prohibited.
9. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a housing-encryption key (Kf) is stored in the housing.
10. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least one game-encryption key (Km) is stored in the housing, in that the authentication of the set of game data stored in the portable article includes at least partial encryption of this set of game data, or of an information item (CTF) linked with this set of game data, with the aid of the game-encryption key (Km), before reading by the housing, and in that the verification of the authentication of this set of game data includes decryption within the housing with the aid of the game-encryption key.
11. Method according to Claims 6 and 10, characterized in that only the authentication certificate (CTF) is encrypted and decrypted.
12. Method according to Claim 9 taken in combination with Claim 10 or 11, characterized in that the game-encryption key (Km) having been encrypted with the aid of the housing-encryption key (Kf) is stored in the housing.
13. Method according to Claim 9 taken in combination with one of Claims 10 to 12, characterized in that, the device including several housings and several portable articles, a different housing-encryption key (Kf) is associated with each housing whilst the game-encryption key (Km) is common for all the housings and to all the portable articles, in that the housing-encryption key of a housing is stored in the latter before storage of the game-encryption key, and in that the set of game data of a portable article is stored in the latter, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with an information item (CTFc) already at least partially encrypted, with the aid of the game-encryption key.
14. Method according to Claim 9 or one of Claims 10 to 13, characterized in that the result-encryption key (Kr) is the housing-encryption key (Kf), or the game-encryption key (Km), or is obtained from a combination of the housing-encryption key and of the game-encryption key.
15. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a key information item (ICR) associated in a one-to-one manner with the said result-encryption key is stored in the portable article cooperating with the housing, and in that the validation station has access to the said result-encryption key by reading the said key information item stored in the portable article.
16. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the set of game data (JE) of a portable article is read by way of a serial protocol between the portable article and the housing.
17. Electronic gaming device, characterized in that it comprises at least one housing (BT), at least one portable article (OB), and at least one validation station (ST), in that the portable article includes a game memory (MJ) containing an authenticatable set of game data (JE) representing a game, a result memory (MR) able to contain an encrypted result information item (IFRc), a first communication interface (ESC) able to cooperate with a housing-communication interface (ESB), and a second communication interface (ESC) able to communicate with a station-communication interface (ESS), in that the housing includes a key memory (MC) containing a result-encryption key, a write- and read-accessible working memory (MT), and a processing unit (UT) linked to these memories as well as to the housing-communication interface, the processing unit being capable, during cooperation between the housing-communication interface and the first communication interface of the article, of verifying the authentication of the set of game data stored in the article and of storing the said set in the working memory so as to allow the running of the game in the housing, then of encrypting a result information item (IFR) dependent on the said game, with the aid of the result-encryption key, and of communicating this encrypted result information item (IFRc) to the housing-communication interface for the purposes of the storage thereof in the result memory of the article, and in that the validation station (ST) includes means (PR) able to determine the said result-encryption key and station-processing means (PR) able to read the encrypted result information item via the station-communication interface, during cooperation between the portable article and the station, and to perform a validation processing from at least this encrypted result information item and the result-encryption key.
18. Device according to Claim 17, characterized in that the station-processing means include station-decryption means able to decrypt the encrypted result information item.
19. Device according to Claim 17, characterized in that the processing unit of the housing is able also to communicate the unencrypted result information item to the housing-communication interface for the purposes of storage thereof in the result memory of the article, and in that the station-processing means are furthermore able to read the unencrypted result information item via the station-communication interface, and include station-encryption means able to encrypt the said unencrypted result information item with the aid of the result-encryption key, as well as comparison means for comparing the recalculated encrypted result information item with the encrypted result information item stored in the result memory of the portable article.
20. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 19, characterized in that the first communication interface (SEC) of the portable article is a serial interface.
21. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 20, characterized in that the authenticatable set of game data is associated with an authentication certificate and in that the means of verifying the authentication of this set of game data include certificate calculation means able to recalculate the said authentication certificate from the set of game data, and comparison means able to compare the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in the game memory of the portable article.
22. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 21, characterized in that it comprises encryption means able to encrypt at least partially the set of authenticatable game data (JE), or an information item (CTF) linked with this set of game data, from at least one game-encryption key, and in that the key memory of the housing is able to contain the said game-encryption key whilst the means of verifying the authentication of the set of game data include decryption means linked to the key memory.
23. Device according to Claims 21 and 22, characterized in that the encryption means encrypt only the authentication certificate (CTF).
24. Device according to Claim 22 or 23, characterized in that the encryption means (CPU) are incorporated with the portable article.
25. Device according to one of Claims 22 to 24, characterized in that the game-encryption key is stored encrypted and in that the processing unit (UT) of the housing includes means for decrypting this game-encryption key.
26. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 25, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) for invalidating the authenticatable set of game data of a portable article.
27. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 26, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) for prohibiting the writing of the encrypted result information item to the result memory of the portable article.
28. Device according to Claim 26 or 27, characterized in that the invalidation means (CPU) and/or the prohibiting means (CPU) are incorporated into the portable article.
29. Device according to one of Claims 17 to 28, characterized in that it comprises several housings, several portable articles and several validation stations, any one of the portable articles being capable of cooperating with any one of the housings and with any one of the validation stations.

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