WO1996034368A1 - Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor - Google Patents

Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1996034368A1
WO1996034368A1 PCT/FR1996/000645 FR9600645W WO9634368A1 WO 1996034368 A1 WO1996034368 A1 WO 1996034368A1 FR 9600645 W FR9600645 W FR 9600645W WO 9634368 A1 WO9634368 A1 WO 9634368A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
housing
game
set
key
result
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/FR1996/000645
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
François BERNHARD
Patrice Bremaud
Original Assignee
Info Telecom
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
Priority to FR9505175A priority Critical patent/FR2733613B1/en
Priority to FR95/05175 priority
Application filed by Info Telecom filed Critical Info Telecom
Publication of WO1996034368A1 publication Critical patent/WO1996034368A1/en
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=9478579&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=WO1996034368(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C15/00Generating random numbers; Lottery apparatus
    • G07C15/005Generating random numbers; Lottery apparatus with dispensing of lottery tickets

Abstract

An electronic gaming device has one or more housings with at least one result-encryption key stored therein, as well as a portable article adapted for co-operating with the housing and with a set of authenticatable digital game data representative of a game stored therein. The portable article is made to co-operate with the housing. The set of game data is authenticated in the housing and stored in a working memory of the housing so as to authorise the progression of the game in the housing. After completion of at least part of the game, result information dependent on said game is encrypted in the housing by means of at least one result-encryption key, and the encrypted result information is stored in a result memory of the portable article, which then co-operates with a validation station capable of accessing the result-encryption key, whereafter said station verifies the result information.

Description

A method of activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic gaming device, and corresponding device.

The invention relates to the activation and anti-fraud protection of an electronic game device and the corresponding device.

currently known different games, including games of chance, allowing a player to earn money by paying an initial bet. For example in the game called "Lotto" (trademark) the player marks a series of numbers on a ticket that is validated with a specialized organization by paying a price equal to the initial bet. A random subsequent fate is performed under control in a chosen place, players in possession of a winning ticket can collect their winnings from a paying agency.

Other games are to get a ticket and scratch it in designated areas in order to discover information for defining whether the ticket in question is winning or losing. Compared to these classic games that require support-paper, it has been planned to propose, in the French Patent No. 92 13 239, a radically different concept of gambling device.

Under this concept, there is a portable unit intended to allow a player to perform one or more events of gambling, the success or failure of said conditioning tests a score or level of gain following predetermined set of rules . This box then also constitutes the transaction element for payment of winning and has all the elements necessary to verify it. However, by design and in particular for security reasons, each self-contained unit can only be used once and only once. This naturally poses an economic and environmental problem because of this combined unit use with an estimated distribution of the order of several tens of millions of units per month.

Besides the fact that this type of housing can only be used once, it is also associated with a unique game types. However, the current market of gambling shows that the lifetime of a type of game is usually short and that they often have to be renewed which then leads the manufacturer's housing design constantly new external forms the product as well as new software interface.

The invention aims to provide a solution to these problems. An object of the invention to provide an electronic game that can be used multiple times with possibly different types of play.

A major problem inherent in such gaming devices is the anti-fraud security, particularly when certain types of gambling are associated with significant gains.

The invention therefore aims to integrate the concept of security in a multi-application and multi gaming device uses.

The invention therefore provides a first method of activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic gaming device including at least a housing wherein has been stored at least one encryption key-result, as well as least one portable object capable of cooperating with the housing, and wherein has been stored a set of digital data authenticatable game and indicative of a play. According to this process, made to cooperate with the portable object is verified at the Box- within the housing authentication of the game data set and stores this set of game data in a working memory of the housing, so as to allow the progress of the game at the housing. Then, after the running of at least a part of the game is encrypted within the dependent result information of said housing game, using at least said key cryptage- result. It stores the encrypted result information in a result memory of the portable object. Then, the portable object made to cooperate with a validation station having access to said result-encryption key, the said station performing a validation processing from at least said encrypted result information and said encryption-key result.

Thus, according to the invention, it withdraws the digital data set, that is to say, the application or game software, outside the control unit and is incorporated into a memory of an object portable that can take different forms, such as credit cards, domino, chip, etc.

As for the electronic box, it can be sold only once and be used more than once with any portable object containing a set of software.

According to the invention this is the portable object that is intended to contain both digital data set defining the game itself, and the result information for the player to confirm this result in order to reach possibly its gain. In other words, the portable object is here the transaction element while the housing not only serves as the player to play.

The concept of "encryption" should be interpreted widely as a "protection using cryptographic means." That said, for simplification purposes, only the encryption words, decryption, encrypt, decrypt will be used in the text below.

The result information will be encrypted in the housing before being transferred to the portable object, naturally depends on the nature of the game. It can be for example a binary type "won" or " lost, "or even, for example, information representing a gain level.

For safety reasons, all numerical data set stored in the portable object is authenticated to allow verification of its audientification within the housing. For the purposes of the present invention, the word "authenticated" must be inteφrété broadly by including "instance storage in" clear "digital data set themselves jointly obtained a certificate of authentication, from the digital data set by an appropriate algorithm, or even an encrypting at least part of this set, or for example an encryption authentication certificate.

Verification authenticates ation of the set of game data may be performed before, during or after the storage thereof in the working memory of the housing. It should also be noted here that, according to the invention, the set of digital game data is transferred to the working memory of the housing (in practice these data are for example read out from the portable object and then copied into the memory labor housing) so that cooperation between the portable object and the case could eventually be removed during the course of the game on the housing.

The invention thus avoids the use of complex software means that require the direct use of the game software of the portable object by the transfer case without processing unit in the memory of the case. Also, according to an implementation of the method according to the invention, it is advantageously provided that the set of game data of a portable article is read by way of a serial protocol between the portable object and The box. This minimizes the hardware and software of the portable object. The direct use of the game software is performed by the housing of the treatment unit directly into the working memory thereof.

Very generally, the processing of validation performed by the validation station should determine and / or verify the result information from the contents of the portable object. Indeed only this stored content must be authentic to allow a contingent payment of a gain.

The validation processing performed by the validation station may include a decryption of the encrypted result information and stored in the result memory of the portable object, using the encryption-key result.

Alternatively, the validation processing may be performed in a different way. Specifically, can be stored in the portable object, together with encrypted result information, unencrypted result information that is to say "in the clear". The station checks then said result information in recryptant, using the encryption-key result, unencrypted result information which is stored in the portable article and comparing this re-encrypted result information with the information results encrypted and stored in the result memory of the portable object.

To further increase security, it is advantageously provided that when the authentication of the entire data set of the portable object was checked and said assembly has been stored in the memory of the work of the case, a ban any subsequent operation by the housing, of the set of game data of this portable object.

This allows in particular to prevent a player does not lead to play a type of game, especially when it is actually a reflex game. For the purposes of the present invention, the prohibition of any subsequent use must be understood in a broad sense to mean for example that is the case can not read the data set, or it can not verify authentication. In other words, the case will be unfit to play with this portable object.

The device according to the invention generally comprises several housings and several portable articles. Also, when the authentication of the entire data set of one of the portable objects was checked and said assembly has been stored in the working memory of one of the boxes, then advantageously prohibits any subsequent exploitation by any of the housings, of the set of game data of this portable object.

According to an embodiment of the method according to the invention, one can authenticate the set of game data stored in the portable object in y adding an authentication certificate associated biuniquely to the digital data set. The audit authentication of the entire data set then includes a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the housing and compares the recalculated authentication certificate and authentication certificate stored in the portable object.

Thus, any subsequent operation can be prohibited for a set of data set by altering in the corresponding portable article, at least partially the said authentication certificate and / or at least partially the set of actual data. One can for this purpose arbitrarily consider changing the value of certain bits of the authentication certificate and / or some of the digital data set. Therefore, if a player tries to play again with the same portable object, unity processing unit recalculates an authentication certificate which differ from the tampered authentication certificate, which prohibit any activation of the game.

Also in order to increase safety, particularly regarding the payment of any winnings, advantageously allows storage of encrypted result information in the portable object that if one has previously banned all higher exploitation of the set of game data of this portable object.

According to a mode of implementation of the method can be stored in the housing at least one key encryption game. The authentication of the entire data set stored in the portable object may then comprise at least partial encryption of the entire data set, or information related to this set of data set (eg authentication certificate), using the key-encryption game, and before reading by the processing unit of the case, the entire data set of the portable object. The verification of the authentication of the entire data set then comprises a decryption within the housing using the encryption key game. In other words, the encrypted transfer of the application, or the associated authentication certificate, avoids loading a fraudulent application inevitably leading to obtaining a gain. One can possibly do encrypt and decrypt the authentication certificate.

When a box encryption key is stored in the housing, can be stored in the housing of the key-encryption game that was encrypted prior to using the key to box encryption. This further increases the security and make it even harder by the knowledge of a third encryption key game.

The key game-encryption can be common to all the cases and all portable objects. The box encryption key is itself preferably different for each case. The key cryptage- housing of a housing is stored in the latter before storage of the game-encryption key, for example during manufacture. Furthermore, the set of game data of a portable object can be stored in the latter, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with information already at least partially encrypted, with the key cryptage- thu. In other words, when manufacturing factory of portable objects can for example be determined in situ the corresponding authentication certificate, encrypt it, and store in the portable object, before public dissemination, data of actual game followed their encrypted authentication certificate.

In general, the encryption-key result may be the key to box encryption, or the key game-encryption, or can be obtained from a combination of these two keys.

When the encryption-key result is the key to game-encryption, any validation station knows the game-encryption key since it is common to all the elements of the device. This being so, when the encryption-key result is not known in advance by the validation station, is provided which is stored in the portable article cooperating with the housing, a key information associated so biunivocal to said encryption-key result, validation station having then access to said encryption-key result of reading said key information stored in the portable object.

Thus, if for example the encryption-key result is the encryption key-housing, it may be advantageously provided to associate each housing an identifier the uniquely defining and identifying thereby the encryption key -Case that has been stored in the housing. An identifier table may for example be stored so protected in a central computer to which are connected all the validation stations. The identifier of the housing is then stored with the encrypted result information in the portable object.

Validation station then having access to that identifier and the correspondence table can determine the encryption key-result and decrypt encrypted result information.

The invention further relates to an electronic gaming device. According to a general characteristic of the invention, this electronic device set comprises at least a housing, at least one portable object and at least one validation station. The portable object includes a set of memory containing a set of authenticatable game data and representative of a game, a result memory adapted to contain an encrypted result information, a first communication interface capable of interacting with a communications interface -Case and a second communication interface capable of communicating with a communication station interface. The housing includes a key memory containing at least one encryption key-result, an accessible working memory writing and reading, and a processing unit connected to these memories as well as communication-box interface. The processing unit is able, in a cooperation between the communication-box interface and the first communication interface of the object, check the authentication of all stored data set in the object and storing said set in the working memory so as to allow the progress of the game at the housing. The housing of the processing unit is also able to encrypt dependent result information of said game, using the encryption key-result, and to communicate this result information encrypted communication-housing for interface it is stored in the result memory of the object. The validation station has means capable of determining said result-encryption key and station-processing means capable of reading encrypted result information via the communication-interface -

station, during cooperation between the portable article and the station, and to perform a validation processing from at least of the encrypted result information and the encryption-key result.

In the case where the electronic device set comprises several housings, several portable articles and several validation stations, any of the portable object is capable of cooperating with any one of the housings and with any one of the validation stations .

According to an embodiment of the device according to the invention, the first communication interface of the portable article is a serial interface. In addition, and for reasons of economy, it is possible to provide the portable object includes only a single communication interface able to cooperate with the communication-box interface or the communication interface - station.

The average processing station may include decryption station means capable of decrypting the encrypted result information for the purpose of its determination.

Alternatively, the housing of the processing unit is adapted to also communicate unencrypted result information to the communication-interface housing for the purpose of storage in the result memory of the object. The station-processing means are then also able to read the unencrypted result information via the communication station interface. They then include station-encryption means able to encrypt the said unencrypted result information using the encryption key-result, and comparison means for comparing encrypted result information recalculated with the information encrypted result stored in the result memory of the portable object. This comparison makes it possible to verify the result information.

When the set of game data entifiable is associated with an authentication certificate, the authentication verifying means of this set of game data then preferably include certificate calculation means able to recalculate said certificate authentication within the housing, from the set of game data, and comparison means adapted to compare the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in the game memory of the portable object.

According to an embodiment of the device, it is possible to provide encryption means adapted to encrypt at least partially the set of authenticatable game data, or information related to this set of game data (e.g., the certificate of authentication), from at least one encryption key game. The memory key housing is then able to contain this key game-encryption while authenticating means of verification of the entire set of data includes decryption means connected to the key memory. The encryption means may encrypt the authentication certificate. These encryption means may be incoφorés within a manufacturing unit to directly deliver a set of game data at least partially encrypted and an authentication certificate already at least partially encrypted, which will be intended to be stored as such in the portable object. However, provision can be alternatively that the encryption means are incoφorés to the portable object, in particular when the latter comprises a microcontroller containing a software manner these encryption means.

Similarly, the provision of a portable object "intelligent", that is to say provided with a central unit, for example, also allows incoφorer in the portable object means to prohibit any subsequent operation a set of game data of a portable object after a first use. This means, that can be achieved for example by software, are as such capable of modifying the value of certain bits of the entire dataset or its authentication certificate. Other features and advantages of the invention will appear on examining implementation methods and embodiments of the invention, not limiting, and the appended drawings in which:

- Figure 1 very schematically shows the hardware architecture of a portable object of a device according to the invention, - Figure 2 schematically shows the hardware architecture of a device housing according to the invention,

- Figure 3 schematically shows the hardware architecture of a device of the validation station according to the invention, - Figures 4a and 4b schematically illustrate an implementation of the method according to the invention, and

- Figures 5 and 6 illustrate two alternative embodiments of the method according to the invention.

The device of the invention includes several autonomous electronic housing BT, several portable objects OB and several validation stations ST.

As illustrated in Figure 1, each portable object OB, e.g. type card smart card, a token, or a module, comprises, for example within an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) a micro- CPU controller connected via a bus to an input interface output ESC serial type, in a MJ game memory, and a result memory RM, such as a register.

As discussed in more detail below, the GM game memory, for example a read only memory, for receiving a set of digital game data, or game software, representative of a particular type game.

The register MR is intended in turn to receive an encrypted result information from the BT box after the running of at least a portion of the game.

The ESC interface includes means for cooperation with a counterpart BSE BT interface housing (Figure 2) and a counterpart ESS interface of the station ST (Figure 3). These engagement means may consist of a mechanical connector or by means of capacitive / inductive coupling, or optical.

As illustrated most particularly in Figure 2, the hardware structure of the electronic portable housing BT revolves around a processing unit UT, such as a microprocessor or a microcontroller. This processing unit UT is connected via a bus to a working memory MT, accessible writing and reading, for example a random access memory (RAM), a program memory and to MM a key type memory MC which is a protected memory that can be a part of the memory MM the processing unit is also connected to an AF liquid crystal display screen as well as a Cl keyboard having keys e.g. control movements in two orthogonal directions. Finally, the processing unit is connected to a communication interface BSE-housing adapted to cooperate with the communication interface ESC, and may for example comprise a mechanical connector disposed in a housing in which can be inserted the connector of the portable object. BSE interface also includes means for converting serial / parallel connected to the internal bus of the housing. All the means of this unit is powered by autonomous power supply means such as batteries AL. Any or all components of this case may be in the form of a Asia.

Working memory MT is dimensioned so as to receive the game application stored in the MJ memory of the object while the memory MM contains the internal management program of the housing (management I / O management key, of the screen of the application loading program in the working memory ...). According to the embodiment described with reference to Figure

3, each ST validation station comprises an articulated processing block around a processor PR is connected to an input / output interface ESS capable of cooperating with the output input interface ESC of the portable object. In addition, the station is connected via an appropriate link, to a central file TB containing the necessary information, as discussed in more detail below, to verify the result of information contained in portable object.

The processor PR of the station in software incoφore different functional means required to operate it (encryption, decryption, comparison, reading ...). will now be described in more detail, with reference particularly to Figures 4a to 4b, a first implementation of the method according to the invention.

On a manufacturing site, the entire digital data set I, forming the application software game, is treated by processing means including an authentication certificate algorithm type SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) known of the art. This may, however, for details, refer to Publication 180-1 of 31 May 1994 issued by the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards).

These calculation means determines a certificate of CTF audientification from logic functions operating on the bits of digital game data (step 1). Thus, for a block of 1 kilo byte application, the authentication certificate includes for example 120 bits.

From a game-encryption key Km, common to all the portable objects to all cases and at all validation stations, encryption means, for example using the encryption algorithm DES (Data Encryption Standard) performing an encryption of the CTF authentication certificate (step 2) so as to deliver an encrypted authentication certificate CTFc. The digital data set and the encrypted authentication certificate is then stored in the game MJ memory of the portable object (step 3).

The portable object is ready to be distributed to the public. As to the housing, is stored in the key memory MC thereof, for example during its manufacture on site, an encryption key Kf-casing (4 step). The housing is then also ready for release to the public.

A player can provide such a housing with a validation type station the station ST. During this operation, it is made to cooperate the housing and the station via respective communication interfaces so as to read (Step 5) the key Kf cryptage- housing stored in the key memory of the housing. These interfaces can be, in particular when they are of the coupling capacity / inductive, the same as the BSE and ESS interfaces. They can also be different from the past, for example mechanical connectors. The processor PR validation station knowing the encryption key Km-game (eg stored in the central database TB) then carried through the type DES encryption encryption means (step 6) of the key Km using the encryption key / Kf housing. This encrypted game-encryption key Kf under, and referenced Kmc, is then stored (step 7) in the key memory of the housing.

When the player wishes to play a particular game, it gets from a specialty retailer portable object containing a corresponding game software. The player then inserts the portable object into the corresponding housing of the housing so as to cooperate with respective interfaces ESC and BSE of the object and the housing.

The decryption means, for example the DES type incoφorés in software in the processing unit UT housing decrypt the encrypted key game-encryption KMC. The processing unit reads the digital data set and the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc stored in the portable object, via a serial interface protocol over BSE. The processing unit UT recalculates an authentication certificate from digital data I play, decrypts the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc using the encryption key Km-game, compares the recalculated authentication certificate and the authentication certificate stored in order to verify the authenticity of the game software (step 8). The entire JE digital data set is stored in the working memory MT of housing to be operated and later by the processing unit UT for execution of the game.

It should be noted here that, especially when using a type certificate SHA, the rauthentification verification JE game software can either be "in the flow" or when all the software has been transferred in the working memory MT, the latter solution requires a larger capacity of RAM.

At this stage, the case is fit to the game and the player can play with his housing (step 9). At the end of the game, or under it depending on the used game or after it, IFR result information is issued by the gaming software and the latter is encrypted (step 10 ) by the UT processing unit using an encryption-key result which is in this case identical to the encryption key Km-game. this produces an encrypted ifrc result information which is transferred via the respective interfaces and the housing of the portable object so as to be stored (step 11) in the result memory RM of the object. The player can then go validate its result so potentially affect its gain.

To do this, the player removes the portable object of the housing and communicates with a validation station which may be the same as that from which it has obtained its housing or another. then establishes cooperation between the portable object and the station. The processor PR of the station then reads the result memory of the portable object (step 12) encrypted result information IFRC and decryption means of this station, eg DES type, knowing the key cryptage- Km game, decrypt IFRC information to obtain IFR result of information and enable payment of winning.

If the player later decides to play again, he just has to get another portable object containing a set of the same or of a different type and do cooperate with its case to play.

In the alternative embodiment illustrated in Figure 5 and intended to increase the safety of the device is provided 20 an alteration of the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc of the portable object after verification of the the entification game software has been performed by the processing unit of the housing. This alteration consists for example of a change in the value of at least some bits of the certificate audientification.

Furthermore, before storing encrypted result of Tir-training ifrc in the result of the object memory, it is checked whether the alteration has occurred (step 21). If so, it allows storage in the result memory MR 'and if not, it prohibits storage.

In general, the portable object is fed through the housing or of the station. All functions which have been described with the stored data or stored in the portable object, including the alteration of the authentication certificate can be made directly in software by the housing processor. In this case, the microprocessor CPU of the portable object can be omitted. That said, the existence of such a microprocessor can perform these alteration operations (or invalidation) and alteration and possible ban of writing encrypted verification result information, directly level of the portable object. Similarly, the existence of a microprocessor CPU of the portable object may allow encryption of the game software at the portable object before transfer into the working memory of the case.

It is also possible that the result-encryption key used to encrypt the result of the information is not the Km-set encryption key and is not known in advance by the validation station. It may be the case when the encryption-key result is simply the key Kf box encryption. In this case, the mode of implementation illustrated in Figure 6 provides not only the storage ifrc encrypted result information in the result memory of the object (step 11) and also storing in said memory or result in a further memory (step 30, a key information

ICR later to determine the key cryptage- result that was used to encrypt result of information.

The ICR information may for example be the result-encryption key itself or an identifier of the housing which is associated biuniquely to the housing and therefore on the encryption key Kf-housing that has been stored.

The processor of the validation station then reads (step 31) ICR key information and determines from a table of correspondence between the identifiers and the encryption key-housing, stored, preferably in a protected manner in the TB file, the encryption key Kr-result (in this case the key Kf) that has been used (step 32).

It can then be proceeded to the decryption result information (step 13).

This variant of the invention also allows to precisely identify the cases that led to winning games and possibly perform statistical. This provides an additional possibility of detecting possible fraud if one realizes that the same case often leads to winning games.

Claims

1. A method of activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic gaming device including at least one housing (BT) which has been stored in at least one result-encryption key, and at least one portable object ( OB) capable of cooperating with the housing and into which has been stored a set of digital game data audientifiable (I) and representative of a game process in which the portable object is co-operating with the housing, it is checked (8 ) in the case authentication of the game data set and stores this set of game data in a working memory (MT) of the housing so as to allow the flow (9) of the set at the housing, then, after the running of at least a part of the game is encrypted (10) within the housing result information item (IFR) dependent on said set using at least said key cryptage- result, and storing (11) this encrypted result information (ifrc ) In a result memory (MR) of the portable object, then, is made to cooperate with the portable object a validation station (ST) having access to said result-encryption key, the said station performing a validation processing ( 13) from at least said encrypted result information and said encryption-key result.
2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the validation processing includes decrypting encrypted result information.
3. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that stored in the portable article, jointly with encrypted result information, unencrypted result information, and in that the validation processing includes re-encryption of the unencrypted result information stored in the portable object and a comparison of this re-encrypted result information with the encrypted result information and stored in the result memory of the portable object.
4. A method according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that when the authentication of the set of game data of the portable article has been verified and the said set has been stored in the working memory the housing is prohibited (20) any subsequent operation by the housing, of the set of game data of this portable object.
5. A method according to claim 4, characterized in that, the device comprising several housings and several portable articles, when the authentication of the set of game data of one of the portable articles has been verified and the said set has been stored in the working memory of one of the housings, all subsequent operation is prohibited, by any of the housings, of the set of game data of this portable object.
6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by the fact that authenticates the set of game data stored in the portable object by adding to it an authentication certificate (CTF) linked with said set of biuniquely data set (I) and that the verification of the authentication of the entire data set includes a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the housing and compares the authentication certificate and the certificate recalculated authentication stored in the portable object.
7. A method according to claim 4 or 5 taken in combination with Claim 6, characterized by the fact that prohibits any further operation of a set of game data by altering, in the corresponding portable article, at least partially said certificate of authentication and / or at least partially the entire data set.
8. Method according to one of the preceding claims taken in combination with Claim 4, characterized by the fact that authorize (21) the storage of the encrypted result information in the portable object if one has, previously prohibited any subsequent operation of the entire data set of this portable object.
9. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that is stored in the housing a housing-encryption key (Kf).
10. A method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that stored in the housing at least one key game-encryption (Km), in that the authentication of the set of stored data set in the portable object comprises encrypting at least part of this set of game data, or an information item (CTF) linked with this set of game data, using the key game-encryption (Km) before reading by the housing, and that the verification of the authentication of this entire set of data includes a decryption within the housing using the encryption key game.
11. Process according to Claims 6 and 10, characterized in that it encrypts and decrypts only the authentication certificate (CTF).
12. A method according to Claim 9 taken in combination with Claim 10 or 11, characterized in that is stored in the housing of the key game-encryption (Km) having been encrypted using the encryption key -Case (K f) -
13. A method according to Claim 9 taken in combination with one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that, the device comprising several housings and several portable articles, a box encryption key (Kf) is associated with each different housing while the key game-encryption (Km) is common for all the housings and to all the portable articles, in that the box encryption key of a housing is stored therein before storing the key game-encryption, and in that the set of game data of a portable article is stored in the latter, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with an information item (CTFc) already at least partially encrypted, using the encryption key game.
14. A method according to Claim 9 or one of Claims 10 to 13, characterized in that the key cryptage- result (Kr) is the housing-encryption key (Kf), or the key cryptage- game ( km), or is obtained from a combination of the encryption key-housing and the key encrypting game.
15. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the storing in the portable article cooperating with the housing, a key information item (ICR) associated biuniquely to said encryption-result key, and in that the validation station has access to said encryption-key result of reading said key information stored in the portable object.
16. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the set of game data (JE) of a portable article is read by way of a serial protocol between the portable article and the housing .
17. Electronic game device, characterized in that it comprises at least one housing (BT), at least one portable article (OB), and at least one validation station (ST), in that the object portable includes a game memory (MJ) containing a set of game data (JE) authenticatable and representative of a game, a result memory (MR) able to contain an encrypted result information item (ifrc), a first interface communication (ESC) able to cooperate with a communication-box interface (ESB), and a second communication interface (ESC) able to communicate with a communication-station interface (ESS), in that the housing includes a memory key (TM) containing an encryption key-result, a working memory (MT) writable and reading, and a processing unit (UT) connected to these memories as well as communication-box interface , the processing unit being capable, during a e cooperation between the housing-communication interface and the first communication interface of the object, to verify the authentication of the set of stored set of data in the object and to store said set in the working memory so as to allow the progress of the game in the housing, then of encrypting a result information item (IFR) dependent on said game, using the encryption key-result, and communicating this encrypted result information (IFRC) interface communication-housing for the purpose of storage in the result of the object memory, and in that the validation station (ST) includes means (PR) able to determine said key cryptage- result and means treatment- station (PR) able to read the encrypted result information via the communication-station interface, during cooperation between the portable article and the station, and to perform a validation processing from at least this encrypted result information and the encryption-key result.
18. The device of claim 17, characterized in that the processing means include station-decryption station means capable of decrypting encrypted result information.
19. Device according to claim 17, characterized in that the housing of the processing unit is adapted to also communicate unencrypted result information to the interface communication-housing for the purpose of storage in the memory result of the object, and in that the means treatment- station is further adapted to read unencrypted result information via the communication-station interface, and include station-encryption means able to encrypt said unencrypted result information using the encryption key-result, and comparison means for comparing the recalculated encrypted result information with the encrypted result information stored in the result memory of the object portable.
20. Device according to one of claims 17 to 19, characterized in that the first communication interface (SEC) of the portable article is a serial interface.
21. Device according to one of claims 17 to 20, characterized in that the authenticatable set of game data is associated with an authentication certificate and in that the authentication verification means of this assembly game data include certificate calculation means able to recalculate the said authentication certificate from the set of game data, and comparison means able to compare the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in the game memory of the portable object.
22. Device according to one of claims 17 to 21, characterized in that it comprises encryption means able to encrypt at least partially the whole authentifiâmes game data (JE), or an information item (CTF) linked this set of game data, from at least one key game-encryption, and in that the key memory of the housing is adapted to contain said key-encrypting game while checking means of authentication of the set of game data include decryption means linked to the key memory.
23. Device according to claims 21 and 22, characterized in that the encryption means encrypt only the audientification certificate (CTF).
24. Device according to claim 22 or 23, characterized in that the encryption means (CPU) are incorporated in the portable object.
25. Device according to one of claims 22 to 24, characterized in that the game-encryption key is stored encrypted and in that the processing unit (UT) of the housing includes means for decrypting this key encryption game.
26. Device according to one of claims 17 to 25, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) for invalidating the authenticatable set of game data of a portable object.
27. Device according to one of claims 17 to 26, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) prohibiting writing of encrypted result information in the result memory of the portable object .
28. Device according to claim 26 or 27, characterized in that the invalidation means (CPU) and / or the inhibiting means (CPU) are incorporated in the portable object.
29. Device according to one of claims 17 to 28, characterized in that it comprises several housings, several portable articles and several validation stations, any one of the portable articles being capable of cooperating with any of the housings and with any validation stations.
PCT/FR1996/000645 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor WO1996034368A1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9505175A FR2733613B1 (en) 1995-04-28 1995-04-28 Method for activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic gaming device, and corresponding device
FR95/05175 1995-04-28

Applications Claiming Priority (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DK96914253T DK0824732T3 (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 A process for the activation, and protection from fraud by an electronic gaming device, and associated apparatus
AU57673/96A AU5767396A (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic ga ming device and device therefor
EP96914253A EP0824732B1 (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor
DE1996603023 DE69603023T2 (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Activation and protection method against fraud in an electronic game device and associated apparatus
DE1996603023 DE69603023D1 (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Activation and protection method against fraud in an electronic game device and associated apparatus
GR990402050T GR3030973T3 (en) 1995-04-28 1999-08-13 Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1996034368A1 true WO1996034368A1 (en) 1996-10-31

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PCT/FR1996/000645 WO1996034368A1 (en) 1995-04-28 1996-04-26 Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor

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EP (1) EP0824732B1 (en)
AT (1) AT181609T (en)
AU (1) AU5767396A (en)
CA (1) CA2219634A1 (en)
DE (2) DE69603023D1 (en)
DK (1) DK0824732T3 (en)
ES (1) ES2132920T3 (en)
FR (1) FR2733613B1 (en)
GR (1) GR3030973T3 (en)
WO (1) WO1996034368A1 (en)

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US7373507B2 (en) 2000-08-10 2008-05-13 Plethora Technology, Inc. System and method for establishing secure communication
US8282490B2 (en) 2006-06-02 2012-10-09 Wms Gaming Inc. Handheld wagering game system and methods for conducting wagering games thereupon
US8858332B2 (en) 2006-01-27 2014-10-14 Wms Gaming Inc. Handheld device for wagering games
US9489804B2 (en) 2012-09-28 2016-11-08 Bally Gaming, Inc. Community gaming system with varying eligibility criteria

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US7373507B2 (en) 2000-08-10 2008-05-13 Plethora Technology, Inc. System and method for establishing secure communication
US8858332B2 (en) 2006-01-27 2014-10-14 Wms Gaming Inc. Handheld device for wagering games
US8282490B2 (en) 2006-06-02 2012-10-09 Wms Gaming Inc. Handheld wagering game system and methods for conducting wagering games thereupon
US8684843B2 (en) 2006-06-02 2014-04-01 Wms Gaming Inc. Handheld wagering game system and methods for conducting wagering games thereupon
US9412228B2 (en) 2006-06-02 2016-08-09 Bally Gaming, Inc. Handheld wagering game system and methods for conducting wagering games thereupon
US10068418B2 (en) 2006-06-02 2018-09-04 Bally Gaming, Inc. Handheld wagering game system and methods for conducting wagering games thereupon
US9489804B2 (en) 2012-09-28 2016-11-08 Bally Gaming, Inc. Community gaming system with varying eligibility criteria

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE69603023T2 (en) 2000-03-30
EP0824732B1 (en) 1999-06-23
FR2733613A1 (en) 1996-10-31
CA2219634A1 (en) 1996-10-31
AT181609T (en) 1999-07-15
DE69603023D1 (en) 1999-07-29
ES2132920T3 (en) 1999-08-16
AU5767396A (en) 1996-11-18
DK0824732T3 (en) 2000-01-24
GR3030973T3 (en) 1999-12-31
DK824732T3 (en)
EP0824732A1 (en) 1998-02-25
FR2733613B1 (en) 1997-07-18

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