EP0817144A1 - Verfahren zur Steuerung der Benutzung eines Rufempfängers, nach diesem Verfahren arbeitender Rufempfänger und Chipkarte für bedingten Zugang eines Rufempfängers - Google Patents

Verfahren zur Steuerung der Benutzung eines Rufempfängers, nach diesem Verfahren arbeitender Rufempfänger und Chipkarte für bedingten Zugang eines Rufempfängers Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0817144A1
EP0817144A1 EP97401610A EP97401610A EP0817144A1 EP 0817144 A1 EP0817144 A1 EP 0817144A1 EP 97401610 A EP97401610 A EP 97401610A EP 97401610 A EP97401610 A EP 97401610A EP 0817144 A1 EP0817144 A1 EP 0817144A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
messenger
message
messages
card
units
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP97401610A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0817144B1 (de
Inventor
Hector Alberto Lezama Argaez
Michel Leduc
Thierry Karlisch
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Gemplus SA
Original Assignee
Gemplus Card International SA
Gemplus SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from MXPA/A/1996/000261A external-priority patent/MXPA96000261A/xx
Application filed by Gemplus Card International SA, Gemplus SA filed Critical Gemplus Card International SA
Publication of EP0817144A1 publication Critical patent/EP0817144A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0817144B1 publication Critical patent/EP0817144B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B5/00—Visible signalling systems, e.g. personal calling systems, remote indication of seats occupied
    • G08B5/22—Visible signalling systems, e.g. personal calling systems, remote indication of seats occupied using electric transmission; using electromagnetic transmission
    • G08B5/222—Personal calling arrangements or devices, i.e. paging systems
    • G08B5/223—Personal calling arrangements or devices, i.e. paging systems using wireless transmission
    • G08B5/224—Paging receivers with visible signalling details
    • G08B5/229—Paging receivers with visible signalling details with other provisions not elsewhere provided for

Definitions

  • the subject of the present invention is a method of control of the use of a pager or "pager" in common parlance.
  • the invention has for object to rationalize the use of such devices. It also concerns a messenger operating according to this method and a smart card for condition access to this messenger.
  • a messenger is a receiving device, some times of retransmission, that a user wears usually on him and which allows him to be alerted by a correspondent on an action to be taken where information to know.
  • the transmission between the sender of a message and the messenger is performed over the air.
  • this transmission wired or otherwise: for example by regularly connecting the messenger to a terminal of a set of terminals scattered over a territory and receiving the messages that are stored waiting and intended for him.
  • Radio receivers Personal mobile communications by radio receivers are popular in recent years, including radio receivers receiving text messages transcribed on screens at liquid crystals.
  • communication devices personal mobile or table, we can cite also cell phones.
  • the object of the present invention is to incorporate a smart card to already operational receivers.
  • control cards has become also usual for different kinds devices, for example, for public telephones in menu. Credit cards are also part of history of the invention.
  • the message is sent by radio
  • the message is sent by a operator by coding a carrier in frequency modulation.
  • the transmitter sends cyclically the messages of the various parties concerned so as to be sure that they have received them.
  • the messenger includes a radio wave receiver with a personal identification code.
  • the receiver is able to detect messages sent and to choose among the messages sent those which are intended.
  • the messenger produces an alarm, a sound emission, a vibration, or a light display on a display.
  • the messenger display called we can even read the number of the caller, possibly directly the message of the caller.
  • the called party can send an acknowledgment reception thanks to its messenger. Generally it call back using the nearest telephone the interlocutor who seeks to reach him.
  • Today paging systems operate either by subscription or by remuneration of the issuing operator through the caller's telephone call, and that of the called party's answer.
  • the defect of the current system of operator's remuneration lies in the fact that the called party can use a different network than that of the operator to call back. Even sometimes he does not recall not to the extent that the message is sufficiently meaningful to avoid the call.
  • the objective of the invention is to allow equipment, in particular subscribers, having assurance that they are performing the service of telecommunications offered to them.
  • each messenger in an example of a portable electronic medium: in the practice a smart card.
  • the messenger then has a smart card reader and is only authorized to only work if a suitable smart card is engaged in the messenger.
  • the smart card will be a smart card of the type with prepaid units of so that it will be possible to deduct units as messages are received, and not authorize their delivery to the bearer of the messenger that if the number of available units has been sufficient.
  • the identification of the recipient is through a PIN code that each recipient enters on a keyboard provided for this purpose on the messenger.
  • the means to perform the above function are of known type.
  • the smart card subject to the present invention in a first embodiment, has for function the regulation of the prepayment of messages transcribed into text on the liquid crystal display, this which controls a number of messages as well as the dimension of these.
  • the smart card subject of the present invention comprises, in addition to the above functions, the decryption of each message it translates via code towards a text in known language.
  • the invention also relates to a messenger comprising a message receiving circuit and a circuit for delivering received messages, characterized in that it includes a smart media reader, smart card, a smart medium engaged in the reader, and a circuit for authorizing the delivery of messages received when a correct chip carrier is engaged in the reader.
  • the invention also relates to a smart card for radio receiver of messages transcribed into text on liquid crystal display, characterized in that a receiver is equipped with elements to receive the card, which card will control the credit which will not operate the receiver only if the balance is sufficient to reproduce the message, that is to say that the function of the card is to give access to the message to the screen, which implies that the message is conditioned upon insertion of the card.
  • the invention relates to a messenger whose operation and / or delivery of the message is preferably subject to a payment of units prepaid cards contained in a memory.
  • the units are contained in a memory of a smart card, the messenger cooperating with said card to debit said units.
  • the units are contained in a memory of the messenger, this one operating independently to charge them.
  • the advantage is then to reuse the memories and avoid traveling to buy cards fleas.
  • the invention finally relates to a smart card for radio receiver of messages transcribed into text on liquid crystal display, characterized in that that it performs the decryption function allowing to reproduce each message, i.e. it decrypts a message using a code which translates the signal into text in known language.
  • the messenger performs a security function of the loading units.
  • Security takes place either in the messenger, preferably using a application security, either in a card microprocessor.
  • An application security module is inaccessible and inviolable due to protection physics of this component. Protection can be passive or active. Such a module typically highlights implements a recognition and accreditation protocol for type of those known in the field of smart cards.
  • the reloading steps are as follows.
  • the user goes to a distributor to make reload a messenger or his card. He gives the number identity of messenger or card and money corresponding to the purchase of units.
  • the distributor calls a central server which sends a signal from reloading with the identity number which has been previously transmitted, and possibly a code representative of a secret code.
  • the microprocessor of messenger or card performs a test of comparison between the message code and that contained in the application security module (or in the card) before incrementing the memory of units of a number of units agreed.
  • order a load units and payment can be made directly by correspondence.
  • the signal reload is preferably issued from the same way for sending messages.
  • the signal recharging can be issued on a specific terminal, to centralize the loading and prevent another messenger can pick up the reload signal.
  • the terminal can be contained in a cabin, or a post, phone for example, or be an infrared terminal.
  • the user can communicate the above data to the central server through the line telephone, and receive the load by the line.
  • Means for receiving acoustic signals, in particular of the DTMF type, can be provided in the messenger. Such means are known to those skilled in the art. art.
  • the message can be encrypted on transmission, then stored, before delivery, in a memory any of the messenger or in the card.
  • the message is then delivered after a decryption step performed by an application security module.
  • the application security module in this case includes at minus a microprocessor and an algorithm for decryption.
  • the message can also be stored directly in a memory area of the security module application.
  • the messenger management function and that of the card microprocessor can be made by a single microprocessor contained in a such application security module.
  • the application security module is preferably included in the messenger.
  • the application security module can be included in the card, which thus achieves itself all or part of the decryption function.
  • the messenger In the first mode, to avoid fraud by using a fake card, the messenger is able to carry out a card authentication procedure. It is advantageous to use a memory card low-end telephone card type (calling card) so-called first generation simply performing a unit storage, identification and passive authentication (without microprocessor). But a second generation card is preferred (always without microprocessor) allowing to realize an active authentication procedure for it and possibly the messenger.
  • the messenger can perform a procedure authentication and / or identification recipient. Authentication is performed by example by the introduction of a secret code in the messenger at the latter's request. This secret code can also used to debit a bank type card.
  • recipient identification can be performed through a contained identification code in the map. These last two functions relating to identification and authentication can be accumulated.
  • the security module is advantageously used for several functions of the messenger, in particular for accommodate all or part of a circuit to authorize delivery of messages received, but also all or part of a decryption algorithm, and / or all or part of a circuit capable of recharging memory in prepaid units.
  • FIG. 1 shows a messenger in which he goes be possible to implement the process of invention control.
  • This messenger has a box 1 provided with a receiving circuit 2, for receive messages sent by a sender 3.
  • the transmitter 3 is a transmitter radio but it could be as well a database linked to terminals to which could if necessary connect messenger 1.
  • receiver 2 has a coil radio frequency 4 connected to an electronic circuit radio frequency interface 5.
  • the receiving circuit 2 ensures, in particular in the case of transmission radio, reception, detection, information and amplification of the radio signal received in the initial stages 6 and 7 of process ( Figure 2).
  • the interface 5 also performs, in the case of radio frequency transmission, the demodulation of the electrical signal received during a step 8.
  • the demodulation operation will include naturally a digitization step so that any further processing of the received message can be performed in binary. If the transmission is not radio steps 6 to 8 can be absent.
  • the messenger comprises a wired circuit where a microprocessor 9 which manages all of its operations.
  • the microprocessor 9 is in relationship via a bus 23 of data, addresses and commands with program memory 10, memories 11 and 12 and a display 13.
  • the display 13 is a liquid crystal screen.
  • the microprocessor 9 performs upon receipt a check of what the message received in the messenger is well intended for the messenger.
  • the message, figure 3 has two main elements on the one hand the address of the messenger 14 and on the other hand the content of the message.
  • Microprocessor 9 samples then in a memory 11 for parameterizing the messenger information relating to the address of this one.
  • this information can be kept secret and protected for example in a block of security.
  • This security is also preferred especially to reload in units prepaid in a memory of the messenger and / or the menu.
  • the microprocessor 9 verifies that the address in memory 11 is the same as the address in part 14 of the message. If successful during from an operation 17, the microprocessor 9 causes recording the message received in memory 12.
  • the memories 10, 11, 12 can moreover be combined into one that would have areas corresponding.
  • Memories 10 and 11 of non-type are preferably non-erasable, the memory non-volatile 12 is preferably erasable and reprogrammable.
  • the microprocessor 9 in implementing the receiving routine contained in memory 10 may cause transmission an alarm consecutive or simultaneous to the memorization.
  • the microprocessor 9 can also permanently display, or after the alarm, a menu 19, inviting the messenger to do appear his message.
  • the messenger of the state of the art also includes a keyboard 20 in connection with the microprocessor 9 to allow bearer to order the messenger and do deliver the message. Steps 18 and 19 may not exist, the wearer regularly consulting his message to find out if he has received messages.
  • the messenger in connection with a chip carrier, preferably a smart card 21.
  • the messenger includes an interface 22 connected to bus 23, address and order data 1.
  • the interface 22 includes a connector to get in touch with connection pads 24 of the chip 25 of the support 21.
  • the functional link chip carrier with messenger 1 can also be wireless in the case of a contactless smart card.
  • the chip 25 will comprise at least one of the following two memories: a unit memory prepaid 26 and a parameter memory 27. From preferably, it will include both. Of preferably also, it will include a microprocessor 28. The microprocessor 28 is not necessary if the microprocessor 9, for a mode of given operation is allowed to take hold of memories 26 and 27. This is generally the case for standard telephone smart cards.
  • the insertion of a chip carrier 21 in interface 22 will be detected, for example by a limit switch type 29 mounted in this interface 22.
  • This detection makes it possible to send an order by bus 23 to microprocessor 9 so that it launches a SECUR program. verification, that the carrier of the messenger is authorized to know and who must be issued.
  • the microprocessor 9, assisted by the need for microprocessor 28, on the one hand will check that the smart card inserted is a card suitable for working with messenger 1 and / or by a DEBIT program that the chip 25 includes in his memory 26 enough prepaid units still available to authorize the issuance of message that has been received and stored.
  • the microprocessor 28 assists, or rather takes over of microprocessor 9, it's because chip 25 has a program memory (not shown) connected to this microprocessor 28 as the memory 10 is connected to the microprocessor 9.
  • the two stages of card authentication chip and unit speed can be implemented individually or together whatever their order according to a verification method previously selected.
  • the messenger with a module 50 application security.
  • This is also connected to the bus 23. It allows in particular to implement, for messenger 1, an authentication protocol for carrier of the messenger. In this case it can operate without a smart card, its functions being all provided by this messenger module.
  • the telecommunications operator who manages the transmitter 3 can weight the cost of sending the message, function again of the length of the message, or depending on when the message is broadcast: off-peak hours, peak hours, or even depending on the national or international character of transmissions by transmitters 3 of the same message, account given that the carrier of the messenger may successively be in one or more regions of the world. It can also be linked to a profile access to certain messages (grouped by example) being subject to the presence of a profile contained in the card. The amount payable may possibly be dependent on this profile.
  • the authentication operation 31 implemented by the microprocessor 9 together with the microprocessor 28 is of the conventional type. It includes the comparison of a code entered with the keyboard 20 by the carrier of the messenger and the smart card 21 with a PIN code (secret or not) stored in memory 27. These verification operations may be subject to elsewhere in a manner known to the operations of encryption to prevent the PIN code stored in the support 21 may in the long run be discovered.
  • the memory 26 is for example a memory comprising type memory cells non-volatile, only programmable: their passage from a blank or erased state to a programmed state being equivalent to a consumption of units.
  • the units can also be constituted by the presence of fuses which are blown successively.
  • the memory 26 is of the erasable type and programmable.
  • the support 21 can be reported as previously reported to services of the operator who manages the transmitter 3 so that it recharges them, against payment of course.
  • the date 32 recorded in memory 27 is also reprogrammed from so that this memory, at least for this part, would be of the erasable and programmable type.
  • She preferably include cells in this case EEPROM type memories.
  • Messenger's memory 12 contains recordings of messages received and stored at step 17. Each record includes, in this memory 12 a serial number 36, possibly a summary description 37, allowing the wearer of the messenger to get an idea of the recorded message. Each record still has a zone 38 relating to the message itself and an area 39 usable in case units had to be counted down to allow delivery of the message.
  • the zone 39 can itself comprise two sub-zones, one first subzone 40, optional, of flow in which shows the number of units that would have to be paid to be able to see the message, and an area 41 in which shows the number of units already paid for allow delivery of the message. Zone 41 may not contain only one bit indicating according to its state that the card 21 has already been debited in its zone 26 or that it was not.
  • the unit debit transaction 35 At the time that the unit debit transaction 35 was done, it remains to go read memory 12 at during an operation 42.
  • This operation 42 carried out by the microprocessor 9 is of course only launched insofar as operations 30, 31 and 35 prior have been successful (all or one of them they only according to the operating mode selected).
  • the content of the message recorded in zone 38 i.e. a message figure.
  • the microprocessor 9, or possibly the microprocessor 28 cause decryption 43 of this message using a key which is contained in an area 44 of the memory 27.
  • the message is broadcast.
  • the simplest issue is to display the message on screen 13. However, it is possible, if messenger 1 has a loudspeaker and circuits for converting a written message into a speech message, to deliver the message orally memorized.
  • the message decryption will always be performed at the end, so as to store only encrypted information in zone 38. In this case the presence of the card will preferably be necessary to take the key 44.
  • the messenger can be a messenger corresponding to multiple recipients it is possible to use as additional address information stored in memory 27 of the card chip, for example, serial number 46 thereof or even an address 47.
  • the address message contained in zone 14 of the message is no longer long than the useful address (the one that allows discriminate between different messengers). It involves an additional address 48.
  • messenger 1 receives the messages intended for several recipients.
  • Complements address 48 are then compared to serial numbers 46 or addresses 47 of the cards 21 and the microprocessor 9 does not authorize the delivery of a message to a user only if these numbers match the additional address 48.
  • the authorization according to the invention is therefore not given only if one or more of the following tests is passed: presence of card - authentic card - carrier authentication - date validity - number sufficient units - additional address. According to invention permission may also be given only if a conjunctive combination of these tests is successful. All combinations of these tests are possible.
  • the microprocessor on the card may replace that of the messenger: this being for example helpless, or at least unable to function as long as the card microprocessor is not in service.
  • the messenger circuit would feature as needed the circuits described for the card.
  • the authorization can act on the functioning of the messenger during all stages from transmission to delivery of the message.
  • the absence of authorization can inhibit reception, or storage or decryption by a function provided for this purpose.
  • the messenger may be physically unable to function: by example when the microprocessor of the messenger is contained only in the card, the messenger cannot only operate when this is introduced into the messenger and / or that she has a sufficient balance.
  • the messenger can receive the message but the user is not notified of receipt only if a card is inserted and it has enough credit. This avoids use minimum of a messenger consisting in receiving only warning signs.
  • the warning can take different forms by example of sound, light, etc.
  • the card can be permanently inserted and for that it can take a reduced format such as the "Plug in” format.
  • the transmitter can issue an instruction inhibition of the messenger's functioning in question. This can be done from different ways below.
  • Space 34 of the message can contain in the index 350, a datum, preferably encrypted, meaning that the user does not have permission.
  • a consumption index 350 greater than a value any existing balance is sufficient to prevent the delivery of the message, when it is subordinate sufficient credit.
  • the message can contain a space reserved for authorization data systematically sent with each message, by the sender which thus controls the use of the service.
  • the verification of the authorization may consist of systematically compare the data received, via the message, with secret and protected data contained in a messenger security block such as a module Application Security (SAM).
  • SAM Application Security
  • calls to a user not up to date with his subscription are hijacked or blocked by the transmitter (operator). That implies that the verification is carried out before the publication of the message by the sender.
  • the control / verification process may include for this purpose a step consisting in comparing all the addresses of the messengers contained in the messages in waiting to be issued by the operator, with a list of addresses corresponding to irregular users (not up to date with their subscription), and to prohibit the transmission when there is an adequacy of addresses.
  • means for storing this list and means of computer comparison at transmitter level for example a microcomputer, and means for selecting messages by address 14 associated with them.
  • Such means are of the type known.
  • the card can have a specific life it either rechargeable or not.
  • new cards may include new ones security algorithms.
  • the card can include a deadline stored in memory and a subroutine provided for this purpose. According to this program, we compare the deadline to a date transmission of the message included in each message. When there is adequacy, the messenger refuses to operate for example by refusing to issue the signal and / or message.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
EP97401610A 1996-07-05 1997-07-04 Verfahren zur Steuerung der Benutzung eines Rufempfängers, nach diesem Verfahren arbeitender Rufempfänger und Chipkarte für bedingten Zugang eines Rufempfängers Expired - Lifetime EP0817144B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
MXPA/A/1996/000261A MXPA96000261A (en) 1996-01-17 Rotating reactor for precise nixtamalization demaiz that does not break the grain, does not produce naxayoteni genera contaminante alg
MX9600261 1996-07-05
FR9613370 1996-10-31
FR9613370 1996-10-31

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0817144A1 true EP0817144A1 (de) 1998-01-07
EP0817144B1 EP0817144B1 (de) 2000-09-27

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EP97401610A Expired - Lifetime EP0817144B1 (de) 1996-07-05 1997-07-04 Verfahren zur Steuerung der Benutzung eines Rufempfängers, nach diesem Verfahren arbeitender Rufempfänger und Chipkarte für bedingten Zugang eines Rufempfängers

Country Status (10)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0817144B1 (de)
CN (1) CN1228861A (de)
AR (1) AR007817A1 (de)
AT (1) ATE196696T1 (de)
AU (1) AU3547597A (de)
BR (1) BR9711000A (de)
CA (1) CA2259528A1 (de)
DE (1) DE69703185D1 (de)
RU (1) RU99102178A (de)
WO (1) WO1998001836A1 (de)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2002005234A1 (fr) * 2000-07-07 2002-01-17 Xiring Procede et dispositif pour recolter et visualiser des informations transmises par ondes electromagnetiques
EP1198766A2 (de) * 1999-02-04 2002-04-24 Motorola, Inc. Drahtlose teilnehmereinheit und verfahren zur verwaltung chipkartendaten.

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6716103B1 (en) 1999-10-07 2004-04-06 Nintendo Co., Ltd. Portable game machine

Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2222287A (en) * 1988-06-30 1990-02-28 Nec Corp Paging receiver preventing unauthorised access to message
EP0360228A2 (de) * 1988-09-20 1990-03-28 Casio Computer Company Limited Rufempfänger
WO1992017006A1 (en) * 1991-03-18 1992-10-01 Motorola, Inc. Selective call receiver with secured message presentation
EP0538933A1 (de) * 1991-10-14 1993-04-28 Philips Electronics Uk Limited Kommunikationsempfänger mit einer im voraus bezahlten Identitätskarte
GB2267168A (en) * 1992-05-21 1993-11-24 Star Paging Method of numeric key control of a pager and pager using numeric key control method
US5283832A (en) * 1991-10-22 1994-02-01 Motorola, Inc. Paging message encryption
US5414418A (en) * 1993-05-03 1995-05-09 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for pre-programming and subsequently designating a response characteristic of a selective call receiver

Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2222287A (en) * 1988-06-30 1990-02-28 Nec Corp Paging receiver preventing unauthorised access to message
EP0360228A2 (de) * 1988-09-20 1990-03-28 Casio Computer Company Limited Rufempfänger
WO1992017006A1 (en) * 1991-03-18 1992-10-01 Motorola, Inc. Selective call receiver with secured message presentation
EP0538933A1 (de) * 1991-10-14 1993-04-28 Philips Electronics Uk Limited Kommunikationsempfänger mit einer im voraus bezahlten Identitätskarte
US5283832A (en) * 1991-10-22 1994-02-01 Motorola, Inc. Paging message encryption
GB2267168A (en) * 1992-05-21 1993-11-24 Star Paging Method of numeric key control of a pager and pager using numeric key control method
US5414418A (en) * 1993-05-03 1995-05-09 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for pre-programming and subsequently designating a response characteristic of a selective call receiver

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1198766A2 (de) * 1999-02-04 2002-04-24 Motorola, Inc. Drahtlose teilnehmereinheit und verfahren zur verwaltung chipkartendaten.
EP1198766A4 (de) * 1999-02-04 2003-01-22 Motorola Inc Drahtlose teilnehmereinheit und verfahren zur verwaltung chipkartendaten.
WO2002005234A1 (fr) * 2000-07-07 2002-01-17 Xiring Procede et dispositif pour recolter et visualiser des informations transmises par ondes electromagnetiques

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
BR9711000A (pt) 2001-11-20
RU99102178A (ru) 2001-01-27
DE69703185D1 (de) 2000-11-02
WO1998001836A1 (fr) 1998-01-15
CA2259528A1 (fr) 1998-01-15
AU3547597A (en) 1998-02-02
AR007817A1 (es) 1999-11-24
CN1228861A (zh) 1999-09-15
EP0817144B1 (de) 2000-09-27
ATE196696T1 (de) 2000-10-15

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