EP0791800A1 - Anti-Raketen Rakete - Google Patents

Anti-Raketen Rakete Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0791800A1
EP0791800A1 EP96102569A EP96102569A EP0791800A1 EP 0791800 A1 EP0791800 A1 EP 0791800A1 EP 96102569 A EP96102569 A EP 96102569A EP 96102569 A EP96102569 A EP 96102569A EP 0791800 A1 EP0791800 A1 EP 0791800A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
missile
seeker
threat
guidance
target
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Granted
Application number
EP96102569A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0791800B1 (de
Inventor
Lynn Boyer
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Individual
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Individual
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Priority to DE69623748T priority Critical patent/DE69623748D1/de
Priority to EP19960102569 priority patent/EP0791800B1/de
Publication of EP0791800A1 publication Critical patent/EP0791800A1/de
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Publication of EP0791800B1 publication Critical patent/EP0791800B1/de
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    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
    • F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
    • F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems

Definitions

  • This invention generally relates to anti-missile missiles and more particularly concerns such missiles having means to render the guidance components of an incoming precision seeker guided threat missile inoperative for performing the mission of guiding the incoming missile to a target without requiring that the anti-missile impact with the incoming threat missile.
  • PSGM seeker guided munitions
  • PK probability of kill
  • a precision, seeker guided munition is any munition, free fall or propelled that can be guided to its target via an onboard seeker and control system.
  • the PSGMs addressed here are those that are either guided autonomously, that is, have an onboard or integral seeker and electronics sophisticated enough to recognize a target by shape, energy emissions/reflectance, comparison to a reference or other means, or are guided remotely but with the controller receiving target information through an on-munition seeker.
  • PSGMs are characterized by their high PK and extreme lethality. PSGMs are a major threat, in all areas of combat, land, air and afloat. Man portable, seeker guided precision anti-aircraft missiles have the potential to be a significant terrorist threat to civil aviation.
  • Camouflage is attempted through paints that change the visual or energy reflective/emissive characteristic of a potential targets or by nets or materials that physically screen the target. Additional defensive ploys include decoys, obscurants, shoot downs and maneuver.
  • Decoys attempt to mislead a precision guided munition so that is misses the target (flares and chaff are excellent examples), obscurants (smoke) hide the target behind an aerosol particulant distribution through which the target cannot be identified and methods are being attempted to shoot down a precision guided weapon, physically by blast or kinetics (thus far unsuccessful due to the small size, high speed and short flight time), or to disable the precision guided munitions seeker by directed energy, typically laser, thus rendering the missile unable to track its intended target. Additionally, maneuver may be used if the target can perform vector or positional changes that exceed the PSGMs seekers ability to track or flight control system to compensate for to obtain a hit. Other methods described have varying degrees of success against different types of precision guided munitions. None is perfect, none works against all threats, and none works, singly or in combination, with a high degree of assurity to negate the threat of PSGMs.
  • PSGMs have several systems components in common. All PSGMs are minimally possessed of a seeker, a commanding system, a guidance system, a maneuvering (flight control) system and a warhead.
  • precision guided munitions broadly encompasses everything from free fall bombs fitted with a seeker and flight control mechanism, artillery projectiles fitted with a seeker and fight control mechanism, to self propelled fire and forget anti-armor, anti-aircraft or anti-ship missiles. Analysis of these systems reveals that the common items are the seeker, command system, flight controls and warhead.
  • the warheads are fairly stable compounds that must be detonated by a specific firing impulse from a specific mechanism. Warheads are extremely difficult to detonate prematurely.
  • the flight controls are mechanical devices or gas reaction jets that are controlled in a number of different ways depending upon the munition. They are robust mechanisms not easily disrupted by external influences.
  • the command system is either an onboard system or a remote system connected through cables to the launching vehicle. Because of the wide variety of possible commanding sources, a single mechanism able to defeat several or all of the command system types if not considered practical. Practically all precision guided munitions contain a seeker that receives, then passes information to an onboard guidance system or to a remote system. The seeker on a precision guided munition may be tailored to any or several portions of the energy spectrum, however the point of similarity is that all seekers must receive energy to track their intended target.
  • the energy reception portion of the seeker is a delicate and sensitive mechanism and is always protected by being located behind a window (faring, nose cone, glass, etc.) that is transparent to the energy frequency of interest. Disruption, degradation, elimination or overload of energy receipt by the seeker effectively binds the PSGM.
  • a blind PSGMs probability of striking its intended target decreases as a function of the distance away from the target the munition is blinded, the dynamics of the atmosphere through which the munition is moving, the control laws governing the munitions flight path and the maneuverability and ability of the intended target to change location.
  • Defense against PSGMs may be achieved by blinding the inbound missile's seeker, or disabling/degrading the incoming missile seekers ability to differentiate or perceive its target. Blinding is achieved by inserting a shield such as an inert or incandescent cloud of material in front of and intersecting an inbound munitions flight path so that the energy transparency characteristics of the precision, seeker guided munition's seeker aperture or the total energy received by the seeker are changed when the PSGM views and/or transits the dispersed material cloud. Obviously the nose of the missile, containing the energy aperture or "window" as the foremost component, transits the shield first and will be impacted by whatever the shielding material consists of.
  • the "window" on the nose of the missile through which energy must pass to be received by the seeker, may be crazed, cracked, abraded and or coated to either scatter inbound energy so that target source is no longer discernible/identifiable, or energy receipt is sufficiently outside seeker parameters so that the received energy is beyond the seekers perception threshold.
  • the material of the shield may or may not have obscurant characteristics similar to that of well known and documented smoke (normally white phosphorous) or other obscurants. While the dispersed material may (though it does not have to) obscure the intend target, the purpose of the dispersed material is to change the energy reception of the threat PSGMs seeker so that the seeker is no longer able to maintain a track on the intended target. With smoke or obscurants, once the PSGM has transited the obscurant cloud, it is again able to reacquire and track a target.
  • an object of the present invention to provide an anti-missile missile with means to render the guidance system of an incoming threat missile inoperative for performing the function of guiding the incoming missile to a predetermined target.
  • Figure 1 is a diagrammatic illustration of a typical precision seeker guided missile in its trajectory to a target.
  • Figure 2 is a view similar to Figure 1 but illustrates the missile of Figure 1 being intercepted by a shield in the form of a cloud of material capable of rendering the guidance system of the incoming threat missile incapable of operating properly.
  • Figure 3 is a view similar to Figure 2 and illustrates the "blinded" trajectory of the incoming threat missile responsive to being intercepted by the shield of the present invention.
  • Figures 4a-4c are diagrammatic elevational views of various states of a missile seeker.
  • Figure 4a illustrates a typical seeker which has not been exposed to the shield means of the present invention and thereby permits energy from the target to pass there through to the guidance components of the missile and thus enable the threat missile to reach its target.
  • Figure 4b illustrates a missile seeker which has been subjected to the shield means of the present invention which has caused the seeker to be coated, crazed, cracked, eroded or overloaded and has destroyed its ability to track.
  • Figure 4c illustrates a coated seeker aperture in which no or insufficient energy passes to the control components of the threat missile.
  • Figure 5-8 illustrates various munitions in which the shield material of the present invention may be housed for transport to the intercept point with the incoming threat missile.
  • Figure 5 is an elevational view of a guided time fuzed missile.
  • Figure 6 is an elevational view of a guided, seeker missile.
  • Figure 7 is an elevational view of an unguided missile.
  • Figure 8 is an elevational view of a guided projectile.
  • Figure 9 is a diagrammatic view of the shield ejection system including an initiator for initiating an explosive which fractures the container for dispersion of the shield material to the atmosphere.
  • Figure 10 is a view similar to Figure 9 but illustrates an explosive initiator for opening ports through which the shield material is released to the atmosphere.
  • Figure 11 is a plan view of the embodiment of the shield means wherein an adhering strip of material is provided with electrical conductors therein.
  • Figure 12 is a diagrammatic view of a wire guided threat missile having tracking wires which are shown to be electrically shorted by the strips as shown in Figure 11.
  • an incoming threat missile 10 is in a trajectory 12 ending at a target 14, illustrated as being a tank.
  • the trajectory typically includes an initial portion 16 which places the missile in the vicinity of the target and terminal portion 18 in which final course adjustments are made to assure impact of the missile with or in the immediate vicinity of the target 14.
  • Missile 10 is shown to include a seeker 20 mounted at the forward end of the missile to receive energy containing target information. This energy may be radar, electrical impulses, laser beams, heat energy and any other type of reflection or transmissions containing target information. The received energy cooperates with guidance and control components to direct the missile to a target in known manner.
  • Figure 2 illustrates an intercept missile 22 having a body 24 including a container portion 26 for containing a shield dispersant 28.
  • Figure 2 illustrates the container portion as being ruptured and a dispersant 28 as having been ejected therefrom in the form of a cloud 30.
  • Figure 3 illustrates the "blinding effect" created on the incoming threat missile as a result of the guidance component (seeker) being exposed to the dispersant cloud of Figure 2.
  • the incoming threat vehicle although not destroyed by impact is incapable of receiving guidance information from the sensor and, therefore, is incapable of being guided to the target.
  • Figure 4a illustrates a seeker aperture 32 which has not been subjected to the shield dispersants of the present invention.
  • the unaffected seeker aperture 32 passes the incoming energy to a seeker energy receptor or antenna 34 and onto a seeker processor 36 which processes the incoming energy signals, in known manner, to guide the missile to the target.
  • the seeker aperture 32 is illustrated as having been subjected to a dispersant containing particulants of a predetermined size and as a result has become crazed, cracked, eroded or overloaded so as to render it inoperative to pass energy to the antenna or processor.
  • Figure 4c is a view similar to Figure 4a, wherein like numerals refer to like parts, but illustrates the seeker aperture as having been subjected to a coating 37 dispersant and as a result has become coated so as to blind it to incoming energy and thus render it inoperative to pass energy to the antenna or processor.
  • Figures 5-8 illustrate various anti-missile missiles in which the dispersant may be housed for transport to the intercept point with the incoming threat missile.
  • a guided time fuzed missile 40 is shown to include a body 42 having forward a forward flight control section 41 and an aft propulsion section 43 respectively provided with flight control fins 44 and 46.
  • Section 41 includes a computer/guidance section 48, a dispersant container 50 for enclosing the shield dispersant, and a container ejection section 51 for ejecting the container 50 from the missile body, if desired.
  • Figure 6 is a view similar to Figure 5, wherein like numerals refer to like parts, and illustrates a guided, seeker missile 54 containing all of the above-identified sections plus an initiator 52 such as a timer/seeker/sensor at the tip of the container to aid in guiding the anti-missile missile in its trajectory to a target and to provide an electrical signal for actuating the dispersant release mechanism at the desired time.
  • an initiator 52 such as a timer/seeker/sensor at the tip of the container to aid in guiding the anti-missile missile in its trajectory to a target and to provide an electrical signal for actuating the dispersant release mechanism at the desired time.
  • Figure 7 is an elevational view of an unguided missile 54 which is merely shot, unguided, into the path of the threat missile and includes a container/casing 50 enclosing the dispersant and initiator 52 such as a time/sensor/seeker at the forward tip of the body of the projectile.
  • the initiator provides an electrical pulse to actuate the dispersant release means as will be described hereinbelow.
  • Figure 8 is a view similar to Figure 7 wherein like reference numerals refer to like parts, and illustrates a guided missile 56 as having the initiator 52 (such as a time/seeker/sensor) at the forward tip of the container and a guidance and control section 48 and fins 62 at the aft end of the missile. No aft propulsion section is required in this type of missile (projectile).
  • the initiator 52 such as a time/seeker/sensor
  • Figure 9 illustrates a mechanism for rupturing the dispersant container.
  • the mechanism includes a pressurizing container 64 which provides pressure to expel the dispersant from the container.
  • initiator 52 ignites an explosive device 68 through an exploding bridge wire 69 or the like and this detonation releases pressure from pressurizing container 64 to pressurize and rupture the dispersant container 50 so that the dispersant may be expelled to the atmosphere.
  • Figure 10 illustrates the dispersant container 50 as being provided with ports 70 around the periphery thereof.
  • the ports are covered with a membrane or closure member 72 which is structurally weaker than the container and is ruptured responsive to pressurization of the container by the source of pressure 64 which is actuated by a signal from an initiator 52. Upon rupturing of the closure member 72, the dispersant is expelled to the atmosphere.
  • FIG 11 illustrates a shield 74 used to disable incoming wire guided missiles.
  • Shield 74 includes a strip of adhering material 75 having electrically conductive members 76 carried thereon.
  • Figure 12 illustrates a wire guided threat missile 80 having wires 78 connected thereto and to a control console.
  • wire guided missiles are known in the art.
  • the wires transmit guidance and control information to the missile for directing the missile to a target. If an electrical short occurs in the wires, target information cannot be received by the missile.
  • the present invention provides a means whereby such an electrical short can be made to occur. This is accomplished by providing missile 10 with a shield container 50 which contains the conductive adhering strips 74 of Figure 11 and ejecting this shield material in the manner discussed supra, the adhering conductive strips will adhere to the trailing wires and provide an electrical short in the wires.
  • the device used to blind a PSGM consists, minimally, of a dispersant delivery mechanism/system, a dispersant ejection mechanism and a dispersant of "blinding" material.
  • the shield means delivery mechanism/system of the present invention in its most basic form can be as simple as a container/casing that is projected/shot to intercept the inbound flight path of the threat precision, seeker guided missile.
  • An initiator such as a timer (time determined and set by the launching mechanism) or an in-projectile sensor activator initiates the dispersant mechanism when the threat missiles flight path is intercepted.
  • Figures 7 and 8 illustrate such delivery system. Complexity and sophistication can be increased such that the delivery system is self propelled, contains a guidance, control and seeker systems and has the capacity to detect the inbound precision guided munition, project its flight path, plot it's own flight path to an intercept point and initiate dispersion at a optimal time for maximum pattern penetration by the inbound munition.
  • Figures 5 and 6 illustrate such delivery systems.
  • the dispersion mechanism can be any of a multitude of well known methods or mechanisms.
  • the dispersion mechanism may be as simple as the fracturing of the casing of the material container and using the relative air stream velocity as the dispersant force.
  • the dispersion mechanism may be mechanical (spring, gas, pyrotechnique, etc.) that either fractures the case and disperses the material or ejects the material through orifices, ports or other exits.
  • the dispersion mechanism may be an explosive or pyrotechnique that is separate from the dispersant material, embedded in the dispersant material or be a component of the dispersant material.
  • the dispersed material is used to change the characteristics (amount) of energy entering said aperture to thereby affect the operational capabilities of the guidance and control components. This is accomplished by altering the energy transmissivity of the PSGMs energy receiving aperture by destroying or modifying the energy transparent aperture on the PSGM through which the energy must pass in its traverse to the guidance and control system or by overloading the seeker's sensing capability.
  • the material may be one of, or a combination of the following:
  • the present invention lends itself to incorporation into or with other defensive systems, either as a separate component or as a part of another munition
  • proposals have been made to build small munitions that would destroy inbound threat munitions by kinetic kill or near explosion.
  • the addition of the blinding mechanism and materials to a kinetic kill or explosive warhead munition would materially expand the probability that the munition would render the inbound threat ineffective.
  • the blinding mechanism and material would be deployed as described and the kinetic kill or explosive warhead would continue as designed and attempt to kill the inbound threat. If an explosive or kinetic kill were not achieved, the deployed blinding materials would achieve, what in military parlance is known as a "soft" kill, as a back-up.
  • Such a system would greatly enhance the probability of rendering the threat munition ineffective.
  • missile refers to an object which is launched toward a target.
  • objects include guided or ballistic missiles, rocket propelled vehicles and other munitions and projectiles.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Aiming, Guidance, Guns With A Light Source, Armor, Camouflage, And Targets (AREA)
EP19960102569 1996-02-21 1996-02-21 Anti-Raketen Rakete Expired - Lifetime EP0791800B1 (de)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE69623748T DE69623748D1 (de) 1996-02-21 1996-02-21 Anti-Raketen Rakete
EP19960102569 EP0791800B1 (de) 1996-02-21 1996-02-21 Anti-Raketen Rakete

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP19960102569 EP0791800B1 (de) 1996-02-21 1996-02-21 Anti-Raketen Rakete

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EP0791800A1 true EP0791800A1 (de) 1997-08-27
EP0791800B1 EP0791800B1 (de) 2002-09-18

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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2010147520A1 (en) * 2009-06-16 2010-12-23 Saab Ab System, apparatus and method for protection of a vehicle against a possible threat
CN104122793A (zh) * 2014-07-01 2014-10-29 中国人民解放军海军航空工程学院 一种满足预设性能的导弹过载控制方法
CN110695948A (zh) * 2019-08-30 2020-01-17 江西洪都航空工业集团有限责任公司 一种适应自动挂载的导弹标记方法
CN114432625A (zh) * 2022-02-16 2022-05-06 宇称智控(北京)科技有限公司 一种远距离精确制导灭火弹

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102004059254A1 (de) * 2004-12-09 2006-06-14 Diehl Bgt Defence Gmbh & Co. Kg Bistatische Radarsensoreinrichtung

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4196668A (en) * 1975-11-18 1980-04-08 Morlock Guenter E Stopping operating enemy vehicles, vessels and aircrafts
FR2486421A1 (de) * 1980-07-09 1982-01-15 Gauchard Fernand
US5194687A (en) * 1992-03-05 1993-03-16 Moishe Garfinkle Means of disabling tactical armored vehicles
EP0557200A1 (de) * 1992-02-21 1993-08-25 Etienne Lacroix - Tous Artifices Sa Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Unschädlichmachen einer Bedrohung durch Freigabe eines Neutralisationsmittels

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4196668A (en) * 1975-11-18 1980-04-08 Morlock Guenter E Stopping operating enemy vehicles, vessels and aircrafts
FR2486421A1 (de) * 1980-07-09 1982-01-15 Gauchard Fernand
EP0557200A1 (de) * 1992-02-21 1993-08-25 Etienne Lacroix - Tous Artifices Sa Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Unschädlichmachen einer Bedrohung durch Freigabe eines Neutralisationsmittels
US5194687A (en) * 1992-03-05 1993-03-16 Moishe Garfinkle Means of disabling tactical armored vehicles

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2010147520A1 (en) * 2009-06-16 2010-12-23 Saab Ab System, apparatus and method for protection of a vehicle against a possible threat
EP2443412A4 (de) * 2009-06-16 2015-05-27 Saab Ab System, vorrichtung und verfahren für den schutz eines fahrzeuges vor möglichen gefahren
CN104122793A (zh) * 2014-07-01 2014-10-29 中国人民解放军海军航空工程学院 一种满足预设性能的导弹过载控制方法
CN104122793B (zh) * 2014-07-01 2016-11-09 中国人民解放军海军航空工程学院 一种满足预设性能的导弹过载控制方法
CN110695948A (zh) * 2019-08-30 2020-01-17 江西洪都航空工业集团有限责任公司 一种适应自动挂载的导弹标记方法
CN114432625A (zh) * 2022-02-16 2022-05-06 宇称智控(北京)科技有限公司 一种远距离精确制导灭火弹

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0791800B1 (de) 2002-09-18
DE69623748D1 (de) 2002-10-24

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