EP0475219B1 - Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge - Google Patents

Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0475219B1
EP0475219B1 EP91114645A EP91114645A EP0475219B1 EP 0475219 B1 EP0475219 B1 EP 0475219B1 EP 91114645 A EP91114645 A EP 91114645A EP 91114645 A EP91114645 A EP 91114645A EP 0475219 B1 EP0475219 B1 EP 0475219B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
radiation
sensor elements
sensor
irradiation
infrared
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP91114645A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP0475219A1 (fr
Inventor
Peter Steiner
David Siegwart
Markus Rechsteiner
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Cerberus AG
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Cerberus AG
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Publication of EP0475219A1 publication Critical patent/EP0475219A1/fr
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G08SIGNALLING
    • G08BSIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B29/00Checking or monitoring of signalling or alarm systems; Prevention or correction of operating errors, e.g. preventing unauthorised operation
    • G08B29/02Monitoring continuously signalling or alarm systems
    • G08B29/04Monitoring of the detection circuits
    • G08B29/046Monitoring of the detection circuits prevention of tampering with detection circuits

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an infrared intrusion detector according to the preamble of patent claim 1.
  • Such a passive infrared intrusion detector is known for example from EP-A1-0'189'536 and is used to detect an object that has entered a monitored area, e.g. to detect an intruder by means of the infrared intrinsic radiation emitted by it and to trigger an alarm signal via the evaluation circuit.
  • the detector housing is closed in the direction of irradiation by a window that is open to the infrared radiation to be detected, e.g. for the body radiation of a person in the range of about 5 to 15 »m, preferably from 7 to 12» m, is permeable, but largely impermeable to shorter-wave radiation.
  • the opacity of the window for infrared radiation for example as a result of a sabotage attempt, can be recognized and signaled by the fact that an infrared radiation source is attached to the outside of the housing, through the window through a reflector irradiated the sensor. If this radiation is reduced, an interference signal is emitted.
  • an infrared radiation source is attached to the outside of the housing, through the window through a reflector irradiated the sensor. If this radiation is reduced, an interference signal is emitted.
  • the detectors mentioned with multiple sensors or dual sensors with at least two separate sensor elements or radiation-sensitive surfaces or flakes this is only possible incompletely and as a rule purely by accident as a result of unintentional irregularities, since the elements are operated in pairs in a differential or quotient circuit become.
  • the radiation source or the reflector in the known detector is arranged asymmetrically, for example outside the plane of symmetry formed by the sensor elements. In order to obtain sufficient differential radiation, however, a relatively large power of the radiation source is required. The necessary precision of the radiation also requires a precise adjustment of the radiation source and the optical arrangement.
  • the invention has for its object to eliminate the disadvantages of the infrared intrusion detectors of the prior art and in particular to improve an infrared intrusion detector of the type mentioned in such a way that the infrared transmission of its entrance window in a simpler manner, without the need for complex adjustment and with reduced energy consumption can be monitored.
  • a gradual decrease is understood here to mean a decrease in the same direction along a certain distance, be it gradually or in small steps, so that a flank with a certain extent is created.
  • the further optical arrangement can preferably be designed as an aspherical reflector, which at the location of the sensor produces an elongated radiation spot running transversely to the axis of symmetry with an intensity gradually decreasing from a maximum in the center toward the sides, the reflector being arranged somewhat obliquely, that the sensor elements come to rest on the flank of the intensity curve and are irradiated unevenly regardless of a precise adjustment of the reflector.
  • the further optical arrangement is designed as a segment mirror, the individual, for example approximately spherical mirror segments each generating an irradiation spot corresponding to the shape of the radiation source and inclined towards one another in such a way that the individual irradiation spots overlap somewhat and a stair-shaped course of radiation transverse to Plane of symmetry result.
  • the step width is selected to be smaller than the distance between the sensor elements, then the two sensor elements inevitably come to lie on different stair steps with different radiation intensity without the need for an exact adjustment. Since artificially generated differences in intensity are used, the desired effect can be achieved with low power of the radiation source.
  • the power required can be reduced even further by designing the radiation source as a relatively thin resistance layer with a low heat capacity, which permits high-frequency modulation of the radiation and the generation of short pulses.
  • the passive infrared intrusion detector shown in FIG. 1 has a housing 1 with a radiation entrance window 2 arranged in a recess 10 in the front wall, and in the interior an infrared sensor 3 and an optical arrangement 4 which detects the intrusion from at least one monitored sensitivity range infrared radiation impinging on the window 2 is directed or bundled onto the sensor 3.
  • the entrance window 2 is made of an at least in the wavelength range of human body radiation, ie in the range around 10 »m, preferably between 5 and 15 »M, in particular from 7 to 12» m, transparent material, advantageously, but not necessarily, for other wavelengths, eg for visible light, but opaque.
  • the window can consist of a suitable plastic, a special glass or silicon.
  • the sensor 3 is sensitive in the same wavelength range and can be designed, for example, as a pyroelectric sensor. If necessary, a special infrared filter can be provided in front of the sensor to absorb other wavelengths.
  • the optical arrangement is analogously designed to be reflective in the same spectral range and expediently has a plurality of mirror segments 4.1, 4.2 ... 4.5 with which an analog number of sensitivity ranges for the sensor are generated, such as e.g. in US-A-3,703,718 or US-A-4,058,726.
  • the sensor 3 is designed as a dual sensor with two sensor elements 8, 9 arranged side by side on both sides of a symmetry plane, so that each mirror segment 4.1 ... 4.5 forms a pair of sensitivity areas, one of which is assigned to one of the two sensor elements 8, 9. Even in the case of a reflector 4 formed in one piece, two sensitivity ranges are created. With an analog effect, more than two sensor elements can also be present.
  • the sensor 3 is connected to a suitable evaluation circuit which responds specifically and selectively to changes in the sensor output signal caused by radiation changes, such as those caused by an intruder crossing a pair of sensitivity ranges. This circuit can e.g.
  • a differential circuit connected to the two or a pair of sensor elements 8, 9, which only emits an output signal if the radiation of the two sensor elements 8, 9 is unequal.
  • an alarm signal is triggered via a discriminator circuit connected to it when the sensor output signal has two successive pulses of different polarity, i.e. positive and negative, which is characteristic of the movement of an intruder through a pair of sensitivity areas.
  • the penetration detector described responds to the infrared radiation emitted by a person and modulated in a certain way.
  • the entrance window 2 of the detector is covered with a layer which is opaque to infrared radiation, but which is translucent the working time, when the system is disarmed, can easily be effected with a suitable spray or varnish, the sensor of the detector can no longer receive evaluable radiation, so that the alarm system is ineffective when activated without the inoperability and the attempted sabotage without further investigation can be recognized.
  • an infrared radiation source 7 is provided on the shoulder of the recess 10 of the front wall of the housing, which irradiates the sensor 3 or its elements 8, 9 through the entrance window 2 via a further optical arrangement 6.
  • This radiation source 7 is designed and set up in such a way that it emits infrared radiation at least in the same wavelength range as a human person with a body temperature of 37 °.
  • a sufficiently intense test signal without the occurrence of excessively disruptive radiation of other wavelengths can be e.g. in training as a resistance element, which is heated to approx. 70 °.
  • the element 7 In order to be able to modulate this infrared radiation of the resistance element 7 particularly well, it is advantageous to design the element in such a way that its heat capacity is particularly low. This can e.g. can be achieved in that a thin resistance layer on an insulating substrate of about 20 to 100 »m thickness is used as the resistance element 7. Such layers can be in any form, e.g. as a meander pattern, using the screen printing process.
  • the two sensor elements In order to obtain an output signal at all in the case of a dual sensor 3 during the functional test, the two sensor elements must be irradiated to different degrees by the radiation source 7. There must be some asymmetry in the arrangement. Such a possibility is shown schematically in FIG. 2.
  • the further optical arrangement 6 consists of several practical versions of approximately four to seven or nine individual segment mirrors 6.1, 6.2 ... 6.5.
  • the radiation source 7 generates a corresponding radiation spot B1, B2 ... B5 over each of these segments 6.1 ... 6.5 in the plane of the sensor 3.
  • the individual segments 6.1 ... 6.5 are now aligned in such a way that the individual radiation spots B1 ... B5 are offset somewhat from one another transversely to the plane of symmetry S of the sensor elements 8, 9 and overlap.
  • the degree of mutual displacement db of adjacent radiation spots is chosen to be at most equal to the distance ds of the two sensor elements 8, 9.
  • the individual segments 6.1 ... 6.5 are aligned and / or arranged such that the center of the radiation is on the side, ie transversely to the plane of symmetry S of the sensor elements 8, 9 is offset. The result of this is that the sensor elements 8, 9 come to rest on the flank of the intensity profile of the radiation and automatically always experience different radiation, which delivers a sufficiently large test signal for signaling if the radiation is absent.
  • the further optical arrangement 6 can be designed as a spherical mirror, e.g. as an ellipsoidal mirror, the sensor 3 being mounted in one focal point, so that the radiation in the plane of symmetry S is focused on the sensor 3, while no strong bundling takes place perpendicularly thereto, as can be seen in FIG. 3 on the basis of the isolux curves.
  • the radiation maximum M is offset with respect to the sensor 3 and the sensor elements 8, 9 lie on the flanks of the radiation course, i.e. they receive different types of radiation.
  • FIGS. 4 a, b and c show the irradiation profile transverse to the plane of symmetry S for various optical arrangements 6 for function monitoring of the detector, in particular its entrance window 2.
  • FIG. 4a shows the intensity curve when using a spherical reflector in a previously known penetration detector.
  • a focus i.e. a more or less good image of the radiation source 7 in the plane of the sensor 3.
  • the radiation intensity B is fairly uniform in the middle and has a sharp drop in intensity at the edges. If the radiation maximum M is laterally offset with respect to the plane of symmetry S of the sensor elements 8, 9, the two elements 8, 9 still experience only a slightly different radiation difference dB. A larger difference could only be achieved if the sensor 3 came to lie exactly on the edge. However, this would require a very precise and precise adjustment of the arrangement. Even then, it would be difficult to avoid strong fluctuations in the output signal, which could occur in particular as a result of slow and gradual changes in the geometry and as a result of temperature fluctuations.
  • FIG. 4b shows the intensity curve when using an aspherical optical arrangement with an irradiation field according to FIG. 3.
  • the intensity B ' gradually falls from the center M towards the sides. If the If the sensor is on slopes of the flanks of the intensity curve B ', there is always an irradiation difference dB' in a certain area of the position, ie no precise adjustment or readjustment is necessary here.
  • FIG. 4c shows the intensity curve B ⁇ analogously in the case of an arrangement corresponding to FIG. 2 with a plurality of segment mirrors 6.1 ... 6.5.
  • the radiation intensity B ⁇ At the border of each radiation spot, there is a sudden change in the radiation intensity B ⁇ , which therefore runs in a step-like manner.
  • the lateral distance db of the stair treads is selected to be at most the same size or smaller as the distance ds of the sensor elements 8, 9, then the two sensor elements 8, 9 must inevitably lie on different steps outside the center M, so that they are always and independently the adjustment corresponds to the irradiation difference dB ⁇ of at least one step.
  • Safe function monitoring of the detector is possible with the lowest possible energy consumption of the radiation source 7.
  • the radiation source 7 can also be mounted asymmetrically in the detector.
  • the individual segments can also be aligned with the same radiation center, but have a different curvature and thus a different imaging scale and a different diameter of the radiation spots.
  • the radiation source can also be designed, for example, as a semiconductor component, for example as a zener diode, which is mounted on a glass substrate and in whose metal housing a radiation-permeable window is inserted.
  • a semiconductor component for example as a zener diode
  • an optically effective, for example lenticular, cover can be provided on the shoulder of the recess 10 of the housing front wall, which bundles the radiation from a large solid angle onto the test optics and thus further reduces the power consumption.
  • the radiation source 7 can also be arranged behind the shoulder of the depression 10, the shoulder being designed to be transparent to infrared radiation at least in the region of the radiation source 7, e.g. is made of polyethylene. So there are no elements that protrude on the outside of the housing or are mounted on it. Since the window 2 is already sunk in the housing 1, there is optimal protection against unwanted manipulation. It goes without saying that the window can also be designed as a Fresnel optic. At the edge of the window 2 opposite the radiation source 7, a further deflecting mirror can be provided behind the shoulder. Fresnel optics, which are included in the test beam path, can also be attached in the edge area of the window 2 in the region of the source 7 and the mirror. It is particularly advantageous that the radiation passes through the window 2 several times and the radiation is fanned out over an entire area, so that not only a single point of the window is monitored, but the entire window area.
  • An additional ultrasound monitoring system with at least one ultrasound emitter US1, US2 and an ultrasound receiver US3 has proven to be particularly advantageous for this purpose. This creates an ultrasound field in front of window 2, which is changed by each shield in front of the window. A specific change in sound pressure or sound propagation time can therefore be evaluated as a sign of the unauthorized attachment of a shield.
  • ultrasound in the frequency range of about 25 kHz is particularly advantageous since it has similar propagation properties to infrared light of about 10 »m wavelength; i.e. Shields that are translucent but impervious to infrared radiation can be recognized by means of ultrasound.
  • the ultrasound receiver US3 can additionally be used to detect a movement in front of the detector by evaluating a Doppler frequency shift of the ultrasound emitted by the ultrasound emitter US1 in a manner known per se. However, this movement evaluation can also be carried out periodically alternating with the sound field evaluation in order to detect any shielding become.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Photometry And Measurement Of Optical Pulse Characteristics (AREA)
  • Geophysics And Detection Of Objects (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge comprenant un capteur à infrarouge (3) entouré d'un boîtier (1) et ayant au moins deux éléments (8, 9) sensibles au rayonnement séparés, un dispositif optique (4) qui dirige sur le capteur (3), à travers une fenêtre (2) transparente au rayonnement infrarouge, du rayonnement infrarouge incident dans un domaine spectral donné à partir d'un domaine de sensibilité spatial au moins par élément (8, 9), un circuit d'exploitation destiné à la transmission du signal en cas de variation prédéterminée du rayonnement incident, ainsi qu'une source de rayonnement infrarouge (7) qui éclaire les éléments capteurs (8, 9) avec des intensités différentes à travers la fenêtre (2) et par l'intermédiaire d'un dispositif optique supplémentaire (4), le circuit d'exploitation produisant un signal de défaut en cas de modification relative prédéterminée de l'éclairement des éléments capteurs (8, 9) par la source de rayonnement (7), caractérisé en ce que le dispositif optique supplémentaire (6) est réalisé et/ou disposé d'une façon disymétrique telle par rapport au plan de symétrie (S) constitué par les deux éléments capteurs (8, 9) que l'intensité (B′, B˝) de l'éclairement produit par la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7) à l'endroit du capteur (3) transversalement aux éléments capteurs (8, 9) diminue graduellement en direction des côtés en partant d'un maximum (M) et en ce que les éléments capteurs (8, 9) se trouvent sur un flanc de la courbe de l'intensité (B′, B˝) de l'éclairement.
  2. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif optique supplémentaire (6) est réalisé sous forme de réflecteur non-sphérique qui focalise, au moins de manière approchée, le rayonnement de la source de rayonnement (7) uniquement en direction du plan de symétrie (S) des éléments capteurs (8, 9) tandis que l'éclairement (B′) diminue graduellement perpendicu-lairement au plan de symétrie (S) à partir du centre (M) avec une mise au point plus faible, les deux éléments capteurs (8, 9) se trouvant sur un flanc ayant une intensité d'éclairement décroissante.
  3. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le dispositif optique supplémentaire (6) possède plusieurs segments de miroir (6.1, 6.2 ... 6.5) qui produisent chacun, à l'emplacement du capteur (3), une tache d'illumination (B1, B2 ... B5), les taches d'illumination (B1, B2 ... B5) étant décalées les unes par rapport aux autres transversalement au plan de symétrie (S) des éléments capteurs (8, 9) et se chevauchant au moins partiellement de telle sorte que l'intensité d'éclairement (B˝) décroît en gradins à partir du centre (M) et que les éléments capteurs (8, 9) se trouvent sur des gradins différents.
  4. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 3, caractérisé en ce que la largeur (dB) des gradins de la courbe d'éclairement (B˝) transversalement au plan de symétrie (S) est au plus égale à la distance (ds) entre les deux éléments capteurs (8, 9).
  5. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon une des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que la fenêtre (2) est placée dans un renfoncement (10) du boîtier (1) et la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7) sur un épaulement de ce renfoncement (10).
  6. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce que la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7) est placée derrière l'épaulement du renfoncement (10) à l'intérieur du boîtier (1), I'épaulement étant transparent au rayonnement infrarouge au moins devant la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7).
  7. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 6, caractérisé en ce que l'épaulement du renfoncement (10) est réalisé sous forme de dispositif à effet optique, au moins à l'endroit de la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7).
  8. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon une des revendications 1 à 7, caractérisé en ce que la source de rayonnement infrarouge (7) est réalisée sous forme de résistance à couche mince sur un substrat isolant (7.1).
  9. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon la revendication 8, caractérisé en ce qu'une lentille de Fresnel (7.2) transparente au rayonnement infrarouge est disposée devant la résistance à couche mince (7) dont elle concentre le rayonnement.
  10. Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge selon l'une des revendications 1 à 9, caractérisé en ce que le boîtier (1) possède au moins un générateur à ultrasons (US1, US2) et au moins un récepteur à ultrasons (US3) qui crée un champ ultrasons devant la fenêtre (2) et en ce que le circuit d'exploitation est constitué de telle manière qu'il émette un signal en cas de modification prédéterminée du champ sonore.
EP91114645A 1990-09-05 1991-08-30 Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge Expired - Lifetime EP0475219B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CH2863/90A CH680882A5 (fr) 1990-09-05 1990-09-05
CH2863/90 1990-09-05

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0475219A1 EP0475219A1 (fr) 1992-03-18
EP0475219B1 true EP0475219B1 (fr) 1995-06-21

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EP91114645A Expired - Lifetime EP0475219B1 (fr) 1990-09-05 1991-08-30 Détecteur d'intrusion à infrarouge

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EP (1) EP0475219B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE124160T1 (fr)
CH (1) CH680882A5 (fr)
DE (1) DE59105775D1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1061489B1 (fr) * 1999-06-07 2004-08-25 Siemens Building Technologies AG Détecteur d'intrusion avec dispositif de surveillance contre un sabotage

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CH657928A5 (de) * 1981-11-25 1986-09-30 Eltec Instr Ag Anordnung fuer einen strahlungsdetektor mit mehreren sensorelementen und deren verwendung.
EP0189536B1 (fr) * 1985-01-08 1989-10-11 Cerberus Ag Détecteur infrarouge d'intrusion

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CH680882A5 (fr) 1992-11-30
DE59105775D1 (de) 1995-07-27
EP0475219A1 (fr) 1992-03-18
ATE124160T1 (de) 1995-07-15

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