EP0043027A1 - Verfahren und Anlage zum Prüfen der Echtheit einer elektronischen Unterschrift - Google Patents

Verfahren und Anlage zum Prüfen der Echtheit einer elektronischen Unterschrift Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0043027A1
EP0043027A1 EP81104628A EP81104628A EP0043027A1 EP 0043027 A1 EP0043027 A1 EP 0043027A1 EP 81104628 A EP81104628 A EP 81104628A EP 81104628 A EP81104628 A EP 81104628A EP 0043027 A1 EP0043027 A1 EP 0043027A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
message
user
vault
key
segment
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP81104628A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0043027B1 (de
Inventor
Willard Gail Bouricius
Horst Feistel
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International Business Machines Corp
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International Business Machines Corp
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Publication of EP0043027A1 publication Critical patent/EP0043027A1/de
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Expired legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0625—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution

Definitions

  • interference can, aside from wiretapping, take two forms: attempts to disrupt communications to prevent reception of intelligence, and attempts to corrupt, or to deceive legitimate operations into accepting false or obsolete information.
  • a still further threat is "Disruption.”
  • the foe no longer cares to remain in hiding, but actively disrupts communication by any (electronic) means available to him, including brute force signals.
  • the topic of countermeasures to Communications Disruption is enormous in scope and known to the military as “Anti-Jamming.” It is of lesser importance in non-military traffic, where one usually has the time to look for the intruder once his activity is known. Of interest here is merely the fact that cryptography has also an important role in Anti-Jamming.
  • the Vault now has the clear text BL1 and can hence check BC received against his local time BC. If both match within the agreed tolerances (determined by transmission distances and switching operations, etc.). The Vault will know the communication Cl must have originated from a legitimate source A. Station A has now been authenticated. The degree of authenticity of the data is simply determined by the dimension of digit block BC. Each digit in BC contributes one bit of authentication information. It is not possible to authenticate more efficiently.
  • the Vault now reads the address of the intended receiver B contained in S/R, and establishes key K in the same manner as it did K A . It then composes a new block BL2 consisting of S/R the - data D, and a new time count BC representing the current time at the Vault. This block BL2 is enciphered using key K B . The resulting cipher C2 is transmitted to B.
  • the present system uses a step coding technique which is very similar to data chaining.
  • a data chaining system reference is made to U.S. Patent No. 4,078,152 of L. B. Tuckerman, entitled “Block-Cipher Cryptographic System with Chaining.”
  • the decisive step here is that B will receive two pieces of information: Cipher C2 which he can read since the Vault enciphered it in his key K B" and cipher Cl which the Vault guarantees as being the authenticated original from A. B now has a copy of Cl, which can, in case of a disagreement, be deciphered in front of a legal arbiter. A cannot change his mind after he transmits Cl since the Vault can automatically certify emanation of Cl from A.
  • the next step then is to encipher blocks C and G, resulting in block H.
  • the cipher is then defined as We also note that in FIG. 8 where the notation denotes the encipherment or encryption of data D with key K using Crpto System ⁇ , and where the notation denotes the step encryption or encipherment of data D with Key K making use of the ⁇ Crypto System, Hy ⁇ -1 or ⁇ -1 we denote the decryption or deciphering process.
  • Vault The facility called the "Vault” plays a decisive role in the present system and its function will now be described.
  • the key list would then contain the names of all members along with the special encipherment of the key assigned to them.
  • Member A desiring to communicate with member B would transmit Cl (as explained before) along with his name A in the clear to the Vault.
  • the system now separates the two components of the vector S/R and establishes S as being A and R as being B.
  • the name B is now routed back to the DES (block 22, FIG. 2) or ⁇ encrypter where B and K * are used to generate K B .
  • Step-Coder which includes the DES. It will be noted in FIG. 2 that although the DES box is shown inside the Step-Coder, it is nevertheless available to the system to perform ordinary encipherment/decipher- ment functions.
  • Step enciphered message ST1 has now been formed and is conveyed to B.
  • Vault has just been generally described with respect to the operations therein as a result of the first sequence of communication, i.e., A to V and then V to B.
  • the operation in the reverse direction would be substantially the same, i.e., B to V with C2 and V to A with ST2.
  • FIG. 1.2 is a combination functional block diagram and system data flow chart.
  • FIG. 1.2 it should first be noted that the figure is partitioned vertically by dotted lines to designate Station A, Vault and Station B. It should also be noted that the upper level of data flow in the figure refers to the first sequence of operations, i.e., from A to the Vault and then from the Vault to B. The lower data flow path in the drawings refers to the second sequence of operations namely from B to the Vault and from the Vault to A.
  • the blocks designate the hardware resources necessary for the description of the protocol.
  • Station A includes three blocks designated A/B, Data and BC. These refer to the particular message segments stored in appropriate registers in the station.
  • Station A contains a box marked T r on the upper level of the drawings and E -1 (step-code) on the lower level.
  • the key K A is shown entering this block from the bottom.
  • the ⁇ relates to the simple block-cipher encryption function under the designated key
  • the ⁇ -1 relates to the step-decoding function necessary to decode the messages ST1 and ST2 received from the Vault.
  • the same comments apply to the ⁇ and E 1 blocks under Station B also.
  • the message designated BL3 contains D ⁇ BC2 ⁇ C1 ⁇ A/B.
  • the bracketed portions have a specific designation under them, i.e., Cl, STl, C2 and ST2, this refers to an encrypted message actually appearing on the communication lines of the system.
  • the particular key under which a particular message is encrypted appears at the bottom right hand corner of the bracket, i.e. K for message Cl.
  • ST2 will now contain a certified copy of C2 and Cl, the entire step-code ST2 being enciphered with K A .
  • ST2 ⁇ (K A , BL6)
  • the cipher ⁇ (K A , K A ) and ⁇ (K B , K B ) are first presented to the Arbiter by A and B which are deciphered to establish the keys owned by A and B. Then Cl and C2 are deciphered using K A and KB, furnishing the required legal proof with the degree of reliability specified by the dimensions of the vectors BC.
  • FIGS. 2 through 5 is basically a microprocessor controlled unit of a conventional design wherein all required subroutines are appropriately stored in the control ' memory of the microprocessor whose routines are_. accessed by predetermined signals appearing on the input line to the system or, when appropriate, by system initialization operations.
  • FIGS. 6A through 6E functionally describes the significant operations occurring within the three system entities at any particular point in time when an electronic signature verification operation is called for. These entities are Station A the "sender", the Vault,and Station B, the "receiver”. Referring to FIGS. 6A through 6E, and specifically to the User A and User B flow charts respectively, it will be observed that both the "sender” and “receiver" functions must be included in each terminal. Whether a particular terminal unit is functioning as a User A or User B, will determine which of the specified functions that particular user's terminal will perform. This determination is made in blocks 1 and 2 of the User A and User B flow charts respectively.
  • FIG. 1 comprises the general architecture of an N to N communication network suitable for carrying out the principles of the present invention.
  • the existence of a Data Communication Network and plurality of communicating Terminals is well known in the art.
  • the Vault is available to the network over the Main Bus which is obviously also available to each Terminal in the system.
  • the functional details of the Vault are set forth in FIG. 2 and similarly the functional details of a suitable microprocessor controlled terminal are set forth in FIG. 3.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the functional details of the Vault Control Unit shown in FIG__2
  • FIG. 5 shows the details of the Step-Coder Unit as shown in FIG. 2.
  • the terminal for practicing the present invention.
  • the first is a Timer (BC) which would be accessed to produce the counter values BC2, etc. mentioned in the previous description of the present transaction verification system.
  • the second is the Step-Decoder Unit shown in the Terminal. It is substantially identical to the Step-Coder Unit in the Vault and each includes a standard key-controlled block-cipher encryption device (DES block).
  • DES block block-controlled block-cipher encryption device
  • register Rl and R2 in the figure are utilized to store K * and the generated user keys K X respectively. It is noted that only register R2 which stores the current working key is utilized during the various encryption and decryption operations required of the system. Further, register R3 and the multiplexor are utilized for providinq the required data chaining function as necessitated by the step-coding (decoding) operations. The specific way in which these two units are utilized is set forth clearly in the description of blocks 10 and 15 in the flow charts and timing sequences charts.
  • a "no" evaluation of block 1 initiates block 2 which tests the system bus for a 'received message?' condition and if the answer to this is likewise 'no' the Terminal returns to the 'wait' state and continues recirculating through blocks 1 and 2 until either a 'send message' signal is detected or a 'receive message' signal is detected.
  • the Terminal controls cause the message DL1 to be formed from the data previously entered by User A into the Terminal.
  • the data content of message BLl is shown clearly in block 3.
  • the system then proceeds to block 4 which causes the Terminal DES unit to form cipher message Cl which is informed by encrypting the message BL1 under the key K A as shown in block 4.
  • the authenticity of CY is checked. This is done by comparing the BC field included in message Cl with the BC field in the local counter within the Vault. It will be noted that any irregularity in the message will cause this check to fail. This 'would include failure of account value, an error in the transmission which might effect several bits in the cipher Cl being conveyed to the Vault or an incorrect address or name supplied to the Vault in clear for purposes of forming the key K A . If the authenticity test should fail, the system would go to block 19, whereupon User A would be requested to resend his message.
  • the system proceeds to block 7 wherein the A/B field of the message is interpreted and it is determined, in this case, that User A is the sender. This now tells the Vault that the person sending the just received cipher is User A, the sender rather than User B, the receiver. At this point the system proceeds to block 8 and in this block the Vault forms the message block BL3 with the data indicated in block 8 on FIG. 6C and proceeds to block 9 at which point User B's address or name as received from User A, is utilized by the Vault to generate the key K B . This is then stored in register R2. At this point the system proceeds to block 10.
  • a step encipherment of the message block BL3 is prepared utilizing the data chaining concept described previously and set forth in more detail in the timing sequence chart for step 10.
  • the output of this block is the step-cipher ST1.
  • step-cipher ST1 is sent to User B and the system returns to block 1 where it returns to a 'wait' state for the next message to be received from other users on the system.
  • User B detects his address sent in 'clear' on the Main Bus together with step-cipher ST1.
  • Block 1 of the User B flow chart determines that a message is being received rather than sent and causes the system to proceed to block 2. Since this is a 'received message' situation the User B Terminal proceeds to block 3 which causes the message ST1 to be placed in User B's memory.
  • the system then proceeds to block 11 wherein the message block BL5 is enciphered (normally) to form the message C2.
  • This message is sent to the Vault in block 12 together with B's name or address in clear.
  • User B's Terminal controls return his system to block 1 and the electronic signature verification operation is terminated insofar as User B's active participation is concerned.
  • block 3 the message C2 received from B is classified. Since the message C2 is a cipher the system proceeds to block 4. Had it not been a cipher it is assumed by the present embodiment that it would have been a 'resend request' from either User A or User B. This would be determined by reading the clear address of the particular user sending the message from the message header and a copy of the last step-cipher saved in block 11 or 16 would be retransmitted to the requesting user.
  • the key K B is generated using B's name which was transmitted along with his message C2 and this key is stored in register R2 within the Vault Step-Coder Unit.
  • block 14 the sender's identity'or name A is accessed and A's key K A is generated.
  • the system then proceeds to block 15 wherein the step-cipher S T2 is generated from the message block BL6 formed in block 13 and A's key K A .
  • step 16 a copy of the step-cipher ST2 is saved and in block 17 this step-cipher is sent to User A.
  • step 17 this step-cipher is sent to User A.
  • the Vault's direct involvement in the transaction is terminated and returns to the 'wait' state as defined in block 1 of his flow chart on FIG. 6B.
  • message ST2 is on the system bus which causes the system to proceed to block 10, which initiates a step-decipher operation within User A's Step-Decoder Unit.
  • message block BL7 which, if everything is proper, should be the same as message block BL6 formed within the Vault in block 13. This validity is checked in block 11 of User A's Terminal. As in- all previous instances this authenticity is checked by comparing the count value BC within the just decoded message block BL7 with the count value BC currently within User A Terminal's Timer.
  • step 12 If it is found that the count values are not equal within acceptable limits, the system would proceed to block 12 which would cause a 'resend request' to be sent to the Vault wherein step-cipher ST2 would be retransmitted, and User A's Terminal sequence would go back to block 7.
  • block 14 within User A's Terminal completes the electronic signature verification operation of the present system assuming that no errors were detected in block 13.
  • the system would proceed to block 19 wherein the Vault mana g ment would be notified by some prearranged method external to the present system of a fault condition within the Vault.
  • the Vault mana g ment would be notified by some prearranged method external to the present system of a fault condition within the Vault.
  • User B would be notified by User A that errors have been detected which are caused in the Vault.
  • the Cl match fails as required of the test in block 13 of User A's Terminal it is presumed that there is either a transient or permanent error somewhere in the transmission system or within the Vault. In the first of these tests, where the errors are different, it may be generally presumed that the error is transient somewhere between User A and User B, the assumption being that retransmission will ultimately result in the same message beinq sent. If, however, the transient errors continue, the system must be notified that the problem exists and-must be corrected.
  • the uses of the herein disclosed electronic signature verification and message authentication system in the modern day business environment could be manifold.
  • the system assures virtually a foolproof method of guaranteeing both the identity of the sender and the content of a message insofar as a receiver is concerned, while at the same time guaranteeing the integrity or data content of the received message to the original sender.
  • This allows the utilization of long distance telecommunications facilities for the real time completion of transactions which could only be performed in the past utilizing much more time consuming and conventional methods, such as electronic mail (i.e., facsimile) or by actually having people meet to consummate various transactions.
  • legally binding contracts could be effected by having both parties to the contract send an additional data or message portion to the other, each having his own unique signature appended thereto, plus each party to the transaction would have his own resident copy of the contract, electronically signed by the other party and wherein the actual wording of the contract - would be verifiable at any time in the future, if, for example, a conflict arose and allegations were made that the wordings were at variance.
  • the system could also have applicability for such a commercial purpose as telephone ordering (i.e., local terminal) by an individual from a large, centrally located store, wherein both ordering and funds transfer could be handled in a highly reliable manner utilizing various aspects of the presently disclosed system.
  • telephone ordering i.e., local terminal
  • both ordering and funds transfer could be handled in a highly reliable manner utilizing various aspects of the presently disclosed system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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EP81104628A 1980-07-02 1981-06-16 Verfahren und Anlage zum Prüfen der Echtheit einer elektronischen Unterschrift Expired EP0043027B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US06/165,455 US4326098A (en) 1980-07-02 1980-07-02 High security system for electronic signature verification
US165455 1980-07-02

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EP0043027A1 true EP0043027A1 (de) 1982-01-06
EP0043027B1 EP0043027B1 (de) 1984-09-26

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EP0389895A1 (de) * 1989-03-16 1990-10-03 Yeda Research And Development Company Limited Verfahren und Apparat für Benützeridentifikation, beruhend auf permutierten Kernen
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US4326098A (en) 1982-04-20
DE3166298D1 (en) 1984-10-31
EP0043027B1 (de) 1984-09-26
JPS5745756A (en) 1982-03-15
JPS625544B2 (de) 1987-02-05

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