DE3523237A1 - Arrangement for protecting the transportation of chip cards - Google Patents

Arrangement for protecting the transportation of chip cards

Info

Publication number
DE3523237A1
DE3523237A1 DE19853523237 DE3523237A DE3523237A1 DE 3523237 A1 DE3523237 A1 DE 3523237A1 DE 19853523237 DE19853523237 DE 19853523237 DE 3523237 A DE3523237 A DE 3523237A DE 3523237 A1 DE3523237 A1 DE 3523237A1
Authority
DE
Germany
Prior art keywords
transport
code word
area
access
logic
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
DE19853523237
Other languages
German (de)
Inventor
Thomas Dr Krivachy
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Priority to DE19853523237 priority Critical patent/DE3523237A1/en
Publication of DE3523237A1 publication Critical patent/DE3523237A1/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/354—Card activation or deactivation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3558—Preliminary personalisation for transfer to user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0833—Card having specific functional components
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11C—STATIC STORES
    • G11C16/00—Erasable programmable read-only memories
    • G11C16/02—Erasable programmable read-only memories electrically programmable
    • G11C16/06—Auxiliary circuits, e.g. for writing into memory
    • G11C16/22—Safety or protection circuits preventing unauthorised or accidental access to memory cells
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11C—STATIC STORES
    • G11C17/00—Read-only memories programmable only once; Semi-permanent stores, e.g. manually-replaceable information cards
    • G11C17/14—Read-only memories programmable only once; Semi-permanent stores, e.g. manually-replaceable information cards in which contents are determined by selectively establishing, breaking or modifying connecting links by permanently altering the state of coupling elements, e.g. PROM
    • G11C17/18—Auxiliary circuits, e.g. for writing into memory

Abstract

To protect chip cards (CK) from any misuse after a theft during the transportation between two manufacturers, it is proposed to provide a transport protection logic (TS) which additionally blocks the access to a blocked area (SB) when a stored test word is not allocated to a transport codeword (TC) input. If the correct transport codeword (TC) is input, the access to the blocked area (SB) is irreversibly enabled by the transport protection logic (TS), retaining, however, the usual access protection by means of a codeword. A number of blocked areas (SB) and associated test or transport codewords (TC) can also be provided. In addition, there is the possibility of blocking the chip card (CK) and making it unusable if one or more faulty transport codewords (TC) are input. <IMAGE>

Description

Die Erfindung bezieht sich auf eine Anordnung zum Sichern des Transports von Chipkarten gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Patentanspruchs 1.The invention relates to an arrangement for securing the transport of chip cards according to the preamble of Claim 1.

Es ist bereits allgemein bekannt, Chipkarten als Identi­ fikationskarten oder als elektronisches Zahlungsmittel zu verwenden. Die Chipkarten werden beispielsweise für die Zugangskontrolle oder an sogenannten POS (point of sales)- Endgeräten oder an öffentlichen Kartentelefonen benutzt. Die Chipkarten enthalten mindestens einen integrierten Schaltkreis, der als Speicherschaltkreis und/oder als Schaltkreis mit zusätzlichen Logikfunktionen, beispiels­ weise als Mikrorechner ausgebildet sein kann.It is already well known to use smart cards as identi fiction cards or as electronic means of payment use. The chip cards are for example for the Access control or at so-called POS (point of sales) - End devices or used on public card phones. The chip cards contain at least one integrated Circuit that as a memory circuit and / or as Circuit with additional logic functions, for example can be designed as a microcomputer.

Bei den Chipkarten besteht die Möglichkeit des Mißbrauchs der Karten zum Schaden des Benutzers und/oder Betreibers des Chipkartensystems. Beispielsweise besteht die Möglich­ keit, gefälschte Chipkarten herzustellen.There is a possibility of misuse with chip cards the cards to the detriment of the user and / or operator of the chip card system. For example, there is the possibility ability to manufacture counterfeit smart cards.

Für die Herstellung einer gültigen Chipkarte ist im all­ gemeinen das Zusammenspiel mehrerer Hersteller erforder­ lich, die örtlich voneinander getrennt sein können und zwischen denen die noch nicht ausgegebenen Chipkarten transportiert werden müssen, da gültige Chipkarten in der Regel nicht bei einem einzigen Hersteller hergestellt werden. Es wäre denkbar, als Sicherheitsvorkehrung für den Transport der noch nicht ausgegebenen Chipkarten Spe­ zialfahrzeuge zu verwenden, die mit besonders ausgewähl­ tem Personal besetzt sind. Eine derartige Transportmög­ lichkeit ist jedoch sehr kostenintensiv. For the production of a valid chip card is in all generally requires the interaction of several manufacturers Lich, which can be separated from each other and between which the not yet issued chip cards must be transported because valid chip cards in the Usually not manufactured by a single manufacturer will. It would be conceivable as a safety precaution for the transport of the not yet issued chip cards Spe to use special vehicles with specially selected staff are busy. Such a transport however, is very expensive.  

Der Erfindung liegt daher die Aufgabe zugrunde, eine An­ ordnung zum Sichern des Transports von Chipkarten anzuge­ ben, bei deren Verwendung die Chipkarten kostengünstig transportiert werden können und ein Mißbrauch von während des Transports entwendeten Chipkarten verhindert oder zu­ mindest erschwert wird.The invention is therefore based on the object order to secure the transport of chip cards ben, when using the smart cards inexpensively can be transported and misused during Prevents or steals smart cards stolen during transport is at least difficult.

Erfindungsgemäß wird die Aufgabe bei der Anordnung der eingangs genannten Art durch die im kennzeichnenden Teil des Patentanspruchs 1 angegebenen Merkmale gelöst.According to the invention the task is in the arrangement of the type mentioned at the beginning by the in the characterizing part of claim 1 specified features solved.

Durch die Transportsicherungslogik ist der Zugang zu ei­ nem Sperrbereich der Chipkarte nur dann möglich, wenn ein Hersteller das ihm zugeorndete Transportcodewort eingibt. Das bei Chipkarten übliche Codewort kann als Transportco­ dewort nicht verwendet werden, da dieses beispielsweise erst von dem letzten Hersteller oder dem Betreiber in den Sperrbereich eingegeben wird. Um zu verhindern, daß nun in eine durch Diebstahl entwendete Chipkarte, in der noch kein Codewort eingespeichert ist, mißbräuchlich ein Code­ wort eingespeichert wird, muß das Transportcodewort be­ kannt sein.The transport security logic means that access to the egg is easy Nem blocking area of the chip card only possible if a Manufacturer enters the assigned transport code word. The code word common for chip cards can be used as a transport co word can not be used because this is for example only from the last manufacturer or operator in the Restricted area is entered. To prevent that now into a chip card stolen by theft, in which still no code word is stored, a code is abusive word is stored, the transport code word must be be known.

Für jeden Hersteller kann nun ein eigenes Transportcode­ wort vorgesehen sein und jedem Hersteller können auch ei­ gene Sperrbereiche zugeordnet sein, zu denen nur er Zu­ gang hat.Each manufacturer can now have its own transport code word can be provided and each manufacturer can also egg gene restricted areas, to which only he closed has.

Zusätzlich zu dem Sperrbereich kann die Chipkarte in ei­ nem Speicherbereich auch einen offenen Bereich enthalten, zu dem jeder Hersteller ohne das Transportcodewort Zugang hat.In addition to the restricted area, the chip card can also be contain an open area in the memory area, to which every manufacturer can access without the transport code word Has.

Das jeweilige Prüfcodewort und das Transportcodewort kön­ nen identisch sein. In diesem Fall gibt die Transportsi­ cherungslogik den Zugang zu dem Sperrbereich frei, wenn das Prüfcodewort und das Transportcodewort identisch sind. Es besteht auch die Möglichkeit, eine Grobkennung zu vereinbaren und nur dann, wenn sich diese und das Transportcodewort zu einem vorgegebenen Wert ergänzen, wird der Zugang zu dem Sperrbereich freigegeben.The respective test code word and the transport code word can be identical. In this case, the transportsi security logic free access to the restricted area if the check code word and the transport code word are identical  are. There is also the possibility of a rough identification to agree and only if this and that Add transport code word to a specified value, access to the restricted area is released.

Um zu verhindern, daß durch eine Mehrzahl von Versuchen unberechtigterweise ein Zugang zu dem Sperrbereich er­ reicht wird, kann der Speicherbereich der Chipkarte bei der Eingabe mindestens eines fehlerhaften Transportcode­ worts gesperrt werden und die Chipkarte kann unbrauchbar gemacht werden.To prevent a number of attempts unauthorized access to the restricted area is enough, the memory area of the chip card entering at least one incorrect transport code words are blocked and the chip card can be unusable be made.

Im folgenden wird ein Ausführungsbeispiel der Anordnung gemäß der Erfindung anhand von Zeichnungen näher erläu­ tert.The following is an embodiment of the arrangement according to the invention with reference to drawings tert.

Die Figur zeigt ein Blockschaltbild der auf einer Chip­ karte vorgesehenen elektronischen Schaltkreise.The figure shows a block diagram of the on a chip card provided electronic circuits.

Die elektronischen Schaltkreise auf der Chipkarte CK sind in zwei Bereiche, nämlich einen Speicherbereich SP und einen Logikbereich LB eingeteilt. Jeder Hersteller hat über eine Steuereinheit im Logikbereich LB Zugang zu einem offenen Bereich OB innerhalb des Speicherbereichs SP. Weiterhin hat jeder Hersteller Zugang zu einem Trans­ portcodebereich TB. Der Zugang zu einem Sperrbereich SB steht nur demjenigen Hersteller offen, der ein richtiges Transportcodewort TC eingibt, das in einer Transportsi­ cherungslogik TS, die Bestandteil einer Sicherungslogik SL ist, mit einem auf der Chipkarte CK gespeicherten Prüfwort in Korrelation gebracht wird. Wenn das Trans­ portcodewort TC dem Prüfwort zugeordnet ist, wird der Zu­ gang zu dem Sperrbereich SB über den Transportcodebereich TB für immer freigegeben. Der Sperrbereich SB wird folg­ lich bezüglich des Transportcodebereichs TB irreversibel freigegeben. Im Sperrbereich SB befinden sich die anwen­ dungsbezogenen Daten, wie beispielsweise ein bestimmter Algorithmus oder ein Schlüssel für eine Verschlüsselung, wobei diese geschützt oder frei zugänglich gespeichert sein können. Für die spätere Verwendung der Chipkarte CK ist zweckmäßigerweise die Zugriffssicherheit über ein Co­ dewort nach wie vor erhalten. Falls beispielsweise das Codewort erst vom letzten Hersteller einer Reihe von Her­ stellern eingegeben wird und im Sperrbereich SB gespei­ chert wird, hat dieser Hersteller nur Zugang zu dem Sperr­ bereich über das entsprechende Transportcodewort TC. The electronic circuits on the chip card CK are divided into two areas, namely a memory area SP and a logic area LB. Each manufacturer has access to an open area OB within the memory area SP via a control unit in the logic area LB. Furthermore, each manufacturer has access to a trans port code area TB . Access to a restricted area SB is only available to those manufacturers who enter a correct transport code word TC , which is correlated in a transport security logic TS , which is part of a security logic SL , with a test word stored on the chip card CK . If the transport code word TC is assigned to the check word, access to the restricted area SB is released forever via the transport code area TB . The blocking area SB is consequently irreversibly released with respect to the transport code area TB . In the restricted area SB there are the application-related data, such as a specific algorithm or a key for encryption, which can be protected or stored in a freely accessible manner. For the later use of the chip card CK , access security via a codeword is expediently still obtained. If, for example, the code word is only entered by the last manufacturer of a number of manufacturers and is stored in the restricted area SB , this manufacturer only has access to the restricted area via the corresponding transport code word TC .

Es ist auch möglich, für mehrere Hersteller verschiedene Transportcodewörter TC vorzusehen und es können auch für jeden Hersteller entsprechende Sperrbereiche SB vorgese­ hen sein, zu denen nur jeweils ein Hersteller mit dem entsprechenden Transportcodewort TC Zugang hat.It is also possible to provide different transport code words TC for several manufacturers and corresponding blocking areas SB can also be provided for each manufacturer, to which only one manufacturer with the corresponding transport code word TC has access.

Der offene Bereich OB ist nicht in jedem Anwendungsfall erforderlich. Es ist auch denkbar, daß alle erforderli­ chen Daten im Sperrbereich SB gespeichert werden.The open area OB is not necessary in every application. It is also conceivable that all the necessary data are stored in the restricted area SB .

Zwischen dem Transportcodewort und dem Prüfcodewort be­ steht in der Transportsicherungslogik TS völlige Frei­ heit, sofern sie den Spezifikationen der Chipkarte CK und evtl. weiteren Verabredungen entsprechen. Im einfachsten Fall sind das Transportcodewort TC und das Prüfcodewort identisch. Das Transportcodewort TC und das Prüfcodewort können sich auch unterscheiden. Beispielsweise kann die Summe jeweils eines Transportcodeworts und einer Grobken­ nung konstant sein, so daß der Sperrbereich SB nur dann zugänglich wird, wenn ein Transportcodewort TC eingegeben wird, das die Differenz zwischen der Summe und der Grob­ kennung darstellt. Es ist auch möglich, nur eine oder mehrere Eingaben eines Transportcodeworts TC zuzulassen. In diesem Fall sperrt sich die Chipkarte CK automatisch und kann nicht mehr weiterbenutzt werden, wenn eine vor­ gegebene Anzahl von zulässigen Eingaben überschritten wird. There is complete freedom in the transport security logic TS between the transport code word and the test code word, provided that they meet the specifications of the CK chip card and any other agreements. In the simplest case, the transport code word TC and the test code word are identical. The transport code word TC and the test code word can also differ. For example, the sum of a transport code word and a rough identification can be constant, so that the restricted area SB is only accessible if a transport code word TC is entered which represents the difference between the sum and the rough identification. It is also possible to allow only one or more entries of a transport code word TC . In this case, the chip card CK is automatically blocked and can no longer be used if a given number of permissible entries is exceeded.

Für das Transportcodewort TC können beispielsweise 16 Bits vorgesehen werden. In Absprache mit dem Auftraggeber wird die Belegung dieser 16 Bits genau festgelegt und dem Her­ steller, der dieses Transportcodewort TC eingeben muß, mitgeteilt. Das Transportcodewort TC ist hier mit dem Prüfcodewort in der Transportsicherungslogik TS identisch. Falls die Chipkarten CK während des Transports entwendet werden, so sind 216, d. h. ungefähr 105 Versuche notwen­ dig, um das richtige Transportcodewort TC zu finden. Falls nur eine einmalige Eingabe des Transportcodeworts TC zuge­ lassen wird, bedeutet dies, daß etwa 105 Karten notwendig sind, um das Transportcodewort TC zu finden.For example, 16 bits can be provided for the transport code word TC . In consultation with the client, the assignment of these 16 bits is precisely defined and the manufacturer who has to enter this transport code word TC is informed. The transport code word TC is identical to the test code word in the transport security logic TS . If the chip cards CK are stolen during the transport, 2 16 , ie approximately 10 5 attempts are necessary to find the correct transport code word TC . If only a single entry of the transport code word TC is allowed, this means that about 10 5 cards are necessary to find the transport code word TC .

Eine weitere Sicherheitsvorkehrung besteht darin, daß je­ der Hersteller oder jede Lieferung ein eigenes Transport­ codewort TC zugeordnet erhält, um den Aufwand für den Miß­ brauch weiterzuerhöhen.Another safety precaution is that each manufacturer or each delivery is assigned its own transport code word TC in order to further increase the effort for misuse.

Claims (6)

1. Anordnung zum Sichern des Transports von Chipkarten, die elektronische Schaltkreise mit einem Speicherbereich und einem Logikbereich enthalten und bei denen der Zugang zu dem Speicherbereich mittels eines Codeworts über den Logikbereich gesteuert wird, dadurch ge­ kennzeichnet, daß im Logikbereich (LB) eine Transportsicherungslogik (TS) vorgesehen ist, die zusätz­ lich zu dem Zugang zu dem Speicherbereich (SP) mittels eines Codeworts einen Zugang zu einem Sperrbereich (SB) des Speicherbereichs (SP) nur dann ermöglicht, wenn ein gespeichertes Prüfwort einem über den Logikbereich (LB) eingegebenen Transportcodewort (TC) zugeordnet ist und daß nach der Eingabe des richtigen Transportcodeworts (TC) der Zugang zu dem Sperrbereich (SB) irreversibel freigegeben ist.1. Arrangement for securing the transport of chip cards which contain electronic circuits with a memory area and a logic area and in which access to the memory area is controlled by means of a code word via the logic area, characterized in that in the logic area (LB) a transport security logic ( TS) is provided which, in addition to access to the memory area (SP) by means of a code word, only allows access to a blocked area (SB) of the memory area (SP) if a stored test word is a transport code word entered via the logic area (LB) (TC) is assigned and that after entering the correct transport code word ( TC) access to the restricted area (SB) is irreversibly released. 2. Anordnung nach Anspruch 1, dadurch ge­ kennzeichnet, daß für jede Chipkarte (CK) mehrere Transportcodewörter (TC) vorgesehen sind, die den Zugang zu jeweils einem Sperrbereich (SB) freigeben.2. Arrangement according to claim 1, characterized in that for each chip card (CK) a plurality of transport code words (TC) are provided which allow access to a blocked area (SB) . 3. Anordnung nach Anspruch 1 oder Anspruch 2, da­ durch gekennzeichnet, daß außer dem Sperrbereich (SB) ein offener Bereich (OB) vorgesehen ist, der ohne Transportcodewort (TC) zugänglich ist.3. Arrangement according to claim 1 or claim 2, characterized in that in addition to the restricted area (SB) an open area (OB) is provided which is accessible without a transport code word (TC) . 4. Anordnung nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, da­ durch gekennzeichnet, daß das Prüfcodewort und das Transportcodewort (TC) identisch sind.4. Arrangement according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the test code word and the transport code word (TC) are identical. 5. Anordnung nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, da­ durch gekennzeichnet, daß das Prüfcodewort und das Transportcodewort (TC) verschieden sind. 5. Arrangement according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the test code word and the transport code word (TC) are different. 6. Anordnung nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 5, da­ durch gekennzeichnet, daß der Sperrbereich bei der Eingabe mindestens eines fehlerhaf­ ten Transportcodeworts (TC) gesperrt wird und die Chip­ karte (CK) unbrauchbar gemacht wird.6. Arrangement according to one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the restricted area is blocked when entering at least one faulty th transport code word ( TC) and the chip card (CK) is made unusable.
DE19853523237 1985-06-28 1985-06-28 Arrangement for protecting the transportation of chip cards Withdrawn DE3523237A1 (en)

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DE102007019839A1 (en) 2007-04-25 2008-10-30 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method of using a chip card
DE102007019839B4 (en) 2007-04-25 2018-10-11 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for using a chip card and chip card
DE102007041370A1 (en) 2007-08-30 2009-03-05 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Chip card, electronic device, method for producing a chip card and method for using a chip card
DE102007000589B3 (en) * 2007-10-29 2009-07-09 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for protecting a chip card against unauthorized use, chip card and chip card terminal
DE102007000589B9 (en) * 2007-10-29 2010-01-28 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for protecting a chip card against unauthorized use, chip card and chip card terminal
US8353054B2 (en) 2007-10-29 2013-01-08 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for protection of a chip card from unauthorized use, chip card and chip card terminal
EP2595083A1 (en) 2007-10-29 2013-05-22 Bundesdruckerei GmbH Method for protecting a chip card against unauthorised use, chip card and chip cards terminal
EP2595085A2 (en) 2007-10-29 2013-05-22 Bundesdruckerei GmbH Method for protecting a chip card against unauthorised use, chip card and chip cards terminal
DE102009000408A1 (en) 2009-01-26 2010-09-16 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Reader for a chip card and computer system
WO2010084142A1 (en) 2009-01-26 2010-07-29 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for activating a smart card function, reader for a smart card and smart card
DE102009000404A1 (en) 2009-01-26 2010-07-29 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for activating a chip card function, reader for a chip card and chip card
WO2010084143A1 (en) 2009-01-26 2010-07-29 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Biometric authentication reader for a smart card and computer system
EP3252641A1 (en) 2009-01-26 2017-12-06 Bundesdruckerei GmbH Reading device for a chip card and computer system
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WO2013010827A1 (en) 2011-07-19 2013-01-24 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for protecting a chip card terminal against unauthorized use
DE102011079441A1 (en) 2011-07-19 2013-01-24 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for protecting a chip card terminal against unauthorized use
WO2014037136A1 (en) 2012-09-04 2014-03-13 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for personalizing a secure element (se) and computer system
DE102012215630A1 (en) 2012-09-04 2014-03-06 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for Personalizing a Secure Element (SE) and Computer System
DE102012224083A1 (en) 2012-12-20 2015-08-20 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method for Personalizing a Secure Element (SE) and Computer System
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