DE102017209594A1 - Method for detecting GNSS spoofing, vehicle-to-X communication device and use - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for the detection of GNSS spoofing comprising the steps:
Receiving a vehicle-to-X message by means of a vehicle-to-X communication device,
Receiving a GNSS signal by means of a GNSS receiver, characterized by
Comparing a position information included by the vehicle-to-X message with a position information included by the GNSS signal, and
Assuming a manipulated GNSS signal if the result of the comparison satisfies a predetermined condition. Furthermore, the invention relates to a vehicle-to-X communication device for carrying out the method as well as the use of the device in a vehicle.

Description

The present invention relates to a method for detecting GNSS spoofing and a corresponding vehicle-to-X communication device and their use.

The determination of the position and time information by means of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is well-known in the art. A disadvantage of this prior art is that a GNSS signal to be received by a GNSS receiver can be imitated or manipulated by means of a pseudolite in such a way that an incorrect position and / or time is transmitted, so-called GNSS spoofing. In particular, when using vehicle systems for which a possible precise position or time information is necessary for the most error-free operation, can be significantly limited by such a faulty signal, which could possibly cause safety-critical situation, especially if the imitated position or time not recognized by the recipient.

The object of the invention is to provide a method by means of which the above-mentioned problems can be overcome.

This object is solved by the subject matters of the independent claims. Advantageous embodiments can be taken, for example, the dependent claims. The content of the claims is made by express reference to the content of the description.

• - Empfangen einer Fahrzeug-zu-X Nachricht mittels einer Fahrzeug-zu-X Kommunikationsvorrichtung,
• - Empfangen eines GNSS-Signals mittels eines GNSS-Empfängers,
• - Vergleichen einer durch die Fahrzeug-zu-X Nachricht umfassten Positionsinformation und mit einer durch das GNSS-Signal umfassten Positionsinformation und
• - Annahme eines manipulierten GNSS-Signals, wenn das Ergebnis des Vergleichs eine vorbestimmte Bedingung erfüllt.

The invention describes a method for the detection of GNSS spoofing comprising the steps:

• Receiving a vehicle-to-X message by means of a vehicle-to-X communication device,
• Receiving a GNSS signal by means of a GNSS receiver,
• Comparing a position information included by the vehicle-to-X message and a position information included by the GNSS signal, and
• - Assuming a manipulated GNSS signal if the result of the comparison meets a predetermined condition.

The invention is based on the idea that spoofing can be detected in an improved manner using vehicle-to-X communication in comparison to individual identification measures, and that suitable measures can be taken to avoid safety-critical situations. Basically, the messages transmitted by means of vehicle-to-X communication include time information and a position indication of the road user and are signed with valid digital certificates and therefore represent a trustworthy source. A received vehicle-to-X message of at least one other road user, in particular a vehicle , can thus be used by a process executing vehicle for plausibility of a GNSS position signal and detection of a GNSS spoofing. An exemplary scenario that can be advantageously avoided by the invention is to send erroneous GNSS signals with time information in the future. If, for example, a vehicle checks locally stored digital security certificates using this future time information, the certificates that expired at this future time are declared invalid. In the case of a vehicle-to-X communication system, this could mean that there are no longer any valid certificates and that the relevant vehicle-to-X communication devices of the road users can no longer participate in the communication.

According to a particularly preferred embodiment, a manipulated GNSS signal is assumed if a spatial distance between a position determined on the basis of the position information of the GNSS signal and a position determined on the basis of the position information of the vehicle-to-X message falls below a limit value. In other words, a GNSS spoofing is assumed or suspected if the positions of at least two road users are not plausibly close to each other.

It is considered as not plausible that, for example, a plurality of vehicles stay in a limited spatial area, which is in particular smaller than the extent of a vehicle as such.

Preferably, information provided by the GNSS receiver, in particular the position information and / or the time information, is not used for position determination and / or time detection and / or the GNSS receiver is switched off when a manipulated GNSS signal is assumed.

When comparing the position information of the GNSS signal with the position information of the vehicle-to-X message, map data are preferably also used for plausibility. Thus it can be prevented that concluded by a comparison faulty to a spoofing If, for example, the road users are on different levels one above the other.

If possible, time detection is preferably performed by means of an alternative time information source, if a manipulated GNSS signal is assumed. Alternative time information sources are for example mobile radio network or DCF77. Conveniently, the alternative time information source is a trusted time source of information. In principle, when selecting the alternative time information source there is no need for comparable precision compared to the time information of the GNSS signal, since usually only the limited affected GNSS spoofing area has to be left to receive the correct GNSS signal again. It often has to be bridged only a limited amount of time.

Alternatively or in addition, a comparison of the position information obtained by means of the GNSS signal with further sensor information and / or information derived from further sensor information, which correlate with a relative or absolute intrinsic position, take place. Thus, for example, a manipulated position signal can be detected if the position information of the GNSS signal has an implausible position jump or a growing divergence in comparison to a movement course detected by means of acceleration and rotation rate sensors.

However, an alternative possible cause for a wrong position history may also be multipath effects of the GNSS signal received from a satellite. Often, however, these can be distinguished from signals generated by spoofing. Even if a distinction between multipath and spoofing should not be possible, it may be expedient for both cases to regard the received GNSS position information and / or time information as implausible and not to use it for further processing.

Favor is a local logging a detected spoofing and / or notification to other road users and / or notification to a competent security device. A competent safety device is, for example, the police or traffic monitoring.

Conveniently, it can be provided that the method is not executed when detecting an accident, in particular a vehicle executing the method. The physical dimensions of a vehicle in such a case are not necessarily relevant. In such a case, for example, the GNSS position information can continue to be used for the use of E-Call.

• - Empfangen einer Fahrzeug-zu-X Nachricht mittels zumindest einer Antenne,
• - Empfangen eines GNSS-Signals mittels eines GNSS-Empfängers, gekennzeichnet durch,
• - Eine elektronische Verarbeitungseinrichtung, welche ausgestaltet ist eine durch die Fahrzeug-zu-X Nachricht umfasste Positionsinformation und/oder Zeitinformation mit einer durch das GNSS-Signal umfassten Positionsinformation und/oder Zeitinformation zu vergleichen und ein manipulierten GNSS-Signal anzunehmen, wenn das Ergebnis des Vergleichs eine vorbestimmte Bedingung erfüllt.

Vehicle-to-X communication device for detecting GNSS spoofing, designed for:

• Receiving a vehicle-to-X message by means of at least one antenna,
• Receiving a GNSS signal by means of a GNSS receiver, characterized by
• An electronic processing device configured to compare position information and / or time information comprised by the vehicle-to-X message with position information and / or time information included by the GNSS signal and to accept a manipulated GNSS signal if the result of Comparison meets a predetermined condition.

In accordance with a further aspect of the invention, a vehicle-to-X communication device is set up to carry out at least one embodiment of the method according to the invention.

In a further development of the specified vehicle-to-X communication device, the specified device has a memory and a processor. The specified method is stored in the form of a computer program in the memory and the processor is provided for carrying out the method when the computer program is loaded from the memory into the processor.

According to a further aspect of the invention, a computer program comprises program code means for performing all the steps of one of the specified methods when the computer program is executed on a computer or one of the specified devices.

According to another aspect of the invention, a computer program product includes program code stored on a computer-readable medium and, when executed on a data processing device, performs one of the specified methods.

The invention also relates to the use of at least one embodiment of the vehicle-to-X communication device in a vehicle. A vehicle is in particular understood to mean a means of locomotion by land, sea or air, e.g. a bicycle, a car, a truck or an aircraft.

Some particularly advantageous embodiments of the invention are specified in the subclaims. Further preferred embodiments will become apparent from the following description of exemplary embodiments with reference to figures.

The 1 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary traffic scenario for explaining the idea underlying the invention.

The position determination by means of a GNSS based system is based on the determination of the distances between a respective satellite 4 - 1 . 4 - 2 . 4 - 3 . 4 - 4 . 4 - 5 and the respective receiver based on the received satellite signals 4 - 1.1 . 4 - 2.1 . 4 - 3.1 . 4 - 4.1 . 4 - 5.1 , Subsequently, the receiver position can be determined using the known satellite positions. By means of a terrestrial transmitter, a so-called pseudolite 1 , takes place according to the example of 1 an imitation of the satellite signals, so the GNSS receivers 2 - 1 and 3 - 1 of the vehicles 2 and 3 an incorrect position or time information is faked.

By means of the pseudolite 1 become signals 1 - 1 and 1 - 2 sent out for the signals receiving vehicles 2 and 3 an identical position 2 ' . 3. ' imitated. According to the invention, a comparison of the own position of a road user with position information of other road users received by means of vehicle-to-X communication is repeated. The eigenposition is rejected as implausible if it is determined in the comparison that the coincidence of the positions of the different participants falls below a limit. It is considered as not plausible that, for example, a plurality of vehicles stay in a limited spatial area, which is in particular smaller than the extent of a vehicle as such. The system time based on GNSS can now no longer be trusted. After detection of a spoofing measures can thus be taken, by means of which in particular safety-critical situations can be avoided. Preferably, information provided by the GNSS receiver, in particular the position and the time information, are no longer used for further evaluations or the receiver is switched off. If possible, current time information can preferably be obtained via an alternative trustworthy source, for example by means of a mobile radio network or DCF77.

According to a further embodiment, as an alternative or in addition to the aforementioned comparison with a limiting value describing a spatial extent, it is provided that a recognition of a spoofing is performed by comparison of trajectories transmitted by vehicle-to-X communication, whereby it can be utilized that the trajectories in a If necessary, the road users arriving in the affected area may have identifiable jump points.

It should also be noted that embodiments, features and variants of the invention, which are described in the various embodiments or embodiments and / or shown in the figures, can be combined with each other as desired. Single or multiple features are arbitrarily interchangeable. Resulting combinations of features are to be understood as covered by the disclosure of this application.

Features that are disclosed only in the specification or features that are disclosed in the specification or in a claim only in conjunction with other features may, in principle, be of independent significance to the invention. They can therefore also be included individually in claims to distinguish them from the prior art.

In general, it should be pointed out that vehicle-to-X communication in particular means direct communication between vehicles and / or between vehicles and infrastructure facilities. For example, this may be vehicle-to-vehicle communication or vehicle-to-infrastructure communication. If, in the context of this application, reference is made to communication between vehicles, this can in principle be carried out, for example, in the context of vehicle-to-vehicle communication, which typically takes place without being mediated by a mobile radio network or a similar external infrastructure and which is therefore dependent on other solutions, Which, for example, build on a mobile network, is to be distinguished. For example, vehicle-to-X communication may be performed using the IEEE 802.11p or IEEE 1609.4 standards. Vehicle-to-X communication may also be referred to as C2X communication. The subareas can be referred to as C2C (Car-to-Car) or C2I (Car-to-Infrastructure). However, the invention explicitly does not exclude vehicle-to-X communication with switching, for example via a mobile radio network.

Claims (9)

A method for detecting GNSS spoofing, comprising the steps of: receiving a vehicle-to-X message by means of a vehicle-to-X communication device, receiving a GNSS signal by means of a GNSS receiver, characterized by , comparing one by the vehicle -to-X message included position information with a through the GNSS signal included position information and assumption of a manipulated GNSS signal if the result of the comparison satisfies a predetermined condition. Method according to Claim 1 Characterized in that it is assumed that a manipulated GNSS signal if a spatial distance of an established on the basis of the position information of the GNSS signal position and a determined based on the position information of the vehicle-to-X message position below a limit value. Method according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that information provided by the GNSS receiver is at least partially not used for position determination and / or time detection and / or the GNSS receiver is switched off when starting from a manipulated GNSS signal. Method according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that in the comparison of the position information of the GNSS signal with the position information of the vehicle-to-X message for plausibility map data are also used. Method according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that time detection takes place by means of an alternative time information source, if a manipulated GNSS signal is assumed. Method according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the method is not executed upon detection of an accident. Method according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that upon acceptance of a spoofing a local logging and / or notification to other road users and / or notification to a competent safety device is carried out. Vehicle-to-X communication device for detecting GNSS spoofing, configured to: - receive a vehicle-to-X message by means of at least one antenna, - receive a GNSS signal by means of a GNSS receiver, characterized by , - an electronic processing device, which is configured to compare position information and / or time information included by the vehicle-to-X message with position information and / or time information included in the GNSS signal and to accept a manipulated GNSS signal if the result of the comparison satisfies a predetermined condition , Use of the vehicle-to-X communication device according to one of the preceding claims in a vehicle.

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