CN116908883A - GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method, system and device based on extended circular array arrival estimation - Google Patents
GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method, system and device based on extended circular array arrival estimation Download PDFInfo
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
- G01S19/29—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system carrier including Doppler, related
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
- G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
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Abstract
The application relates to a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method, a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention system and a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention device based on extended circular array arrival estimation, and belongs to the technical field of GNSS navigation. The GNSS navigation anti-deception method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is characterized in that the GNSS navigation comprises an M-element uniform circular array with the center at the origin of coordinates, the radius of the uniform circular array is R=lambda/2, lambda is the wavelength of a carrier signal, and the GNSS navigation processes the received signal as follows; step 1, a GNSS navigation system carries out characteristic decomposition on C, wherein the received signal comprises a useful signal and a deception jamming signal; step 3, forming an array flow pattern by two deceptive disturbances; and 4, solving a flow pattern set of the array disturbance by adopting QR decomposition.
Description
Technical Field
The application relates to a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method, a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention system and a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention device based on extended circular array arrival estimation, and belongs to the technical field of GNSS navigation.
Background
With the rapid development of global satellite navigation systems and navigation positioning technologies, the satellite navigation positioning accuracy is more and more accurate, and satellite navigation services play a more important role in society and life, but inevitably, the navigation signals received by a receiver are always interfered by intention or not in the process of propagation of satellite navigation signals, so that the positioning result of the receiver is wrong, and therefore, the safe application of the satellite navigation system is gradually paid attention to by wide users.
In addition to natural interference and electromagnetic interference under complex environmental conditions, satellite navigation signals may also suffer from malicious attacks, i.e. so-called jamming of the target receiver, during the atmospheric propagation. The satellite navigation signals are subject to artifacts that fall into two categories, jamming and spoofing. The deception jamming has the same or similar waveform as the real signal emitted by the navigation satellite, has small emitting power and strong concealment, and can trap and track the GNSS receiving terminal, so that the GNSS receiving terminal outputs a wrong positioning time service result, and the harmfulness is generally larger than that of the pressing jamming. Spoofing interference can be further subdivided into generative spoofing, which simulates the transmission of real satellite signals primarily through jammers, and forwarded spoofing, which is accomplished primarily through the reception and forwarding of real satellite signals.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method, system and device based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation are provided.
The application solves the technical problems by the following technical scheme:
the GNSS navigation anti-deception method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is characterized in that the GNSS navigation comprises an M-element uniform circular array with the center at the origin of coordinates, the radius of the uniform circular array is R=lambda/2, lambda is the wavelength of a carrier signal, and the GNSS navigation processes the received signal as follows;
step 1, the GNSS navigation system receives signals including useful signals and deception jamming signals, and the useful signals are in the form s 1 (t); the circular array receives a deception jamming signal j (n) and noise n (n) in addition to a useful signal s (n); all signals received by the array are x (n) =s (n) +j (n) +n (n);
the received signals of the M array elements are denoted as x 1 (n),...,x M (n)，
X represents that the input signal matrix is x= [ X 1 ,x 2 ,...,x M ] T ；
Constructing a higher order cumulant parameter, z=xx H ，
Obtaining a high order moment
In practical applications, the spectral characteristics of noise tend to be a form of variation and not easily measured; in particular, when there are a plurality of jammer signals, there is a possibility that the jammer signal echo (scattered) signals are completely correlated with each other; therefore, the traditional second moment statistical features are not outstanding, so that algorithm failure is caused, and the space degree of freedom of the high-order moment expansion array can be utilized to effectively extract the characteristics of the deception target signals; the higher order cumulant parameter is an intermediate step of obtaining higher order moments;
step 2, carrying out feature decomposition on the C to obtain P large feature values, wherein the feature vectors corresponding to the P large feature values are tensed into a deceptive jamming signal subspace U j And M is 2 -feature vector Zhang Chenggao order noise subspace corresponding to P smaller feature values
Obtaining the spatial spectrum of the extended circular array as
The direction arrival angle of the deception jamming signal can be obtained through spectral peak local peak value searchI.e. in the spatial two-dimensional power spectrum +.>The maximum value is found, namely the direction arrival angle of the deception jamming signal;
step 3, assuming that the maximum variation of the deception jamming incidence angle isConsidering two-point distribution, the disturbance on the right of the incident angle is pΔθ, the disturbance on the left is qΔθ, and p+q=1; assuming that the power of the two disturbance spoofing jamming signals is equal; thus, the two spoofing disturbances form an array flow pattern of:
the presence of the orthogonal basis H satisfies a system of equations,
step 4, solving the flow pattern set of the array disturbance flow pattern of the deception jamming signal by adopting QR decompositionAn orthogonal basis vector of the null space; rank of column full->Wherein->
Solving forTo ensure correct reception of the useful signal and to completely suppress other P spoofed interfering signals, the weight vector is constrained to +.>
And the weight vector of the spatial adaptive filter is w=hd, and the spatial adaptive filter is substituted into spatial filtering to realize deception jamming inhibition of the extended circular array.
Based on the technical scheme, the application also makes the following perfection and improvement on the technical scheme:
further, the M-element uniform circular array adopts a spherical coordinate system to represent the direction of arrival of the incident plane wave; the origin O of the coordinate system is located at the center of the array, i.e., the center of the circle. Signal source pitch angle theta epsilon [0, pi/2]Is the connection from the origin to the signal sourceAngle between line and Z axis, azimuth angleIt is the angle (anticlockwise) between the projection of the origin onto the X-y plane of the line connecting the source and the positive half axis of the X-axis. The angle r between the m-th array element (except the central array element) of the array and the X axis m . According to the phase relation of each array element relative to the origin of coordinates, the space steering vector of the array can be obtained as follows:
where ζ=2πRsin θ/λ, r m =2pi M/M, m=1, 2, …, M then the array signal is expressed as
The array flow pattern correction after the circular array expansion is as follows:
the GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is characterized in that the GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is applied to the device.
The device of the GNSS navigation anti-deception method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is characterized in that the device applies the GNSS navigation anti-deception method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation according to any scheme
In the conventional processing algorithm, it is mostly assumed that noise is gaussian white noise or color gaussian noise of a suppression characteristic, and in practice, the spectral characteristic of noise tends to be a form of variation and is not easily measured. In particular, when there are a plurality of jammer signals, there is a possibility that the jammer echo (scattered) signals are completely correlated with each other. The navigation application array antenna is generally in a circular array form, the space degree of freedom of the high-order moment extension array can be utilized to effectively extract the characteristics of deception target signals, the whole space is scanned in a 90-degree pitch angle and 360-degree azimuth angle range, the estimation accuracy is improved, and the deception target is further widened and suppressed according to deception targets, so that the method is a basic idea of the method.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a circular array layout provided by the present application.
Detailed Description
The following examples are presented in conjunction with the accompanying drawings only to illustrate the technical aspects described in the claims, and are not intended to limit the scope of the claims.
A GNSS navigation anti-deception method based on extended circular array arrival estimation comprises the following steps: an M-ary uniform circular array centered at the origin of coordinates is shown in fig. 1. The circle center is taken as a reference point, the radius of the uniform circular array is R=lambda/2, and lambda is the wavelength of the carrier signal. The direction of arrival of the incident plane wave is represented by a spherical coordinate system. The origin O of the coordinate system is located at the center of the array, i.e., the center of the circle. Signal source pitch angle theta epsilon [0, pi/2]Is the included angle between the connecting line from the origin to the signal source and the Z axis, azimuth angleIt is the angle (anticlockwise) between the projection of the origin onto the X-y plane of the line connecting the source and the positive half axis of the X-axis. The angle r between the m-th array element (except the central array element) of the array and the X axis m 。
If one incident direction in the space isAccording to the phase relation of each array element relative to the origin of coordinates, the space steering vector of the array can be obtained as follows:
where ζ=2πRsin θ/λ, r m =2pi M/M, m=1, 2, …, M then the array signal is expressed asThe total K signals of the system are incident to the array, wherein the array comprises P (P < K) deceptive jamming signalsNumber (x). Their set of directions of arrival (DOA) is +.>Without loss of generality, the DOA of the signaling is assumed to be +.>The useful signal form is denoted s 1 (t). If the incident useful signal received by the reference array element is s 1 (t) the incident useful signal received by the mth array element of the circular array is
In the middle ofIs the delay of the incoming signal received by element m relative to the signal received by the reference element. The circular array receives the spoof signal j (n) and the noise n (n) in addition to the useful signal s (n), so that the entire signal received by the array is
x(n)＝s(n)+j(n)+n(n)，
Let the received signals of M array elements respectively expressed as x 1 (n),...,x M (n) the input signal matrix is represented by X as x= [ X ] 1 ,x 2 ,...,x M ] T ，
Constructing a higher order cumulant parameter, z=xx H ，
Obtaining a high order moment
C is subjected to characteristic decomposition, P large characteristic values can be obtained, and the characteristic vectors corresponding to the P large characteristic values are tensed into a deceptive jamming signal subspace U j And M is 2 -feature vector Zhang Chenggao order noise subspace U corresponding to P smaller feature values V 。
Array flow after circular array expansionThe correction is as follows:
then, the higher order spoofing jamming signal subspace U j And spoofing an interfering signal array patterni=1.. P are split into the same subspaces. Whereas the higher order noise subspace is:
u i is a feature vector in the noise subspace because of U j And U V Mutually orthogonal, the spatial spectrum of the extended circular array can be obtained as follows:
the direction arrival angle of the deception jamming signal can be obtained through spectral peak local peak value search
The weight vector of the spatial domain adaptive filter is set as w, and the weight vector is constrained to be
In order to ensure that the deception jamming signals stably fall into the nulls, the maximum variation of the deception jamming incidence angle is assumed to beConsidering the two-point distribution, the disturbance to the right of the incident angle is pΔθ, the disturbance to the left is qΔθ, and p+q=1. It is assumed that the power of the two disturbance spoofing jamming signals is equal. Thus, the two spoofing disturbances form an array flow pattern of:
the presence of the orthogonal basis H satisfies a system of equations,
QR decomposition may be employed to solve for a set of spoofing jamming signal disturbance array flow patterns
i=1.Wherein the column orthogonal matrix Q is M 2 ×M 2 Dimension due to->Is a column full order matrix, and the column vector of the matrix Q is expressed as +.>Since the matrix Q is an orthogonal matrix, its back M 2 The space spanned by the P column vectors is orthogonal to the space spanned by the first P vectors, so that the M 2 P orthogonal vectors can be used as +.>Is included in the vector.
Linear combination of orthogonal basis to obtain
w＝d 1 h 1 +d 2 h 2 +...+d G h G ＝H[d 1 ，d 2 ，...，d G ] T ＝HdG＝M 2 -P
If the gain is required to be maximized in the useful signal direction, it is necessary to makeThat is to sayThe coefficient matrix of this equation H (M 2 X Z dimension) is a high matrix and is of a rank-full, belonging to an overdetermined equation, so that the vector d can be found by the least squares method (LS),
substituting the above to obtain final weight vector
Substitution spatial filtering realizes deception jamming inhibition of the extended circular array.
The GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on the extended circular array arrival estimation can be applied to a GNSS navigation system and a device.
The foregoing description of the preferred embodiments of the application is not intended to limit the application to the precise form disclosed, and any such modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the application are intended to be included within the scope of the application.
Claims (5)
1. The GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on the extended circular array wave arrival estimation is characterized in that the GNSS navigation comprises an M-element uniform circular array with the center at the origin of coordinates, the radius of the uniform circular array is R=lambda/2, lambda is the wavelength of a carrier signal, and the GNSS navigation processes the received signal as follows:
step 1, a GNSS navigation system receives signals including useful signals and deception jamming signals, wherein the useful signals are in a form s (n); the circular array receives a deception jamming signal j (n) and noise n (n) in addition to a useful signal s (n); all signals received by the array are x (n) =s (n) +j (n) +n (n);
the received signals of the M array elements are denoted as x 1 (n),...,x M (n)，
X represents that the input signal matrix is x= [ X 1 ,x 2 ,...,x M ] T ；
Constructing a higher order cumulant parameter, z=xx H ，
Obtaining a high order moment
Step 2, carrying out characteristic decomposition on the C,
C＝∑Λ∑ -1 sigma is M 2 ×M 2 And (3) a square matrix, wherein the ith column is the characteristic vector of C. Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are corresponding eigenvalues, wherein P large eigenvalues, corresponding eigenvectors of the P large eigenvalues tense into a spoofing interference signal subspace U j And M is 2 -feature vector Zhang Chenggao order noise subspace corresponding to P smaller feature values
Obtaining the spatial spectrum of the extended circular array as
The direction arrival angle of the deception jamming signal can be obtained through spectral peak local peak value search
Step 3, assuming that the maximum variation of the deception jamming incidence angle isConsidering two-point distribution, the disturbance on the right of the incident angle is pΔθ, the disturbance on the left is qΔθ, and p+q=1; assuming that the power of the two disturbance spoofing jamming signals is equal; thus, the two spoofing disturbances form an array flow pattern of:
the presence of the orthogonal basis H satisfies a system of equations,
step 4, solving the flow pattern set of the array disturbance flow pattern of the deception jamming signal by adopting QR decomposition
i=1.. orthogonal basis vectors of the P zero space; rank of column full->Wherein->
Solving for
And the weight vector of the spatial adaptive filter is w=hd, and the spatial adaptive filter is substituted into spatial filtering to realize deception jamming inhibition of the extended circular array.
2. The GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on extended circular array arrival estimation of claim 1 wherein said M-ary uniform circular array employs a spherical coordinate system to represent the direction of arrival of the incident plane wave; the origin O of the coordinate system is positioned at the center of the array, namely the circle center; signal source pitch angle theta epsilon [0, pi/2]Is the included angle between the connecting line from the origin to the signal source and the Z axis, azimuth angleThe included angle between the projection of the connecting line from the origin to the signal source on the X-y plane and the positive half axis of the X axis; angle r of m-th array element of array and X-axis m The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the According to the phase relation of each array element relative to the origin of coordinates, the space steering vector of the array can be obtained as follows:
where ζ=2πRsin θ/λ, r m =2pi M/M, m=1, 2, …, M then the array signal is expressed as
The array flow pattern correction after the circular array expansion is as follows:
3. the GNSS navigation spoofing method based on extended circular array arrival estimation of claim 1, wherein the fourth step is to solve forTo ensure correct reception of the useful signal and to completely suppress other P spoofed interfering signals, the weight vector is constrained to +.>
4. A system of GNSS navigation anti-fraud methods based on extended circular array arrival estimation, characterized in that said device applies the GNSS navigation anti-fraud method based on extended circular array arrival estimation according to any of the preceding claims.
5. An apparatus for a GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on extended circular array arrival estimation, wherein the apparatus applies the GNSS navigation spoofing prevention method based on extended circular array arrival estimation as claimed in any of the preceding claims.
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| CN117590429A (en) * | 2023-11-06 | 2024-02-23 | 中山大学·深圳 | L-shaped array-based multi-spoofing signal incoming wave direction detection method and system |
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