CN113495284A - Satellite navigation deception jamming sensing and restraining system and method based on beam scanning - Google Patents
Satellite navigation deception jamming sensing and restraining system and method based on beam scanning Download PDFInfo
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- CN113495284A CN113495284A CN202111023616.7A CN202111023616A CN113495284A CN 113495284 A CN113495284 A CN 113495284A CN 202111023616 A CN202111023616 A CN 202111023616A CN 113495284 A CN113495284 A CN 113495284A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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Abstract
The invention discloses a satellite navigation deception jamming sensing and inhibiting system and a method based on beam scanning, which comprises the following steps: the system comprises an array antenna, a radio frequency channel, an A/D converter, a baseband processing board and a wireless encryption transmission module which are sequentially connected, wherein the array antenna is used for receiving satellite signals; the radio frequency channel is used for carrying out frequency conversion processing on satellite signals; the A/D converter is used for sampling the satellite signals after frequency conversion; the baseband processing board is used for carrying out interference detection and suppression on the sampled signals; and the wireless encryption transmission module is used for uploading the detected interference information to the cloud data center. By adopting the technical scheme of the invention, the deception jamming is detected by utilizing the characteristics that the deception jamming source and the real satellite signal have different arrival directions.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to a satellite navigation interference detection and suppression technology, and particularly relates to a satellite navigation deception interference sensing and suppression system and method based on beam scanning.
Background
In a complex electromagnetic environment or a countermeasure scene, a satellite navigation system is influenced by various types of interference. Interference for a satellite navigation receiver can be classified into suppressed interference and spoofed interference. The interference is suppressed by mainly transmitting a high-power signal to deteriorate the signal-to-noise ratio, so that the receiver cannot normally receive the satellite signal. The deception jamming mainly aims at achieving deception by transmitting false signals to enable a receiver positioning result to deviate from a real position and a real track. The signal power of the deception jamming is usually close to that of the real signal, the deception jamming has certain concealment performance, once the deception jamming succeeds, the destructive effect is more prominent, and therefore, the detection and the suppression of the deception jamming are a key problem.
Spoofed interference can be classified into two categories, a generative one and a repeater one, depending on the implementation. The generation formula is generally suitable for civil code signals, and can modify parameters such as ephemeris, transmission time, the number of visible satellites and the like, so that the positioning and time service of a receiver are abnormal, but the generation formula is not suitable for encrypted military code signals. The retransmission type is suitable for military code signals and civil code signals, and firstly satellite signals are received and then the positioning results of the receiver deviate from the real positions through introducing delay and retransmission.
For various types of deception jamming, students propose more detection methods, which can be classified into the following categories: one is a combined navigation system structure, for example, detecting spoofing interference based on inertial navigation detection satellite pseudo-range error change, and the detection probability of the method is higher, but the method is only suitable for a tightly coupled combined navigation system. The second type is a dual receiver structure, for example, detecting parameters such as pseudo range double differences, satellite clock difference double differences and the like to identify spoofing interference, but the problem of system time synchronization needs to be considered. The third type is a single receiver structure, interference is detected based on self-acquisition and tracking parameters of the receiver, for example, forwarding type deception interference is identified through multi-correlation peak detection, the method is simple and efficient, but for generating type interference, the detection probability is low, and a real satellite corresponding to a false signal may not be visible at present, so that a plurality of peaks cannot be generated at the moment; detecting deception jamming based on the pseudo range and position difference information adjacent to the pseudo range; for a mobile platform, the method is relatively simple, but the detection timeliness is not high. The fourth type is based on an array structure, interference incoming direction is measured through spatial spectrum estimation, whether interference exists or not is detected, in practice, deception interference power is only slightly higher than that of a real signal, even the deception interference power is submerged in noise, accuracy of a direction finding algorithm is not high, and therefore detection probability of the method is relatively low.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to detect the deception jamming more accurately, more efficiently and more widely, the invention provides a deception jamming sensing and inhibiting system and a method based on beam scanning, which detect the deception jamming by utilizing the characteristics that the deception jamming source and the real satellite signal have different arrival directions.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a beam scanning based satellite navigation spoofing interference sensing and suppression system, comprising: sequentially connecting the array antenna, the radio frequency channel, the A/D converter, the baseband processing board and the wireless encryption transmission module,
the array antenna is used for receiving satellite signals;
the radio frequency channel is used for carrying out frequency conversion processing on satellite signals;
the A/D converter is used for sampling the satellite signals after frequency conversion;
the baseband processing board is used for carrying out interference detection and suppression on the sampled signals;
and the wireless encryption transmission module is used for uploading the detected interference information to the cloud data center.
Preferably, the number of the array antenna elements is 10-30.
Preferably, the baseband processing board includes: the device comprises a beam scanning unit, a related processing unit and a detection judging unit; the beam scanning unit includes: a null construction module and a weighting processing module.
The null construction module is used for constructing a direction vector of a satellite signal in a tracking state, and calculating a weight vector corresponding to each array element according to a linear constraint minimum variance criterion;
the weighting processing module is used for processing array received signals based on the weight vector, sequentially scanning beams in the arrival direction of each satellite signal in sequence, and zeroing the satellite signals to inhibit the satellite signals in the direction;
the relevant processing unit is used for stripping carrier waves and pseudo codes from the weighted digital signals and calculating a tracking carrier-to-noise ratio;
and the detection judgment unit is used for detecting the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of each satellite to obtain interference information.
Preferably, the detection decision unit, if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of the satellite signal is deteriorated during the beam scanning process, the signal is unlocked, which indicates that the satellite signal is a real satellite signal; if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio is normal and the signal is not unlocked, the satellite signal is a false signal, and interference sources incident from other directions exist.
Preferably, the baseband processing board sequentially completes beam scanning and detection on all visible satellites to judge whether signals of all the satellites are true or false, then stores detection results and starts to perform global beam scanning through the beam scanning unit; when a certain angle is scanned, if some or all of the false satellite signals are unlocked, the direction is the incoming wave direction of the interference source, then the null in the direction is kept, and the direction is zeroed through weighting processing to suppress the interference.
Preferably, the azimuth angle of the scan ranges from 0 ° to 360 °, the pitch angle ranges from 0 ° to 90 °, and the step is from 0.1 ° to 1 °.
Preferably, after interference is successfully suppressed, the receiver normally works, reliable time and position information is obtained after positioning, and then the wireless encryption transmission module uploads the interference information obtained by time, position and detection to the cloud data center.
The invention also provides a deception jamming sensing and inhibiting method based on beam scanning, which comprises the following steps:
step 1, a receiver calculates the position of a visible satellite and finishes positioning, then nulls are sequentially formed in the direction of each satellite signal through a beam forming algorithm, each satellite is scanned, if the corresponding satellite signal is unlocked, the signal is a real satellite signal, and if the signal is not unlocked, the currently received and processed satellite signal is a false signal incident in other directions;
step 2, starting beam scanning of a full space, when a certain direction is scanned, and a corresponding false signal is unlocked, the direction is the incoming wave direction of deception interference, a null is constructed in the direction, and an interference signal in the direction is suppressed through array weighting processing;
step 3, the receiver normally positions and obtains a reliable position result, and the interference information uploading process is started: and uploading the self position information, the time, the detected interference information and the like to the cloud data center.
Preferably, the azimuth angle of the scan ranges from 0 ° to 360 °, the pitch angle ranges from 0 ° to 90 °, and the step is from 0.1 ° to 1 °.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: 1. two scenes of generating interference and forwarding interference are supported, and the applicability is wide; 2. the detection probability and the detection efficiency are higher; 3. meanwhile, the method has the capability of detecting and inhibiting interference, and is easy to integrate with an array anti-interference technology; 4. has the function of sharing interference information.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a deception jamming sensing and suppression system based on beam scanning according to the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a spoofed interference sensing and suppressing method based on beam scanning according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention is further explained with reference to the drawings and the embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention provides a satellite navigation spoofing interference sensing and suppressing system based on beam scanning, the hardware assembly includes: array antenna, radio frequency channel, A/D converter, baseband processing board, wireless encryption transmission module. The array antenna is connected with a radio frequency channel, the radio frequency channel is connected with an A/D (analog/digital) which is also connected with a baseband processing board, and the wireless encryption transmission module is connected with the baseband processing board. The software assembly comprises: the beam scanning unit, the correlation processing unit and the detection judging unit. According to the processing flow, the signals firstly pass through the beam scanning unit, then pass through the related processing unit, and finally are detected and judged, and the whole processing flow is operated on the baseband processing board.
The number of the array antenna elements is 10-30, and the array antenna elements are used for receiving signals; the radio frequency channel carries out frequency conversion processing on the signal, and then the A/D finishes signal sampling; the baseband processing board is used for processing the sampled signal and finishing the detection of interference; the wireless encryption transmission module is used for uploading time, the position of the satellite navigation terminal and interference information obtained through detection to the cloud data center, and other navigation terminal nodes can share the interference information through accessing the cloud data center.
The software assembly runs on a hardware platform. The beam scanning unit comprises a null construction module and a weighting processing module. The null construction module is used for constructing a direction vector of a satellite signal in a tracking state
The mathematical form is shown as the following formula,
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
represents a signal wavelength; e denotes an exponential constant, j denotes a complex symbol, and T denotes a matrix transposition.
Indicating the arrival of the signal at
A time difference between an individual array element and a reference array element, wherein,
the coordinates of the array elements are represented,
，
indicating the number of array elements.
And
respectively representing the pitch and azimuth angles of the satellite signals arriving at the array antenna. Then, the minimum variance criterion is calculated according to the linear constraint
The weight value corresponding to each array element is written into a vector form
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
in order to constrain the vector of the vector,
the number of 0 s is
。
Where E represents the mathematical expectation, H represents the conjugate transpose of the matrix,
representing the constructed covariance matrix, in which
Is a matrix of the units,
the zero-trap control coefficient is adopted, the zero-trap depth is adjusted to be proper, and the signal distortion caused by over-deep zero-trap is avoided.
Is shown as
The direction vector corresponding to the particle satellite can be obtained by the formula (1).
The weighting processing module is used for processing array received signals based on the weight vector obtained by the null construction module, namely, beam scanning is sequentially carried out on each satellite signal direction in sequence, the duration of each time is 5-10 seconds, the function and the effect are that the satellite signals in the corresponding direction are zeroed, namely, the satellite signals in the direction are inhibited, as shown in the following formula,
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
indicating the number of satellites currently in a tracking state,
representing the array received signal.
The related processing unit corresponds to the capturing and tracking processing in the traditional receiver, and mainly processes the weighted digital signal, including stripping carrier waves and pseudo codes, calculating a tracking carrier-to-noise ratio and the like.
And the detection judgment unit detects the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of the satellite. In the beam scanning process, if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of the corresponding satellite signal is deteriorated, the signal is unlocked, and the satellite signal is a real satellite signal; if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio is normal and the signal is not unlocked, the satellite signal is a false signal, and interference sources incident from other directions exist. Wherein the detection of the carrier to noise ratio degradation is mainly performed by a threshold value
The comparison is carried out, and the comparison is carried out,
the value of 30dB Hz or less can be obtained.
According to the steps, beam scanning and detection are sequentially completed for all visible satellites, so that the truth of each satellite signal can be judged, then the detection result is stored, and beam scanning of the whole domain space is started, and the beam scanning is mainly completed by the beam scanning unit. The range of the azimuth angle of scanning is 0-360 degrees, the range of the pitch angle is 0-90 degrees, the stepping is 0.1-1 degrees, and the stepping can be generally calculated according to 1 degree. When scanning to a certain angle
In the above-mentioned order, wherein,
representing the pitch angle at which the signal reaches the array antenna,
indicating the azimuth, if some or all false satellite signals are out-of-lock, indicating that the direction is the incoming wave direction of the interference source, and then keeping
And (3) nulling in the direction, repeating the processes of (3), (4) and (5), and nulling the direction through weighting processing so as to suppress interference. After the global space scan is completed, all the interference sources can be usually found.
After interference is successfully suppressed, the receiver normally works, reliable time and position information is obtained after positioning, then the time, position and interference information are uploaded to a cloud data center through a wireless encryption transmission module, and interference information is shared, wherein the interference information mainly comprises interference and a plurality of interference, satellite numbers corresponding to true and false signals and the like.
As shown in fig. 2, the present invention provides a spoofing interference sensing and suppressing method based on beam scanning, which includes the following steps:
step 1, normally capturing, tracking and positioning a satellite navigation terminal, obtaining the position of the satellite, and then calculating the azimuth angle and the pitch angle of the satellite relative to the satellite navigation terminal;
step 2, constructing nulls in the direction of each satellite signal in sequence, scanning beams, if the satellite signal is unlocked, the satellite signal is a real signal, if the satellite signal is not unlocked, the satellite signal is a false signal, and an interference source incident from other directions exists, and according to the method, beam scanning is finished on all visible satellites;
and 3, if no false signal exists, finishing the detection, and if the false signal exists, entering an interference suppression process: carrying out beam scanning on the global space, and when scanning to a certain direction, losing lock of a false satellite signal, indicating that the false signal comes from the direction, keeping a null and suppressing interference;
step 4, the receiver normally positions and obtains a reliable position result, and the interference information uploading process is started: and uploading the self position information, the time, the detected interference information and the like to the cloud data center. Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment may contain only a single embodiment, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should integrate the description, and the embodiments may be combined as appropriate to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
Claims (9)
1. A system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning, comprising: sequentially connecting the array antenna, the radio frequency channel, the A/D converter, the baseband processing board and the wireless encryption transmission module,
the array antenna is used for receiving satellite signals;
the radio frequency channel is used for carrying out frequency conversion processing on satellite signals;
the A/D converter is used for sampling the satellite signals after frequency conversion;
the baseband processing board is used for carrying out interference detection and suppression on the sampled signals;
and the wireless encryption transmission module is used for uploading the detected interference information to the cloud data center.
2. The system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning of claim 1 wherein the number of array antenna elements is between 10 and 30.
3. The system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning of claim 1 wherein the baseband processing board comprises: the device comprises a beam scanning unit, a related processing unit and a detection judging unit; the beam scanning unit includes: a null construction module and a weighting processing module; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the null construction module is used for constructing a direction vector of a satellite signal in a tracking state, and calculating a weight vector corresponding to each array element according to a linear constraint minimum variance criterion;
the weighting processing module is used for processing array received signals based on the weight vector, sequentially scanning beams in the arrival direction of each satellite signal in sequence, and zeroing the satellite signals to inhibit the satellite signals in the direction;
the relevant processing unit is used for stripping carrier waves and pseudo codes from the weighted digital signals and calculating a tracking carrier-to-noise ratio;
and the detection judgment unit is used for detecting the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of each satellite to obtain interference information.
4. The system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning of claim 3, wherein said detection decision unit, if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio of the satellite signal is deteriorated during the beam scanning, the signal is unlocked, which indicates that the satellite signal is a real satellite signal; if the tracking carrier-to-noise ratio is normal and the signal is not unlocked, the satellite signal is a false signal, and interference sources incident from other directions exist.
5. The system as claimed in claim 4, wherein the baseband processing board sequentially performs beam scanning and detection on all visible satellites to determine whether each satellite signal is true or false, then stores the detection result and starts global beam scanning through the beam scanning unit; when a certain angle is scanned, if some or all of the false satellite signals are unlocked, the direction is the incoming wave direction of the interference source, then the null in the direction is kept, and the direction is zeroed through weighting processing to suppress the interference.
6. The system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning of claim 5, wherein the beam scanning is in the azimuth range of 0 ° -360 °, the elevation range of 0 ° -90 °, and the step is in the range of 0.1 ° -1 °.
7. The system for sensing and suppressing satellite navigation spoofing interference based on beam scanning of claim 6, wherein after interference suppression is successful, the receiver operates normally, after positioning, reliable time and position information is obtained, and then the wireless encryption transmission module uploads the time, position and interference information obtained by detection to the cloud data center.
8. A deception jamming sensing and suppression method based on beam scanning is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, a receiver calculates the position of a visible satellite and finishes positioning, then nulls are sequentially formed in the direction of each satellite signal through a beam forming algorithm, each satellite is scanned, if the corresponding satellite signal is unlocked, the signal is a real satellite signal, and if the signal is not unlocked, the currently received and processed satellite signal is a false signal incident in other directions;
step 2, starting beam scanning of a full space, when a certain direction is scanned, and a corresponding false signal is unlocked, the direction is the incoming wave direction of deception interference, a null is constructed in the direction, and an interference signal in the direction is suppressed through array weighting processing;
step 3, the receiver normally positions and obtains a reliable position result, and the interference information uploading process is started: and uploading the self position information, the time, the detected interference information and the like to the cloud data center.
9. The spoof interference sensing and suppression method of claim 8 wherein the beam sweep is in the azimuth range of 0 ° -360 °, the elevation range of 0 ° -90 °, and the step is in the range of 0.1 ° -1 °.
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