CN116824925B - Method for improving TCAS target track quality based on mixed monitoring - Google Patents
Method for improving TCAS target track quality based on mixed monitoring Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
- G08G5/04—Anti-collision systems
- G08G5/045—Navigation or guidance aids, e.g. determination of anti-collision manoeuvers
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- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
- G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
- G08G5/0073—Surveillance aids
- G08G5/0078—Surveillance aids for monitoring traffic from the aircraft
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for improving TCAS target track quality based on mixed monitoring, which comprises the following steps: the TCAS device processes the response message containing the air position information of the intrusion machine to obtain the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local under the ADS-B signal source, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the local machine head and the height of the intrusion machine; the TCAS equipment makes an S-mode inquiry list so as to inquire an invading machine with an S-mode transponder, and based on analysis of a response message, a relative slant distance between the invading machine and the invading machine, the azimuth of the invading machine relative to a machine head of the invading machine and the height of the invading machine are obtained; comparing the slant distance, azimuth and altitude under the two signal sources, and if the slant distance difference absolute value condition, the azimuth difference absolute value condition and the altitude difference absolute value condition are simultaneously satisfied, updating the position information of the mixed monitoring target track by using the distance, the altitude and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source. The invention improves the track stability and the position accuracy of the intrusion machine.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of communication, in particular to a method for improving TCAS target track quality based on mixed monitoring.
Background
The TCAS (vehicle-mounted collision avoidance system) equipment monitors an aircraft equipped with an air traffic control transponder (S mode/ATCBS transponder) by using C-only full call inquiry and S mode inquiry, establishes and updates the track of the invading machine in a one-to-one mode, periodically sends the track information of the invading machine to the collision avoidance processing module, calculates the distance, height, azimuth and movement trend of the invading machine relative to the aircraft, and gives climbing or descending advice by combining the movement trend of the aircraft so as to achieve the aim of avoiding collision of the aircraft. TCAS devices are an essential and effective device for preventing collisions of aircraft in airspace and maintaining a safe separation between aircraft. The quality of the monitoring module in the TCAS equipment for the establishment, updating and maintenance of the flight path of the invading machine directly influences the final vertical decision warning proposal given by the anti-collision processing module.
During the use process of the TCAS equipment, the types of the intrusion machines are classified into 4 types, and the intrusion machines are ranked according to threat levels from low to high, namely OT (other planes), PT (approaching threat plane), TA (traffic warning plane) and RA (resolution warning plane). If an RA alarm occurs, the TCAS device outputs a voice alarm (such as climbing or descending) and displays the alarm (displayed on a display in the form of red and green stripes, wherein the red stripes indicate that the aircraft should avoid a far-away lifting speed, and the green stripes indicate that the aircraft should keep or approach the lifting speed) so as to remind the pilot to take a maneuver, thereby achieving the aim of avoiding the collision of the aircraft. In actual use, the types of invading machines sent out by the TCAS device are mostly OT and PT, and the information displayed by the invading machines on the display mainly comprises the distance, azimuth and altitude (altitude comprises relative altitude or absolute altitude) of the invading machines, and a pilot can manually switch. The pilot can observe the position information of the conventional transponder or the S-mode transponder with the ATCRBS mode in the airspace nearby the pilot in real time through the information of the invading machines sent to the display by the TCAS equipment, and take evading action in advance.
The TCAS equipment mainly comprises two large functional modules, namely a monitoring processing module and an anti-collision processing module, wherein the monitoring processing module is used for detecting the track of an invading aircraft based on the principle of secondary radar, then the anti-collision processing module is used for processing a logic algorithm, the transmitting frequency of the TCAS equipment is 1030MHz, the receiving center frequency is 1090MHz, the TCAS equipment scans and inquires 4 areas in front of, behind, left of and right of the aircraft by controlling the beam direction of an antenna, and the aircraft with an empty pipe transponder (S mode/ATCBS transponder) nearby can respond.
When the TCAS equipment updates the track, three information such as the distance, the height and the azimuth of the intrusion machine obtained by the period inquiry are associated with the distance, the height and the azimuth in the track information of the intrusion machine in the previous period, if the information is not associated with the information, the distance, the height and the azimuth information of the intrusion machine obtained by the period inquiry are not adopted, but the distance, the height and the azimuth information of the intrusion machine in the current period are extrapolated by utilizing an alpha beta filtering algorithm on the basis of a historical track, and if three information such as the distance, the height and the azimuth are detected in a plurality of continuous periods and are not associated with the track information, the track information of the intrusion machine is deleted.
The distance detection of the TCAS device to the intrusion machine is calculated by using the inquiry response time difference, the height detection is obtained by extracting relevant information from the response message, and the distance and the height detection are accurate. The TCAS device mainly uses an amplitude orientation method or a phase orientation method for detecting the azimuth. In the amplitude orientation method, the TCAS device scans and inquires 4 areas in front (0 degree), back (180 degrees), left (270 degrees) and right (90 degrees) of an aircraft by controlling the beam direction of an antenna, and decodes response signals of the intrusion machine, if the TCAS device detects that the amplitudes of signals received by the 0 degree antenna and the 90 degree antenna are the largest and equal, the direction of the intrusion machine is between 0 degree and 90 degrees, and the direction of equal-intensity signals of the 0 degree antenna and the 90 degree antenna, namely the direction of the intrusion machine is 45 degrees. In the phase orientation method, the TCAS device compares the phases of signals received by two antennas to determine the direction of an intruder in a coordinate plane. Since the directional antenna of the TCAS device has only 4 antenna beams, each of which is responsible for the orientation in the 90-degree region to achieve the positioning of 360 degrees in the horizontal direction, the detection accuracy of the TCAS device for the azimuth of the intrusion machine is not high (the azimuth accuracy of the angle measurement is less than 9 degrees root mean square according to the requirement of DO 185B) regardless of whether the amplitude orientation method or the phase orientation method is used. Moreover, in the actual use process, the signal amplitude received by the directional antenna of the TCAS equipment is changed due to shielding of other protruding antennas or structural members near the directional antenna of the TCAS equipment, so that the deviation between the azimuth of the intrusion machine calculated by the TCAS equipment and the actual azimuth is more than ten degrees.
Based on the description, in the flight process, the TCAS device for angle measurement based on the amplitude orientation method or the phase orientation method finally reports the azimuth error of the invagination machine on the display interface of the flight instrument (for example, the plane on the left side of the aircraft nose is displayed on the right side of the aircraft nose) or the situation that the azimuth correlation is not carried out on the unstable track and repeated starting batch is caused by overlarge azimuth deviation detected in each period, so that bad use feeling is brought to a pilot or the position information of the invagination machine is wrongly judged by the pilot.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems of inaccurate azimuth display, unstable azimuth and the like of the intrusion machine caused by low azimuth detection precision of the TCAS equipment on the intrusion machine, the invention provides a method for improving the quality of TCAS target tracks based on mixed monitoring.
The invention discloses a method for improving TCAS target track quality based on mixed monitoring, which comprises the following steps:
step 1: the TCAS device processes the received response message containing the air position information of the intrusion machine to obtain the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local machine under the ADS-B signal source, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the local machine head and the height of the intrusion machine;
step 2: the TCAS equipment makes an S-mode inquiry list so as to inquire an invading machine with an S-mode transponder, and based on analysis of a response message, a relative slant distance between the invading machine and the invading machine, the azimuth of the invading machine relative to a machine head of the invading machine and the height of the invading machine are obtained;
step 3: comparing the slant distance, azimuth and altitude under the two signal sources obtained in the step 1 and the step 2, if the slant distance absolute value condition, the azimuth difference absolute value condition and the altitude difference absolute value condition are simultaneously satisfied, the invading machine with the S-mode transponder is considered to be a mixed monitoring target, the mixed monitoring is confirmed successfully, and the position information of the mixed monitoring target track can be updated by using the distance, the altitude and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source.
Further, the step 1 includes:
step 11: receiving an ADS-B message of an intrusion machine, and attaching the intrusion machine on the basis of the ADS-B message of the intrusion machine, namely the longitude and latitude, the altitude and the true heading of an aircraft provided with TCAS equipment;
step 12: extracting an S-mode address in the ADS-B message, and comparing the S-mode address with the S-mode address in the existing track array one by one to obtain the positions of the local and the intrusion machine;
step 13: based on the positions of the local and the intrusion machine, obtaining the inclined distance between the intrusion machine and the local;
step 14: judging whether ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is credible or not;
step 15: and when the ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is credible, calculating to obtain the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head and the height of the intrusion machine.
Further, the step 12 includes:
step 121: when a first aerial position message is received, storing the aerial position message into a track array;
step 122: when the second aerial position message is received, comparing the second aerial position message with the first aerial position message to judge whether the second aerial position message belongs to a pair of odd-even messages or not; if the message does not belong to the pair of odd-even messages, discarding the first aerial position message, updating the second aerial position message into the first aerial position message, and stopping subsequent processing; if the message belongs to a pair of parity messages, starting global decoding calculation: discarding the second aerial position message when decoding fails, and stopping subsequent processing; when decoding is successful, obtaining an initial position, and checking the range of the initial position and the local position;
step 123: when the third air position message is received, the third air position message is decoded locally with the global decoding position in step 122, and the local decoding position corresponding to the third air position message and the local longitude and latitude information in the third air position message stored in step 11 are converted from the WGS 84 coordinate system to the geocentric coordinate system.
Further, the performing the range check on the initial position and the local position includes:
if the second air position message exceeds the preset effective range, discarding the second air position message, and stopping subsequent processing; otherwise, continuing to receive and process the subsequent message in the effective range.
Further, the step 14 includes:
if the relative speed between the intrusion machine and the local machine is smaller than the preset speed, the ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is considered to be reliable, meanwhile, the absolute speed of the local machine is obtained according to the longitude, latitude and height of the local machine in the period and the upper period, and when the absolute speed is smaller than the preset absolute speed, the ADS-B information of the local machine is considered to be reliable.
Further, before the step 12, the method further includes:
extracting a downlink format number of the ADS-B message, and filtering an S mode address in the ADS-B message when the downlink format number is 17 or 18 and the code field is 0,1,6, wherein the filtering principle is that the S mode address cannot be all 0 or all 1 and cannot be the S mode address of the host; when the type field is located in the [9, 18] or [20,22] interval, the ADS-B message is an over-the-air type message.
Further, the step 15 includes:
subtracting the true heading of the machine stored in the step 11 from the position of the intrusion machine relative to the machine obtained by using the inverse trigonometric function to obtain the position of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head; and directly analyzing the height information of the intrusion machine from the aerial position message.
Further, the step 2 includes:
the TCAS equipment in the machine makes an S-mode inquiry list, receives an S-mode response message with a downlink format of 16 after sending an S-mode inquiry with a format of UF0, calculates the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the machine under the detection condition by multiplying the time difference of the inquiry and the response message by the speed of light, calculates the azimuth of the intrusion machine under the detection condition relative to the machine head by an amplitude orientation method or a phase orientation method, and calculates the height of the intrusion machine by a height code field with the downlink format of 16.
Further, the updating of the position information of the hybrid surveillance target track includes:
according to the threat level of the intrusion machine, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is divided into two types: a monitoring period of m seconds 1 time and a monitoring period of n seconds 1 time; n is greater than m;
the TCAS equipment confirms the intrusion machine which is provided with the S-mode transponder and has the cross-linking capability field of 1 once every 10 seconds according to the processing flow of the step 2 and the step 3;
for an invading machine with a monitoring period of n seconds and successful mixed monitoring confirmation, in a non-active inquiry period, updating position information of a track by utilizing the distance, the height and the azimuth under an ADS-B information source, and in an active inquiry period, respectively using the detected azimuth to be different from the azimuth in a historical track and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source to be different from the azimuth in the historical track, and selecting azimuth information with the minimum difference value to update the position information of a mixed target;
for an invading machine with a monitoring period of m seconds and a successful mixed monitoring confirmation, respectively using the detected azimuth to be different from the azimuth in the historical track and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source to be different from the azimuth in the historical track to select azimuth information with the minimum difference value to update the position information of the mixed target.
Further, calculating the relative time of the intrusion machine relative to the local machine, wherein tau is expressed by tau=the inclined distance of the intrusion machine detected by the TCAS equipment relative to the local machine divided by the relative speed between the intrusion machine and the local machine;
if tau is greater than the preset time, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is n seconds 1 time, and if tau is greater than the preset time, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is m seconds 1 time.
Due to the adoption of the technical scheme, the invention has the following advantages:
the invention utilizes ADS-B information source to carry OUT mixed monitoring on the S mode target with ADS-B OUT function, and the longitude and latitude heights of the local and the intrusion machine are compared to form the position information of the intrusion machine relative to the local under the WGS 84 coordinate system, and the position information is compared with the position information obtained by detecting TCAS equipment to obtain the position information closest to the historical track, because the accuracy of the aerial position message in the ADS-B message is 5 meters, and the broadcasting period of the position information of the ADS-B message is 0.5 seconds, the position of the intrusion machine after the position information correction by utilizing the ADS-B information source is more accurate and the track is more stable compared with the monitoring period (1 second plus or minus 0.1 second) of the TCAS equipment.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for the description of the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is apparent that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the embodiments of the present invention, and other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings for those skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for improving TCAS target track quality based on hybrid monitoring according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, wherein it is apparent that the examples described are only some, but not all, of the examples of the present invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art are intended to fall within the scope of the embodiments of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention provides an embodiment of a method for improving TCAS target track quality based on hybrid monitoring, which can be divided into 3 flows, namely, ADS-B message receiving processing, hybrid target location confirmation and hybrid target aircraft updating, and is specifically described as follows:
s1, the ADS-B message receiving processing flow is as follows:
s11, receiving an ADS-B message of an intrusion machine, and attaching longitude and latitude, altitude and true heading of the intrusion machine (namely an airplane provided with TCAS equipment) on the basis of the original ADS-B message, wherein the longitude and latitude, altitude and true heading are used for synchronously calculating the distance, altitude and azimuth of the mixed target relative to the intrusion machine in a subsequent mixed monitoring target;
s12, extracting the downlink format number of the ADS-B message, and carrying out the next processing only when the downlink format number is 17 or 18 and the code field is 0,1,6 according to the requirement of the DO260B standard;
s13, filtering the S mode address in the ADS-B message, wherein the filtering principle is that the S mode address cannot be all 0 or all 1, and cannot be the S mode address of the local machine (in order to prevent false alarm generated by the ADS-B OUT information received by the local machine);
s14, according to DO185B standard requirements, TCAS equipment only generates a decision alarm suggestion for an air intrusion machine, so that type fields in ADS-B messages are judged, the next processing is carried out only when the type fields are located in the (9, 18) or (20, 22) intervals (namely, the ADS-B messages are air type messages), and when the type fields are located in the (20, 22) intervals, the atmospheric height data of an aircraft corresponding to the ADS-B messages are declared to be invalid;
s15, extracting an S-mode address in the ADS-B message, and comparing the S-mode address with the S-mode address in the existing track array one by one;
s16, when a first aerial position message is received, storing the aerial position message into a track array, wherein the effective time is 10S;
s17, when the second aerial position message is received, comparing the second aerial position message with the first message to judge whether the second aerial position message is a pair of odd-even messages, if not, discarding the first aerial position message, updating the aerial position message into the first message, and stopping subsequent processing. If so, then global decoding computation is started (see DO260B Standard T.5 for specific algorithm of global decoding): discarding the second message when the decoding fails, and stopping the subsequent processing; when the decoding is successful, an initial position is obtained, and the value is subjected to range check with a local position (namely an airplane provided with TCAS equipment). If the result is beyond the effective range of 50nm (i.e. the power range of the TCAS device, because the purpose of receiving the ADS-B message is to combine with the information of the intrusion machine detected by the TCAS device to form a mixed target, ADS-B air position messages beyond 50nm are not processed), the result is considered to be wrong, and the second air position message is discarded, and the subsequent processing is stopped; otherwise, continuing to receive and process the subsequent message in the effective range;
s18, when a third aerial position message is received, carrying out local decoding on the message and the global decoding position in S17 (a specific algorithm of the local decoding is referred to DO260B standard T.5), calculating a local decoding position, and converting the local decoding position corresponding to the third aerial position message and local longitude and latitude height information in the third aerial position message stored in S11 from a WGS 84 coordinate system to a geocentric coordinate system according to the following conversion formula, wherein the conversion formula is as follows:
X=(N + h) cosφcosλ
Y=(N + h)cosφsinλ
Z=(N(1 – e 2 ) + h)sinφ
wherein: x, Y, Z the x-axis coordinate, y-axis coordinate, and z-axis coordinate in the geocentric coordinate system, respectively;
represents the length of a line normal to the ellipsoid between the ellipsoid surface point (lambda, phi) and the ellipsoid axis intersection point.
h=height in WGS 84 coordinate system, Φ=latitude in WGS 84 coordinate system, λ=longitude in WGS 84 coordinate system.
e 2 =(a 2 - b 2 )/a 2 Flat= 6.69437999014, representing WGS 84 ellipsoid first eccentricity10 -3 。
a=semimajor axis of WGS 84 ellipsoid= 6378137.0 meters.
b=the semi-minor axis of WGS 84 ellipsoid= 6356752.3142 meters.
S19, converting the local position into a geocentric coordinate system through the conversion formula、/>、/>Converting the position of the invasive machine into +.>、/>、/>And then adopting a standard equation to obtain the slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local machine:
r 2 =(X intrusion machine - X Local machine ) 2 + (Y Intrusion machine - Y Local machine ) 2 + (Z Intrusion machine –Z Local machine ) 2
S110, since the application range of the algorithm is defined in DO185B as that the relative speed between the two machines is smaller than 1200kt, after the slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local machine is calculated, the approaching speed between the intrusion machine and the local machine needs to be judged, if the relative speed is smaller than 1200kt, ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is considered to be reliable, meanwhile, in order to prevent the calculated position information jump of the intrusion machine relative to the local machine caused by the local longitude and latitude jump, the longitude and latitude and the height of the local machine in the period and the upper period need to be calculated to obtain the absolute speed of the local machine, and if the relative speed is smaller than 600kt, ADS-B information of the local machine is considered to be reliable;
s111, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the local can be obtained by using the inverse trigonometric function (the intrusion machine and the local are regarded as two points, and the azimuth is relative to the azimuth of north):
thita (azimuth) =atan2 (X) Intrusion machine - X Local machine ，Y Intrusion machine - Y Local machine )
S112, because the TCAS device reports the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head can be obtained by subtracting the true heading of the machine stored in S11 from Thita;
s113, directly analyzing the height information of the invading machine from the aerial position message;
s114, calculating the distance, the height and the azimuth information of the intrusion machine with the ADS-B function relative to the intrusion machine under the ADS-B information source.
S2, the process flow of confirming the mixed monitoring target position is as follows:
s21, for an intrusion machine equipped with an S-mode transponder, extracting a cross-linking capability field from a DF0 message, if the cross-linking capability field is 1, indicating that the intrusion machine supports the cross-linking capability of an air traffic warning and anti-collision system, and extracting the air position message information of the intrusion machine through an S-mode inquiry message;
s22, the TCAS equipment makes an S-mode query list, sets a response length field=1 (which indicates that the S-mode transponder needs to respond to a long message with a downlink format of 16) in a query message aiming at an invading machine of an S-mode transponder with a cross-linking capability field=1, and sets a ground communication B register number in the query field to be 5, so that the air position message of the invading machine is expected to be extracted; after the TCAS equipment sends out an S-mode inquiry with the format of UF0, receiving an S-mode response message with the downlink format of 16, calculating by multiplying the time difference of the inquiry and the response message by the speed of light to obtain the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local under the detection condition, calculating by an amplitude orientation method or a phase orientation method to obtain the orientation of the intrusion machine relative to the head of the local under the detection condition, and calculating by a height code field with the downlink format of 16 to obtain the height of the intrusion machine;
s23, the TCAS device processes the communication field in the received 16-downlink response message, wherein the communication field comprises the aerial position information message of the intrusion machine, the processing mode is completely consistent with the processing flow of ADS-B message receiving processing in the patent, and the relative inclined distance between the intrusion machine and the self machine under an ADS-B signal source, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the self machine head and the height of the intrusion machine can be obtained through the flow;
and S24, comparing the inclined distance, the azimuth and the altitude under the two signal sources obtained in the S22 and the S23, and if the absolute value of the inclined distance difference < =290 meters, the absolute value of the azimuth difference < =45 degrees and the absolute value of the altitude difference < =100 feet are simultaneously satisfied, declaring the intrusion machine equipped with the S-mode transponder as a mixed monitoring target and confirming that the mixed monitoring is successful, and updating the position information of the mixed monitoring target track by using the distance, the altitude and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source.
S3, the process flow of updating the mixed monitoring target track is as follows:
s31, the monitoring period of the TCAS equipment for the invading machine is roughly divided into two types according to the threat degree of the invading machine, namely a 1-time monitoring period of 1 second and a 1-time monitoring period of 5 seconds;
s32, calculating the relative time of the intrusion machine relative to the local, wherein tau is expressed by tau=the relative speed of the intrusion machine relative to the local/the inclined distance of the intrusion machine detected by TCAS equipment;
s33, if tau is greater than 60 seconds, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is 5 seconds and 1 time, and if tau is less than 60 seconds, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is 1 second and 1 time;
s34, the TCAS equipment confirms the invading machine which is provided with the S-mode transponder and has the cross-linking capability field of 1 once every 10 seconds according to the processing flow of 'mixed monitoring target position confirmation' in the patent;
s35, for an invading machine with a monitoring period of 5 seconds and 1 time and successful mixed monitoring confirmation, in a non-active inquiry period, updating position information of tracks by utilizing the distance, the height and the azimuth under an ADS-B information source, and in an active inquiry period, respectively, updating position information of a mixed target by utilizing the difference between the detected azimuth and the azimuth in a historical track and the difference between the azimuth under the ADS-B information source and the azimuth in the historical track, wherein the optimal position information (namely, the azimuth information with the minimum difference) is selected;
s36, for an invading machine with a monitoring period of 1 second and 1 time and successful mixed monitoring confirmation, each period respectively uses the detected azimuth to be different from the azimuth in the historical track and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source to be different from the azimuth in the historical track, and optimal position information (namely azimuth information with the smallest difference) is selected to update the position information of the mixed target (because the distance and the altitude information obtained by active detection are reliable and the synchronism is higher, a preferential updating mode is adopted only for the azimuth information).
The invention uses ADS-B information source to correct the position information, which can make the position of the invading machine more accurate and the track more stable, and solve the problem of error display of the invading machine position or repeated starting of the track caused by no correlation of track information in the use process of TCAS equipment.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical aspects of the present invention and not for limiting the same, and although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, it should be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: modifications and equivalents may be made to the specific embodiments of the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, which is intended to be covered by the claims.
Claims (9)
1. A method for improving TCAS target track quality based on hybrid monitoring, comprising:
step 1: the TCAS device processes the received response message containing the air position information of the intrusion machine to obtain the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the local machine under the ADS-B signal source, the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the local machine head and the height of the intrusion machine;
step 2: the TCAS equipment makes an S-mode inquiry list so as to inquire an invading machine with an S-mode transponder, and based on analysis of a response message, a relative slant distance between the invading machine and the invading machine, the azimuth of the invading machine relative to a machine head of the invading machine and the height of the invading machine are obtained;
step 3: comparing the slant distance, the azimuth and the altitude under the two signal sources obtained in the step 1 and the step 2, if the slant distance difference absolute value condition, the azimuth difference absolute value condition and the altitude difference absolute value condition are simultaneously met, considering the invading machine with the S-mode transponder as a mixed monitoring target and the mixed monitoring is successful, and updating the position information of the mixed monitoring target track by using the distance, the altitude and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source;
the updating of the position information of the mixed monitoring target track comprises the following steps:
according to the threat level of the intrusion machine, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is divided into two types: a monitoring period of m seconds 1 time and a monitoring period of n seconds 1 time; n is greater than m;
the TCAS equipment confirms the invading machine which is provided with the S-mode transponder and has the cross-linking capability field of 1 once every k seconds according to the processing flow of the step 2 and the step 3; k is greater than n;
for an invading machine with a monitoring period of n seconds and successful mixed monitoring confirmation, in a non-active inquiry period, updating position information of a track by utilizing the distance, the height and the azimuth under an ADS-B information source, and in an active inquiry period, respectively using the detected azimuth to be different from the azimuth in a historical track and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source to be different from the azimuth in the historical track, and selecting azimuth information with the minimum difference value to update the position information of a mixed target;
for an invading machine with a monitoring period of m seconds and a successful mixed monitoring confirmation, respectively using the detected azimuth to be different from the azimuth in the historical track and the azimuth under the ADS-B information source to be different from the azimuth in the historical track to select azimuth information with the minimum difference value to update the position information of the mixed target.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step 1 comprises:
step 11: receiving an ADS-B message of an intrusion machine, and attaching the intrusion machine on the basis of the ADS-B message of the intrusion machine, namely the longitude and latitude, the altitude and the true heading of an aircraft provided with TCAS equipment;
step 12: extracting an S-mode address in the ADS-B message, and comparing the S-mode address with the S-mode address in the existing track array one by one to obtain the positions of the local and the intrusion machine;
step 13: based on the positions of the local and the intrusion machine, obtaining the inclined distance between the intrusion machine and the local;
step 14: judging whether ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is credible or not;
step 15: and when the ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is credible, calculating to obtain the azimuth of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head and the height of the intrusion machine.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the step 12 comprises:
step 121: when a first aerial position message is received, storing the aerial position message into a track array;
step 122: when the second aerial position message is received, comparing the second aerial position message with the first aerial position message to judge whether the second aerial position message belongs to a pair of odd-even messages or not; if the message does not belong to the pair of odd-even messages, discarding the first aerial position message, updating the second aerial position message into the first aerial position message, and stopping subsequent processing; if the message belongs to a pair of parity messages, starting global decoding calculation: discarding the second aerial position message when decoding fails, and stopping subsequent processing; when decoding is successful, obtaining an initial position, and checking the range of the initial position and the local position;
step 123: when the third air position message is received, the third air position message is decoded locally with the global decoding position in step 122, and the local decoding position corresponding to the third air position message and the local longitude and latitude information in the third air position message stored in step 11 are converted from the WGS 84 coordinate system to the geocentric coordinate system.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein said range checking the initial position with the local position comprises:
if the second air position message exceeds the preset effective range, discarding the second air position message, and stopping subsequent processing; otherwise, continuing to receive and process the subsequent message in the effective range.
5. The method according to claim 2, wherein the step 14 comprises:
if the relative speed between the intrusion machine and the local machine is smaller than the preset speed, the ADS-B information of the intrusion machine is considered to be reliable, meanwhile, the absolute speed of the local machine is obtained according to the longitude, latitude and height of the local machine in the period and the upper period, and when the absolute speed is smaller than the preset absolute speed, the ADS-B information of the local machine is considered to be reliable.
6. The method according to claim 2, further comprising, prior to step 12:
extracting a downlink format number of the ADS-B message, and filtering an S mode address in the ADS-B message when the downlink format number is 17 or 18 and the code field is 0,1,6, wherein the filtering principle is that the S mode address cannot be all 0 or all 1 and cannot be the S mode address of the host; when the type field is located in the [9, 18] or [20,22] interval, the ADS-B message is an over-the-air type message.
7. The method according to claim 2, wherein said step 15 comprises:
subtracting the true heading of the machine stored in the step 11 from the position of the intrusion machine relative to the machine obtained by using the inverse trigonometric function to obtain the position of the intrusion machine relative to the machine head; and directly analyzing the height information of the intrusion machine from the aerial position message.
8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step 2 comprises:
the TCAS equipment in the machine makes an S-mode inquiry list, receives an S-mode response message with a downlink format of 16 after sending an S-mode inquiry with a format of UF0, calculates the relative slant distance between the intrusion machine and the machine under the detection condition by multiplying the time difference of the inquiry and the response message by the speed of light, calculates the azimuth of the intrusion machine under the detection condition relative to the machine head by an amplitude orientation method or a phase orientation method, and calculates the height of the intrusion machine by a height code field with the downlink format of 16.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the relative time of the intruder to the host is calculated as tau, and tau = TCAS device detected as an intruder to host skew divided by the relative speed between the intruder and the host;
if tau is greater than the preset time, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is n seconds 1 time, and if tau is greater than the preset time, the monitoring period of the TCAS device for the intrusion machine is m seconds 1 time.
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