CN115663813B - Fault analysis method considering information physical attack of substation topology - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of power system safety, in particular to a fault analysis method for information physical attack considering substation topology, which comprises the following steps: according to the attack principle and the influence mechanism of multiple types of attacks in the information physical cooperation attack, corresponding variables are set to represent the selection condition of the cooperation attack object and the influenced condition of the power system; according to fault trip isolation logic in the power system fault response process, considering the influence of network attack on a relay protection device, and establishing a breaker switch action model of the power system under the network attack; establishing a fault influence propagation model by adopting a multi-commodity flow model with reference to an actual power system fault propagation process; and according to the cooperative attack position, the actual operation mode of the power system and the internal wiring condition of the transformer substation are considered, and the breaker switch action model and the fault influence propagation model are solved to obtain the fault condition of the power system. The method can accurately evaluate the influence degree of the power system under the relay protection fault condition by the cooperative attack.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a fault analysis method for information physical attack considering substation topology, and belongs to the technical field of power system safety.
Background
In the field of power system security, as the dependence degree of a modern power system on a communication and automatic control system is higher, the information physical cooperation attack can cause more serious consequences on reliable power supply than the traditional malicious attack. The information physical cooperative attack has various types and complex influence, and how to analytically describe the fault influence condition of the power system under different information physical cooperative attacks and describe the interaction between the cooperative attack evolution process and the power system response process still remains to be solved. Therefore, a fault analysis method considering the information physical attack of the substation topology is yet to be proposed.
In the prior art, when a power system fault is researched, relay protection is often regarded as absolutely reliable. Under the background of information physical fusion, network attacks aiming at relay protection are not considered sufficiently, and an analysis method for cascading failures caused by such a cooperative attack form is lacked.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the invention provides a fault analysis method considering the information physical attack of the topology of the transformer substation, the analysis method describes the influence of the network attack on a relay protection device by using a breaker switch action model of a power system, and analyzes the actual fault propagation process of the power system by using a fault influence propagation model based on multiple commodity flows. According to the cooperative attack position, the actual operation mode of the power system and the internal wiring condition of the transformer substation are considered, the breaker switch action model and the fault influence propagation model are solved to obtain the fault condition of the power system, and the comprehensive loss of the system is evaluated.
The technical scheme for solving the technical problems is as follows: a fault analysis method considering information physical attack of substation topology is disclosed, and the method comprises the following steps:
s1, establishing corresponding variables to represent the selection condition of a cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of a power system according to the attack principle and the influence mechanism of multiple types of attacks in the information physical cooperative attack;
s2, according to fault tripping isolation logic in the power system fault response process, considering the influence of network attack on a relay protection device, and establishing a breaker switch action model of the power system under the network attack;
s3, establishing a fault influence propagation model by adopting a multi-commodity flow model by referring to the actual fault propagation process of the power system;
and S4, according to the cooperative attack position, considering the actual operation mode of the power system and the internal wiring condition of the transformer substation, and solving the breaker switch action model and the fault influence propagation model to obtain the fault condition of the power system.
On the basis of the technical scheme, the invention can be further improved as follows:
further, in step S1, the cyber-physical attack includes three attack forms:
physical attacks targeting the transmission line will cause the line to have a short-circuit fault;
the refusal network attack targeting the relay protection device prevents the circuit breaker from tripping by modifying the relay setting, thereby enlarging the fault influence;
and the false network attack control relay which takes the relay protection device as a target sends a tripping signal to the corresponding breaker to cut off a key power flow transmission path.
Furthermore, under the coordination of physical attack and network attack refusal, a large number of elements affected by the fault exit the operation; therefore, for each system element, the selection condition of the cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of the power system are represented by binary variables;
the attack variables include:f i representing whether the power transmission line connected with the node i is subjected to physical attack or not, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0;α ij representing whether a relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij is attacked by a refused network or not, wherein the attacked state is 1, and otherwise, the attacked state is 0;β ij representing whether a relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij is attacked by the misoperation network or not, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0;
the affected condition variables of the power system include:s ij representing the on-off condition of the circuit breaker ij, wherein the closed state of the circuit breaker is represented as 1, otherwise, the closed state of the circuit breaker is 0;c i and characterizing the condition that the node i is affected by the fault, wherein the node affected by the fault is represented as 1, and otherwise, the node affected by the fault is 0.
Further, in step S2, when the relay protection device is affected by a network attack, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker depends on the type of the network attack; for the relay protection device which is not attacked, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker is determined by the fault state of the nodes at the two ends, and the relevant constraints are as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,Eis a set of circuit breakers, and is,z ij presetting the action condition for the relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij,
the pre-accident state of the circuit breaker ij.
Expressions (1) - (6) describe the on-off logic of the breaker under the physical cooperation attack of the information, and expressions (1) - (2) show that if any node on two sides of the breaker ij is affected by the fault (c i =1 orc j = 1), the relay protection device corresponding to the breaker will operate (z ij = 1). Equation (3) shows that if the nodes on the two sides of the circuit breaker are not affected by the fault, the relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker will not act (z ij = 0). Equation (4) indicates that the circuit breaker that was not commissioned prior to the accident will remain open. Equation (5) Circuit breaker protected from active network attacksα ij =0，β ij = 0) is only related to the operation of the predetermined relay protection device. That is, the action of the relay protection device corresponds to the tripping of the circuit breaker, and vice versa (s ij =1-z ij ). Equation (6) indicates that the open/close state of the circuit breaker affected by the network attack is determined by the type of the network attack. (ifα ij =1, thens ij =1, ifβ ij =1, thens ij = 0)
Further, in step S3, when the line is physically attacked, the relay protection devices at the two ends of the line control the corresponding circuit breakers to trip and isolate faults; if the relay protection fails due to refusing network attack, the fault will be further propagated, resulting in that more system elements are affected by the fault and quit operation.
Further, the fault propagation model is constrained as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,Vin the form of a set of nodes, the nodes,Mis a positive number that is sufficiently large that,f i indicating whether the connected line of node i is subject to physical attack,F ij for the flow of goods on the circuit breaker ij,F ji for the flow of goods on the circuit breaker ji,F ik is the commodity flow on breaker ik.
Equation (7) indicates that the connected components have the same fault condition, i.e. by closing the circuit breaker (C) ((C))s ij = 1) connected nodes are in the same state (c i =c j ). Constraints (8) and (9) use network flow theory to represent the fault propagation process as a multi-commodity flow model. Here, the multi-commodity flow model takes the short-circuit fault effect as commodity and takes the node subjected to physical attack as the nodeAnd the source point takes the breaker as a path of commodity flow, and all nodes are considered as sinks. The commodity consumption per sink is 0 or 1, corresponding to the failure state of the node. Constraint (8) indicating open circuit breaker (c)s ij No commodity stream on = 0: (F ij = 0). Constraints (9) ensure commodity conservation at each node. If the node is a source point (f i = 1), which produces at least one article of commerce. The commodity can be consumed at this node or flow out to other nodes along the circuit breaker. If the node is not a source point (f i = 0), the node does not produce any commodity. For a group of connected nodes, at least one node must consume commodity due to mass balance if there is one source point. Considering the constraint (7), it is known that the fault states of these nodes are all 1. If there is no source point, the fault status of these nodes is 0.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the fault evolution modeling method is researched aiming at the fault evolution modeling problem of the information physics attack, the interaction influence relation between the fault tripping isolation logic of the relay protection and the network attack in the fault response process of the power system is analyzed, the actual fault transmission process is considered, the breaker switching action model and the fault influence transmission model are established, and the fault transmission process of the power system under the information physics cooperative attack can be accurately reflected.
The invention discloses a fault analysis method considering information physical attack of substation topology, which can analytically indicate the condition that each element of an actual power system is influenced by faults under a given cooperative attack scheme, and accurately evaluate the influence degree of the power system under the cooperative attack under the relay protection fault condition.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a wiring diagram of an IEEE RTS 24 node system including a substation topology;
fig. 2 is a diagram of a power system fault situation after a cooperative attack.
Detailed Description
The following is a detailed description of specific embodiments of the invention. The present invention may be embodied in many different forms than those specifically described herein and those skilled in the art will be able to make similar modifications without departing from the spirit of the invention and it is therefore not intended to be limited to the specific embodiments disclosed.
Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. The terminology used is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention.
A fault analysis method considering information physical attack of substation topology is provided, which comprises the following steps:
s1, establishing corresponding variables to represent the selection condition of a cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of a power system according to the attack principle and the influence mechanism of multiple types of attacks in the information physical cooperative attack;
the cyber-physical cooperative attack comprises three attack forms:
physical attacks targeting the transmission line will cause the line to have a short-circuit fault;
the refusal network attack targeting the relay protection device prevents the circuit breaker from tripping by modifying the relay setting, thereby enlarging the fault influence;
and the false network attack control relay which takes the relay protection device as a target sends a tripping signal to the corresponding breaker to cut off a key power flow transmission path.
Furthermore, under the coordination of physical attack and network attack refusal, a large number of elements affected by the fault exit from operation; therefore, for each system element, the selection condition of the cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of the power system are represented by binary variables;
the attack variables include:f i representing whether the power transmission line connected with the node i is subjected to physical attack or not, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0;α ij representing whether a relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij is attacked by a refused network or not, wherein the attacked state is 1, and otherwise, the attacked state is 0;β ij representing whether relay protection device corresponding to circuit breaker ij is subjected to misoperation or notThe network attack is represented as 1, otherwise, the network attack is 0;
the affected condition variables of the power system include:s ij representing the on-off condition of the circuit breaker ij, wherein the closed state of the circuit breaker is represented as 1, otherwise, the closed state of the circuit breaker is 0;c i and characterizing the condition that the node i is affected by the fault, wherein the node affected by the fault is represented as 1, and otherwise, the node affected by the fault is 0.
S2, according to fault tripping isolation logic in the power system fault response process, considering the influence of network attack on a relay protection device, and establishing a breaker switch action model of the power system under the network attack;
when the relay protection device is influenced by network attack, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker is determined according to the type of the network attack; for the relay protection device which is not attacked, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker is determined by the fault state of the nodes at the two ends, and the relevant constraints are as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,Eis a set of circuit breakers, and is,z ij presetting the action condition for the relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij,
in the pre-accident state of the circuit breaker ij,c j is a nodejAffected by the fault.
Expressions (1) - (6) describe the on-off logic of the circuit breaker under the physical cooperation attack of the information, and expressions (1) - (2) show that if any node on two sides of the circuit breaker ij is affected by the fault (c i =1 orc j = 1), the relay protection device corresponding to the breaker will operate (z ij = 1). Equation (3) shows that if the nodes on the two sides of the circuit breaker are not affected by the fault, the relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker will not act (z ij = 0). Equation (4) indicates that the circuit breaker that was not commissioned prior to the accident will remain open. Equation (5) Circuit breaker protected from active network attacksα ij =0，β ij = 0) is only related to the operation of the predetermined relay protection device. That is, the action of the relay protection device corresponds to the tripping of the circuit breaker, and vice versa (s ij =1-z ij ). Equation (6) shows that the open/close state of the circuit breaker affected by the network attack is determined by the type of network attack (ifα ij =1, thens ij =1, ifβ ij =1, thens ij = 0)。
S3, establishing a fault influence propagation model by adopting a multi-commodity flow model with reference to an actual power system fault propagation process;
when the line is subjected to physical attack, the relay protection devices at two ends of the line control corresponding circuit breakers to trip and isolate faults; if the relay protection fails due to refusing network attack, the fault is further propagated, so that more system elements are influenced by the fault and quit operation.
Further, the fault propagation model is constrained as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,Vin the form of a set of nodes, the nodes,Mis a positive number that is large enough to be,f i indicating whether the connected line of node i is subject to physical attack,F ij for the flow of goods on the circuit breaker ij,F ji for the flow of goods on the circuit breaker ji,F ik is the commodity flow on breaker ik.
Equation (7) indicates that the connected components have the same fault condition, i.e. by closing the circuit breaker (C) ((C))s ij = 1) connected nodes are in the same state (c i =c j ). Constraints (8) and (9) use network flow theory to represent the fault propagation process as a multi-commodity flow model. Here, the multi-commodity-flow model takes the short-circuit fault influence as a commodity, takes a node subjected to physical attack as a source point, takes a breaker as a commodity-flow path, and all nodes are considered as sinks. The commodity consumption of each sink is 0 or 1, corresponding to the failure state of the node. Constraint (8) indicating open circuit breaker (c)s ij No commodity stream on = 0: (F ij = 0). Constraints (9) ensure commodity conservation at each node. If the node is a source point (f i = 1), which produces at least one article of commerce. The commodity can be consumed at this node or flow out to other nodes along the circuit breaker. If the node is not a source node (A)f i = 0), the node does not produce any commodity. For a group of connected nodes, at least one node must consume commodity due to mass balance if there is one source point. The failure of these nodes is known in view of the constraint (7)The states are all 1. If there is no source point in it, the fault status of these nodes is 0.
And S4, according to the cooperative attack position, considering the actual operation mode of the power system and the internal wiring condition of the transformer substation, and solving a breaker switch action model and a fault influence propagation model to obtain the fault condition of the power system.
The working principle of the analysis method according to the present invention is described in this embodiment with reference to fig. 1 and 2:
step 1: and (3) verifying the effectiveness of the analysis method provided by the invention by taking an IEEE RTS 24 node system containing the topology of the transformer substation as a test example. The wiring diagram of the system is shown in fig. 1. In the system, 147 nodes and 38 power transmission lines are provided, and corresponding variables are set for the nodes and the lines. Given a cooperative attack scheme, the lines 69 to 142 and the lines 103 to 104 are subjected to physical attack, the relay protection devices corresponding to the breakers 141 to 142, 141 to 140, 69 to 70 and 122 to 123 are subjected to network refusal attack, and the relay protection devices corresponding to the breakers 41 to 42 and 41 to 43 are subjected to network misoperation attack.
And 2, according to fault tripping isolation logic in the power system fault response process, considering the influence of network attack on the relay protection device, and establishing a breaker switch action model of the power system under the network attack.
And 3, establishing a fault influence propagation model by using a multi-commodity flow model with reference to the actual fault propagation process of the power system.
And 4, according to the cooperative attack position, considering the actual operation mode of the power system, and solving the breaker switch action model and the fault influence propagation model to obtain the fault condition of the power system, as shown in fig. 2. The area affected by the fault is shown as a red dashed circle. Furthermore, the load nodes 40, 78, 104 are disconnected from the power generation nodes 37-39, 143-145 from the normal operating portion of the main network, and these nodes either exit operation altogether or maintain only a small portion of functionality.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for brevity of description, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not exhaustive, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the following claims.
Claims (3)
1. A fault analysis method considering information physical attack of substation topology is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, establishing corresponding variables to represent the selection condition of a cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of a power system according to the attack principle and the influence mechanism of multiple types of attacks in the information physical cooperative attack;
s2, according to fault tripping isolation logic in the power system fault response process, considering the influence of network attack on a relay protection device, and establishing a breaker switch action model of the power system under the network attack;
s3, establishing a fault influence propagation model by adopting a multi-commodity flow model by referring to the actual fault propagation process of the power system;
s4, according to the cooperative attack position, considering the actual operation mode of the power system and the internal wiring condition of the transformer substation, and solving a breaker switch action model and a fault influence propagation model to obtain the fault condition of the power system;
under the coordination of physical attack and network attack refusal, a large number of elements affected by the fault exit from operation; therefore, for each system element, the selection condition of the cooperative attack object and the influenced condition of the power system are represented by binary variables;
the attack variables include: f. of i Representing whether the power transmission line connected with the node i is subjected to physical attack or not, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0; alpha (alpha) ("alpha") ij Representing whether a relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij is attacked by a refused network, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0; beta is a ij Representing whether a relay protection device corresponding to the circuit breaker ij is attacked by the misoperation network or not, wherein the attack is represented as 1, and otherwise, the attack is 0;
electric power systemThe affected condition variables include: s ij Representing the on-off condition of the circuit breaker ij, wherein the closed state of the circuit breaker is represented as 1, otherwise, the closed state of the circuit breaker is 0; c. C i Representing the condition that the node i is influenced by the fault, wherein the node is influenced by the fault and is represented as 1, and otherwise, the node is 0;
in the step S2, when the relay protection device is influenced by network attack, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker is determined according to the type of the network attack; for the relay protection device which is not attacked, the on-off state of the corresponding circuit breaker is determined by the fault state of the nodes at the two ends, and the relevant constraints are as follows:
wherein E is a set of circuit breakers, z ij Presetting the action condition for the relay protection device corresponding to the breaker ij,
the state is the pre-accident state of the breaker ij;
in step S3, the fault propagation model is constrained as follows:
where V is a set of nodes, M is a sufficiently large positive number, and f i Characterizing the physical attack situation on the links of node i, F ij For the flow of goods on the circuit breaker ij, F ji For the flow of goods on the breaker ji, F ik Is the commodity flow on breaker ik.
2. The fault analysis method of the cyber-physical attack considering the topology of the transformer substation according to claim 1, wherein in the step S1, the cyber-physical cooperative attack includes three attack forms:
physical attacks targeting the transmission line will cause short circuit faults in the line;
the refusal network attack targeting the relay protection device prevents the circuit breaker from tripping by modifying the relay setting, thereby enlarging the fault influence;
and the false network attack control relay which takes the relay protection device as a target sends a tripping signal to the corresponding breaker to cut off a key power flow transmission path.
3. The fault analysis method considering the information physical attack of the substation topology according to claim 1, wherein in step S3, when the line is physically attacked, the relay protection devices at two ends of the line control the corresponding circuit breakers to trip and isolate faults; if the relay protection fails due to refusing network attack, the fault is further propagated, so that more system elements are influenced by the fault and quit operation.
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