CN109936133A - Consider the power system vulnerability analysis method that information physical gangs up against - Google Patents

Consider the power system vulnerability analysis method that information physical gangs up against Download PDF

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CN109936133A
CN109936133A CN201910152597.4A CN201910152597A CN109936133A CN 109936133 A CN109936133 A CN 109936133A CN 201910152597 A CN201910152597 A CN 201910152597A CN 109936133 A CN109936133 A CN 109936133A
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power
load
isolated island
electric
electric power
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CN109936133B (en
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李晨
刘学松
代国庆
孙伟光
李孟
安山
徐国强
全凤丽
王黎
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Qingdao Power Supply Co of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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Qingdao Power Supply Co of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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Abstract

Present disclose provides a kind of power system vulnerability analysis methods that consideration information physical gangs up against, when somewhere power grid primary equipment (generator, transformer and transmission line of electricity etc.) is run by physical damage backed off after random, cause the variation of topological structure of electric, it is possible that the problems such as power flow transfer of electric system, branch power be out-of-limit and unbalanced power.If information system is subject to information attack at this time; then think that power-management centre loses optimizing regulation ability; power grid takes equal proportion to adjust the mode of hair electrical power to guarantee power-balance; out-of-limit branch will be acted by protective relaying device and be cut off; if information system is not subject to attack, after the equipment being destroyed is stopped transport, power-management centre is optimized with the minimum target of load loss amount; it is controlled from power supply side and load side synergic adjustment, guarantees that elimination branch power is out-of-limit while grid power balance.

Description

Consider the power system vulnerability analysis method that information physical gangs up against
Technical field
This disclosure relates to a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against.
Background technique
Only there is provided background technical informations relevant to the disclosure for the statement of this part, it is not necessary to so constitute first skill Art.
Smart grid is a kind of composite system being made of information virtual network and physical entity network, its main feature is that information System and the cooperation of physical system close coordination.With the continuous development of smart grid, the degree of automation of electric system is constantly mentioned Height, the various survey calculations of power grid, Decision Control element number greatly increase, and the scale of Power Information Network is increasing.Electricity Force system already develops into the complication system of an information physical depth integration, and stable operation be unable to do without its information system Real-Time Scheduling.Information system is sent to power-management centre and is analyzed and processed by the operation data of acquisition electric system, Simultaneously control is adjusted to electric system in control centre's Real-time Decision, to guarantee the stable operation of power system security.Current state The unstable factors such as the threat of terrorism, military conflict frequently occur on border, and electric system is mutually converted as the various energy Hinge is the critical infrastructures of country, has tremendous influence to national security, economic development, social stability, become terror One of the highest priority that molecule attacks.
Under above-mentioned background, power information physics emerging system vulnerability analysis and its research of calculation method are just shown It obtains particularly important.Be broadly divided into two kinds for the attack pattern of electric system at present: the first is directly primary to electric system Equipment carries out physical damage, primarily directed to the even certain important loads of power plant, substation, transmission line of electricity, bus nodes Artificial calculated attack, this attack pattern can make one or more power equipments break down and out of service, to change The topological structure of electric power networks seriously affects the transmission and distribution function of normal electric energy, in some instances it may even be possible to cause a series of chain Failure makes grid disconnection, causes a wide range of power outages accident;Another attack pattern is terrorist using advanced network skill Art invades Electricity Information Network, destroys the function of information system.Due to the control of electric system physical equipment and mutually coordinated very Dependency Specification system in big degree, therefore be possible to lead to that complicated object occurs in electric system for the attack of information system Interactive process is managed, and finally threatens the safety of whole system.For physical attacks, information attack has cost small, hidden The strong feature of covering property, may be more serious for the destruction of electric system.It is interaction between information system and physical system, Due to the two close-coupled, any one link, which goes wrong, all may cause serious damage sequence.Current most of documents All it is the influence for considering single attack pattern to electric system, information attack and physical attacks does not combine to study and divide Analysis.
Summary of the invention
The disclosure to solve the above-mentioned problems, proposes a kind of power system vulnerability that consideration information physical gangs up against It the characteristics of analysis method, the disclosure is merged for current power system information physical height, pays close attention in power scheduling control Power information system and electric power physical system are carried out integrated modelling by the function of the heart.Using the method for quantitative analysis to electric power Dynamic Evolution after system is attacked is simulated, and the evaluation index for losing load as damage sequence is used, to analyze The fragility of electric system.The fragility element of power grid can be found out, to take specific aim safeguard procedures to reduce power train The loss united after being attacked.
To achieve the goals above, the disclosure adopts the following technical scheme that
A kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against, comprising the following steps:
(1) setting is destroyed the state of each electric network element of backed off after random operation;
(2) topological analysis is carried out, obtains off-the-line after power grid is attacked into the number of several mutual disjunct electric power isolated islands, And power supply, network and the load condition of each electric power isolated island;
(3) elimination of branch overload is carried out to each not only electric power isolated island containing generator but also containing power load;
(4) constantly topological analysis obtains the electric power isolated island since the further off-the-line of cascading failure is mutually not attached at several New electric power isolated island number, and power supply, network and the load condition of each new electric power isolated island repeat disappearing for step (3) Except operation, until there is no cascading failure;
(5) it is that whether calculating finishes the new electric power isolated island containing power load again containing generating set that judgement is each, if then Load loss situation is counted, otherwise returns to (4), analytical calculation is carried out to remaining new electric power isolated island;
(6) after losing the accident after load is ganged up against as electric system by information physical using in load loss situation Fruit evaluation index causes to lose the fragile element that the most element of load is power grid after being attacked.
It is limited as further, in the step (1), using the function of power-management centre as point of penetration, by information system System and physical system carry out integrated modelling analysis.
It limits as further, in the step (3), specifically includes: the trend distribution of simulation system, specifically, right It is greater than the isolated island of electricity consumption in power generation, respective power output is proportionally reduced according to the power output size of every unit;Electricity consumption is greater than The isolated island of power generation then proportionally increases the power output of each unit according to the spinning reserve of every unit, if spinning reserve is not Foot, then on the basis of all units are completely sent out, each power load proportionally accordingly reduces load level, passes by if there is branch Load then carries out cascading failure judgement.
It is limited as further, in the step (3), if the detailed process of cascading failure judgement includes control centre By network attack, operating status perception and control ability are lost, branch overload can not be handled, then all overload branch trippings, and Carry out system topological analysis;If control centre by network attack, does not have operating status perception and control ability, handles branch Overload, then according to making, the smallest strategy of the isolated island load loss amount carries out generation re-dispatching and corresponding load shedding is arranged for control centre It applies to eliminate branch overload.
It is limited as further, in the step (3), the electric power is obtained by topological analysis in system topological analysis Number and each new electric power of the isolated island due to cascading failure further off-the-line at several mutual disjunct new electric power isolated islands Power supply, network and the load condition of isolated island.
It is limited as further, in the step (3), using the primary equipment in electric system as destruction target, Decision variable is the generating set power output and load level of each node under control centre's control, and objective function keeps system total It is minimum to lose load.
Limited as further, in the step (3), the bound for objective function include: when occur with It is unavailable that lower situation will cause power circuit l: each generating set, transmission line of electricity, node, electric substation's function in electric system The vector of state is 0-1, wherein the vector of functional status is that 1 corresponding force device is hit and disabler, function shape The vector of state is that 0 corresponding force device is not normal by strike function.
It is limited as further, in the step (3), the bound for objective function includes: power circuit l It catches a packet and head/endpoint node of disabler, power circuit l catches a packet and disabler, connect with power circuit l Electric substation catches a packet and the then power circuit l with it with bar of a failure in disabler and multi-circuit lines on the same pole Failure.
Limited as further, in the step (3), the bound for objective function include: when occur with It is unavailable that lower situation will cause generating set j: generating set j catch a packet and what disabler or generating set j were accessed Node catches a packet and disabler.
It is limited as further, in the step (3), the bound for objective function further includes DC power flow Equation constraint, Branch Power Flow equality constraint, power-balance constraint;Inequality constraints: Branch Power Flow security constraint, generating set go out Force constraint and the active variable quantity constraint of load.
A kind of power system vulnerability analysis system for considering information physical and ganging up against, runs on processor or memory On, it is configured as executing to give an order:
(1) setting is destroyed the state of each electric network element of backed off after random operation;
(2) topological analysis is carried out, obtains off-the-line after power grid is attacked into the number of several mutual disjunct electric power isolated islands, And power supply, network and the load condition of each electric power isolated island;
(3) elimination of branch overload is carried out to each not only electric power isolated island containing generator but also containing power load;
(4) constantly topological analysis obtains the electric power isolated island since the further off-the-line of cascading failure is mutually not attached at several New electric power isolated island number, and power supply, network and the load condition of each new electric power isolated island repeat disappearing for step (3) Except operation, until there is no cascading failure;
(5) it is that whether calculating finishes the new electric power isolated island containing power load again containing generating set that judgement is each, if then Load loss situation is counted, otherwise returns to (4), analytical calculation is carried out to remaining new electric power isolated island;
(6) after losing the accident after load is ganged up against as electric system by information physical using in load loss situation Fruit evaluation index causes to lose the fragile element that the most element of load is power grid after being attacked.
Compared with prior art, the disclosure has the beneficial effect that
The characteristics of disclosure is merged for current power system information physical height, pays close attention to power scheduling control centre Function, power information system and electric power physical system are subjected to integrated modelling.Using the method for quantitative analysis to power train Dynamic Evolution after system is attacked is simulated, and the evaluation index for losing load as damage sequence is used, to analyze electricity The fragility of Force system.The fragility element of power grid can be found out, to take specific aim safeguard procedures to reduce electric system Loss after being attacked;
The disclosure uses the vulnerability analysis method based on DC power flow, and calculating speed is fast, avoids AC power flow calculating Occurs the problem of iteration does not restrain in the process.
The present disclosure contemplates the actual topological structures of electric system to influence, and more meets system conditions, calculated result is more Accurately, practicability is more preferable.
Detailed description of the invention
The accompanying drawings constituting a part of this application is used to provide further understanding of the present application, and the application's shows Meaning property embodiment and its explanation are not constituted an undue limitation on the present application for explaining the application.
Fig. 1 is vulnerability analysis flow chart;
Fig. 2 is IEEE RTS-24 bus test system figure.
Specific embodiment:
The disclosure is described further with embodiment with reference to the accompanying drawing.
It is noted that following detailed description is all illustrative, it is intended to provide further instruction to the application.Unless another It indicates, all technical and scientific terms that the present embodiment uses have and the application person of an ordinary skill in the technical field Normally understood identical meanings.
It should be noted that term used herein above is merely to describe specific embodiment, and be not intended to restricted root According to the illustrative embodiments of the application.As used herein, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, otherwise singular Also it is intended to include plural form, additionally, it should be understood that, when in the present specification using term "comprising" and/or " packet Include " when, indicate existing characteristics, step, operation, device, component and/or their combination.
In the disclosure, term for example "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "front", "rear", "vertical", "horizontal", " side ", The orientation or positional relationship of the instructions such as "bottom" is to be based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings, only to facilitate describing this public affairs The relative for opening each component or component structure relationship and determination, not refers in particular to either component or element in the disclosure, cannot understand For the limitation to the disclosure.
In the disclosure, term such as " affixed ", " connected ", " connection " be shall be understood in a broad sense, and indicate may be a fixed connection, It is also possible to be integrally connected or is detachably connected;It can be directly connected, it can also be indirectly connected through an intermediary.For The related scientific research of this field or technical staff can determine the concrete meaning of above-mentioned term in the disclosure as the case may be, It should not be understood as the limitation to the disclosure.
The disclosure after meter and the constraint of practical power systems topological structure, is improved on the basis of customary DC tide model The power system vulnerability analysis calculation method of formation.
After electric system is attacked, if ignoring short-term transient process, only focus on POST FAULT POWER SYSTEMS again into Enter the operating condition of stable state, can be analyzed using power system mesomeric state method.Electric system is combined by information physical attacks Dynamic Evolution after hitting can be described as: when somewhere power grid primary equipment (generator, transformer and transmission line of electricity etc.) It is run by physical damage backed off after random, causes the variation of topological structure of electric, it is possible that the power flow transfer of electric system, branch The problems such as road power is out-of-limit and unbalanced power.If information system is subject to information attack at this time, then it is assumed that power-management centre Optimizing regulation ability is lost, power grid takes equal proportion to adjust the mode of hair electrical power to guarantee that power-balance, out-of-limit branch will It is acted and is cut off by protective relaying device, topological structure of electric can change again at this time, or even a series of cascading failures occur.If Information system is not subject to attack, after the equipment that is destroyed is stopped transport, power-management centre with the minimum target of load loss amount into It goes and optimizes, controlled from power supply side and load side synergic adjustment, guarantee that elimination branch power is out-of-limit while grid power balance, from And avoid the generation of cascading failure.The off-the-line situation for obtaining power grid in whole process using topological analysis algorithm, to each power grid Region is calculated.For above-mentioned Dynamic Evolution, simulated using Fig. 1 step.
It is as follows to the process description of Fig. 1:
(1) element operating status is set.It is electric that setting is destroyed generator, electric substation and transmission line of electricity of backed off after random operation etc. Mesh element;
(2) system topological is analyzed.Obtain after power grid is attacked off-the-line at several mutual disjunct electricity by topological analysis The power supply of the number of power isolated island (subsystem) and each electric power isolated island, network, load condition;
(3) each electric power isolated island (subsystem) not only containing generator but also containing power load is analyzed as follows:
(3.1) simulation system trend is distributed.First of all for area power balance is guaranteed, the orphan of electricity consumption is greater than for generating electricity Island proportionally reduces respective power output according to the power output size of every unit;It is greater than the isolated island of power generation for electricity consumption, then according to every The spinning reserve of platform unit proportionally increases the power output of each unit, need to be full in all units if spinning reserve is insufficient On the basis of hair, each power load proportionally accordingly reduces load level.According to the power generation and load progress trend after adjusting It calculates, judges whether there is branch overload, then there is no (4) are entered, overloaded if there is branch, then enter (3.2);
(3.2) cascading failure judges.If control centre loses operating status perception and control ability, nothing by network attack Method handles branch overload, then all overload branch trippings, and enters (3.3);If control centre by network attack, does not have fortune Row state aware and control ability can handle branch overload, then control centre is according to keeping the isolated island load loss amount the smallest Strategy carries out generation re-dispatching and corresponding load shedding measure to eliminate branch overload, enters (4) later;
(3.3) system topological is analyzed.Obtain the electric power isolated island due to cascading failure further off-the-line by topological analysis At the number of several mutual disjunct new electric power isolated islands (subsystem), and power supply, network, the load of each new electric power isolated island Situation;
(4) it is that whether calculating finishes the electric power isolated island (subsystem) containing power load again containing generating set that judgement is each, If then entering (5), (3) otherwise are returned, analytical calculation is carried out to dump power isolated island;
(5) to each i.e. containing the generating set simulation system trend point again of the new electric power isolated island (subsystem) containing power load again Match, cascading failure judgement, system topological analysis and etc., (there is not new electric power until there is no cascading failure Isolated island);
(6) it is that whether the new electric power isolated island (subsystem) containing power load has been calculated again containing generating set that judgement is each Finish, if then entering (7), otherwise return to (5), analytical calculation is carried out to remaining new electric power isolated island;
(7) load loss situation is counted.
The load loss situation that each electric power isolated island can be obtained according to this method, by the load loss amount of each electrical isolated island The execution being added as under the attack pattern, and using total load loss amount as power system vulnerability evaluation index.
The disclosure considers influencing each other for information system and physical system, using the function of power-management centre as point of penetration, Information system and physical system are subjected to integrated modelling analysis.Consider that terrorist starts information physical to combine electric system Attack: electric system is subject to physical attacks, i.e. certain primary equipments of electric system are run by physical damage backed off after random.Simultaneously Power-management centre may bear information attack, if by information attack, then the disabler of control centre, it cannot be to electricity Net the generator output of each node, load optimizes adjusting control;If being not subject to information attack, then control centre's energy It is enough to work normally, the spare unit of starting, generator power can be taken to dispatch again and to measures such as insignificant load off-loads, it is right Power grid optimizes adjusting, and target is to keep the mistake load of the whole network minimum.On the basis of topological analysis algorithm, proposes and be based on The vulnerability analysis method of DC power flow carries out quantitative simulation analysis to the dynamic process that power system accident develops, using mistake Load ganged up against as electric system by information physical after damage sequence evaluation index, caused after being attacked lose load The fragile element that most elements is power grid is measured, needs to be laid special stress on protecting.The disclosure is by establishing dividing for power grid fragility Analyse model, find out the fragility element of power grid, thus take effectively safeguard procedures reduce the damage that electric system is attacked It loses.Constructed model belongs to mixed integer nonlinear programming problem, using IEEE RTS-24 bus test system to mention calculate Method is verified, sample calculation analysis show proposition problem and its model feasibility and validity.
The purpose of the disclosure is to construct power information physics system Integrated Model, on the basis of DC power flow equation, Meter and the constraint of practical power systems topological structure, improvement form a kind of vulnerability analysis method towards electric system power transmission network.
The purpose of the disclosure is realized by following technical scheme:
Power scheduling control centre availability
Power-management centre availability variable is defined first:
η indicates the availability of dispatching control center in formula (1), is 0-1 variable.Control centre is represented for 1 to work normally, and is 0, which represents control centre, loses function.
Objective function
The planning problem using the primary equipments such as generating set, power circuit, node and electric substation in electric system as Target is destroyed, the generating set power output and load level that decision variable is each node under control centre's control are (if the node Controllably), objective function is that the mistake load that keeps system total is minimum:
In formula (2): PG,PLIt is the system decision-making variable that system operations staff is controlled, respectively node generator is active The vector expression-form of power output, node load level, dimension are equal to the number of the total node of power grid.ΔPLiFor the active of load i Loss amount.
Constraint condition
For electric network element by after physical damage, it is contemplated that relay protection device movement keeps damaged element out of service, The constraint of power system network topologies change is as follows:
In formula (3), δGenLineBusSubRespectively characterize each generating set, transmission line of electricity, section in electric system The vector expression-form of point, electric substation's functional status, vector dimension and generating set, transmission line of electricity, node and electric substation's number Mesh is identical, and element is 0 or 1, is hit and disabler for 1 corresponding force device, does not meet with for 0 corresponding force device The function that overwhelms is normal.For vector δGenIn j-th of element, the i.e. functional status of generating set j, be 0-1 variable; For vector δLineIn first of element, the i.e. functional status of transmission line of electricity l, be 0-1 variable;For vector δBusIn n-th yuan Element, the i.e. functional status of node n are 0-1 variable;For vector δSubIn s-th of element, the i.e. functional status of electric substation s, For 0-1 variable.
In formula (4) (5), Y, H are respectively to characterize electric system under the influence of topological structure, and power circuit, generating set are No available vector expression-form, vector dimension is identical as power circuit, generating set number, and element is 1 or 0, is 0 pair Should force device it is unavailable, it is available for 1 corresponding force device.The meaning of formula (4) is that will cause when there is following situations Power circuit l is unavailable: i.e. power circuit l catches a packet and head/endpoint node of disabler, power circuit l catches a packet And if disabler, catching a packet with the power circuit l electric substation connecting and disabler and power circuit l are with bar more times One time in route, then for physical damage, the multi circuit transmission lines with bar generally can be out of service simultaneously, and program is analyzed For a l' failure i.e. in multi-circuit lines on the same pole then with it with the power circuit l also failure of bar.YlFor power circuit l can With state,WithThe respectively functional status of the first and last node of power circuit l connection is 0-1 variable;For Set composed by all power circuits being connected with electric substation s,Meaning be connected with power circuit l All electric substation s;To gather with composed by other power circuits with bar paired running of power circuit l,For With power circuit with all power circuit l ' of bar paired running.The meaning of formula (5) is that will cause hair when there is following situations Motor group j is unavailable: i.e. generating set j catches a packet and node that disabler or generating set j are accessed catches a packet and Disabler, H in formulajFor the available mode of generating set j,For the functional status of the node of generating set j access, it is 0-1 variable.
Other than above-mentioned topological structure constraint, constraint condition also includes equality constraint: the constraint of DC power flow equation, branch Trend equality constraint, power-balance constraint;Inequality constraints: Branch Power Flow security constraint, generating set units limits and load Active variable quantity constraint.
PG-PL=B θ (6)
Formula (6) is DC power flow equation, wherein PGActive vector power, P are injected for each node generatorLFor each node Load active power vector, B are DC power flow susceptance matrix, and θ is node phase angle vector.
Formula (7) is transmission of electricity branch effective power flow equality constraint, P in formulalFor the effective power flow for the branch l that transmits electricity, xlFor transmission of electricity branch The reactance of road l, AlnFor the element in route-node incidence matrix, θnFor the phase angle of node n, N is system node set, and D is electricity Power line set.
Formula (8) is power balance equation, P in formulaGjFor the active power output of generator j, Δ PGjIt is issued for control centre's control The active power regulation amount of motor j, GnFor all generator collections on system interior joint n;PLiFor the active power of load i, ΔPLiFor the active loss amount of load i, LnFor all load aggregations on system interior joint n.
Formula (9) is transmission of electricity branch l power bound constraint,For the active power transfer value upper limit for the branch l that transmits electricity.
The active power output bound that formula (10) is generator j constrains,Respectively generator j it is active go out Power bound.
Formula (11) is the active power Loss constraint of load i, and L is load aggregation all in system.
Specifically, IEEE RTS-24 node system example
Fig. 2 gives IEEE RTS-24 bus test system, which includes 10 nodes containing generating set (32 Generator);17 nodes containing load;38 branches;Branch 3-24 is connecting transformer, branch 9-11,9- of electric substation 1 12,10-11,10-12 are the connecting transformer of electric substation 2.
Table 1 gives IEEE RTS-24 node system generating set data.
Table 1IEEE RTS-24 node system generating set data
Table 2 gives the data of IEEE RTS-24 node system branch reactance and transimission power limit value.
Table 2IEEE RTS-24 node system branch reactance and transimission power limit value
Table 3 gives IEEE RTS-24 node system load data.
Table 3IEEE RTS-24 node system load data
According to parameter given herein above, IEEE RTS-24 test macro is counted using the algorithm that the present embodiment proposes It calculates.
Table 4 gives simulating grid by information attack, control centre's disabler, then random to the primary equipment of power grid After sampled analog physical damage, the mistake load of every kind of lower power grid that ruins a plan and accounts for the ratio of total load (total load amount is 2850MW)。
The fragility calculated result that table 4IEEE RTS-24 node system is ganged up against by information physical
Table 4 shows that node 13,15 and 18 goes out as target of attack when power grid loses load accounting and reaches 70% or more It is existing, it is the fragile node of power grid;Route 12-23 and common-tower double-circuit lines 20-23 are occurred nearly in all ruin a plan, route Also there is more number in 7-8 and 16-17, is the fragile branch of power grid.No matter which kind of attack option, the fragility section of power grid are directed to Point and branch are basically unchanged.By analyzing above, it should reinforce the security protection to these nodes and branch, to reduce Power grid is by loss when attacking.
Table 5 gives power grid only by physical attacks and the mistake load comparing result that gangs up against of information physical simultaneously. If power grid is only by physical attacks, control centre's function is normal, can be minimum with the mistake load of optimal control power grid.Choose table Attack option 2, attack option 5 in 1 can be used, in the not available situation in control centre in control centre respectively, carry out mistake load Amount comparison.
Only the mistake load that gangs up against of information physical compares table 5 by physical attacks and simultaneously
Table 5 shows that, for same attack option, it is obvious to lose load for power grid under the optimizing regulation effect of control centre It reduces, therefore dispatching control center is also the target for needing to lay special stress on protecting.During service restoration, it should guarantee scheduling first Center restores to work normally, and could farthest reduce loss.
To sum up, the present invention is based on the backgrounds of current power system information physical height fusion, in customary DC tide model On the basis of, the real topology constraint of meter and electric system proposes what electric system was ganged up against by information physical Vulnerability analysis model simultaneously solves, and this kind of attack problem is described as a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem, with mistake load The evaluation index as damage sequence is measured, to analyze the fragility of electric system.Using model of the present invention, analyze more different Attack option can effectively excavate fragility node and branch in electric system, to take corresponding safeguard procedures, reduce The risk and loss that electric system is attacked, improve the safety in operation of electric system.Due to considering electric system reality Topological structure influence, this algorithm more meets system conditions, and calculated result is more acurrate, and practicability is more preferable.Pass through IEEE The sample calculation analysis of RTS-24 bus test system shows vulnerability analysis and meter of this algorithm for electric system power transmission network It calculates, is effective.
The foregoing is merely preferred embodiment of the present application, are not intended to limit this application, for the skill of this field For art personnel, various changes and changes are possible in this application.Within the spirit and principles of this application, made any to repair Change, equivalent replacement, improvement etc., should be included within the scope of protection of this application.
Although above-mentioned be described in conjunction with specific embodiment of the attached drawing to the disclosure, model not is protected to the disclosure The limitation enclosed, those skilled in the art should understand that, on the basis of the technical solution of the disclosure, those skilled in the art are not Need to make the creative labor the various modifications or changes that can be made still within the protection scope of the disclosure.

Claims (10)

1. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against, it is characterized in that: the following steps are included:
(1) setting is destroyed the state of each electric network element of backed off after random operation;
(2) topological analysis is carried out, obtains off-the-line after power grid is attacked into the number of several mutual disjunct electric power isolated islands, and Power supply, network and the load condition of each electric power isolated island;
(3) elimination of branch overload is carried out to each not only electric power isolated island containing generator but also containing power load;
(4) constantly topological analysis show that the electric power isolated island is mutually disjunct new at several due to the further off-the-line of cascading failure The number of electric power isolated island, and each power supply, network and the load condition of new electric power isolated island repeat the elimination behaviour of step (3) Make, until there is no cascading failure;
(5) it is that whether calculating finishes the new electric power isolated island containing power load again containing generating set that judgement is each, if then counting Otherwise load loss situation returns to (4), carry out analytical calculation to remaining new electric power isolated island;
(6) damage sequence after load is ganged up against as electric system by information physical is lost using in load loss situation to comment Estimate index, causes to lose the fragile element that the most element of load is power grid after being attacked.
2. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as described in claim 1, special Sign is: in the step (1), using the function of power-management centre as point of penetration, information system and physical system being carried out one Change modeling analysis.
3. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as described in claim 1, special Sign is: in the step (3), specifically includes: the trend distribution of simulation system, specifically, it is greater than the isolated island of electricity consumption for generating electricity, Proportionally reduce respective power output according to the power output size of every unit;It is greater than the isolated island of power generation for electricity consumption, then according to every The spinning reserve of unit proportionally increases the power output of each unit, if spinning reserve is insufficient, completely sends out in all units On the basis of, each power load proportionally accordingly reduces load level, then carries out cascading failure judgement if there is branch overload.
4. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as claimed in claim 3, special Sign is: in the step (3), if the detailed process of cascading failure judgement includes control centre by network attack, losing operation shape State perception and control ability can not handle branch overload, then all overload branch trippings, and carry out system topological analysis;If adjusting Degree center has operating status perception and a control ability not by network attack, processing branch overload, then control centre is according to making The smallest strategy of the isolated island load loss amount carries out generation re-dispatching and corresponding load shedding measure to eliminate branch overload.
5. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as claimed in claim 4, special Sign is: in the step (3), obtaining the electric power isolated island since cascading failure is again into one by topological analysis in system topological analysis Off-the-line is walked into the number of several mutual disjunct new electric power isolated islands, and power supply, network and the load of each new electric power isolated island Situation.
6. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as claimed in claim 5, special Sign is: in the step (3), using the primary equipment in electric system as target is destroyed, decision variable is control centre's control Under each node generating set power output and load level, objective function is that the mistake load that keeps system total is minimum.
7. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as described in claim 1, special Sign is: in the step (3), the bound for objective function includes: following situations ought occur to will cause power circuit l It is unavailable: each generating set in electric system, transmission line of electricity, node, electric substation's functional status vector be 0-1, wherein function The vector of energy state is that 1 corresponding force device is hit and disabler, and the vector of functional status is that 0 corresponding electric power is first Part is not normal by strike function.
8. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as claimed in claim 7, special Sign is: in the step (3), the bound for objective function includes: that power circuit l catches a packet and disabler, electricity Head/endpoint node of line of force road l catches a packet and disabler, catches a packet and function with the power circuit l electric substation connecting A failure in failure and multi-circuit lines on the same pole is then with it the same as the power circuit l also failure of bar;
Or, the bound for objective function includes: following situations ought occur to will cause generator in the step (3) Group j is unavailable: generating set j catches a packet and node that disabler or generating set j are accessed catches a packet and function is lost Effect.
9. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis method for considering information physical and ganging up against as claimed in claim 8, special Sign is: in the step (3), the bound for objective function further includes the constraint of DC power flow equation, Branch Power Flow equation Constraint, power-balance constraint;Inequality constraints: Branch Power Flow security constraint, generating set units limits and the active variation of load Amount constraint.
10. a kind of power system vulnerability analysis system for considering information physical and ganging up against, it is characterized in that: running on processor Or on memory, it is configured as executing to give an order:
(1) setting is destroyed the state of each electric network element of backed off after random operation;
(2) topological analysis is carried out, obtains off-the-line after power grid is attacked into the number of several mutual disjunct electric power isolated islands, and Power supply, network and the load condition of each electric power isolated island;
(3) elimination of branch overload is carried out to each not only electric power isolated island containing generator but also containing power load;
(4) constantly topological analysis show that the electric power isolated island is mutually disjunct new at several due to the further off-the-line of cascading failure The number of electric power isolated island, and each power supply, network and the load condition of new electric power isolated island repeat the elimination behaviour of step (3) Make, until there is no cascading failure;
(5) it is that whether calculating finishes the new electric power isolated island containing power load again containing generating set that judgement is each, if then counting Otherwise load loss situation returns to (4), carry out analytical calculation to remaining new electric power isolated island;
(6) damage sequence after load is ganged up against as electric system by information physical is lost using in load loss situation to comment Estimate index, causes to lose the fragile element that the most element of load is power grid after being attacked.
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