CN115480474B - Time service interference resisting method - Google Patents
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- CN115480474B CN115480474B CN202211068599.3A CN202211068599A CN115480474B CN 115480474 B CN115480474 B CN 115480474B CN 202211068599 A CN202211068599 A CN 202211068599A CN 115480474 B CN115480474 B CN 115480474B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G04—HOROLOGY
- G04R—RADIO-CONTROLLED TIME-PIECES
- G04R20/00—Setting the time according to the time information carried or implied by the radio signal
- G04R20/02—Setting the time according to the time information carried or implied by the radio signal the radio signal being sent by a satellite, e.g. GPS
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
- G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-time-service interference method, which comprises the steps of utilizing a time-service interference self-adaptive detection submodel to detect real-time interference on time-service signals received by time-service equipment; processing time service interference received by the time-consuming equipment by using a timing anti-interference model, wherein when no time service interference is detected, the time-consuming equipment adopts a non-interference timing sub-model to perform timing; when the time service interference is detected, the time consuming device adopts the time service interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time keeping. The invention can detect GNSS time service interference in real time and realize anti-interference timing effect. Aiming at complex composite GNSS timing interference and GNSS timing interruption under extreme conditions, the invention can adaptively detect the GNSS timing interference, realize independent time maintenance independent of GNSS timing, and support the reliable timing of the time-consuming equipment in multi-scene and strong game environments.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a time signal processing method. And more particularly to a method of resisting time service interference.
Background
Time is a basic element of each link of information acquisition, transmission, fusion and application. The time information is accurately and reliably acquired, and is the premise of stable operation in the important national fields such as electric power, traffic, finance, communication, national defense and the like. Among them, GNSS time service is one of the most important ways for the time consuming device to acquire time. However, due to the characteristics of low floor power, public signal system and the like of the GNSS time service signals, the GNSS time service is easy to be interfered by human maliciously, so that equipment cannot normally acquire time or acquire wrong time when in use, and the equipment is often difficult to perceive. At present, aiming at the anti-time service interference method of GNSS time service, the method is mainly used for eliminating the suppression type interference and selecting multiple sources of deception type interference, and countermeasures for detecting complex interference signals and interrupting time service sources in a strong game environment are lacked. Therefore, a time acquisition and maintenance method for integrated GNSS timing interference and GNSS timing interruption needs to be studied to realize anti-GNSS timing interference and time maintenance under complex conditions by the device when in use.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an anti-time-service interference method, which aims at a GNSS time service mode to realize accurate GNSS timing in a non-interference mode, and interference real-time detection and autonomous time keeping in the interference mode.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a method for resisting time service interference comprises
Performing real-time interference detection on time service signals received by time service equipment by using a time service interference self-adaptive detection sub-model;
processing time service interference received by time-consuming equipment by using a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time-consuming equipment adopts a no-interference timing submodel to perform timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time consuming device adopts the time service interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time keeping.
Preferably, the constructed timing disturbance rejection model F (F t ,f s ) Comprising the following steps:
in the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing submodel, f s And (5) representing the interference timing submodel, wherein mu is a time service interference identifier.
When μ=0, no time service interference is indicated, and the time-consuming equipment adopts a non-interference timing submodel at timing; when μ=1, this indicates that there is time-lapse interference, and the time-lapse device uses the interference timing submodel.
Preferably, the constructed time service interference adaptive detection submodel f r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), alpha represents a GNSS time service signal correlation peak distribution factor, and gamma represents a GNSS time service signal second interval jump factorThe sub epsilon represents a GNSS time service signal second pulse speed change factor, and mu is a GNSS time service interference mark; when f r (α, γ, ε) =0, no timing interference is indicated; when f r When (α, γ, ε) =1, the interference due to timing is indicated.
Preferably, the interference-free timing submodel f t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In formula (8), t G Representing the result of timing calculation of GNSS time service signals received by time consuming equipment, t F The time consumption device receives the GNSS time service signal and corrects the timing correction amount of the self atomic clock.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the time service is interfered, the frequency correction period is 100s.
Preferably, the constructed timing submodel with interference f s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Representing the timing result of autonomous time keeping by the time consuming device using the self-contained atomic clock, t B The time-consuming device uses other available time service sources outside the GNSS to calibrate the self-contained atomic clock.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the timing is interfered, the searching interval of the frequency correction timing source is preferably 600s.
Preferably, the time service signal correlation peak distribution factor α:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein p (n) represents the change weight of the number of correlation peaks of the time service signal, n is the number of correlation peaks of the time service signal, p (tau) represents the change weight of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the time service signal, and tau is the change rate of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the time service signal.
Preferably, the constructed time service signal is a second interval jump factor gamma:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), the equality determination is represented by equal (Δt, T), the determination value is 1 when Δt=t, and the determination value is 0 when Δt+.t; Δt represents a second interval obtained according to a GNSS time service signal navigation message, T represents a second interval kick detection period, and the second interval kick detection period is accumulated by an atomic clock of a user equipment.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the timing is disturbed, the second interval kick detection period T is preferably 5s.
Preferably, the time service signal pulse per second speed change factor epsilon:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) represents less than the sex determination, dist (f) c ,f p ) When < D, the judgment value is 1, dist (f c ,f p ) When the judgment value is more than or equal to D, the judgment value is 0; dist (f) c ,f p ) Representing two curves f c And f p Distance between f c A deviation change curve representing the output of the second pulse by the time consuming device and the output of the second pulse by the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p A deviation change curve of the time consumption equipment output second pulse and the self atomic clock output second pulse in the timing mode is represented; d represents the offset threshold for the time-consuming device to output pulses per second.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the time service is interfered, the offset threshold D of the output second pulse of the time-consuming device is preferably 100ns.
From formulas (3), (4) and (5), if and only if the number of correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is 1 and the amplitude change rate of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is less than 10%, the distribution factor alpha=0 of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals, otherwise, alpha=1;
as can be derived from equation (6), if and only if the second interval Δt derived from the GNSS timing signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, the GNSS timing signal second interval kick factor γ=0, otherwise γ=1;
from equation (7), the deviation change curve f of the second pulse output by the device from the second pulse output by the self-contained atomic clock is obtained if and only if the device is used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time consumption equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the two signals is smaller than the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time consuming device, the speed change of the second pulse of the GNSS time service signal is caused bySub epsilon=0, otherwise epsilon=1.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows:
the invention provides an anti-time-service interference method which can detect GNSS time-service interference in real time and realize an anti-interference timing effect. Aiming at complex composite GNSS timing interference and GNSS timing interruption under extreme conditions, the invention can adaptively detect the GNSS timing interference, realize independent time maintenance independent of GNSS timing, and support the reliable timing of the time-consuming equipment in multi-scene and strong game environments.
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The following describes the embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the drawings.
Fig. 1 shows a flow chart of the time service interference resisting method provided by the invention.
Detailed Description
In order to more clearly illustrate the present invention, the present invention will be further described with reference to preferred embodiments and the accompanying drawings. Like parts in the drawings are denoted by the same reference numerals. It is to be understood by persons skilled in the art that the following detailed description is illustrative and not restrictive, and that this invention is not limited to the details given herein.
As shown in fig. 1, the invention provides a time service anti-interference method, which is characterized in that accurate GNSS timing in a non-interference mode, interference real-time detection in an interference mode and autonomous time maintenance are realized according to a GNSS time service mode.
A method for resisting time service interference comprises
Performing real-time interference detection on time service signals received by time service equipment by using a time service interference self-adaptive detection sub-model;
processing time service interference received by time-consuming equipment by using a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time-consuming equipment adopts a no-interference timing submodel to perform timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time consuming device adopts the time service interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time keeping.
S1: and detecting the time service interference in real time by using the GNSS time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel.
GNSS timing disturbances are classified into jamming and spoofing. The device cannot acquire GNSS time during the use of the pressing type interference, so that the timing interruption is caused; the device acquires wrong GNSS time when the deceptive jamming is used, resulting in timing deviation. Adaptive GNSS timing jamming signals are often mixed with jamming and deception jamming, and the device is difficult to realize anti-jamming in use. Accordingly, a GNSS time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel f is constructed r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝μ＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), alpha represents a GNSS time service signal correlation peak distribution factor, gamma represents a GNSS time service signal second interval jump factor, epsilon represents a GNSS time service signal second pulse speed change factor, and mu is a GNSS time service interference mark. When f r (α, γ, ε) =μ=0, indicating no GNSS timing interference; when f r When (α, γ, ε) =μ=1, GNSS timing interference is present.
As can be derived from equation (2), the GNSS timing interference identifier μ=0 indicates no GNSS timing interference if and only if α=0 and γ=0 and ε=0, and μ=1 indicates GNSS timing interference otherwise.
S11: the GNSS time service interference can inhibit or even eliminate the time service signal correlation peak or increase the dynamically-changing false correlation peak, so that the device cannot receive the real GNSS time service signal or capture and track the GNSS time service interference signal when in use. Accordingly, a GNSS time service signal correlation peak distribution factor alpha is constructed:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein:
in equations (3) to (5), p (n) represents a change weight of the number of correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signal, n represents the number of correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signal, p (τ) represents a change weight of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signal, and τ represents a change rate of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signal.
As can be derived from formulas (3) to (5), if and only if the number of correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is 1 and the amplitude change rate of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is less than 10%, the distribution factor alpha=0 of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals, otherwise, alpha=1;
s12: the GNSS timing interference can be generated by tampering with the navigation message of the timing signal, and when in use, the equipment is in second-level jump at regular time, so that second-level timing deviation is caused. Accordingly, a GNSS time service signal second interval kick factor gamma is constructed:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), the equality determination is represented by equal (Δt, T), the determination value is 1 when Δt=t, and the determination value is 0 when Δt+.t; Δt represents a second interval obtained according to a GNSS time service signal navigation message, T represents a second interval kick detection period, and the second interval kick detection period is accumulated by an atomic clock of a user equipment.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the timing is disturbed, the second interval kick detection period T is preferably 5s.
As can be derived from equation (6), the GNSS time signal second interval kick factor γ=0 if and only if the second interval Δt derived from the GNSS time signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, otherwise γ=1.
S13: the GNSS timing interference can be caused by slowly inducing the code phase of the timing signal, and the second pulse output by the equipment is offset at a certain rate during use, so that the timing deviation in the second is caused. Accordingly, a GNSS time service signal pulse per second speed change factor epsilon is constructed:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) represents less than the sex determination, dist (f) c ,f p ) When < D, the judgment value is 1, dist (f c ,f p ) When the judgment value is more than or equal to D, the judgment value is 0; dist (f) c ,f p ) Representing two curvesf c And f p Distance between f c A deviation change curve representing the output of the second pulse by the time consuming device and the output of the second pulse by the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p A deviation change curve of the time consumption equipment output second pulse and the self atomic clock output second pulse in the timing mode is represented; d represents the offset threshold for the time-consuming device to output pulses per second.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the time service is interfered, the offset threshold D of the output second pulse of the time-consuming device is preferably 100ns.
From equation (7), the deviation change curve f of the second pulse output by the device from the second pulse output by the self-contained atomic clock is obtained if and only if the device is used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time consumption equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the two signals is smaller than the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time consuming device, the second pulse speed change factor epsilon=0 of the GNSS time service signal, otherwise epsilon=1.
S2: processing time service interference received by a time-consuming device by using a timing anti-disturbance model F (F) t ,f s )：
In the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing submodel, f s And (5) representing the interference timing submodel, wherein mu is the GNSS time service interference identifier. When μ=0, no GNSS timing interference is indicated, and the time-consuming equipment adopts a non-interference timing submodel at timing; when μ=1, it indicates that there is GNSS timing interference, and the time-consuming device timing employs an interference timing submodel.
S21: the non-interference timing submodel f t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In formula (8), t G Representing the result of timing calculation of GNSS time service signals received by time consuming equipment, t F Timing correction after indicating time-consuming equipment to receive GNSS time service signal to calibrate self atomic clockAmount of the components.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the time service is interfered, the frequency correction period is 100s.
S22: the timing sub-model f with interference s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Representing the timing result of autonomous time keeping by the time consuming device using the self-contained atomic clock, t B The time-consuming device uses other available time service sources outside the GNSS to calibrate the self-contained atomic clock.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether the timing is interfered, the searching interval of the frequency correction timing source is preferably 600s.
An embodiment of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which when executed by a processor implements the method provided by the first embodiment described above.
In practical applications, the computer-readable storage medium may take the form of any combination of one or more computer-readable media. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable signal medium or a computer readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or a combination of any of the foregoing. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the computer-readable storage medium would include the following: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a Random Access Memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. In this embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can contain, or store a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
The computer readable signal medium may include a propagated data signal with computer readable program code embodied therein, either in baseband or as part of a carrier wave. Such a propagated data signal may take any of a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, electro-magnetic, optical, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A computer readable signal medium may also be any computer readable medium that is not a computer readable storage medium and that can communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
Program code embodied on a computer readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wireline, optical fiber cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.
Computer program code for carrying out operations of the present application may be written in one or more programming languages, including an object oriented programming language such as Java, smalltalk, C ++ and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the "C" programming language or similar programming languages. The program code may execute entirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any kind of network, including a Local Area Network (LAN) or a Wide Area Network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet service provider).
It should be understood that the foregoing examples of the present invention are provided merely for clearly illustrating the present invention and are not intended to limit the embodiments of the present invention, and that various other changes and modifications may be made therein by one skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (9)
1. The time service interference resisting method is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
performing real-time interference detection on time service signals received by time service equipment by using a time service interference self-adaptive detection sub-model;
processing time service interference received by time-consuming equipment by using a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time-consuming equipment adopts a no-interference timing submodel to perform timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time-consuming equipment adopts an interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time maintenance;
the time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel f r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), alpha represents a GNSS time service signal correlation peak distribution factor, gamma represents a GNSS time service signal second interval kick factor, and epsilon represents a GNSS time service signal second pulse speed change factor; when f r (α, γ, ε) =0, no timing interference is indicated; when f r When (α, γ, ε) =1, the interference due to timing is indicated.
2. The method of resisting time disturbances according to claim 1 where the timed anti-disturbance model F (F t ,f s ) Comprising: a non-interfering timing sub-model and an interfering timing sub-model,
in the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing submodel, f s And (5) representing the interference timing submodel, wherein mu is a time service interference identifier.
3. The method of resisting time service interference according to claim 1, wherein the interference-free timing submodel f t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In formula (8), t G Representing the result of timing calculation of GNSS time service signals received by time consuming equipment, t F The time consumption device receives the GNSS time service signal and corrects the timing correction amount of the self atomic clock.
4. The method of resisting time service interference according to claim 1, wherein said interfered timing submodel f s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Representing the timing result of autonomous time keeping by the time consuming device using the self-contained atomic clock, t B The time-consuming device uses other available time service sources outside the GNSS to calibrate the self-contained atomic clock.
5. The method of resisting time service interference according to claim 1, wherein the time service signal correlation peak distribution factor α:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein p (n) represents the change weight of the number of correlation peaks of the time service signal, n is the number of correlation peaks of the time service signal, p (tau) represents the change weight of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the time service signal, and tau is the change rate of the amplitude of the correlation peaks of the time service signal.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the time signal second interval kick factor γ:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), the equality determination is represented by equal (Δt, T), the determination value is 1 when Δt=t, and the determination value is 0 when Δt+.t; Δt represents a second interval obtained from the GNSS time service signal navigation message, and T represents a second interval kick detection period.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the time signal pulses a variable speed factor epsilon:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) represents less than the sex determination, dist (f) c ,f p ) When < D, the judgment value is 1, dist (f c ,f p ) When the judgment value is more than or equal to D, the judgment value is 0; dist (f) c ,f p ) Representing two curves f c And f p Distance between f c A deviation change curve representing the output of the second pulse by the time consuming device and the output of the second pulse by the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p A deviation change curve of the time consumption equipment output second pulse and the self atomic clock output second pulse in the timing mode is represented; d represents the offset threshold for the time-consuming device to output pulses per second.
8. The method of anti-timing interference according to claim 1, wherein,
if and only if the number of correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is 1 and the amplitude change rate of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals is less than 10%, the distribution factor alpha=0 of the correlation peaks of the GNSS time service signals, otherwise, alpha=1;
the GNSS time signal second interval kick factor γ=0 if and only if the second interval Δt derived from the GNSS time signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, otherwise γ=1.
9. The method of combating time disturbances according to claim 1 where the device outputs a variation curve f of the deviation of the second pulse from the second pulse output from the self-contained atomic clock if and only if it is used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time consumption equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the two signals is smaller than the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time consuming device, the second pulse speed change factor epsilon=0 of the GNSS time service signal, otherwise epsilon=1.
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