CN115480474A - Anti-time service interference method - Google Patents
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- CN115480474A CN115480474A CN202211068599.3A CN202211068599A CN115480474A CN 115480474 A CN115480474 A CN 115480474A CN 202211068599 A CN202211068599 A CN 202211068599A CN 115480474 A CN115480474 A CN 115480474A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G04—HOROLOGY
- G04R—RADIO-CONTROLLED TIME-PIECES
- G04R20/00—Setting the time according to the time information carried or implied by the radio signal
- G04R20/02—Setting the time according to the time information carried or implied by the radio signal the radio signal being sent by a satellite, e.g. GPS
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
- G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-time service interference method, which comprises the steps of utilizing a time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel to carry out real-time interference detection on a time service signal received by time service equipment; processing time service interference received by time service equipment by utilizing a timing anti-interference model, wherein when no time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference-free timing sub-model for timing; when the time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time maintenance. The GNSS timing interference detection method and the GNSS timing interference detection system can detect GNSS timing interference in real time and achieve the anti-interference timing effect. Aiming at complex composite GNSS time service interference and GNSS time service interruption under extreme conditions, the invention can adaptively detect the GNSS time service interference, realize independent time keeping independent of GNSS time service and support time equipment to realize reliable timing in a multi-scene and strong game environment.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a time signal processing method. And more particularly to a method of resisting time service interference.
Background
Time is a basic element of each link of information acquisition, transmission, fusion and application. The method can accurately and reliably acquire the time information, and is a precondition for stable operation in national important fields such as electric power, traffic, finance, communication, national defense and the like. The GNSS time service is one of the most important ways for the time-consuming equipment to acquire time. However, due to the characteristics of low landing power of GNSS timing signals, public signal systems and the like, GNSS timing is easily subjected to man-made malicious interference, so that the device cannot normally acquire time or acquire wrong time during use, and the device is often difficult to perceive. At present, an anti-time service interference method for GNSS time service mainly eliminates suppression type interference and multi-source selection of deception type interference, and a countermeasure for detecting a complex interference signal and interrupting a time service source in a strong game environment is lacked. Therefore, it is necessary to research a time acquisition and maintaining method for GNSS time service integrated interference and GNSS time service interruption so as to implement GNSS time service interference resistance and time maintenance under complex conditions by using a time service device.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an anti-time service interference method, which aims at a GNSS time service mode to realize accurate GNSS timing in an interference-free mode, interference real-time detection and autonomous time keeping in an interference mode.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a method for resisting time service interference comprises
Carrying out real-time interference detection on a time service signal received by time service equipment by utilizing a time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel;
processing the time service interference received by the time service equipment by utilizing a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time-using equipment adopts an interference-free timing sub-model to carry out timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time maintenance.
Preferably, said constructed timing immunity model F (F) t ,f s ) Bag (bag)Comprises the following steps:
in the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing sub-model, f s An interference timing submodel is shown, and mu is a time service interference identifier.
When mu =0, no time service interference is indicated, and the time service equipment adopts an interference-free timing submodel at regular time; when mu =1, time service interference exists, and the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel at regular time.
Preferably, the constructed time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel f r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), alpha represents a related peak distribution factor of a GNSS time signal, gamma represents a second interval kick factor of the GNSS time signal, epsilon represents a second pulse speed change factor of the GNSS time signal, and mu is a GNSS time interference mark; when f is r (α, γ, ∈) =0, this indicates no time-transfer interference; when f is r When (α, γ, ∈) =1, time interference is present.
Preferably, the non-interfering timer model f t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In the formula (8), t G Indicating the result of the time equipment receiving GNSS time signal for timing calculation, t F The timing correction quantity after the GNSS time signal is received by the time equipment to carry out frequency correction on the self-contained atomic clock is shown.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether the time service is interfered, the frequency correction period is 100s.
Preferably, the constructed interfered timer model f s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Timing results representing autonomous time keeping by the time-consuming equipment using its own atomic clock, t B Indicating that a time-consuming device utilizes it other than a GNSSHe can use the time service source to correct the timing correction after the frequency correction of the self-contained atomic clock.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the frequency correction time service source search interval is preferably 600s.
Preferably, the time signal correlation peak distribution factor α:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein, p (n) represents the variation weight of the number of the relative peaks of the time service signal, n is the number of the relative peaks of the time service signal, p (tau) represents the variation weight of the amplitude of the relative peaks of the time service signal, and tau is the amplitude variation rate of the relative peaks of the time service signal.
Preferably, the constructed time signal second interval kick factor γ:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), isequal (Δ T, T) indicates equality determination, and the determination value is 1 when Δ T = T and 0 when Δ T ≠ T; and delta T represents a second interval obtained according to a navigation message of a GNSS timing signal, and T represents a second interval kick detection period which is generated by time equipment with an atomic clock in an accumulated way.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the second interval kick detection period T is preferably 5s.
Preferably, the time signal pulse-per-second speed change factor epsilon:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) denotes a judgment of the degree of inequality, dist (f) c ,f p ) The determination value is 1,dist (f) when < D c ,f p ) The judgment value is 0 when the value is more than or equal to D; dist (f) c ,f p ) Represents two curves f c And f p Distance between f and f c Showing the variation curve of the deviation of the output second pulse of the time-use device and the output second pulse of the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p The deviation change curve of the second pulse output by the time equipment and the second pulse output by the self-contained atomic clock in the timing mode is shown; d represents the offset threshold for the time spent by the device outputting the pulse per second.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time service equipment is preferably 100ns.
As can be derived from equations (3), (4) and (5), when and only when the number of GNSS timing signal correlation peaks is 1 and the GNSS timing signal correlation peak amplitude variation rate is less than 10%, the GNSS timing signal correlation peak distribution factor α =0, otherwise α =1;
as can be derived from equation (6), the GNSS timing signal second interval kick factor γ =0 if and only if the second interval Δ T derived from the GNSS timing signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, otherwise γ =1;
from equation (7), it follows that the deviation curve f of the device output second pulse from the output second pulse with atomic clock when used in the calibration mode and only when used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time-use equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the two is smaller than the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time equipment, the second pulse speed change factor of the GNSS timing signal is epsilon =0, otherwise epsilon =1.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention provides an anti-time service interference method which can detect GNSS time service interference in real time and realize anti-interference timing effect. Aiming at complex composite GNSS time service interference and GNSS time service interruption under extreme conditions, the invention can adaptively detect the GNSS time service interference, realize autonomous time keeping independent of GNSS time service and support time service equipment to realize reliable timing in a multi-scene and strong game environment.
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The following describes embodiments of the present invention in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 shows a flow chart of a method for resisting time service interference provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to more clearly illustrate the present invention, the present invention is further described below with reference to preferred embodiments and the accompanying drawings. Similar components in the figures are denoted by the same reference numerals. It is to be understood by persons skilled in the art that the following detailed description is illustrative and not restrictive, and is not to be taken as limiting the scope of the invention.
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention provides a time service anti-interference method, which is characterized in that, for a GNSS time service mode, accurate GNSS timing in an interference-free mode, interference real-time detection and autonomous time keeping in an interference-free mode are implemented.
A method for resisting time service interference comprises
Carrying out real-time interference detection on a time service signal received by time service equipment by utilizing a time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel;
processing the time service interference received by the time service equipment by utilizing a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference-free timing sub-model to carry out timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time maintenance.
S1: and (3) detecting the time service interference in real time by utilizing the GNSS time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel.
GNSS time service interference is divided into suppressed interference and deceptive interference. When the suppression interference is used, the equipment cannot acquire GNSS time, so that timing interruption is caused; when the deceptive jamming is used, the equipment acquires wrong GNSS time, and timing deviation is caused. Self-adaptive GNSS time service interference signals are often mixed with pressure type interference and deception type interference, and equipment is difficult to realize interference resistance when in use. Accordingly, a GNSS time service interference self-adaptive detection sub-model f is constructed r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝μ＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), α represents a GNSS timing signal correlation peak distribution factor, γ represents a GNSS timing signal second interval kick factor, ε represents a GNSS timing signal second pulse speed change factor, and μ represents a GNSS timing interference flag. When f is r (α, γ, ∈) = μ =0, indicating that GNSS time service interference is absent; when f is r When (α, γ, ∈) = μ =1, GNSS timing interference is indicated.
As can be derived from equation (2), if and only if α =0, γ =0, and ∈ =0, the GNSS timing interference flag μ =0 indicates no GNSS timing interference, and if μ =1 indicates GNSS timing interference.
S11: GNSS time service interference can inhibit or even eliminate a time service signal correlation peak, or add a dynamically changed false correlation peak, so that the equipment cannot receive a real GNSS time service signal or capture and track the GNSS time service interference signal when in use. Therefore, a GNSS time signal correlation peak distribution factor alpha is constructed:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein:
in the expressions (3) to (5), p (n) represents a change weight of the number of peaks related to the GNSS time signal, n represents the number of peaks related to the GNSS time signal, p (τ) represents a change weight of the amplitude of the peak related to the GNSS time signal, and τ is a change rate of the amplitude of the peak related to the GNSS time signal.
As can be obtained from equations (3) to (5), when and only when the number of GNSS timing signal correlation peaks is 1 and the GNSS timing signal correlation peak amplitude variation rate is less than 10%, the GNSS timing signal correlation peak distribution factor α =0, otherwise α =1;
s12: GNSS time service interference can be achieved by tampering navigation messages of time service signals, and second-level jumping occurs to equipment at fixed time when the GNSS time service interference is used, so that second-level timing deviation is caused. Accordingly, a GNSS time signal second interval kick factor gamma is constructed:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), isequal (Δ T, T) indicates equality determination, and the determination value is 1 when Δ T = T and 0 when Δ T ≠ T; and delta T represents a second interval obtained according to a GNSS time signal navigation message, and T represents a second interval kick detection period generated by the time-consuming equipment with an atomic clock.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the second interval kick detection period T is preferably 5s.
As can be derived from equation (6), the GNSS timing signal second interval kick factor γ =0 if and only if the second interval Δ T derived from the GNSS timing signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, and γ =1 otherwise.
S13: GNSS time service interference can slowly induce the code phase of a time service signal, and the second pulse output by equipment shifts at a certain rate when in use, so that timing deviation in seconds is caused. Accordingly, a GNSS time signal second pulse speed change factor epsilon is constructed:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) denotes a judgment of the degree of inequality, dist (f) c ,f p ) The determination value is 1,dist (f) when < D c ,f p ) The judgment value is 0 when the value is more than or equal to D; dist (f) c ,f p ) Represents two curves f c And f p Distance between f and f c Showing the variation curve of the deviation of the time-of-use device output second pulse and the output second pulse of the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p The deviation change curve of the second pulse output by the time equipment and the second pulse output by the self-contained atomic clock in the timing mode is shown; d represents the offset threshold of the time-of-use device output pulse per second.
Preferably, in order to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the offset threshold D of the second pulse output by the time service equipment is preferably 100ns.
From equation (7), it follows that the deviation curve f of the device output second pulse from the output second pulse with atomic clock when used in the calibration mode and only when used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time-use equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the GNSS timing signal and the time device is smaller than a shift threshold D of the second pulse output by the time device, the second pulse variable speed factor of the GNSS timing signal is epsilon =0, otherwise epsilon =1.
S2: processing the time service interference received by the time service equipment by utilizing a timing anti-interference model F (F) t ,f s )：
In the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing sub-model, f s And indicating an interference timing submodel, wherein mu is a GNSS time service interference identifier. When mu =0, no GNSS time service interference is indicated, and the time service equipment adopts an interference-free timing sub-model regularly; when the mu =1, GNSS time service interference exists, and the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel at regular time.
S21: said interference-free timing submodel f t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In the formula (8), t G Indicating the result of the time equipment receiving GNSS time signal for timing calculation, t F The timing correction quantity after the GNSS time signal is received by the time equipment to carry out frequency correction on the self-contained atomic clock is shown.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the frequency correction period is 100s.
S22: the timer model f with interference s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Timing results representing autonomous time keeping by the time-consuming equipment using its own atomic clock, t B The timing correction quantity is obtained by the timing equipment after the frequency of the self-contained atomic clock is corrected by other available timing sources except GNSS.
Preferably, to accurately detect whether time service is interfered, the frequency correction time service source search interval is preferably 600s.
One embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, which when executed by a processor implements the method provided by the first embodiment described above.
In practice, the computer-readable storage medium may take any combination of one or more computer-readable media. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable signal medium or a computer readable storage medium. A computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any combination of the foregoing. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the computer readable storage medium would include the following: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a Random Access Memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. In the present embodiment, a computer readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can contain, or store a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
A computer readable signal medium may include a propagated data signal with computer readable program code embodied therein, for example, in baseband or as part of a carrier wave. Such a propagated data signal may take any of a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, electro-magnetic, optical, or any suitable combination thereof. A computer readable signal medium may also be any computer readable medium that is not a computer readable storage medium and that can communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
Program code embodied on a computer readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wireline, optical fiber cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.
Computer program code for carrying out operations for aspects of the present application may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including an object oriented programming language such as Java, smalltalk, C + +, and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the "C" programming language or similar programming languages. The program code may execute entirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a Local Area Network (LAN) or a Wide Area Network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet service provider).
It should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments of the present invention are only examples for clearly illustrating the present invention, and are not intended to limit the embodiments of the present invention, and it will be obvious to those skilled in the art that other variations or modifications may be made on the basis of the above description, and all embodiments may not be exhaustive, and all obvious variations or modifications may be included within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A method for resisting time service interference is characterized by comprising the following steps:
carrying out real-time interference detection on a time service signal received by time service equipment by utilizing a time service interference self-adaptive detection submodel;
processing the time service interference received by the time service equipment by utilizing a timing anti-interference model, wherein
When no time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference-free timing sub-model to carry out timing;
when the time service interference is detected, the time service equipment adopts an interference timing submodel to realize autonomous time maintenance.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the timing disturbance rejection model F (F) t ,f s ) The method comprises the following steps: an interference-free timing submodel and an interference-free timing submodel,
in the formula (1), f t Representing a non-interfering timing sub-model, f s An interference timing submodel is shown, and mu is a time service interference identifier.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the non-interfering timing submodel f is defined as t ：
f t ＝t G +t F (8)
In the formula (8), t G Indicating the result of the time equipment receiving GNSS time signal for timing calculation, t F The timing correction quantity after the GNSS time signal is received by the time equipment to carry out frequency correction on the self-contained atomic clock is shown.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the timer model with interference (f) is a timer model with interference (f) s ：
f s ＝t C +t B (9)
In the formula (9), t C Timing results representing autonomous time keeping by the time-consuming equipment using its own atomic clock, t B The timing correction quantity is obtained by the timing equipment after the frequency of the self-contained atomic clock is corrected by other available timing sources except GNSS.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the time service interference adaptive detection submodel f is a time service interference adaptive detection submodel r (α,γ,ε)：
f r (α,γ,ε)＝1-(1-α)(1-γ)(1-ε) (2)
In the formula (2), alpha represents a related peak distribution factor of the GNSS time signal, gamma represents a second interval kick factor of the GNSS time signal, and epsilon represents a second pulse speed change factor of the GNSS time signal; when f is r (α, γ, ∈) =0, which indicates no time-transfer interference; when f is r When (α, γ, ∈) =1, time interference is present.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the distribution factor α of the time signal correlation peak is:
α＝1-(1-p(n))(1-p(τ)) (3)
wherein, p (n) represents the variation weight of the number of the relative peaks of the time service signal, n is the number of the relative peaks of the time service signal, p (tau) represents the variation weight of the amplitude of the relative peaks of the time service signal, and tau is the amplitude variation rate of the relative peaks of the time service signal.
7. The method for resisting time service interference according to claim 5, wherein the constructed time service signal second interval kick factor γ:
γ＝1-isequal(Δt,T) (6)
in the formula (6), isequal (Δ T, T) indicates equality determination, and the determination value is 1 when Δ T = T and 0 when Δ T ≠ T; Δ T represents a second interval obtained from a GNSS time signal navigation message, and T represents a second interval kick detection period.
8. The method of claim 5, wherein the time signal pulse-per-second transmission factor ε:
ε＝1-isless(dist(f c ,f p ),D) (7)
in the formula (7), isless (dist (f) c ,f p ) D) denotes a judgment of the degree of inequality, dist (f) c ,f p ) The determination value is 1,dist (f) when < D c ,f p ) When the value is more than or equal to D, the judgment value is 0; dist (f) c ,f p ) Represents two curves f c And f p Distance between f c Showing the variation curve of the deviation of the output second pulse of the time-use device and the output second pulse of the self-contained atomic clock in the calibration mode, f p The deviation change curve of the second pulse output by the time equipment and the second pulse output by the self-contained atomic clock in the timing mode is shown; d represents the offset threshold of the time-of-use device output pulse per second.
9. The method of claim 5, wherein the method of combating time service interference,
if and only if the number of the GNSS time signal correlation peaks is 1 and the amplitude change rate of the GNSS time signal correlation peaks is less than 10%, the GNSS time signal correlation peak distribution factor is alpha =0, otherwise, alpha =1;
and if and only if the second interval delta T obtained according to the GNSS timing signal navigation message is equal to the second interval kick detection period T, the GNSS timing signal second interval kick factor gamma =0, otherwise gamma =1.
10. The method of claim 5, wherein the variation curve f of the deviation of the second pulse output by the device from the second pulse output by the atomic clock is determined if and only if the device is used in the calibration mode c Deviation change curve f of time-use equipment output second pulse and self-contained atomic clock output second pulse in timing mode p When the distance between the GNSS timing signal and the time device is smaller than a shift threshold D of the second pulse output by the time device, the second pulse variable speed factor of the GNSS timing signal is epsilon =0, otherwise epsilon =1.
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| CN212965434U (en) * | 2020-08-13 | 2021-04-13 | 河北冀贞科技有限公司 | Defense system for regional satellite navigation time service signal |
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| CN103312373A (en) * | 2012-03-13 | 2013-09-18 | 郑州威科姆科技股份有限公司 | Time-domain device for suppressing narrow-band interference in Beidou I time-service receiver |
| US20170060101A1 (en) * | 2015-01-31 | 2017-03-02 | San Diego Gas & Electric Company | Methods and systems for detecting and defending against invalid time signals |
| CN110954925A (en) * | 2019-12-16 | 2020-04-03 | 深圳市儒科电子有限公司 | Beidou deception interference resisting method and GNSS time service type receiving device |
| CN111505674A (en) * | 2020-05-22 | 2020-08-07 | 陕西天基通信科技有限责任公司 | Dual-mode amplification multi-path distribution system with anti-interference function and distribution method |
| CN212965434U (en) * | 2020-08-13 | 2021-04-13 | 河北冀贞科技有限公司 | Defense system for regional satellite navigation time service signal |
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