CN115396084A - Safety communication method based on integrated safety layer - Google Patents
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- CN115396084A CN115396084A CN202110568771.0A CN202110568771A CN115396084A CN 115396084 A CN115396084 A CN 115396084A CN 202110568771 A CN202110568771 A CN 202110568771A CN 115396084 A CN115396084 A CN 115396084A
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 65
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 23
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 11
- 238000013496 data integrity verification Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000000903 blocking effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005611 electricity Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004927 fusion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008595 infiltration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001764 infiltration Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000010354 integration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000035772 mutation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012502 risk assessment Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012954 risk control Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Communication Control (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to a secure communication method based on an integrated security layer. The information safety and the function safety are integrated into an integrated safety layer, the integrated safety layer is positioned between a communication stack and a user layer of a communication protocol, the function safety is realized by using a serial number, a timestamp and CRC, and the information safety is realized by using encryption and data integrity checking means. The invention solves the safety problem of data transmission between the controller and the instrument, breaks through the mutually independent relationship between the functional safety and the information safety, and ensures the accuracy and the reliability of data transmission through the integrated safety layer which integrates the information safety and the functional safety. The invention can meet the requirements of data transmission accuracy and reliability, and has a large application and popularization space.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of network communication, and particularly provides a communication protocol design of an integrated safety layer integrating functional safety and information safety.
Background
At present, industrial control systems are widely applied to industries such as chemical industry, water and electricity and the like which are closely related to the national civilian life, once the industrial control systems have problems, serious accidents are caused, economic losses are caused if the industrial control systems have the problems, and personal safety and environmental safety are harmed if the industrial control systems have the problems, so that the safety problems of the industrial control systems are concerned by various industries in the industrial field. With the advent of fieldbus technology, including industrial ethernet, bus security issues have become increasingly important.
The safety problem of industrial control systems mainly comprises three aspects: functional security, information security, and physical security. Functional safety refers to the fact that the safety-related parts protected in the system correctly perform their intended services and functions, and when they fail or fail, the system can still be brought into a safe state, thereby ensuring that the environment, the plant, the personnel and the equipment are not damaged. Information security refers to the prevention of illegal or harmful infiltration and intrusion into industrial control systems, or to interfere with their proper and planned operation, or improper access to confidential information. The function safety and the information safety of the industrial control system are not independent from each other, but have close relation. Macroscopically, the two goals are consistent, both are to ensure the stable, efficient and safe operation of the system, and the maximization of the production benefit is pursued, but the emphasis points are different.
Aiming at the safety communication, the function safety and the information safety are independently realized for a long time, the complex association relationship existing between two safety elements is ignored, and the communication safety requirements under the conditions of complex industrial environment, heterogeneous and diverse equipment and variable safety attack are difficult to meet.
In the existing products and technologies, there is a communication protocol capable of realizing function security independently, a concept of a function security layer is proposed in standard IEC61784-3, the function security layer is added between a communication stack and a user layer, and an implementation method of information security is not limited to between the communication stack and the user layer, and can penetrate through any part of a bus.
How to integrate information security on the basis of realizing functional security communication, the risk caused by system failure and information threat is comprehensively considered from the beginning of design, integrated risk analysis is developed, the mutual influence and action relationship of functional security and information security are combed, the decoupling of functional security and information security is realized, the influence of functional security and information security is eliminated by combining risk control strategies of two security systems, and the functional security and information security integration of communication in the real sense is realized.
The idea of combining functional safety and information safety is already proposed, but most researches are theoretical problems of coordination scheduling, optimization and the like, and no specific implementation method is proposed at present.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects in the prior art, the technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a communication protocol of an integrated safety layer integrating functional safety and information safety, which is mainly used for safety communication between a controller and an instrument in a bus control system. The design is based on the technology designed by the universal bus communication protocol, combines the concept of functional safety and information safety fusion, adds an integrated safety layer on the basis of the existing protocol stack and physical layer, realizes the functions of controlling functional safety failure and defending information safety threat, has strong operability and has wide popularization prospect.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for realizing the purpose is as follows: the safety communication method based on the integrated safety layer is characterized in that a safety layer for realizing function safety and information safety is arranged between a communication stack and a user layer of an industrial control terminal, the safety layer adopts at least one of a serial number, a timestamp and CRC to realize the function safety, and adopts at least one of encryption and data integrity check to realize the information safety.
When the industrial control terminal sends data, the safety layer executes the following steps:
after the security layer acquires data to be transmitted each time, firstly adding a serial number, and when the serial number is increased by a set value compared with the last time;
then adding a timestamp for representing the data received by the industrial control terminal;
carrying out key agreement with other industrial control terminals to generate a key pair, and distributing the key to other industrial control terminals;
then CRC calculation is carried out to realize data integrity verification;
and finally, after all the message contents are encrypted, transmitting the encrypted message contents to other industrial control terminals through a communication stack.
When the industrial control terminal receives data, the safety layer executes the following steps:
after the security layer receives data each time, firstly performing key negotiation to obtain a key, and decrypting the received message;
then carrying out data integrity check, comparing whether the CRC meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing;
comparing whether the serial number meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to process;
and finally, comparing whether the timestamp meets the set requirement or not, if not, discarding the message, if so, storing the message data, and finishing the receiving.
The safety communication method based on the integrated safety layer is used for a foundation fieldbus, and the safety layer is initialized before working.
The safety communication method based on the integrated safety layer is used for a foundation field bus, and the safety layer starts to work after receiving the read operation instruction trigger of the industrial control terminal.
The safety communication method based on the integrated safety layer is used for a foundation field bus, and the safety layer starts to work after receiving the write operation command trigger of the industrial control terminal.
The industrial control terminal is a PLC or an instrument.
The safety communication terminal based on the integrated safety layer is characterized in that a safety layer used for realizing function safety and information safety is arranged between a communication stack of an industrial control terminal and a user layer, and the safety layer is used for realizing the function safety by adopting at least one of a serial number, a timestamp and CRC and realizing the information safety by adopting at least one of encryption and data integrity check.
The security layer comprises a data security sending module, and is used for:
after the security layer acquires data to be transmitted each time, firstly adding a serial number, and when the serial number is increased by a set value compared with the last time;
then adding a timestamp for representing the data received by the industrial control terminal;
carrying out key agreement with other industrial control terminals to generate a key pair, and distributing the key to other industrial control terminals;
then CRC calculation is carried out to realize data integrity verification;
and finally, after all the message contents are encrypted, transmitting the encrypted message contents to other industrial control terminals through a communication stack.
The security layer comprises a data security receiving module, and is used for:
after the security layer receives data each time, firstly performing key negotiation to obtain a key, and decrypting the received message;
then carrying out data integrity check, comparing whether CRC meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to carry out;
comparing whether the serial number meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to perform;
and finally, comparing whether the timestamp meets the set requirement or not, if not, discarding the message, if so, storing the message data, and finishing the receiving.
The invention relates to a communication protocol for realizing an integrated safety layer integrating functional safety and information safety. It has the following advantages:
1. the portability is strong, the information safety and the function safety are realized through the integrated safety layer, the information safety and the function safety are conveniently realized by being transplanted to other buses, and the structure is simple. According to the invention, the new integrated safety layer is added to realize the safety communication between the control module and the instrument.
2. The implementation method is simple and easy to operate, the contents of other layers of the bus do not need to be modified, only a brand new integrated security layer needs to be added on a communication stack, the time cost and the labor cost are reduced, the complexity of function implementation is reduced, and the usability and the economical efficiency are good.
3. The universality is strong. With the increasing demand of communication safety performance in industry, on the basis of the original field bus, the method is applied to realize communication safety to a greater extent, a hardware system platform does not need to be changed, and the method has strong universality and is easy to realize.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the algorithm at the controller end of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the algorithm of the meter end of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a communication diagram illustrating the execution of an initialization command according to the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a communication diagram of the present invention when executing a read command;
FIG. 6 is a communication diagram of the present invention when executing a write command.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described in detail below with reference to the drawings and the embodiments.
The invention provides a communication protocol design method based on an integrated security layer, which integrates a security layer with functional security and information security and ensures the accuracy and reliability of data transmission.
The invention solves the problem that the accuracy and the reliability can not be ensured during the data transmission between the controller and the instrument, combines the measures for realizing the functional safety and the measures for realizing the information safety together, breaks through the independent relationship between the original functional safety and the original information safety, can be realized more simply and conveniently, ensures that the communication between the controller and the instrument is safer and more reliable, and has wide application prospect.
A communication protocol design of an integrated safety layer integrating function safety and information safety integrates measures for realizing function safety and information safety in a communication protocol into the integrated safety layer, and is used for safety communication of a controller and an instrument in a bus control system, and the method comprises the following steps of:
the communication protocol realizes the function safety and the information safety through an integrated safety layer positioned between a communication stack and a user layer, the integrated safety layer realizes the function safety by adopting a serial number, a timestamp, CRC (cyclic redundancy check) and the like, and realizes the information safety by adopting encryption and data integrity check.
The function safety and the information safety are integrated into an integrated safety layer, and related measures for realizing the function safety and the information safety are realized in the integrated safety layer in a centralized manner.
The serial number, the timestamp and the CRC are adopted to realize functional safety, the serial number, the timestamp and the CRC are added into a message for transmission, and relevant measures are checked during receiving.
And the information safety is realized by adopting encryption and data integrity verification, the data integrity verification part is added into the message, and the verification is carried out on the receiving part.
The invention is based on the communication protocol design of an integrated safety layer fusing functional safety and information safety, and realizes functional safety and information safety by adding related safety strategies on the basis of the original message.
A communication protocol design based on an integrated security layer for secure communication between a controller and a meter, comprising the following parts:
the controller and the instrument are connected through a bus; the function safety and the information safety form an integrated safety layer;
information security: the threat includes that a malicious attacker pretends to be legal information and sends the legal information to related equipment, the attacker modifies a correct message to cause errors of the received message, and the attacker monitors and steals data transmitted by a bus;
the function is safe: in the data transmission process, data can be damaged, retransmitted and lost, unexpected messages are inserted into the data, the original sequence, data delay and blocking are disturbed, illegal data are disguised into correct messages, the messages are transmitted to unexpected communication receivers, and the like, so that the data cannot be transmitted correctly;
an integrated security layer fusing functional security and information security is defined between the communication stack and the user layer, and the integrated security layer is different from any layer structure in the original bus structure and is used for realizing functional security and information security;
the serial number, the timestamp and the CRC are adopted to realize functional safety, the messages are ensured to be transmitted in sequence through the serial number, the condition of message loss is avoided, the timestamp ensures that the messages are transmitted in time, the condition of time delay is avoided, the CRC ensures that no bit error occurs in the messages, and each bit in the messages does not have the condition of mutation; the information security is realized by using encryption and data integrity verification strategies, the controller end determines a key through key negotiation and distributes the key to the instrument end, and the data integrity verification verifies the transmitted message to ensure that the data is transmitted correctly.
Taking fig. 1 as an implementation example, the former bus is composed of a physical layer, a communication stack and a user layer, and a functional security layer is added after functional security is added, and the implementation of information security is not fixed, but the invention proposes an integrated security layer, in which functional security and information security are integrated, when data is obtained from an upper computer, the data is transmitted to the integrated security layer, is subjected to security processing, is transmitted to the integrated security layer of the communication stack, is transmitted to an instrument end through a bus, and is processed, and if the obtained data is correct, the data is transmitted to the user layer, so as to implement correct data transmission.
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of an algorithm of a sending end of the present invention, when original data of an upper computer reaches a security layer, a serial number is added first, the serial number is executed according to a requirement of increasing 1 each time, and then a timestamp is added, the timestamp is obtained system time, and is executed in order to prevent overtime; carrying out key agreement to generate a key pair and distributing the key to the instrument; and then CRC calculation is carried out, data integrity verification is carried out, and finally all message contents are encrypted and then transmitted to an instrument end through a communication stack.
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of an algorithm of a receiving end according to the present invention, when the receiving end receives a message from a sending end, the message reaches an integrated security layer through a communication stack, and a key agreement is first performed to decrypt the received message; then carrying out data integrity verification and CRC calculation, comparing the result obtained by calculation with the original result, and judging whether the data passes the verification; and comparing the sequence numbers after passing the verification, if the verification passes, comparing the time stamps, if the time stamps are in a specified range, meeting the requirement, and transmitting the data to a user layer after storing the data.
Fig. 4-6 illustrate initialization, read, and write operations implemented in a foundation fieldbus using an integrated security layer. Fig. 4 shows initialization operation, in which a controller sends an initialization request instruction, a policy of functional security and information security is added to original data through an integrated security layer, message content is added, the message is transmitted to a communication stack and transmitted to an instrument end through a bus, the instrument end receives the initialized request instruction, decrypts the instruction and verifies whether the relevant policy meets requirements, the message meeting the requirements is a correctly transmitted message, and the message is transmitted to a user layer. Fig. 5 shows that, during a read operation, the controller sends a read request command, and adds a policy of functional security and information security through the integrated security layer to implement correct transmission of a message, and receives the read request command at the instrument end, decrypts the command and verifies whether the related policy meets the requirement, and the message meeting the requirement is a correctly transmitted message, and transmits the message to the user layer. Fig. 6 shows that, during write operation, the controller sends a write request command, adds policies of functional security and information security through the integrated security layer to implement correct transmission of a message, and receives the write request command at the instrument end, decrypts the command and verifies whether the related policies meet the requirements, and the message meeting the requirements is the correctly transmitted message and is transmitted to the user layer.
Claims (10)
1. The safety communication method based on the integrated safety layer is characterized in that the safety layer for realizing function safety and information safety is arranged between a communication stack of an industrial control terminal and a user layer, the safety layer adopts at least one mode of a serial number, a timestamp and CRC to realize the function safety, and adopts at least one mode of encryption and data integrity check to realize the information safety.
2. The integrated security layer-based secure communication method according to claim 1, wherein when the industrial control terminal transmits data, the security layer performs the following steps:
after the security layer acquires data to be transmitted each time, firstly adding a serial number, and when the serial number is increased by a set value compared with the last time;
then adding a time stamp for representing the data received by the industrial control terminal;
carrying out key agreement with other industrial control terminals to generate a key pair, and distributing the key to other industrial control terminals;
then CRC calculation is carried out to realize data integrity verification;
and finally, after all the message contents are encrypted, transmitting the encrypted message contents to other industrial control terminals through a communication stack.
3. The integrated security layer-based secure communication method of claim 1, wherein when the industrial control terminal receives data, the security layer performs the following steps:
after the security layer receives data each time, firstly performing key negotiation to obtain a key, and decrypting the received message;
then carrying out data integrity check, comparing whether the CRC meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing;
comparing whether the serial number meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to perform;
and finally, comparing whether the timestamp meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, if so, storing the message data, and finishing the receiving.
4. An integrated security layer based secure communication method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein for the foundation fieldbus, the security layer is initialized before operation.
5. The integrated safety layer-based safety communication method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the safety layer is used for a foundation field bus and starts to work after receiving a read operation command trigger of an industrial control terminal.
6. The integrated safety layer-based safety communication method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the safety layer is used for a foundation field bus and starts to work after receiving the write operation command trigger of the industrial control terminal.
7. The integrated safety layer-based safety communication method according to claim 1, wherein the industrial control terminal is a PLC or a meter.
8. The safety communication terminal based on the integrated safety layer is characterized in that a safety layer used for achieving function safety and information safety is arranged between a communication stack and a user layer of an industrial control terminal, and the safety layer is used for achieving the function safety in at least one mode of a serial number, a timestamp and CRC and achieving the information safety in at least one mode of encryption and data integrity check.
9. The integrated security layer-based secure communication terminal of claim 8, wherein the security layer comprises a data security transmission module configured to:
after the security layer acquires data to be transmitted each time, firstly adding a serial number, and when the serial number is increased by a set value compared with the last time;
then adding a timestamp for representing the data received by the industrial control terminal;
carrying out key agreement with other industrial control terminals to generate a key pair, and distributing the key to other industrial control terminals;
then CRC calculation is carried out to realize data integrity verification;
and finally, after all the message contents are encrypted, transmitting the encrypted message contents to other industrial control terminals through a communication stack.
10. The integrated security layer-based secure communication terminal of claim 8, wherein the security layer comprises a data security receiving module configured to:
after the security layer receives data each time, firstly performing key negotiation to obtain a key, and decrypting the received message;
then carrying out data integrity check, comparing whether CRC meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to carry out;
comparing whether the serial number meets the set requirement, if not, discarding the message, and if so, continuing to process;
and finally, comparing whether the timestamp meets the set requirement or not, if not, discarding the message, if so, storing the message data, and finishing the receiving.
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Cited By (1)
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| CN115987688A (en) * | 2023-03-20 | 2023-04-18 | 北京网藤科技有限公司 | Method and system for guaranteeing safe communication between PLC and upper computer |
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