CN111866113A - Communication system and method based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol - Google Patents

Communication system and method based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol Download PDF

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Publication number
CN111866113A
CN111866113A CN202010674075.3A CN202010674075A CN111866113A CN 111866113 A CN111866113 A CN 111866113A CN 202010674075 A CN202010674075 A CN 202010674075A CN 111866113 A CN111866113 A CN 111866113A
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message
layer
safety
communication
function module
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沈志
皮正军
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Beijing Jiaoda Microunion Tech. Co.,Ltd.
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Hangzhou Weilian Jingtai Technology Co ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/30Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
    • H04L69/32Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
    • H04L69/322Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
    • H04L69/326Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the transport layer [OSI layer 4]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L1/00Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
    • H04L1/0001Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
    • H04L1/0015Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff characterised by the adaptation strategy
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L1/00Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
    • H04L1/004Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
    • H04L1/0056Systems characterized by the type of code used
    • H04L1/0061Error detection codes
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/30Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
    • H04L69/32Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
    • H04L69/322Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
    • H04L69/329Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]

Abstract

The invention provides a communication system and a method based on a RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol, belongs to the technical field of information communication, and aims to solve the problem of difficulty in safety protocol migration. The communication system includes: the communication transmission layer is used for realizing the communication between the external equipment and the safety function module layer; the safety function module layer receives the message of the communication transmission layer in an independent double-channel mode, performs safety receiving protection algorithm verification on the message, and processes or forwards the message to the user application layer according to the algorithm verification result; and the user application layer is used for analyzing the message service bearing data and processing the application. The communication method realizes cross-platform transplantation of the RSSP-I railway signal safety communication protocol through the layered structure of the communication transmission layer, the safety function module layer and the user application layer, and solves the problem of protocol multiplexing development among equipment.

Description

Communication system and method based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information communication, and particularly relates to a communication system and a method based on an RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol.
Background
In a closed transmission system among railway signal safety equipment, a functional structure and a protocol for safety related information interaction stipulate the use of an RSSP-I railway signal safety communication protocol, the protocol is designed for solving the time sequence of data communication among the equipment, and the problems of high requirements of data timeliness, data integrity, data packet sequence, data accuracy and the like of the communication among the equipment are solved, so that the RSSP-I railway signal safety communication protocol is widely applied to a railway signal safety equipment system. When a safety protocol needs to be transplanted between railway signal safety devices or a communication mode or service bearing data is changed, a protocol implementation method needs to be changed, so that the safety protocol is difficult to transplant, repeated workload is brought, and the safety protocol needs to be realized again.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention aims to solve the above technical problems, and provides a communication system and method based on RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a communication system based on RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol, comprising: the communication transmission layer is used for realizing the communication between the external equipment and the safety function module layer; the safety function module layer receives the message of the communication transmission layer in an independent double-channel mode, performs safety receiving protection algorithm verification on the message, and processes or forwards the message to the user application layer according to the algorithm verification result; and the user application layer is used for analyzing the message service bearing data and processing the application.
Preferably, the communication transport layer includes a receiving module and a sending module, the receiving module is configured to receive and identify a data request from an external device and forward the data request to the security function module layer, and the sending module is configured to receive a message request and a response from the security function module layer and send the message request and the response to the external device.
Preferably, the safety function module layer comprises an fsm _ process module and a timer _ management module, and the fsm _ process module is used for carrying out safety protection check, message data response construction and synchronous timing correction and response on the safety threat of the naked message data from the non-safety function module layer; the timer _ management module is used to maintain a local timer count.
Preferably, the communication transmission layer comprises a recv _ msg task module and a send _ msg task module, the recv _ msg task module of the communication transmission layer performs polling processing to complete receiving and identifying of a bare message data request of an opposite end of the device, transmits the identified bare message data request to the fsm _ process module of the safety function module layer for safety protection check and processing, and the send _ msg task module receives a message data response of a processing result of the fsm _ process module and transmits the message data response to the opposite end of the device.
The invention also provides a communication method based on the communication system, which comprises the following steps:
a1, initializing the parameters of the dual-channel secure communication protocol by the secure function module layer;
a2, the safety function module layer uses double channels to receive RSSP-I message independently and processes the same message in the same period;
a3, the safety function module layer uses safety receiving protection algorithm to check the message;
a4, the safety function module layer discards the message, initiates the time sequence correction or forwards the message to the user application layer according to the operation checking result;
a5, the user application layer receives the message of the safety function module layer, and formats the message according to the type of the message header;
a6, the user application layer analyzes and extracts the related service bearing data for application and processing.
Preferably, in step a1, the initializing the dual channel secure communication protocol parameters includes: source identification, maximum allowed frame number, timestamp, home device sequence number, and last received sequence number.
Preferably, in step a3, the method for verifying the receiving security protection algorithm includes the following steps:
b1, judging whether the message information received twice before and after is repeated through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the repeated message is found, actively discarding the received repeated message;
b2, judging whether a lost data frame exists between the two messages received before and after through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the lost data frame between the two messages exceeds a limit value, actively discarding the received message, and initiating timing correction;
b3, judging whether an illegal message is received or not through the serial number/timestamp and message header information in the security check domain, and actively discarding the received message once the illegal message is found;
b4, judging whether the sequence of the two received messages is wrong or not through the serial number/timestamp information in the safety check domain, and if the message with disordered sequence is found, actively discarding the received message by the safety function module layer and initiating the time-sequence correction;
b5, judging whether the type of the received message is wrong or not according to the type of the message header and the address information, and actively discarding the message received this time once the message is wrong;
b6, implementing the security coding technique through the inspection channel of the security inspection domain and the message tail, thereby judging whether the currently received message data is correct.
Preferably, in step a4, if the real-time secure data packet fails to perform arithmetic checks such as a sequence number, a timestamp, and a double check of the real-time secure data packet, sending a timing correction request packet to the external device, where the timing correction request packet includes a local sequence number X and a remote sequence number Y; if the operation verification such as the serial number, the timestamp, the double verification and the like of the real-time safety data message is successful, the real-time safety data message is forwarded to a user application layer to be responsible for analyzing message service bearing data and application processing; if the time sequence correction reply message of the external equipment succeeds in operation verification such as the sequence number, the timestamp and the like of the time sequence correction reply message, the remote time sequence number Y is updated according to the time sequence number responded by the message, and link connection is reestablished.
Preferably, the timing correction request and reply flow is as follows: the time sequence correction request and the reply message are identified as the handshake heartbeat of the two parties, firstly, one party tentatively sets a serial number to carry out request handshake, and after the other party responds, the time sequence number of the synchronous other party is updated, and the pair of request and response is identified as one challenge and response; then, the two parties periodically initiate accumulated sequence number synchronous requests to carry out respective communication handshake.
After the technical scheme is adopted, the invention has the following advantages:
the invention realizes cross-platform transplantation of RSSP-I railway signal safety communication protocol and solves the problem of protocol multiplexing development among equipment through the layered structure of the communication transmission layer, the safety function module layer and the user application layer.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication system based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating the steps of a communication method based on the RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol according to the present invention;
in the figure:
1-a communication transport layer; 101-a receiving module; 102-a sending module; 2-a secure functional module layer; 3-user application layer.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the following drawings and specific examples.
As shown in fig. 1, a communication system based on RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol includes a communication transport layer 1, a secure function module layer 2 and a user application layer 3. The communication transmission layer 1, the safety function module layer 2 and the user application layer 3 are layered through C language.
The communication transport layer 1 is used for realizing communication between an external device and a security function module layer, and the communication transport layer 1 includes a receiving module 101 and a sending module 102. The receiving module 101 is configured to receive and identify a data request from an external device and forward the data request to the security function module layer 2, and the sending module 102 is configured to receive a message request and a response from the security function module layer 2 and send the message request and the response to the external device.
The safety function module layer 2 receives the message of the communication transmission layer 1 by adopting an independent double-channel mode, carries out safety receiving protection algorithm verification on the message, and processes or forwards the message to the user application layer 3 according to the algorithm verification result.
The user application layer 3 is used for analyzing the message service bearing data and processing the application.
The safety function module layer 2 comprises a fsm _ process module and a timer _ management module. The fsm _ process module is used for carrying out security protection check on security threats of the bare message data from the non-security function module layer 2, constructing message data response and synchronizing time sequence correction and response. the timer _ management module is used for maintaining local timing count, the local timing count of the timer _ management module is initialized to 1, the timing is accumulated to 1 for 500ms, and the local timing count and the timestamp of the message data are used for safety verification. Wherein the local timing count range is 0-232-1.
The communication transmission layer 1 comprises a recv _ msg task module and a send _ msg task module. And the recv _ msg task module of the communication transmission layer 1 performs polling processing to complete the receiving and identification of the bare message data request of the opposite end of the equipment, transmits the identified bare message data request to the fsm _ process module of the safety function module layer 2 for safety protection check and processing, and transmits the message data response of the processing result of the fsm _ process module to the opposite end of the equipment through the send _ msg task module.
When the safety function module layer 2 is initialized, a communication parameter init _ param function is called to initialize safety communication protocol parameters, recv _ msg module task 1/task 2 of two independent communication transmission layers 1 is created to bear double-channel received message information (the priority is 105), fsm _ process module task 3/task 4 of two independent safety function module layers 2 is created to realize the processing of the double-channel message information (the priority is 105) and the bearing of message information sent to an opposite terminal device send _ msg module task 5 (the priority is 100), a local timer of a timer _ manage module is created at the same time, and finally five task modules and the local timer module are started to finish the initialization work of the safety function module layer 2.
The fsm _ process module receives the bare message request data of the non-safety function module layer recv _ msg task module, and respectively processes the bare message according to the type of the bare message:
If the naked message is an RSD message, calling a secure communication protocol message processing tsd _ pro function to identify the sending end identification error of the message data and carry out CRC (cyclic redundancy check) on the numerical value error of the message data, if the sending end identification error or the numerical value error is detected, discarding the message, eliminating the danger of the identification error and the numerical value error of the message sending end, then judging whether the message information received in the two times is repeated or not, whether a lost data frame exists between the message information received in the two times or not, whether the message received in the two times or not is in sequence error or not and whether the current received message is overtime or not by the serial number/timestamp and message header information in a security check domain, and carrying out double check on the message tail and a check channel in the security check domain, if the lost message, the message with wrong sequence and the message with failed double check are found, a time sequence synchronization function wt _ SSE is called to send a time sequence synchronization request SSE message to a send _ msg module, otherwise, if the data passes the safety protection, the service data is analyzed and processed by a user application layer.
And if the naked message is an SSR time sequence synchronization request message, calling a time sequence synchronization correction response function SSR _ pro to reestablish the link.
When a TSD message is initially received, if a lost message, a message with a wrong sequence and a message with a double check failure are detected to fail, a time sequence synchronization request SSE with a sequence number of local timing counting is initiated, an SSR time sequence synchronization response of an opposite end of the equipment is waited to update the local remote opposite end synchronization counting, if the TSD is received again, a protection check failure is detected, and a time sequence synchronization request SSE with a sequence number of local timing counting accumulation is initiated again.
As shown in fig. 2, the present invention further provides a communication method based on the above communication system, including the following steps:
a1, initializing the parameters of the two-channel secure communication protocol by the secure function module layer 2;
a2, the security function module layer 2 uses double channels to independently receive RSSP-I message messages and processes the same messages in the same period;
a3, using safety receiving protection algorithm to check the message by the safety function module layer 2;
a4, the safety function module layer 2 discards the message, initiates the time sequence correction or forwards the message to the user application layer 3 according to the operation checking result;
a5, the user application layer 3 receives the message of the safety function module layer 2, and formats the message according to the type of the message header;
a6, the user application layer 3 analyzes and extracts the relevant service bearing data for application and processing.
In step a1, initializing parameters of the dual-channel secure communication protocol includes: source identification, maximum allowed frame number, timestamp, home device sequence number, and last received sequence number.
In step a3, the method for verifying the safety reception protection algorithm includes the following steps:
b1, judging whether the message information received twice before and after is repeated through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the repeated message is found, actively discarding the received repeated message;
b2, judging whether a lost data frame exists between the two messages received before and after through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the lost data frame between the two messages exceeds a limit value, actively discarding the received message, and initiating timing correction;
b3, judging whether an illegal message is received or not through the serial number/timestamp and message header information in the security check domain, and actively discarding the received message once the illegal message is found;
b4, judging whether the sequence of the two received messages is wrong or not through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, and if the message with disordered sequence is found, actively discarding the received message by the security function module layer 2 and initiating the sequence correction;
b5, judging whether the type of the received message is wrong or not according to the type of the message header and the address information, and actively discarding the message received this time once the message is wrong;
b6, implementing the security coding technique through the inspection channel of the security inspection domain and the message tail, thereby judging whether the currently received message data is correct.
In step a4, if the real-time safety data message fails to be checked through operations such as serial number, timestamp and double check of the real-time safety data message, sending a timing sequence correction request message to an external device, wherein the timing sequence correction request message comprises a local serial number X and a remote serial number Y; if the operation verification such as the serial number, the timestamp, the double verification and the like of the real-time safety data message is successful, the real-time safety data message is forwarded to a user application layer 3 to be responsible for analyzing the message service bearing data and carrying out application processing; if the time sequence correction reply message of the external equipment succeeds in operation verification such as the sequence number, the timestamp and the like of the time sequence correction reply message, the remote time sequence number Y is updated according to the time sequence number responded by the message, and link connection is reestablished.
The timing correction request and reply flow is as follows: the time sequence correction request and the reply message are identified as the handshake heartbeat of the two parties, firstly, one party tentatively sets a serial number to carry out request handshake, and after the other party responds, the time sequence number of the synchronous other party is updated, and the pair of request and response is identified as one challenge and response; then, the two parties periodically initiate accumulated sequence number synchronous requests to carry out respective communication handshake.
Other embodiments of the present invention than the preferred embodiments described above will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the present invention, and various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit of the present invention as defined in the appended claims.

Claims (9)

1. A communication system based on RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol, comprising:
the communication transmission layer (1), the communication transmission layer (1) is used for realizing the communication between the external equipment and the safety function module layer (2);
the safety function module layer (2), the safety function module layer (2) receives the message of the communication transmission layer (1) by adopting an independent double-channel mode, carries out safety receiving protection algorithm verification on the message, and processes or forwards the message to the user application layer (3) according to the algorithm verification result;
And the user application layer (3), wherein the user application layer (3) is used for analyzing the message service bearing data and processing the application.
2. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication system according to claim 1, wherein the communication transport layer (1) comprises a receiving module (101), a sending module (102), the receiving module (101) is configured to receive, identify and forward data requests from external devices to the secure function module layer (2), and the sending module (102) is configured to receive and respond to message requests from the secure function module layer (2) and send the message requests to the external devices.
3. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication system according to claim 1, wherein the secure function module layer (2) comprises a fsm _ process module and a timer _ management module, the fsm _ process module is used for performing security protection check, message data response construction and synchronization timing correction and response on security threats of bare message data from the non-secure function module layer (2); the timer _ management module is used to maintain a local timer count.
4. The communication system according to claim 3, wherein the communication transport layer (1) comprises a recv _ msg task module and a send _ msg task module, the recv _ msg task module of the communication transport layer (1) performs polling processing to complete the receiving and identifying of the device-side bare message data request, transmits the identified bare message data request to the fsm _ process module of the security function module layer (2) for security protection checking and processing, and the send _ msg task module receives the message data response of the fsm _ process module processing result and transmits the message data response to the device-side.
5. A communication method based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol is characterized by comprising the following steps:
a1, initializing the parameters of the dual-channel secure communication protocol by the secure function module layer (2);
a2, the security function module layer (2) uses double channels to independently receive RSSP-I message messages and processes the same messages in the same period;
a3, the safety function module layer (2) uses the safety receiving protection algorithm to check the message;
a4, the safety function module layer (2) discards the message, initiates the time sequence correction or forwards the message to the user application layer (3) according to the operation checking result;
a5, the user application layer (3) receives the message of the safety function module layer (2), and formats the message according to the type of the message header;
a6, the user application layer (3) analyzes and extracts the related service bearing data for application and processing.
6. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication method as claimed in claim 5, wherein the initializing the dual channel secure communication protocol parameters in step a1 comprises: source identification, maximum allowed frame number, timestamp, home device sequence number, and last received sequence number.
7. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication method as claimed in claim 5, wherein in the step a3, the method for verifying the flow of the secure reception protection algorithm comprises the steps of:
b1, judging whether the message information received twice before and after is repeated through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the repeated message is found, actively discarding the received repeated message;
b2, judging whether a lost data frame exists between the two messages received before and after through the serial number/timestamp information in the security check domain, if the lost data frame between the two messages exceeds a limit value, actively discarding the received message, and initiating timing correction;
b3, judging whether an illegal message is received or not through the serial number/timestamp and message header information in the security check domain, and actively discarding the received message once the illegal message is found;
b4, judging whether the sequence of the two received messages is wrong or not through the serial number/timestamp information in the safety check domain, and if the message with disordered sequence is found, actively discarding the received message by the safety function module layer (2) and initiating the time-sequence correction;
b5, judging whether the type of the received message is wrong or not according to the type of the message header and the address information, and actively discarding the message received this time once the message is wrong;
b6, implementing the security coding technique through the inspection channel of the security inspection domain and the message tail, thereby judging whether the currently received message data is correct.
8. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication method as claimed in claim 5, wherein, in the step a4,
if the real-time safety data message fails in operation verification such as the serial number, the timestamp, the double verification and the like of the real-time safety data message, sending a time sequence correction request message to external equipment, wherein the time sequence correction request message comprises a local serial number X and a remote serial number Y;
if the operation verification such as the serial number, the timestamp, the double verification and the like of the real-time safety data message is successful, the real-time safety data message is forwarded to a user application layer (3) to be responsible for analyzing message service bearing data and application processing;
if the time sequence correction reply message of the external equipment succeeds in operation verification such as the sequence number, the timestamp and the like of the time sequence correction reply message, the remote time sequence number Y is updated according to the time sequence number responded by the message, and link connection is reestablished.
9. The RSSP railway signal secure communication protocol-based communication method as claimed in claim 8, wherein the timing correction request and reply flow is as follows:
the time sequence correction request and the reply message are identified as the handshake heartbeat of the two parties, firstly, one party tentatively sets a serial number to carry out request handshake, and after the other party responds, the time sequence number of the synchronous other party is updated, and the pair of request and response is identified as one challenge and response; then, the two parties periodically initiate accumulated sequence number synchronous requests to carry out respective communication handshake.
CN202010674075.3A 2020-07-14 2020-07-14 Communication system and method based on RSSP railway signal safety communication protocol Pending CN111866113A (en)

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