CN115061156A - Array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method and system based on integrated navigation - Google Patents
Array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method and system based on integrated navigation Download PDFInfo
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- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/48—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system
- G01S19/49—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system whereby the further system is an inertial position system, e.g. loosely-coupled
Abstract
The invention relates to an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method and system based on integrated navigation, which belong to the technical field of integrated navigation, can improve the robustness of a system and solve the problem that a satellite navigation receiver terminal is easily interfered by external deception; the method comprises the following steps: s1, resolving the current carrier attitude according to the angular rate, specific force information and magnetic flux information output by the inertia measurement unit; s2, calculating the projection of the current visible satellite true direction vector in a geographic system, projecting the current visible satellite true direction vector into an array antenna coordinate system according to the carrier attitude, and calculating the altitude angle and the azimuth angle of the visible satellite relative to the array antenna coordinate system; s3, sampling satellite signals of the current epoch by adopting a digital frequency storage technology, storing the satellite signals after down-conversion, continuously adjusting the direction of a zero point by utilizing an array antenna direction zero setting technology, and detecting whether deceptive signals enter; s4, determining the incoming wave direction of the deception signal; s5, shaping an array antenna directional pattern; and S6, adjusting the beam pointing to restrain the entering of the deception signal.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of integrated navigation, in particular to an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method based on integrated navigation.
Background
The combined navigation system realizes the complementation between single navigation systems by fusing data of various sensors, has the characteristics of high positioning precision, strong stability and the like, and is widely applied to the military field and the civil field. Meanwhile, a satellite navigation system which is an important component of the integrated navigation system also has the defects of weak signal strength, high possibility of interference and deception and the like, and if corresponding measures are not taken, great hidden dangers can be brought to various fields of military and civilian in China, so that an anti-deception technology of satellite signals is very important.
Accordingly, it is desirable to develop a method and system for array antenna anti-satellite navigation spoofing based combined navigation to address the deficiencies of the prior art and to solve or mitigate one or more of the problems set forth above.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, the invention provides an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method and system based on integrated navigation, which improve the robustness of an integrated navigation system by combining software and hardware and can solve the problem that a satellite navigation receiver terminal is easily interfered by external deception.
In one aspect, the invention provides an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method based on integrated navigation, which is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, solving the current carrier attitude according to the angular rate and specific force information output by the inertia measurement unit and/or the magnetic flux information output by the magnetic strength measurement equipment;
s2, calculating real direction vectors of all current visible satellites in a geographic system, projecting the real direction vectors into an array antenna coordinate system according to the carrier attitude obtained in S1, and calculating the altitude angle and the azimuth angle of the visible satellites relative to the array antenna coordinate system;
s3, sampling satellite signals of the current epoch by adopting a digital frequency storage technology, carrying out down-conversion and storing the satellite signals, continuously adjusting the zero direction by utilizing a direction zero setting technology of the array antenna, and detecting whether deceptive signals enter or not; if not, the anti-cheating operation is finished, otherwise, the next step is carried out;
s4, determining the incoming wave direction of the deception signal;
s5, shaping an array antenna directional pattern;
and S6, adjusting the beam direction according to the antenna pattern obtained in S5, and inhibiting the entrance of deceptive signals.
As to the above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner, there is further provided an implementation manner, and the content of step S4 includes: and measuring the incoming wave direction of the deception signal by using a phase comparison method by utilizing a signal obtained after forming a null region in the direction of a real signal source.
The above-described aspects and any possible implementations further provide an implementation in which the magnetic strength measurement device is a magnetometer.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the content of step S1 includes:
s11, judging whether the criterion is met
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is the acceleration output by an accelerometer in an inertial measurement unit, g is the local gravity, beta 1 Is a preset acceleration threshold; if so, judging that the carrier is in a low-acceleration maneuvering state, and resolving the carrier attitude according to the state; otherwise, entering the next step;
s12, judging whether the horizontal acceleration meets the criterion f H ＜β 2 Wherein f is H Is the horizontal acceleration modulus, beta 2 Is a preset horizontal acceleration threshold; if so, judging that the carrier is in a low-acceleration maneuvering state, and resolving the carrier attitude according to the state; otherwise, entering the next step;
and S13, judging whether the carrier has continuous turning or circling motion by combining the output of the gyroscope in the inertia measurement unit, and if the carrier does not have turning or circling, determining that the error of the misalignment angle is large and needing to correct the attitude.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the correcting the gesture in step S13 includes: and correcting the horizontal misalignment angle according to the horizontal specific force, and correcting the orientation misalignment angle according to the magnetic flux information.
As for the above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner, there is further provided an implementation manner, wherein the correcting the azimuth misalignment angle according to the magnetic flux information specifically includes: the magnetic heading is substituted for the azimuth.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the content of calculating the projection of the true direction vector of the visible satellite in the geographic system in step S2 is specifically: determining the current visible satellite number according to the current carrier position information output by the integrated navigation system, the current time maintained by the local clock and the preloaded satellite almanac; and then calculating the projection of the real direction vectors of all the current visible satellites in the geographic system according to the satellite position information solved and calculated by the almanac.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the determining, in step S4, the specific content of the incoming wave direction of the spoofed signal includes: selecting a real signal, carrying out null operation in the source direction of the real signal, and determining the incoming wave direction of the deceptive signal by utilizing a phase comparison method according to information obtained by the null operation.
The above-described aspects and any possible implementation further provide an implementation in which the selected true signal is a satellite signal of a current epoch.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the content of step S5 includes: and forming the directional diagram of the array antenna according to the altitude and the azimuth of the satellite signal of the current epoch in the step S3 and the altitude and the azimuth of the deceptive signal in the step S4.
The above-mentioned aspect and any possible implementation manner further provide an implementation manner, and the step S6 includes: applying a zero point constraint condition to the array directional diagram to force the array directional diagram to form a null all the time in a certain fixed incoming wave direction, thereby realizing the suppression of deceptive signals;
the method comprises the following specific steps:
s61, calculating an array steering vector of the interference according to the incoming wave direction of the deception signal;
s62, constructing the array steering vector into a virtual correlation matrix; if a plurality of incoming wave directions exist, summing virtual correlation matrixes formed by each array steering vector;
s63, calculating a static direction coefficient of zero point constraint;
and S64, applying the static direction coefficient as a constraint condition to the array directional diagram.
In another aspect, the invention provides an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting system based on integrated navigation, which is characterized by comprising an inertial measurement unit, magnetic strength measurement equipment and a processing module, wherein the inertial measurement unit and the magnetic strength measurement equipment are connected with the processing module;
the processing module comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the method as described above when executing the computer program.
Compared with the prior art, one of the technical schemes has the following advantages or beneficial effects: the invention adopts a mode of combining software and hardware, improves the performance by combining various resources on the basis of traditionally using the array antenna to resist cheating, and can fully utilize the data of other airborne sensors and the maneuvering characteristics of the carrier to identify cheating signals which may exist; a Kalman filtering tight coupling algorithm is used in the algorithm level, and a sequential filtering technology is adopted, so that the system can more conveniently remove the satellite channels suffering from deception at present;
another technical scheme among the above-mentioned technical scheme has following advantage or beneficial effect: the method of the invention makes full use of reliable data provided by other sensors in the integrated navigation system to assist the satellite receiver to detect and reject deception signals, and has higher practical value.
Of course, it is not necessary for any one product in which the invention is practiced to achieve all of the above-described technical effects simultaneously.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for preventing satellite navigation spoofing by an array antenna based on combined navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of phase difference measurement under a two-dimensional plane condition of an array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method based on integrated navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of phase difference measurement under a three-dimensional plane condition of an array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method based on integrated navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an array antenna adaptive filtering model of an array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method based on combined navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a diagram of a uniformly distributed square grid array antenna structure for a combined navigation based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resistant method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of array antenna signal incidence of an array antenna anti-satellite navigation spoofing method based on combined navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 7 is a zero-point forming flowchart of an array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method based on combined navigation according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
For better understanding of the technical solutions of the present invention, the following detailed descriptions of the embodiments of the present invention are provided with reference to the accompanying drawings.
It should be understood that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Satellite signal spoofing techniques are mainly classified into a repeater type and a generator type; embodiments based on spoofing can be further divided into single antenna spoofing and multiple antenna spoofing. The satellite signal anti-spoofing technology comprises two aspects of detecting and eliminating spoofed interference signals. In order to solve the current situation that a satellite navigation receiver terminal is easily interfered by external deception, the invention provides an array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method based on integrated navigation. The method comprises detection of deception jamming signals and elimination of the deception jamming signals, and the incoming wave direction of the deception jamming signals is detected by using an array antenna and a spatial filtering technology from the angle of signal processing of a receiver; and the correct direction of satellite signals is estimated by using the data of the airborne sensor from the navigation positioning layer, and the beam direction is adjusted, so that the satellite navigation deception resisting effect is realized at two stages.
According to an embodiment of the invention, the array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method based on combined navigation is shown in fig. 1, and the steps include:
step 1: and the current attitude of the carrier is solved by fusing the angular rate and specific force information output by the IMU and the magnetic flux information output by the magnetometer. The method comprises the following specific steps:
the IMU is based on the Newton inertia principle, and the output angular rate and specific force information cannot be interfered; the magnetic flux measured by the magnetometer comes from the earth magnetic field and is generally difficult to interfere. Therefore, maneuver judgment can be performed according to the output of the accelerometer, when the carrier is in a hovering, constant-speed or low-acceleration state, the attitude of the carrier is corrected by using the attitude reference technology, so that the attitude stability and the usability of the integrated navigation system can be kept for a long time, and attitude reference with certain precision is provided for the carrier. The IMU is an inertial measurement unit and mainly comprises a gyroscope and an accelerometer.
Firstly, the specific force output by the accelerometer is compared
If the modulus of (c) and the local gravity g satisfy the criterion
(β 1 Is a preset acceleration threshold), it may be preliminarily assumed that there is no acceleration maneuver. In order to reduce the effect of the accelerometer measuring noise, it is common to use the average value of the accelerometer over a period of time instead of the instantaneous value for a determination that the vehicle is moving steadily. Then on the basis of
On the basis of the above-mentioned data, the module value of acceleration is calculated for horizontal
And (4) further judgment:
(1) when f is H ＜β 2 (β 2 A preset horizontal acceleration threshold), it can be judged that there is no acceleration maneuver and the specific force is utilized
Solving or estimating misalignment angle phi b 。
(2) When f is H ≥β 2 Then, there may be two cases: first, calculate the misalignment angle phi in the attitude matrix b Larger, second, the vehicle does have larger horizontal acceleration maneuver. Further judgment of the Condition f H ≥β 2 Whether the attitude is only generated in a short time or not is judged, if yes, the short-time large acceleration maneuver exists, and the attitude is maintained only by using the output of the gyroscope; if the continuous occurrence time of the condition is longer and is larger than a preset time threshold value, the gyroscope output is required to be combined to check whether the carrier has continuous turning or circling motion, and if the condition has turning or circling, no further processing is carried out(ii) a If there is no turn or hover, the misalignment angle error is considered to be the root of the error, requiring a quick correction of the attitude.
Under the low-acceleration maneuvering condition, respectively approximating an inertial navigation ratio force equation and an error equation thereof as follows:
under the condition of stable speed, the acceleration and the acceleration error have the same meaning, and the above formulas are equal to obtain
When the motor is low, the right side of the equation is equal
Can be approximated as
After being rewritten into component form, there are
Namely that
Wherein, the first and the second end of the pipe are connected with each other,
g n ＝[0 0 -g] T ；φ＝[φ E φ N φ U ] T . The above formula shows that the specific horizontal forceProviding only horizontal misalignment angle correction information and not being used to calculate the azimuthal misalignment phi U But the azimuth can be approximately replaced by the magnetic heading given by the magnetometer. Without first assuming the orientation correction phi U Is equal to 0, and thus has
Namely, it is
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the specific force modulus value at low maneuvering; e.g. of the type 3 ＝[0 0 1] T Is a unit vector of the z axis in the direction of the day. Left multiplication of two sides of the equation
Memo
Can obtain the product
Wherein, C 3 Array of postures
The third row vector of (2). It follows that a two unit vector
And
the included angle between the two is the projection phi of the horizontal misalignment angle in the b system b 。
Calculating the misalignment angle by phi b The quaternion attitude update algorithm combined with the gyroscope angular increment output is as follows:
wherein
In a small area, the geomagnetic field vector H can be regarded as a constant vector to establish a magnetic field coordinate system (ox) m y m z m Line, abbreviated as m line). When the magnetic field coordinate system is coincident with the geographic system, the output of three axes of the magnetometer is M n ＝[M N 0 M D ] T And in the carrier system, the output of the magnetometer is
According to
Substituting the pitch angle theta and the roll angle gamma output by the integrated navigation system into the direction cosine array
Then, it can be obtained
So as to obtain the components of the earth magnetic field vector on the X axis and the Y axis as
Thereby obtaining a magnetic heading of
Step 2: and determining the current visible satellite number according to the current carrier position information output by the inertia/terrain matching/geomagnetic/barometric altimeter combined navigation system, the current time maintained by the local clock and the preloaded satellite almanac. And then calculating the projection of the real direction vectors of all the current visible satellites in the geographic system according to the satellite position information solved and calculated by the almanac. And finally, projecting the direction vector into an array antenna coordinate system according to the attitude information of the current carrier obtained by calculation in the step 1, and calculating the altitude angle and the azimuth angle of the visible satellite relative to the array antenna coordinate system according to the direction vector. The method comprises the following specific steps:
for a combined navigation system, the inertial navigation system works by depending on inertial information and can provide reliable position information without depending on any external information; the barometric altimeter obtains the current altitude by measuring the change of the external air pressure, and the barometric altimeter also cannot be deceived or interfered. In addition, the terrain matching system can also obtain the current position by matching the current terrain, so that the position divergence caused by long-time operation of the inertial navigation system is corrected. Therefore, the position information of the current carrier is a known quantity for the integrated navigation system. The high-precision clock carried on the integrated navigation system can also maintain accurate UTC time in a longer time; the validity period of the satellite almanac is up to half a year and can be pre-loaded into the integrated navigation system before the receiver is used. In summary, the visible satellite number of the current position of the receiver and the position of the current position of the receiver in the ECEF coordinate system can be calculated through the kepler equation, so that the deception signal of the invisible satellite is removed.
For the true direction vectors of all visible satellites, firstly, calculating the projection of the vector between the satellite currently tracked by each satellite channel and a carrier in an ECEF coordinate system; and secondly projecting the vector into the geographical system by using a conversion matrix between the ECEF coordinate system and the geographical system. The calculation method is as follows:
wherein [ Δ e Δ n Δ u ]] T For the vector between the satellite currently being tracked and the carrier in the geographic coordinate system with the origin at the carrier position, [ Δ x Δ y Δ z [ ]] T Is the projection of the observation vector of the carrier to the satellite in the ECEF coordinate system, and S is the transformation matrix from the ECEF coordinate system to the geographic system.
[X Y Z] T The position of the satellite in the ECEF coordinate system is calculated by the satellite receiver according to the almanac. [ x y z ]] T The position of the carrier in the ECEF coordinate system is output by the integrated navigation system. L and lambda are respectively the latitude and longitude of the carrier.
The array antenna coordinate system is defined as a rectangular coordinate system, the original point is the geometric center of the array antenna, the X-axis direction points to the right side of the array antenna, the Y-axis direction points to the front direction of the array antenna, and the Z-axis direction points to the antenna direction of the array antenna. The horizontal plane of the array antenna is 0-degree elevation angle, and the zenith direction of the array antenna is + 90-degree elevation angle. Assuming that the attitude transfer matrix from the airspace coordinate system (p system) to the geographic coordinate system (n system) is
Let pitch, roll and yaw (north and east are positive) be [ theta gamma psi [ ]] T The three rotation sequences from p series to n series are: yaw-pitch-roll. At this time have
Then the coordinates X of the visible satellite relative to the array antenna coordinate system can be obtained P Y P Z P ] T Comprises the following steps:
according to the calculation formulas of the altitude angle and the azimuth angle, the method comprises the following steps:
θ、
respectively, altitude and azimuth. Wherein theta epsilon (0, pi/2),
and step 3: sampling satellite signals of a current epoch by adopting a digital frequency storage technology, performing down-conversion on the sampled satellite signals, and storing the satellite signals in the integrated navigation system; and continuously adjusting the direction of the zero point by using the direction zero setting technology of the array antenna, and detecting whether a deception signal enters. The method comprises the following specific steps:
(1) since the number of satellite signals in the same epoch is large and the zero point formation direction is wide, detection of a spoofed signal is difficult to be performed in a single epoch time, and the processor is overloaded. The digital frequency storage technology stores digital signals obtained by sampling high-speed A/D signals in a device, and can realize the storage and reproduction capacity of the combined navigation system on radio frequency and microwave signals.
The spatial filter is used for weighting and adding signals received by each channel of the array and outputting the signals. Assuming that a uniform linear array is composed of N non-directional array element antennas, the distance between adjacent array elements is d, and N x1 vector W represents a weighting vector, i.e. the vector
W＝[w 1 … w N ] T
Then the output signal may be expressed as
G(θ)＝W H ·a(θ)
a (θ) is an N-dimensional direction vector of the array antenna:
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
wherein λ is the satellite signal wavelength and θ is the angle between the signal direction and the array normal.
The null technique is the simplest spatial filtering technique, with the initial antenna pattern determined by the beam vector. The adaptive algorithm modifies the weighting values of the antennas to minimize the weighted signal output power, thus forming a null in the direction of the interfering signal. In practice, the null formation is to make the sum of the contributions of the signal energy received by each antenna element in a given direction close to zero, and a constraint must be proposed to achieve this. So that the antenna pattern is sufficiently small in power over this designated spatial area to remain as consistent as possible with the original antenna pattern in the other direction. Therefore, the problem of forming the null in a specific direction is solved by minimizing the variation of the weight of the null power constraint in the specific direction.
Using gain squared | G (theta)' for output signal G (theta) of array antenna 2 ＝W H a(θ)Wa(θ) H Constrained to be less than a given constant epsilon, the above minimization optimization problem can be expressed as follows:
obj:minf(W)＝||W-W 0 || 2
S.T.W H QW≤ε
in the formula, W 0 Is the initial weight vector of the array, weighted with chebyshev amplitude herein; w is an optimization weight vector to be solved; the constant epsilon controls the depth of the null in the null forming direction; q is an NxN dimensional Hermitian matrix having a value of
In the formula, theta m Is the center of the area of the direction to form the null, Δ θ m Is m null widths.
Q is subjected to eigenvalue decomposition and can be expressed as
Q＝ΓΛΓ H
Λ＝diag(λ 1 ,λ 2 ,…λ 1 )
Where Γ is a unitary matrix composed of eigenvectors of Q, and Λ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Q.
The minimization optimization problem is to find a weight vector W to be closest to an initial weight vector W under the constraint condition that the power integral of a null direction area to be formed is less than a certain constant epsilon 0 . Because the larger eigenvalue of the matrix Q is related to the number M of the nulls, a proper N is selected to ensure that the M is less than or equal to N is less than or equal to N, and the array can be ensured to have approximate zero response in a spatial region. By constrained substitution of a set of eigenvectors of the matrix Q, such that the array has zero response within a certain width of interest, the optimization problem turns into
obj:minf(W)＝||W-W 0 || 2
S.T.W H e i ＝0,i＝1,2,3…n M≤n≤N
In the formula, e i Is the ith characteristic value of Q. Since W is a real number, the weight W can be obtained by solving through the lagrange multiplier method.
And 3.1, processing the signals stored in the device through a spatial filter to realize the weighting of the satellite signals, thereby forming a null in the expected direction to shield the signals in the direction so as to detect whether deceptive signals exist.
(2) And (2) acquiring a posture transfer matrix projected from an array antenna coordinate system to a geographic coordinate system according to the current carrier posture information calculated in the step 1, converting areas with different azimuth angles and elevation angles in the geographic coordinate system into the antenna coordinate system, and then performing null scanning on all directions of the space by using the method in the step (1), wherein if the null areas are formed by the elevation angles and the azimuth angle directions calculated in the step 2, signals of the satellite can be still received, and the situation that deceptive signals enter in other directions is indicated.
(3) The array antenna needs to control the antenna to point to the direction with the strongest satellite signal according to the combined navigation information to form the null, and the accurate pointing of the null area to the satellite is always kept when the carrier moves, which is the most key index of the method. In the tracking process, due to factors such as the precision of a sensor and an actuating mechanism, the antenna cannot accurately point to a theoretical position, so that the antenna points to deviate from a satellite, and the null region fails. Therefore, in practical operation, the null region can be continuously adjusted to point to the aligned satellite by using the cone scan tracking mode.
The principle of the antenna cone scanning tracking mode is as follows: suppose that the antenna deviates from the central axis OO 'by a small angle epsilon and rotates around the axis at a constant speed, OS' is the antenna beam axis, T is the track of the antenna making circular motion, and S is the actual direction of the satellite. If the antenna is not pointed to be correct, the size of theta and the strength of the received satellite signal are continuously changed in one scanning period, the position of the satellite is determined according to the theta and the change condition of the satellite signal strength, and the antenna is controlled to be adjusted. When the antenna is pointed and aligned with the satellite, the axis OS and the axis OO' coincide, and then θ no longer changes and the satellite signal strength is strongest.
The strength of the signal level received by the antenna at maximum gain (within half-power beamwidth) satisfies the following equation:
wherein P is 0 For maximum signal level received at maximum gain of the antenna, θ 1/2 For half power beamwidth, θ is the angle of maximum gain of the antenna, P (θ) is the signal level strength of the antenna at θ, and a is a constant coefficient, which is related to the antenna aperture and the received signal frequency. Half power beamwidth of
Wherein λ is the antenna receiving signal wavelength, f is the satellite signal frequency, D is the antenna aperture, and c is the propagation velocity of electromagnetic waves in space.
Let the relation between the voltage output by the array antenna and the received signal power be
U＝b·(P (θ) -P m )
Where b is the slope between the output voltage of the array antenna and the signal level, and Pm is the minimum level that can be detected by the receiver.
Order to
Can obtain the product
Wherein U is the magnitude of the voltage output at the antenna at a point of deviation from the maximum gain θ; um is the maximum voltage output by the antenna at the position where the antenna gain is maximum; the other parameter is an existing fixed parameter, so it can be seen that the level of fading at the maximum gain of the antenna is only related to the angle at which the antenna is pointed away from the maximum gain.
The cone scanning of the array antenna can be decomposed into an azimuth angle direction and a high-low angle direction, so that the antenna makes cosine motion in the azimuth angle direction and makes sine motion in the high-low angle direction, and the direction of a null region synthesized by the two is circular motion. The equations of motion for the azimuthal and elevation directions are as follows:
n＝1,2,3…N
wherein N is the number of points dividing the circle; p AZ 、P EL Is the center of a circular motion, P AZ(n) 、P AZ(n) Is any point on the circular motion of the antenna in the cone scanning process.
Setting the S point as a satellite position; o is the pointing position of the current antenna, and the deviation angle between the O point and the satellite is theta; epsilon is the circular scanning radius;
the included angle between the position of the antenna deviated from the satellite and the horizontal direction; um is any point on the circumferential trajectory T of the beam at which the signal level is of the magnitude U AGC ；
The included angle between the horizontal direction and the motion of the device is shown; AZ is in the horizontal direction, and EL is in the direction parallel to the horizontal direction; in triangle Δ SOU M In, from the cosine theorem
Combining the basic principle of conical scanning to obtain a signal level equation of any point of the beam on the circular motion track:
the equation only shows a maximum value and a minimum value in one scanning period; and the maximum value and the minimum value appear on two intersection points of a connecting line of the circumference center and the satellite position and the circumference; therefore, a new tracking adjustment method can be derived:
the voltage value measured by the point receiver closest to the satellite direction in the scanning process is set as U max The voltage value measured by the receiver at the farthest point is U min (ii) a The adjustment amount of the antenna in the azimuth angle can be obtained as
Substitution of theta and
then, there are
Whether the satellite falls within or out of the circular scanning range is judged by the magnitude of the minimum level detected by the receiver in one scanning period. When the satellite is just on the circular scanning track, the voltage output by the receiver is as follows:
U th ＝b·(P (2·ε) -P m )。
in summary, the adjustment formula of the antenna in the azimuth direction can be obtained as
Similarly, the adjustment amount in the pitch angle direction can be obtained as
By using the technology, a cone scanning tracking mode can be utilized in actual operation, the null region is continuously adjusted to point to the alignment satellite, signals are guaranteed to be stably shielded, and the signals can be conveniently continuously processed and judged in subsequent steps.
And 4, step 4: if a spoof signal exists in other directions detected in the step 3, the incoming wave direction of the spoof signal is measured by using a phase comparison method by using a signal obtained after a null region is formed in the direction of the true signal source. The method comprises the following specific steps:
firstly, according to the combined navigation information, the position and speed information of the satellite and the like, a null is formed in the incoming wave direction of the real satellite signal by utilizing a null technology to shield the signal in the direction, and the interference possibly caused by the real signal to the deceptive signal is shielded.
And secondly, detecting the incoming wave direction of the deceptive signal. The detection of the incoming wave direction of the deception signal can be realized by an array antenna attitude detection method. The array antenna attitude measurement method is realized by carrier phase difference measurement. For convenience of explanation, the analysis is started from the two-dimensional plane condition, and the principle of direction finding by phase difference measurement under the two-dimensional plane condition is shown in fig. 2.
In fig. 2, the antenna units A, B form a direction-finding baseline, and the straight distance is d, and since the distance from the satellite to the receiver is much greater than d, the angle between the incoming wave direction of the navigation signal and the normal direction of the baseline can be considered to be θ. If the signal wavelength is λ and a vertical line is drawn from antenna element B, then the phase difference Φ between the same signal arriving at antenna element A, B is expressed as:
φ＝2πd·sinθ/λ。
the value range of the phase difference phi is [ -pi, pi), if d > lambda/2, the above formula has the problem of phase ambiguity, namely, a plurality of different theta values generate corresponding relations with the same phi value to cause ambiguity of a direction finding result. Thus, after obtaining the phase difference measurement, the method of calculating the incoming wave direction is as follows:
to further solve the above equation, a short baseline recursive long baseline approach may be utilized: according to the formula, if d < + -. lambda/2, the absolute value of |2 pi d · sin theta/lambda | is less than pi obviously, and the phase ambiguity problem is ensured to be avoided. The base line length should be smaller in view of the presence of measurement noise. Since the peak-to-peak value of the carrier phase measurement noise is generally 0.1 cycle and the signal wavelength is about 20cm, the short base line length can be set to 6 cm. The error in the wave direction is now calculated to be about 19.5 deg. according to the above equation. And n base lines can be constructed by n +1 antennae on the same straight line, when the length of the base line exceeds 24cm, the error of the incoming wave direction is about 4.8 degrees, and the angle judgment requirement can be met. Summarizing the above, the following ambiguity recurrence relation can be obtained:
in the formula, N k The phase ambiguity corresponding to the length of the base line from the first antenna to the (k + 1) th antenna. D k Is the base length, phi, from the first antenna to the (k + 1) th antenna k Is the phase difference between the same signals received by the first antenna and the (k + 1) th antenna.
Therefore, if the phase ambiguity N k-1 Known, to find N k The following conditions need to be satisfied:
Δφ k the error is measured for the phase of the signal received by the first antenna and the (k + 1) th antenna. To obtain finally
The method is generalized to the three-dimensional case: measurements were performed with 2 baselines arranged perpendicular to each other on the platform, as shown in fig. 3. In fig. 3, AB and CD are two baselines perpendicular to each other, and the line-of-sight vectors MA, MB, MC, MD of the satellite signals arriving at the antenna can be approximately considered as being parallel to each other. MA, MB and AB are coplanar (MC, MD and CD alike), and the problem is reduced to the two-dimensional direction finding case above. In the antenna array coordinate system defined in the step 3, the projections of the unit sight line vector on the X axis and the Y axis can be respectively solved through a two-dimensional direction finding principle, and then the azimuth angle and the elevation angle of the satellite signal can be solved according to a trigonometric function relation.
And 5: and (4) comparing the altitude angle and the azimuth angle of the real signal and the deception signal obtained by calculation in the step (3) and the step (4) and shaping the directional diagram of the array antenna. The method comprises the following specific steps:
because the navigation satellite continuously moves according to the constellation diagram, the position of the navigation satellite continuously changes; in order to realize the position solution, the receiver needs to stably track at least 4 or more navigation satellite signals. Therefore, the satellite navigation array antenna needs to form multi-beam pointing, each beam points to one navigation satellite, the azimuth change of the satellite can be tracked in real time, and the beam pointing is adjusted to change along with the position of the satellite, so that the receiving effect of the ground navigation receiver on satellite signals is improved.
The adaptive beamformer is the main physical hardware that constitutes the spatial adaptive filtering. The topological structure of the planar array antenna is one of the key technologies of the adaptive beam former for processing signals; the equivalent area of the antenna array, the array interval and the array boundary distribution determine the characteristics of array digital beam forming; different array topologies have different spatial angular resolutions and symmetries. The current common planar arrays include square arrays, circular arrays, hexagonal arrays and the like.
Without loss of generality, the working principle of the adaptive beamformer is studied by taking a uniform linear array as an example, and a model thereof is shown in fig. 4. Assuming that each array element is isotropic, the distance between the array elements is d, and a receiving unit is connected behind each array element. The spatially incident signal s (t) enters the antenna at an angle thetaArray and received, x1(t), x 2 (t)、……、x N (t) is the output signal of N array element channels, w 1 、w 2 、、……、w N The weighted values output by the N array element channels are respectively the output y (t) of the array antenna after weighted summation.
Due to the difference of the spatial positions of the array elements and the difference of the arrival time of the incident signal at each array element, the signal x received by the array 1 (t)、x 2 (t)、……、x N (t) are phase-delayed with respect to each other by x 2 (t) and x 1 (t) phase delayed from phase
x 3 (t) and x 2 (t) is also phase retarded compared to
… … are analogized in that the delayed phase angle β is
β＝2πd·sinθ/λ
Where λ is the wavelength of the incident signal and d is the array element spacing. Then the array receives signal x 1 (t)、x 2 (t)、……、x N (t) is related to the incident signal s (t) as follows:
let nx 1 vectors x (t) and a (θ), which are also referred to as steering vectors of the array, represent the delay phase of the received signal and each array element of the array, respectively. Namely:
X(t)＝[x 1 (t)、x 2 (t)、......、x N (t)] T
in the case of a plurality of incident signals, M spatial incident signals s 1 (t)、s 2 (t)、......、s M (t) at an angle θ 1 、θ 2 、......、θ M Enter the antenna array and are received, order
S(t)＝[s 1 (t)、s 2 (t)、......、s M (t)] T
A＝[a 1 (t)、a 2 (t)、......、a M (t)] T
Where M guide vectors a 1 (t)、a 2 (t)、......、a M The matrix A formed by (t) is called a flow pattern matrix of the array. At this moment, there are
X(t)＝A·S(t)
Further, if a plurality of signals included in the incident signal include both a desired signal and an undesired interfering signal, and the number of desired signals and interfering signals can be respectively determined in advance, for example, if it is known in advance that the number of desired signals is M and the number of interfering signals is P, the above equation can be expressed as:
X(t)＝A·S(t)+B·J(t)
b is the steering vector a of P interference signals M+1 (t)、a M+2 (t)、……、a M+P (t) a prevalence matrix of J (t) P interference signals s M+1 (t)、s M+2 (t)、……、s M+P (t) a matrix of.
And the adaptive filter weights and adds the signals received by each channel of the array and outputs the signals. Let Nx 1 vector W represent the weighting vector, i.e.
W＝[w 1 、w 2 、……、w N ] T
Then the array output signal y (t) can be rewritten to
y(t)＝W H ·X(t)
As long as an appropriate weighting vector (optimal weight vector) is sought so that the output signal contains as many desired signal components as possible, the components of the interference signal and the noise signal can be minimized, and the effect can be measured by the directional diagram. The directional diagram is defined as the array response of a given array weight vector to signals with different angles, and the amplification factor of the array to incident signals in each direction in space is measured.
F(θ)＝W H ·a(θ)
The one-dimensional array case described above is generalized to the multi-dimensional case. Firstly, the topological structure selected by the method is a square array antenna. Uniformly distributed square lattices as shown in figure 5, the array elements are uniformly distributed at equal intervals along the X and Y axes. Without loss of generality, a common K unit of the array antenna is set, the distance between the units is d, the geometric center of the array is a reference origin, and the array units are all isotropic. Defining an array antenna airspace coordinate system as a spherical coordinate system with the origin at the geometric center of the array antenna, wherein the X-axis direction points to the right side of the array antenna, the Y-axis direction points to the front direction of the array antenna, and the Z-axis direction points to the antenna direction of the array antenna. Then, for the k-th unit antenna with the row number m and the column number n, the coordinate of the k-th unit antenna in the spatial domain coordinate system of the array antenna is set as (r) k θ k 0) Then its polar coordinates on the array distribution plane are shown in fig. 6 and can be expressed as:
for the m-th incident satellite signal, the direction cosine is only related to the incident signal angle, and the altitude angle and the azimuth angle are defined as
Then the direction cosine is
In summary, the delay τ of the m-th satellite signal received by the array element k mk Can be expressed as a function of the direction cosine
Thus, for a narrow band incident signal, the delay of the array element receiving signal can be approximately expressed as the phase of the carrier:
definition of
Is a steering vector of the signal m, then
The dimension is K:
then, defining the matrix of array weight coefficients as W and the complex weight coefficient omega mn Is the m-th row and n-th column element.
And is provided with
In summary, the synthesized beam pattern function of the antenna array is
Therefore, the beam pattern can be calculated according to the calculated altitude angle and azimuth angle, and deception signals from other directions are restrained.
Step 6: and (5) adjusting the beam direction according to the antenna directional pattern obtained by calculation in the step 5, and inhibiting the entering of deceptive signals. The method comprises the following specific steps:
for the deception jamming adopting a single antenna transmission mode, all the jamming satellite signals calculated in the step 4 are from the same direction; and for the deception jamming adopting the multi-antenna transmission mode, the satellite signal source direction is also different from that calculated in the step 3. Therefore, the method can effectively detect the condition that the single antenna transmits deception signals, and utilizes the optimal beam forming technology to form null points to suppress the null points.
And applying a zero point constraint condition to the array directional diagram to force the array directional diagram to form a null in a certain fixed incoming wave direction all the time. The zero point beam constraint condition is a pre-known fixed constraint condition, and the null direction is calculated in the step 4. The zero beam constraint algorithm is realized by the following steps:
1) and 4, calculating an array steering vector of the interference according to the incoming wave direction of the deception signal obtained in the step 4.
The calculation formula is as follows:
2) constructing a virtual correlation matrix by using the guide vector, wherein the calculation formula is as follows:
if there are multiple beam directions, the virtual correlation matrices formed by each steering vector need to be summed.
The number of beam pointing must be less than the number of antenna array elements.
In order to avoid matrix inversion from occurring ill-conditioned, a unit matrix may be loaded on the virtual correlation matrix.
R′ b ＝R b +δI
3) And calculating a static direction coefficient of zero point constraint, and solving a zero point constraint matrix filter by using the direction coefficient to synthesize and cancel the interference and the signal received by the reference antenna unit after delay matching, amplitude weighting and phase weighting, thereby achieving the purpose of eliminating the deception signal.
Wherein
The vector of constants is K x1, the first element is 1, and the other elements are 0. A zero-point beamforming constraint implementation block diagram is shown in fig. 7. The interference received by the auxiliary antenna unit is subjected to time delay matching, amplitude weighting and phase weighting, and is synthesized and cancelled with the signal received by the reference antenna unit. Through adjusting the time delay matching and the weighting weight coefficients of the amplitude and the phase, the mutual offset of deception signals is realized, and the normal work of a receiver is ensured.
The invention utilizes the redundant information of the integrated navigation system and combines with the array antenna hardware, and realizes the satellite navigation deception resisting method from the aspect of improving the algorithm of a receiver signal processing layer and a navigation positioning layer. The method can realize the detection and elimination of the deceptive interference signals, improves the adaptability of the navigation system to the complex environment and has wide application prospect.
The method and the system for preventing the satellite navigation spoofing of the array antenna based on the integrated navigation provided by the embodiment of the application are introduced in detail. The above description of the embodiments is only for the purpose of helping to understand the method of the present application and its core ideas; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there may be variations in the specific embodiments and the application scope, and in summary, the content of the present specification should not be construed as a limitation to the present application.
It is also noted that the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a good or system that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such good or system. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising an … …" does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a commodity or system that includes the element. "substantially" means within an acceptable error range, and a person skilled in the art can solve the technical problem within a certain error range to substantially achieve the technical effect.
The terminology used in the embodiments of the invention is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. As used in the examples of the present invention and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. In the above embodiments, the implementation may be wholly or partially realized by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When used in whole or in part, can be implemented in a computer program product that includes one or more computer instructions. When loaded or executed on a computer, cause the flow or functions according to embodiments of the invention to occur, in whole or in part. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a network of computers, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website site, computer, server, or data center to another website site, computer, server, or data center via wire (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.)). The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device, such as a server, a data center, etc., that includes one or more of the available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy Disk, hard Disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., Solid State Disk (SSD)), among others.
Claims (10)
1. An array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting method based on combined navigation is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, solving the current carrier attitude according to the angular rate and specific force information output by the inertia measurement unit and/or the magnetic flux information output by the magnetic strength measurement equipment;
s2, calculating real direction vectors of all current visible satellites in a geographic system, projecting the real direction vectors into an array antenna coordinate system according to the carrier attitude obtained in S1, and calculating the altitude angle and the azimuth angle of the visible satellites relative to the array antenna coordinate system;
s3, sampling satellite signals of the current epoch by adopting a digital frequency storage technology, storing the satellite signals after down-conversion, continuously adjusting the direction of a zero point by utilizing a direction zero setting technology of an array antenna, and detecting whether deceptive signals enter or not; if not, the anti-cheating operation is finished, otherwise, the next step is carried out;
s4, determining the incoming wave direction of the deception signal;
s5, shaping an array antenna directional pattern;
and S6, adjusting the beam direction according to the antenna pattern obtained in S5, and inhibiting the entrance of deceptive signals.
2. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method of claim 1, wherein the step S4 includes: and measuring the incoming wave direction of the deception signal by using a phase comparison method by utilizing a signal obtained after forming a null region in the direction of a real signal source.
3. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method of claim 1, wherein the step S1 includes:
s11, judging whether the criterion is met
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is the acceleration output by an accelerometer in an inertial measurement unit, g is the local gravity, beta 1 Is a preset acceleration threshold; if yes, judging that the carrier is positionedA low-acceleration maneuvering state, and resolving the carrier attitude in the state; otherwise, entering the next step;
s12, judging whether the horizontal acceleration meets the criterion f H ＜β 2 Wherein f is H Is the horizontal acceleration modulus, beta 2 Is a preset horizontal acceleration threshold; if so, judging that the carrier is in a low-acceleration maneuvering state, and resolving the carrier attitude according to the state; otherwise, entering the next step;
and S13, judging whether the carrier has continuous turning or circling motion by combining the output of the gyroscope in the inertia measurement unit, and if the carrier does not have turning or circling, determining that the error of the misalignment angle is large and needing to correct the attitude.
4. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method of claim 3, wherein the correction of the attitude in the step S13 comprises: and correcting the horizontal misalignment angle according to the horizontal specific force, and correcting the orientation misalignment angle according to the magnetic flux information.
5. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the correction of the azimuth misalignment angle according to the magnetic flux information specifically comprises: the magnetic heading is substituted for the azimuth.
6. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the content of the projection of the true direction vector of the visible satellite in the geographic system calculated in the step S2 is specifically: determining the current visible satellite number according to the current carrier position information output by the integrated navigation system, the current time maintained by the local clock and the preloaded satellite almanac; and then calculating the projection of the real direction vectors of all the current visible satellites in the geographic system according to the satellite position information solved and calculated by the almanac.
7. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method of claim 1, wherein the step S4 for determining the specific content of the incoming wave direction of the spoofed signal comprises the following steps: selecting a real signal, carrying out null operation in the source direction of the real signal, and determining the incoming wave direction of the deceptive signal by utilizing a phase comparison method according to information obtained by the null operation.
8. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing method of claim 7, wherein the selected true signal is a satellite signal of a current epoch.
9. The integrated navigation-based array antenna satellite navigation spoofing resisting method of claim 1, wherein the step S5 includes: and forming the directional diagram of the array antenna according to the altitude and the azimuth of the satellite signal of the current epoch in the step S3 and the altitude and the azimuth of the deceptive signal in the step S4.
10. An array antenna satellite navigation deception resisting system based on integrated navigation is characterized by comprising an inertial measurement unit, magnetic strength measurement equipment and a processing module, wherein the inertial measurement unit and the magnetic strength measurement equipment are connected with the processing module;
the processing module comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 when executing the computer program.
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| CN117250646A (en) * | 2023-11-17 | 2023-12-19 | 毫厘智能科技(江苏)有限公司 | Direction finding method and device based on chip, chip module and storage medium |
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| CN117452443B (en) * | 2023-12-22 | 2024-03-22 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method and device based on double threshold judgment |
| CN117572465B (en) * | 2024-01-16 | 2024-03-26 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Text layout optimization method and system for single-frequency SBAS authentication service |
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| CN108241159B (en) * | 2017-12-24 | 2021-12-28 | 北京卫星信息工程研究所 | Anti-deception jamming method based on bionic combined navigation assistance |
| CN109581426B (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2021-04-23 | 帆美航空科技(北京)有限公司 | Method, system, equipment and storage medium for identifying GNSS abnormal signal |
| CN112902967A (en) * | 2021-01-31 | 2021-06-04 | 南京理工大学 | Anti-cheating navigation method based on residual error chi-square-improved sequential probability ratio |
| CN113031022B (en) * | 2021-04-25 | 2022-04-22 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Multi-dimensional domain satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on beam null pointing |
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| CN117250646A (en) * | 2023-11-17 | 2023-12-19 | 毫厘智能科技(江苏)有限公司 | Direction finding method and device based on chip, chip module and storage medium |
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