CN108241159B - Anti-deception jamming method based on bionic combined navigation assistance - Google Patents
Anti-deception jamming method based on bionic combined navigation assistance Download PDFInfo
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- CN108241159B CN108241159B CN201711413527.7A CN201711413527A CN108241159B CN 108241159 B CN108241159 B CN 108241159B CN 201711413527 A CN201711413527 A CN 201711413527A CN 108241159 B CN108241159 B CN 108241159B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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Abstract
The invention provides a deception jamming resisting method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance, which comprises the following steps of: carrier navigation information acquired in real time through multi-source data fusion by utilizing bionic combined navigation is combined with satellite ephemeris in satellite navigation messages, and auxiliary information for anti-interference detection is calculated and acquired; carrying out deception jamming detection processing on the GNSS baseband signal processing part, and detecting, identifying and eliminating deception jamming signals; message delay detection is carried out in the GNSS information processing part, and whether regenerative deception jamming exists in the deception jamming is detected; and (4) carrying out deception detection again in the GNSS positioning resolving part, and detecting, identifying and eliminating deception jamming signals. The navigation information acquired by the method is not influenced by the external environment, and whether a deceptive jamming signal exists or not is judged efficiently by utilizing the auxiliary information based on the bionic combined navigation, so that the detection and the inhibition of the deceptive jamming are realized, the applicability of the deceptive jamming resisting algorithm is expanded, and the reliability of the system is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of satellite application, and relates to a deception jamming resisting method based on bionic combined navigation assistance, which can be used for normal capturing and tracking of satellite signals in a complex jamming environment.
Background
Due to the external complex electromagnetic interference environment, the satellite navigation system itself is easily affected by various types of radio frequency interference. In particular, in electronic military countermeasures, the targeted interference method has a greater impact on the navigation receiver. At present, deceptive jamming is becoming a major threat in the field of satellite navigation. The deceptive jamming is that under the condition that the receiver seems to work normally, false satellite signals preferentially control a tracking loop of the navigation receiver, the receiver locks wrong satellite signals and then resolves false navigation data, and therefore wrong position information is calculated.
The main methods for resisting the deceptive jamming at present are divided into three categories: firstly, in the satellite navigation itself, beams of useful signals are formed by the multi-antenna array technology. This type of receiver can null towards the source of the spoof, suppressing the adverse effects of the spoof. Secondly, algorithms such as residual signal detection, autonomous integrity monitoring and the like are added in a satellite navigation algorithm, and deception jamming signals are detected during satellite signal processing; and thirdly, assisting the anti-interference detection of the satellite navigation signal through external auxiliary information, for example, performing the anti-interference detection in the satellite signal capturing stage through INS resolving result information in the GNSS/INS integrated navigation system.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problem that the traditional satellite navigation anti-deception jamming method needs a plurality of antenna array elements, a complex algorithm and poor auxiliary reliability at a single level of satellite signal processing, and completes the detection of the deception jamming.
The technical means for solving the problems are as follows: the invention provides a deception jamming resisting method based on bionic combined navigation assistance, which comprises the following steps of:
carrier navigation information acquired in real time by a multi-source data fusion method through bionic combined navigation is combined with satellite ephemeris data in navigation messages, and auxiliary information for anti-interference detection is calculated and acquired;
according to the auxiliary information provided by the bionic integrated navigation, deception jamming detection processing is carried out on a GNSS baseband signal processing part, and deception jamming signals obtained through detection are removed;
according to the auxiliary information removed by the GNSS baseband signal processing part, carrying out message delay detection in the GNSS information processing part to detect whether regenerative deception interference in deception interference exists or not;
and carrying out deception detection again in the GNSS positioning resolving part according to the auxiliary information processed by the GNSS information processing part, and removing the detected deception jamming signals.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the carrier navigation information obtained in real time by using the biomimetic integrated navigation includes auxiliary time information, auxiliary position information, auxiliary speed information, and auxiliary attitude information.
Further, as a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the assistance information includes pseudo-range information of a satellite, a code phase value of a signal, and assistance code rate information.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the pseudo-range information of the satellite is calculated by carrier position information in the auxiliary information provided by the biomimetic integrated navigation and position information in satellite ephemeris in the navigation message.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the code phase value of the signal is obtained by the following steps:
obtaining signal propagation time according to the pseudo-range information and the light speed, and obtaining signal emission time according to signal receiving time processing recorded in the GNSS baseband signal processing part; and processing according to the signal transmitting time to obtain the code phase value of the signal.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the auxiliary code rate information is obtained by adopting the following steps:
providing carrier position and speed information in the auxiliary information and position and speed information in satellite ephemeris in a navigation message by bionic integrated navigation, and calculating to obtain auxiliary Doppler information of the carrier through a Doppler calculation formula; and obtains the auxiliary code rate information through the ratio of the signal carrier rate to the code rate.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the method performs deception jamming detection processing in a GNSS baseband signal processing section, and includes: multi-peak anti-interference detection, power anti-interference detection, Doppler frequency and code rate consistency detection, emission time detection and loop signal trace detection.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the method for performing text delay detection in a GNSS information processing section includes:
and demodulating satellite signal modulation time according to the navigation message, comparing the satellite signal modulation time with the signal modulation time calculated through the auxiliary information, wherein if the satellite signal modulation time is the same as the signal modulation time, the signal is a real signal, and if the satellite signal modulation time is different from the signal modulation time, the signal is an interference signal which is transmitted by delaying a regenerative interference signal.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the method performs spoofing detection again in the GNSS positioning solution part, and includes: autonomous integrity detection or position trace and rationality detection, combined navigation sequential filtering detection, time trace and rationality detection, inter-system consistency detection, and clock consistency detection.
Further, as a preferred technical solution of the present invention, the detecting of the position mark and the rationality specifically includes:
positioning is finished through GNSS, and calculation is carried out according to the actual carrier information obtained through positioning calculation and the actual carrier position cached at the last moment to obtain an error;
and comparing the error with a preset threshold value, and judging whether the information of actual calculation and auxiliary calculation changes or not according to the comparison result.
The invention has the advantages that the bionic combined navigation assistance-based anti-deception jamming method provided by the invention can provide accurate attitude and speed information without being interfered by external electromagnetic environment, can provide accurate navigation information such as position, speed, attitude and the like by being combined with inertial navigation, can provide accurate assistance information by being combined with information such as ephemeris and the like of a satellite, and establishes a reasonable hypothesis testing model when a baseband signal processing part, an information processing part and a positioning resolving part of a receiver process GNSS satellite signals by comparing the assistance information with the information generated by the satellite and by using the assistance information based on the bionic combined navigation, and adopts a proper hypothesis testing method, whether deception jamming signals exist is judged efficiently, detection and suppression of deception jamming are further achieved, detection, recognition and elimination of the deception jamming are achieved, the defect that a plurality of antenna array elements and a complex algorithm which are needed by traditional satellite navigation and are used for resisting the deception jamming are poor in auxiliary reliability at a single level of satellite signal processing is overcome, applicability of a deception jamming resisting algorithm is expanded, system reliability is improved, and the method is more suitable for a complex deception jamming environment.
Therefore, the anti-deception jamming method has the following characteristics:
(1) the invention integrates various navigation data through self-navigation modes such as bionics, inertia and the like which are not influenced by the surrounding electromagnetic environment, and provides auxiliary information with high precision and strong reliability.
(2) In the satellite signal processing process, the multi-azimuth deception jamming signal detection, identification and elimination are carried out in the three processing processes of baseband signal processing, information processing and positioning calculation, so that the applicability of the deception jamming resisting algorithm is expanded, and the system reliability is improved.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the principle of the anti-spoofing jamming method based on the bionic integrated navigation assistance of the invention.
Fig. 2 is a working schematic diagram of the combined navigation information extraction module according to the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of an auxiliary baseband processing module according to the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of an auxiliary signal processing module according to the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an assisted positioning solution module according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the invention provides a bionic integrated navigation assistance-based anti-deception jamming method, and a system based on the method can comprise an integrated navigation information extraction module, an auxiliary baseband processing module, an auxiliary signal processing module and an auxiliary positioning resolving module. And a navigation information extraction module is used for extracting navigation information provided by the bionic integrated navigation to assist the GNSS navigation in resisting deception jamming. Specifically, the method of the present invention comprises the steps of:
step 1, firstly, a navigation information extraction module is used for extracting navigation information provided by the bionic integrated navigation. The principle is as shown in fig. 2, carrier navigation information obtained in real time by bionic integrated navigation is combined with data such as satellite ephemeris in the navigation message, and auxiliary information for anti-interference detection is obtained through calculation.
The bionic integrated navigation composed of various navigation modes such as polarized light navigation, optical flow navigation, inertial navigation, geomagnetic navigation and the like is utilized to obtain various navigation information of different types, and then the information is subjected to multi-source data fusion to obtain accurate time, position, speed, attitude information and the like. The navigation information extraction module utilizes auxiliary information provided by the bionic integrated navigation and related information obtained by the satellite base band part to jointly calculate information required by anti-interference detection, and the specific process is as follows:
(1) the information of the carrier is obtained by the bionic integrated navigation and is used as auxiliary information, namely auxiliary time information, auxiliary position information, auxiliary speed information and auxiliary attitude information;
(2) since the satellite ephemeris is valid within 4 hours centered on the reference time, the satellite ephemeris data at the previous time can be used to calculate the current time; the clock drift of the same GNSS module changes little in a short time and can be regarded as a constant value, so that the clock drift data of the GNSS module at the previous moment is extracted as the clock drift data.
(3) And calculating the pseudo-range information of the satellite by using the position information of the satellite in the satellite ephemeris and the carrier position information provided by the bionic integrated navigation.
(4) By using the pseudo-range information and the light velocity, the signal propagation time can be calculated and processed, and the signal transmitting time can be calculated and processed according to the signal receiving time recorded in the receiver. According to the signal transmitting time, the code phase value of the signal can be obtained through calculation and processing.
(5) The method comprises the steps of utilizing position and speed information of a carrier and position and speed information of a satellite in satellite ephemeris, calculating auxiliary Doppler information of the carrier through a Doppler calculation formula, calculating a ratio of carrier speed to code speed according to signal original carrier speed and code speed, obtaining auxiliary code speed information through the ratio of the corresponding signal carrier speed to code speed and the auxiliary Doppler information because the ratio of the carrier speed to the code speed is constant and does not change along with Doppler change, and obtaining a curve graph of the Doppler and code speed information through caching to obtain a change trend of the Doppler and code speed information.
And 2, carrying out deception jamming detection processing on a GNSS baseband signal processing part by using an auxiliary baseband processing module according to auxiliary information provided by the bionic combined navigation so as to obtain a deception jamming signal detection result, and detecting, identifying and eliminating the deception jamming signal. The principle is shown in fig. 3.
Preferably, the method performs deception jamming detection processing in the GNSS baseband signal processing section, and may include: multi-peak anti-interference detection, power anti-interference detection, Doppler frequency and code rate consistency detection, emission time detection and loop signal trace detection. The specific detection process is as follows:
(1) the code phase information calculated by the navigation information extraction module is used for setting the range of the real signal code phase, and when code correlation operation is carried out, if deception jamming signals exist and a plurality of correlation peak values exist in the correlation operation, only the correlation peak in the range set by the auxiliary code is allowed to be captured. I.e. this correlation peak is a true signal and the other correlation peaks are spoofed signals. And completing the multi-peak anti-interference detection.
(2) The power of the spoofed interference will typically be greater than the power of the true signal received by the receiver. The higher the power, the higher the probability that spurious interference aligned with the true signal will induce the receiver in the acquisition tracking stage. However, due to the limitations of the satellite transmission power and the atmospheric propagation path loss, the power of the GPS signal received by the receiver has a reasonable range. And setting a threshold value through the approximate power range of the actual signal, wherein the actual signal power is within the threshold value range. And completing the anti-interference detection.
(3) Obtaining a Doppler frequency shift measured value by frequency discrimination and phase discrimination of an intermediate frequency signal obtained by down-converting a local carrier and an original signal in a tracking loop, obtaining a code rate by a ratio of a carrier rate and a code rate of a corresponding signal, performing subtraction with the Doppler frequency shift and the code rate cached at the previous moment, caching the difference value, and obtaining a change rate of the Doppler frequency shift and the code rate; the Doppler frequency shift measured value obtained through auxiliary information calculation is processed in the same way as the code rate, if the cache difference value of the actual signal has the same sign as the cache difference value of the auxiliary information, and the error of the two difference values is within the set error range, the change trend of the Doppler frequency shift and the code rate is correct, and the signal is a real signal. Thereby completing the consistency detection of Doppler frequency and code rate.
(4) The baseband signal processing part constructs signal transmitting time through the content of the navigation message after frame synchronization, and compares the signal transmitting time with the signal transmitting time calculated by the auxiliary information, if the time is the same, the signal is a real signal; if the time is different, the signal is an interference signal. And finishing emission time detection.
(5) And recording the working states of the code ring and the carrier ring in a program, and if the code rate and the Doppler frequency shift calculated by the auxiliary information do not change greatly, jumping the loop for multiple times to show that interference signals possibly exist in the loop, thereby completing the trace detection of the loop signals.
And 3, carrying out message delay detection in the GNSS information processing part by using an auxiliary information processing module according to the auxiliary information rejected by the GNSS baseband signal processing part in the step 2, and detecting whether regenerative deception in deceptive interference exists.
The principle is as shown in fig. 4, the time when the satellite signal is modulated is demodulated through the navigation message, and compared with the signal modulation time calculated through the auxiliary information, if the time is the same, the signal is a real signal, and if the time is different, the signal is an interference signal which is transmitted by delaying the regenerative interference signal.
And 4, carrying out deception detection again on the GNSS positioning resolving part by using an auxiliary positioning resolving module according to the auxiliary information of the bionic integrated navigation processed by the GNSS information processing part in the step 3 to obtain a deception jamming signal detection result, and detecting, identifying and eliminating the deception jamming signal, wherein the principle is shown in figure 5.
Preferably, the method performs spoof detection again in the GNSS positioning solution part, including: autonomous integrity detection, position trace and rationality detection, combined navigation sequential filtering detection, time trace and rationality detection, inter-system consistency detection and clock consistency detection.
And carrying out deception detection again, wherein the specific process is as follows:
(1) and after the navigation message is demodulated, detecting the composition of the received satellite signal according to the length, the updating time and the rationality of each parameter of the navigation message, and finishing the autonomous integrity detection.
(2) After the positioning is finished through the GNSS module, the position of the carrier calculated according to the positioning is differenced with the position of the carrier cached at the last moment to obtain the position change rate of unit time, and the position change rate is cached; then comparing the position change rate with the position change rate cached in the previous epoch, and detecting whether the symbols are the same or not and whether the numerical value is changed too much so as to cause discontinuous position change; and performing the same processing through auxiliary information, respectively comparing the signs and the sizes of the calculated actual position and the auxiliary position, and the calculated position change rate and the auxiliary position change rate, and calculating whether the error is smaller than a preset threshold value, wherein if the information change of the actual calculation and the auxiliary calculation is the same, and the numerical error is smaller than the preset threshold value, the position data is reasonable, and the position trace and the rationality detection are completed.
(3) When the combined navigation sequential filtering processing is carried out, the statistical value expectation and the variance of the system covariance matrix are calculated by utilizing a window function with the length of N, whether the system covariance matrix has larger discontinuous change is detected according to the size of the expectation and the variance, whether an interference signal exists is judged, and the combined navigation sequential filtering detection is completed.
(4) When the positioning is resolved, the positioning time is firstly compared with the time of the previous epoch after being resolved, and whether the time interval is correct or not is detected; and then comparing the time with the positioning time calculated by the auxiliary information to detect whether the time is accurate or not, and finishing the time trace and the rationality detection.
(5) When positioning resolving is carried out, the pseudo range and the carrier phase of satellite signals in Beidou and GPS systems of each channel are respectively calculated, the change rate of the pseudo range and the carrier phase is obtained by carrying out subtraction with the previous time, the change consistency of the pseudo range and the carrier phase change among different channels of the same system is determined by comparing the sign and the value change of the change rate of the pseudo range and the carrier phase among different channels of the same system, the change of the pseudo range and the carrier phase among different systems can be judged abnormally, interference signals are detected, and the detection of the consistency among the systems is completed.
(6) When positioning calculation is carried out, system time contained in satellite signals in the Beidou satellite and GPS systems in each satellite signal receiving channel is calculated respectively, time comparison among the systems is carried out firstly, then conversion is carried out according to time errors among different systems of the Beidou satellite and GPS systems, time comparison among different systems is carried out, interference signals are detected, and clock consistency detection is completed.
Finally, various deception detection methods are carried out to detect and eliminate the interference caused by deception interference signals, and the accurate positioning of the system is realized.
In summary, the invention provides a deception jamming resisting method based on bionic combined navigation assistance, a bionic combined navigation system based on polarized light navigation/optical flow navigation/geomagnetic navigation/inertial navigation is an autonomous navigation system, the obtained navigation information is not influenced by external environment, real-time and reliable carrier position, speed and attitude information can be obtained, and satellite deception jamming can be detected and identified by using the information. By utilizing auxiliary information based on bionic integrated navigation, when a baseband signal processing part, an information processing part and a positioning resolving part of a receiver process GNSS satellite signals, a reasonable mathematical detection method of hypothesis testing is established, whether deceptive interference signals exist is judged efficiently, and then detection and inhibition of deceptive interference are realized. The applicability of the anti-spoofing interference algorithm is expanded, and the system reliability is improved.
It should be noted that the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be understood that various changes and modifications can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the technical idea of the present invention, and these changes and modifications are included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A deception jamming resisting method based on bionic combined navigation assistance is characterized by comprising the following steps:
carrier navigation information acquired in real time by a multi-source data fusion method through bionic combined navigation is combined with satellite ephemeris data in navigation messages, and auxiliary information for anti-interference detection is calculated and acquired;
according to the auxiliary information provided by the bionic integrated navigation, deception jamming detection processing is carried out on a GNSS baseband signal processing part, and deception jamming signals obtained through detection are removed;
after the deception jamming signals are removed from the GNSS baseband signal processing part, message delay detection is carried out in the GNSS information processing part according to the auxiliary information, and whether the regenerative deception jamming exists in the deception jamming is detected;
after the GNSS information processing part processes the auxiliary information, the deception detection is carried out again in the GNSS positioning resolving part according to the auxiliary information, and the detected deception jamming signals are removed.
2. The anti-deception jamming method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance of claim 1, wherein the carrier navigation information obtained in real time by utilizing bionic integrated navigation includes assistance time information, assistance position information, assistance speed information and assistance attitude information.
3. The anti-spoofing interference method based on bionic combined navigation assistance of claim 1, wherein the assistance information comprises pseudo-range information of a satellite, a code phase value of a signal, and assistance code rate information.
4. The anti-spoofing interference method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance of claim 3, wherein the pseudo-range information of the satellite is calculated from carrier position information in carrier navigation information provided by the bionic integrated navigation and position information in satellite ephemeris in the navigation message.
5. The anti-spoofing interference method based on bionic combined navigation assistance of claim 3, wherein the code phase value of the signal is obtained by the following steps:
obtaining signal propagation time according to the pseudo-range information and the light speed, and obtaining signal emission time according to signal receiving time processing recorded in the GNSS baseband signal processing part; and processing according to the signal transmitting time to obtain the code phase value of the signal.
6. The anti-spoof interference method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance of claim 3, wherein the auxiliary code rate information is obtained by the following steps:
providing carrier position and speed information in carrier navigation information and satellite position and speed information in satellite ephemeris in navigation messages by bionic integrated navigation, and calculating to obtain auxiliary Doppler information of the carrier through a Doppler calculation formula; and calculating to obtain the ratio of the carrier rate to the code rate according to the original carrier rate and the code rate of the signal, and obtaining auxiliary code rate information according to the ratio of the carrier rate to the code rate of the signal and the auxiliary Doppler information.
7. The anti-spoofing interference method based on bionic combined navigation assistance of claim 1, wherein the method performs spoofing interference detection processing in a GNSS baseband signal processing part, and comprises the following steps: multi-peak anti-interference detection, power anti-interference detection, Doppler frequency and code rate consistency detection, emission time detection and loop signal trace detection.
8. The anti-deception jamming method based on bionic combined navigation assistance of claim 1, wherein the method performs text delay detection in a GNSS information processing part, and comprises the following steps:
and demodulating satellite signal modulation time according to the navigation message, comparing the satellite signal modulation time with the signal modulation time calculated through the auxiliary information, wherein if the satellite signal modulation time is the same as the signal modulation time, the signal is a real signal, and if the satellite signal modulation time is different from the signal modulation time, the signal is an interference signal which is delayed and emitted by a regenerative deception interference signal in the deception interference.
9. The anti-spoofing interference method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance of claim 1, wherein the method carries out spoofing detection again in a GNSS positioning resolving part, and comprises the following steps: autonomous integrity detection or position trace and rationality detection, combined navigation sequential filtering detection, time trace and rationality detection, inter-system consistency detection, and clock consistency detection.
10. The anti-deception jamming method based on bionic integrated navigation assistance according to claim 9, wherein the detection of the position trace and the rationality specifically comprises:
positioning is finished through GNSS, and calculation is carried out according to the carrier position information calculated by positioning and the carrier position information cached at the last moment to obtain an error;
and comparing the error with a preset threshold value, and judging whether the information of actual solution of positioning completed by the GNSS and auxiliary calculation performed by the auxiliary information changes or not according to the comparison result.
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