CN114974621A - Method and system for processing uniform boron dilution accident of nuclear power station - Google Patents

Method and system for processing uniform boron dilution accident of nuclear power station Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114974621A
CN114974621A CN202210567631.6A CN202210567631A CN114974621A CN 114974621 A CN114974621 A CN 114974621A CN 202210567631 A CN202210567631 A CN 202210567631A CN 114974621 A CN114974621 A CN 114974621A
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signal
over
power
judging whether
preset
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焦振营
吴月军
刘志云
王振营
马廷伟
黄宇
王泰科
胡明信
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China General Nuclear Power Corp
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
CGN Power Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
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China General Nuclear Power Corp
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
CGN Power Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
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Priority to CN202210567631.6A priority Critical patent/CN114974621A/en
Publication of CN114974621A publication Critical patent/CN114974621A/en
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G21NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21CNUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C7/00Control of nuclear reaction
    • G21C7/06Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section
    • G21C7/22Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section by displacement of a fluid or fluent neutron-absorbing material, e.g. by adding neutron-absorbing material to the coolant
    • GPHYSICS
    • G21NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21CNUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C17/00Monitoring; Testing ; Maintaining
    • G21C17/10Structural combination of fuel element, control rod, reactor core, or moderator structure with sensitive instruments, e.g. for measuring radioactivity, strain
    • GPHYSICS
    • G21NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21CNUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C17/00Monitoring; Testing ; Maintaining
    • G21C17/10Structural combination of fuel element, control rod, reactor core, or moderator structure with sensitive instruments, e.g. for measuring radioactivity, strain
    • G21C17/108Measuring reactor flux
    • GPHYSICS
    • G21NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21CNUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C7/00Control of nuclear reaction
    • G21C7/36Control circuits
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02EREDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E30/00Energy generation of nuclear origin
    • Y02E30/30Nuclear fission reactors

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Plasma & Fusion (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Chemical Kinetics & Catalysis (AREA)
  • Monitoring And Testing Of Nuclear Reactors (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a method and a system for processing a nuclear power station uniform boron dilution accident, wherein the processing method comprises the following steps: acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS (distributed control system), and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not; acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition; the overtemperature and overpower actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or when the detection signal meets a second preset condition, an isolation signal is generated so as to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system. By implementing the technical scheme of the invention, under the running state of the unit and the manual control mode of the control rod, the automatic protection function of the mis-dilution accident can be realized, the response speed of the unit to the mis-dilution accident is improved, the human failure generated in the process of handling the mis-dilution accident by an operator is effectively reduced, and the running safety and the economical efficiency of the nuclear power plant are greatly improved.

Description

Method and system for processing uniform boron dilution accident of nuclear power station
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of nuclear power safety, in particular to a method and a system for processing a nuclear power station uniform boron dilution accident.
Background
The main function of the chemical and volume control system is to regulate the concentration of boron solution to control the reactivity of the reactor, but when the chemical and volume control system or other systems are in failure or human error, a loop can accidentally introduce boric acid solution or demineralized water with lower boron concentration, and the dilution sources enter the reactor through the chemical and volume control system, so that boron dilution accidents causing reactive runaway can be caused, and great threat is brought to the safety belt of the reactor.
According to the speed of reactivity introduction, the boron dilution accident can be divided into two types of uniform boron dilution accident (slow dilution accident) and non-uniform boron dilution (fast dilution accident), wherein the uniform boron dilution accident is as follows: the boric acid solution or clear water with lower boron concentration is fully stirred and mixed with the coolant of the primary loop before entering the reactor core, so that the boron concentration of the primary loop is gradually and uniformly reduced; the non-uniform boron dilution accident is: because the primary circuit does not have enough forced circulation, boric acid solution or clear water with lower boron concentration accumulates in the pump shell of the main pump, when the main pump is started again, low-boron water clusters or clear water clusters enter the reactor core, and the fuel of the reactor core is rapidly damaged. For non-uniform boron dilution accidents, there are usually only preventive measures, because the clear water or low-boron water entering the core quickly can cause the fuel assemblies in the core to melt locally and instantly, which causes serious consequences, and therefore, the accidents must be avoided from the design point of view. For the even boron dilution accident, after clean water or low boron water enters a primary loop, the clean water or the low boron water and a primary loop coolant (boron water meeting the requirement) are forcibly circulated and uniformly stirred by a main pump and the like, the damage to the reactor core is not quickly diluted so quickly, the effect is gradually accumulated, and therefore the error dilution of the type can avoid the deterioration of the unit state through detection and intervention.
At present, aiming at the uniform boron dilution accident of a nuclear power station, a control rod is mostly detected and protected in an automatic control mode under the power operation working condition, namely, the actual rod position value of the control rod is obtained according to a measurement signal provided by a rod position control system, and whether protection is needed or not is determined according to the actual rod position value. However, when the control rods are in the manual control mode, the actual rod position values of the control rods cannot be directly obtained, and thus the core cannot be effectively protected.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problem that the misclute accident in the prior art cannot be applied to a control rod manual control mode, and provides a method and a system for processing a nuclear power station uniform boron dilution accident.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: a method for treating a uniform boron dilution accident of a nuclear power station is constructed, and comprises the following steps:
s10, acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system, and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not;
s20, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition;
and S30, when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, generating an isolation signal to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
and when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, generating an indication signal, and outputting uniform boron dilution accident indication information according to the indication signal.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
and after the uniform boron dilution accident treatment is finished, receiving a reset signal input by a user, and restoring the chemical and volume control system to a normal operation state according to the reset signal.
Preferably, the determining whether the over-temperature and over-power measured signal meets a first preset condition includes:
acquiring an over-temperature difference setting value, judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-temperature difference condition or not according to the over-temperature difference setting value, and generating a first intermediate signal when the over-temperature difference condition is met;
acquiring an over-power difference setting value, judging whether the over-temperature over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-power difference condition or not according to the over-power difference setting value, and generating a second intermediate signal when the over-power difference condition is met;
performing a logical or operation on the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal, and generating a third intermediate signal;
acquiring a shutdown signal, and performing logical negation operation on the shutdown signal to generate a fourth intermediate signal;
and performing logical AND operation on the third intermediate signal and the fourth intermediate signal, and generating a first trigger signal.
Preferably, the neutron fluence detector comprises a middle-range neutron fluence detector and a power-range neutron fluence detector; furthermore, it is possible to provide a liquid crystal display device,
the step S20 includes:
s21, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, acquiring the current power of the reactor according to the detection signal, judging whether the current power is smaller than a power threshold value or not, and if so, executing S22; if not, go to step S23;
s22, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the middle range meets a preset low-power condition or not, and generating a second trigger signal when the detection signal meets the low-power condition;
and S23, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range meets a preset high-power condition or not, and generating a third trigger signal when the detection signal meets the high-power condition.
Preferably, the step S22 includes:
s221, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector with a first setting value, judging whether a preset first low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a second trigger signal when the first low-power condition is met;
s222, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a second setting value, judging whether a preset second low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a fourth trigger signal when the second low-power condition is met;
the step S23 includes:
and comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a third setting value, judging whether a preset high-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a third trigger signal when the high-power condition is met, wherein the third setting value is larger than the second setting value.
Preferably, the number of the intermediate-range neutron fluence detectors is plural, and the intermediate-range neutron fluence detectors are dispersedly arranged in a plurality of channels outside the core, and the step S221 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of each intermediate range neutron fluence detector of the channel is greater than the first setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the first setting value in the channel is greater than a first preset value, and if so, generating a fifth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel;
and judging whether the number of the channels with the fifth intermediate signals in the plurality of channels is greater than a second preset value or not, and if so, generating a second trigger signal.
Preferably, the number of the power range neutron fluence detectors is a plurality, and the detectors are dispersedly arranged in a plurality of channels outside the reactor core, and furthermore,
the step S222 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the second setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the second setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a sixth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel;
judging whether the number of channels with the sixth intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value or not, and if so, generating a fourth trigger signal;
the step S223 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the third setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the third setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a seventh intermediate signal corresponding to the channel
And judging whether the number of the channels with the seventh intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value, and if so, generating a third trigger signal.
Preferably, the step S30 includes:
performing a logical OR operation on the first trigger signal, the second trigger signal, the third trigger signal, and the fourth trigger signal to generate an isolation signal, and isolating a dilution source by a chemical and volumetric control system.
The invention also constructs a system for treating the uniform boron dilution accident of the nuclear power station, which comprises the following components:
the first judgment module is used for acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not;
the second judgment module is used for acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside the reactor core and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition;
and the isolation signal generation module is used for generating an isolation signal when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or the detection signal meets a second preset condition so as to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
and the output module is used for generating an indication signal when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, and outputting uniform boron dilution accident indication information according to the indication signal.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
and the resetting module is used for receiving a resetting signal input by a user after the uniform boron dilution accident treatment is finished, and enabling the chemical and volume control system to be restored to a normal operation state according to the resetting signal.
According to the technical scheme provided by the invention, when a nuclear power plant has a mistaken dilution accident (only aiming at a uniform boron dilution accident), the mistaken dilution accident can be automatically diagnosed according to an overtemperature and overpower actual measurement signal and a detection signal of a neutron fluence detector, and a possible dilution source can be automatically isolated, so that the automatic protection function of the mistaken dilution accident is realized under the running state of a unit and a control rod is in a manual control mode. Therefore, the system can help an operator to complete the treatment of the mis-dilution accident, improve the response speed of the unit to the mis-dilution accident, effectively reduce the human factor failure generated in the process of treating the mis-dilution accident by the operator, and greatly improve the operation safety and the economical efficiency of the nuclear power plant.
Drawings
In order to illustrate the embodiments of the invention more clearly, the drawings that are needed in the description of the embodiments will be briefly described below, it being apparent that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the invention, and that other drawings may be derived from those drawings by a person skilled in the art without inventive effort. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of one embodiment of step S10 of FIG. 1;
FIG. 3 is a flowchart of one embodiment of step S20 of FIG. 1;
FIG. 4 is a logic diagram of a system for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a logical block diagram of a system for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
First, it is explained that when the power condition control rod is in the manual control mode, the chemical and volumetric control systems cannot be automatically isolated using the measured rod position signal. Aiming at the uniform boron dilution accident, after the accident occurs, the neutron flux of the reactor rises, the power rises, and the temperature and the pressure change, according to the state representation, the uniform boron dilution accident (the false dilution accident) under the working condition is represented by selecting signals of over-power delta T, over-temperature delta T and neutron fluence rate, and instruments such as the temperature, the pressure, the neutron flux and the like corresponding to the instruments are adopted by the instruments.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for handling a nuclear power plant uniform boron dilution accident according to an embodiment of the present invention, where the method is suitable for a uniform boron dilution accident that occurs when a control rod is in a manual control mode, and specifically includes the following steps:
s10, acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system, and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not;
in this step, it should be noted that the measured over-temperature and over-power signal is obtained from a DCS control system of the nuclear power plant, and is specifically obtained by processing a temperature difference signal of a cold and hot section of a reactor coolant system main loop.
S20, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition;
and S30, when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, generating an isolation signal to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system.
The technical scheme of the embodiment establishes a set of automatic protection method for the mis-dilution accident (only aiming at the uniform boron dilution accident) by depending on the advantages of a computer, when the mis-dilution accident occurs in a nuclear power plant, the mis-dilution accident is automatically diagnosed according to the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal and the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector, and a possible dilution source is automatically isolated, so that the automatic protection function of the mis-dilution accident in the running state of the unit is realized. Therefore, the system can help an operator to complete the treatment of the mis-dilution accident, improve the response speed of the unit to the mis-dilution accident, effectively reduce the human factor failure generated in the process of treating the mis-dilution accident by the operator, and greatly improve the operation safety and the economical efficiency of the nuclear power plant.
Further, in an optional embodiment, the method for handling a homogeneous boron dilution accident in a nuclear power plant of the present invention further includes: when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, an indication signal is generated, and uniform boron dilution accident indication information is output according to the indication signal, for example, a diagnosis result of a mistaken dilution accident can be prompted to a user through a matched mistaken dilution accident display interface and an audible and visual alarm. In this way, the operator can be helped to quickly know the current unit state.
Further, in an optional embodiment, the method for handling a homogeneous boron dilution accident in a nuclear power plant of the present invention further includes: after the uniform boron dilution accident processing is completed, a reset signal input by a user is received, for example, the reset signal can be received through a matched reset button, and the chemical and volume control system is restored to a normal operation state according to the reset signal. In this embodiment, after the misclution event is addressed, the operator may input a reset signal by activating a reset button to return the chemical and volumetric control system to normal operation.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of an embodiment of step S10 in fig. 1, where in the embodiment, the determining whether the measured over-temperature and over-power signal satisfies the first preset condition in step S10 may specifically include:
s11, acquiring an over-temperature difference setting value, judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-temperature difference condition or not according to the over-temperature difference setting value, and generating a first intermediate signal when the over-temperature difference condition is met;
in this step, regarding the over temperature difference (over temperature Δ T) setting value, it is related to the following parameters: a temperature difference value at rated thermal power, a measured average temperature value of the reactor coolant, a design value of the average temperature of the coolant at rated thermal power, a rotational speed value of the reactor coolant pump, a rotational speed design value of the coolant pump, a difference between core upper and lower power, predetermined gain and offset values, and the like. Moreover, whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets the preset over-temperature difference condition can be judged in the following ways: and comparing the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal with the over-temperature difference setting value, and if the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal is greater than the over-temperature difference setting value, determining that a preset over-temperature difference condition is met, and generating a first intermediate signal.
S12, acquiring an over-power differential quantity setting value, judging whether the over-temperature over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-power differential quantity condition or not according to the over-power differential quantity setting value, and generating a second intermediate signal when the over-power differential quantity condition is met;
in this step, regarding the overpower delta (overpower Δ T) setting value, it is related to the following parameters: a temperature difference value at rated thermal power, a measured average temperature value of the reactor coolant, a design value of the average temperature of the coolant at rated thermal power, a rotational speed value of the reactor coolant pump, a rotational speed design value of the coolant pump, predetermined gain and offset values (different from the gain and offset values in the over temperature difference setting value), and the like. It should be noted that the calculation formula of the overpower difference amount setting value is different from the calculation formula of the overtemperature difference amount setting value. Moreover, whether the overtemperature and overpower actual measurement signal meets the preset overpower difference condition can be judged in the following way: and comparing the over-temperature and over-power measured signal with the over-power difference setting value, and if the over-temperature and over-power measured signal is greater than the over-power difference setting value, determining that a preset over-power difference condition is met, and generating a second intermediate signal.
S13, carrying out logical OR operation on the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal and generating a third intermediate signal;
s14, acquiring a shutdown signal, and performing logical negation operation on the shutdown signal to generate a fourth intermediate signal;
in this step, it is to be noted that the shutdown signal of the nuclear power plant reactor is a closing/opening signal of a shutdown circuit breaker, and the nuclear power plant is generally provided with a plurality of pairs of shutdown circuit breakers, for example, four pairs, so that if two pairs of the four pairs of shutdown circuit breakers are opened, the shutdown signal is considered as a reactor shutdown.
And S15, performing logical AND operation on the third intermediate signal and the fourth intermediate signal, and generating a first trigger signal.
In this step, it should be noted that, by using the fourth intermediate signal to block the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal, it is possible to avoid triggering the generation of the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal after the non-mistaken dilution accident shutdown, because: after the non-error dilution accident is stopped, the fourth intermediate signal is triggered before the first intermediate signal or the second intermediate signal, and the first intermediate signal or the second intermediate signal caused by the process of stopping and dropping the rods is later than the fourth intermediate signal. Therefore, the invalid withdrawal of the nuclear power unit can be avoided, and the economy of the nuclear power plant is further improved.
Further, regarding step S10, in a specific embodiment, the measured over-temperature and over-power signal obtained from the DCS instrument control system is the measured over-temperature and over-power signal of multiple loops, that is, there are multiple measured over-temperature and over-power signals, for example, four loops correspond to four measured over-temperature and over-power signals, and then, whether to generate the first intermediate signal may be determined by: if at least two over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signals are greater than the over-temperature difference setting value in the four over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signals, the preset over-temperature difference condition is considered to be met, and a first intermediate signal is generated; otherwise, the preset over-temperature difference condition is not met. Likewise, whether to generate the second intermediate signal may be determined by: if at least two over-temperature and over-power measured signals are larger than the over-power differential setting value in the four over-temperature and over-power measured signals, the preset over-power differential condition is considered to be met, and a second intermediate signal is generated; otherwise, the preset overpower difference condition is not satisfied. In the embodiment, invalid signals can be eliminated by carrying out logic degradation processing (taking four out of two), so that the redundancy performance is enhanced, and single failure is avoided.
Fig. 3 is a flowchart of an embodiment of step S20 in fig. 1, in which the neutron fluence detector includes an intermediate-range neutron fluence detector, a power-range neutron fluence detector, and step S20 may specifically include:
s21, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, acquiring the current power of the reactor according to the detection signal, judging whether the current power is smaller than a power threshold value or not, and if so, executing S22; if not, go to step S23;
in this step, the power threshold is the product of the power of the nuclear power plant at full operation (100% nuclear power) and a certain percentage, for example, the power threshold is 10% nuclear power. In addition, the current power of the reactor can be obtained according to the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range.
S22, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the middle range meets a preset low-power condition or not, and generating a second trigger signal when the detection signal meets the low-power condition;
and S23, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range meets a preset high-power condition or not, and generating a third trigger signal when the detection signal meets the high-power condition.
Further, in an alternative embodiment, step S22 includes:
s221, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector with a first setting value, judging whether a preset first low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a second trigger signal when the first low-power condition is met;
step S222, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a second setting value, judging whether a preset second low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a fourth trigger signal when the second low-power condition is met;
the step S23 includes:
and comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a third setting value, judging whether a preset high-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a third trigger signal when the high-power condition is met, wherein the third setting value is larger than the second setting value.
In this embodiment, the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range corresponds to two setting values (a high setting value and a low setting value), and when the current power of the reactor is smaller than the power threshold, the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range can be compared with the low setting value (a second setting value) to determine whether a preset second low-power condition is met; when the current power of the reactor is not less than the power threshold, the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range can be compared with a high setting value (third setting value) to judge whether the preset high-power condition is met.
In one embodiment, the number of the intermediate-range neutron fluence detectors is multiple and is distributed in multiple channels outside the core, for example, four channels in total, and three intermediate-range neutron fluence detectors are arranged in each channel, so that there are 12 intermediate-range neutron fluence detectors in total. Further, step S221 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of each intermediate range neutron fluence detector of the channel is greater than the first setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the first setting value in the channel is greater than a first preset value, and if so, generating a fifth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel, wherein the first preset value is 2, for example, namely, three-out-of-two degenerate logic is adopted to process three comparison results in one channel;
and judging whether the number of the channels with the fifth intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a second preset value, and if so, generating a second trigger signal, wherein the second preset value is 2, for example, that is, processing results of four channels by adopting a two-out-of-four degeneration logic.
Similarly, in one embodiment, the number of power range neutron fluence detectors is multiple and distributed in multiple channels outside the core, for example, four channels in total, and three power range neutron fluence detectors are arranged in each channel, so that there are 12 power range neutron fluence detectors in total. Further, step S222 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the second setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the second setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a sixth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel;
judging whether the number of channels with the sixth intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value or not, and if so, generating a fourth trigger signal;
step S223 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the third setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the third setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a seventh intermediate signal corresponding to the channel
And judging whether the number of the channels with the seventh intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value, and if so, generating a third trigger signal.
In this embodiment, for example, if the third preset value and the fourth preset value are 2 respectively, three comparison results in one channel are processed by using two-out-of-three degeneration logic, and then results in four channels are processed by using two-out-of-four degeneration logic.
Further, in an optional embodiment, step S30 specifically includes:
performing a logical OR operation on the first trigger signal, the second trigger signal, the third trigger signal, and the fourth trigger signal to generate an isolation signal, and isolating a dilution source by a chemical and volumetric control system.
In one embodiment, in conjunction with fig. 4, there are four trigger signals applied to the inputs of the or logic gate, wherein the first trigger signal is generated according to the following: and after carrying out logical OR operation on the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal, carrying out logical AND operation on the first intermediate signal and a logical negation signal of the shutdown signal. Sending the four paths of trigger signals to an RS trigger after logical OR operation, and outputting an isolation signal and an indication signal, wherein the isolation signal is sent to a chemical and volume control system to block continuous injection of a dilution source; the indication signal is sent to a display interface for displaying, and needs to be maintained, because the signal disappears after a short time after the shutdown, the indication cannot be continued to the operator, and the operator can be prompted to mistakenly dilute the accident by maintaining the signal. In addition, after the treatment of the mis-dilution accident is finished, the operator can restore to the normal operation state by inputting a reset signal and a driving command.
Fig. 5 is a logical structure diagram of a system for handling a nuclear power plant uniform boron dilution accident according to an embodiment of the present invention, and the system for handling a nuclear power plant uniform boron dilution accident according to the embodiment includes: the system comprises a first judgment module 10, a second judgment module 20 and an isolation signal generation module 30, wherein the first judgment module 10 is used for acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition; the second judging module 20 is configured to obtain a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector disposed outside the reactor core, and judge whether the detection signal satisfies a second preset condition; the isolation signal generation module 30 is configured to generate an isolation signal when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, so as to isolate the dilution source through the chemical and volume control system.
Further, the system for handling the uniform boron dilution accident in the nuclear power plant in the embodiment further includes an output module 40 and a reset module 50, where the output module 40 is configured to further generate an indication signal when the measured overtemperature and overpower signal meets a first preset condition, or when the detection signal meets a second preset condition, and output indication information of the uniform boron dilution accident according to the indication signal. The reset module 50 is configured to receive a reset signal input by a user after the uniform boron dilution accident processing is completed, and to restore the chemical and volumetric control system to a normal operation state according to the reset signal.
In one embodiment, a display interface may be configured at LEVEL 2 of the main control room LEVEL, and the display interface may display the misclution accident, including an indication signal, a reset button, and further, which abnormality is specific: the over-temperature delta T is high (the over-temperature over-power actual measurement signal is abnormal compared with the over-temperature difference setting value); the over-power delta T is high (the over-temperature over-power actual measurement signal is abnormal compared with the over-power differential setting value); the neutron fluence rate of the middle range is high (the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector of the middle range is abnormal compared with the first setting value); the neutron fluence rate in the power range is high (high fixed value); the power range has high neutron fluence rate (low constant value).
The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes may be made by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims (12)

1. A method for processing a nuclear power station uniform boron dilution accident is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s10, acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system, and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not;
s20, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition;
and S30, when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, generating an isolation signal to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system.
2. The method for handling a homogeneous boron dilution accident in a nuclear power plant as recited in claim 1, further comprising:
and when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition, or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, generating an indication signal, and outputting uniform boron dilution accident indication information according to the indication signal.
3. The method for handling a homogeneous boron dilution accident in a nuclear power plant as recited in claim 1, further comprising:
and after the uniform boron dilution accident treatment is finished, receiving a reset signal input by a user, and restoring the chemical and volume control system to a normal operation state according to the reset signal.
4. The method for handling the uniform boron dilution accident in the nuclear power plant according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the determining whether the measured over-temperature and over-power signal meets a first preset condition includes:
acquiring an over-temperature difference setting value, judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-temperature difference condition or not according to the over-temperature difference setting value, and generating a first intermediate signal when the over-temperature difference condition is met;
acquiring an over-power difference setting value, judging whether the over-temperature over-power actual measurement signal meets a preset over-power difference condition or not according to the over-power difference setting value, and generating a second intermediate signal when the over-power difference condition is met;
performing a logical or operation on the first intermediate signal and the second intermediate signal, and generating a third intermediate signal;
acquiring a shutdown signal, and performing logical negation operation on the shutdown signal to generate a fourth intermediate signal;
and performing logical AND operation on the third intermediate signal and the fourth intermediate signal, and generating a first trigger signal.
5. The method for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident according to claim 4, wherein the neutron fluence detector comprises a mid-range neutron fluence detector, a power-range neutron fluence detector; furthermore, it is possible to provide a liquid crystal display device,
the step S20 includes:
s21, acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside a reactor core, acquiring the current power of the reactor according to the detection signal, judging whether the current power is smaller than a power threshold value or not, and if so, executing S22; if not, go to step S23;
s22, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the middle range meets a preset low-power condition or not, and generating a second trigger signal when the detection signal meets the low-power condition;
and S23, judging whether a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range meets a preset high-power condition or not, and generating a third trigger signal when the detection signal meets the high-power condition.
6. The method for handling the nuclear power plant uniform boron dilution accident according to claim 5, wherein the step S22 comprises:
step S221, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector with a first setting value, judging whether a preset first low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a second trigger signal when the first low-power condition is met;
step S222, comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a second setting value, judging whether a preset second low-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a fourth trigger signal when the second low-power condition is met;
the step S23 includes:
and comparing a detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in the power range with a third setting value, judging whether a preset high-power condition is met or not according to a comparison result, and generating a third trigger signal when the high-power condition is met, wherein the third setting value is larger than the second setting value.
7. The method for handling the event of homogeneous boron dilution in nuclear power plants according to claim 6, wherein the number of said neutron fluence detectors in the intermediate range is plural and is distributed in a plurality of channels outside the core, and said step S221 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of each intermediate range neutron fluence detector of the channel is greater than the first setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the first setting value in the channel is greater than a first preset value, and if so, generating a fifth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel;
and judging whether the number of the channels with the fifth intermediate signals in the plurality of channels is greater than a second preset value or not, and if so, generating a second trigger signal.
8. The method for handling the nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident according to claim 6, wherein the number of the power range neutron fluence detectors is plural and is dispersedly arranged in a plurality of channels outside the core, and further,
the step S222 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the second setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the second setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a sixth intermediate signal corresponding to the channel;
judging whether the number of channels with the sixth intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value or not, and if so, generating a fourth trigger signal;
the step S223 includes:
for each channel, performing: judging whether the detection signal of the neutron fluence detector in each power range of the channel is greater than the third setting value, judging whether the number of the detection signals greater than the third setting value in the channel is greater than a third preset value, and if so, generating a seventh intermediate signal corresponding to the channel
And judging whether the number of the channels with the seventh intermediate signal in the plurality of channels is greater than a fourth preset value, and if so, generating a third trigger signal.
9. The method for handling the homogeneous boron dilution accident in the nuclear power plant as recited in claim 6, wherein the step S30 includes:
performing a logical OR operation on the first trigger signal, the second trigger signal, the third trigger signal, and the fourth trigger signal to generate an isolation signal, and isolating a dilution source by a chemical and volumetric control system.
10. A system for handling a nuclear power plant uniform boron dilution accident is characterized by comprising:
the first judgment module is used for acquiring an over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal from a DCS instrument control system and judging whether the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or not;
the second judgment module is used for acquiring a detection signal from a neutron fluence detector arranged outside the reactor core and judging whether the detection signal meets a second preset condition;
and the isolation signal generation module is used for generating an isolation signal when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or the detection signal meets a second preset condition so as to isolate the dilution source through a chemical and volume control system.
11. The system for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident of claim 10, further comprising:
and the output module is used for generating an indication signal when the over-temperature and over-power actual measurement signal meets a first preset condition or the detection signal meets a second preset condition, and outputting uniform boron dilution accident indication information according to the indication signal.
12. The system for handling a nuclear power plant homogeneous boron dilution accident according to claim 10, further comprising:
and the resetting module is used for receiving a resetting signal input by a user after the uniform boron dilution accident treatment is finished, and enabling the chemical and volume control system to be restored to a normal operation state according to the resetting signal.
CN202210567631.6A 2022-05-24 2022-05-24 Method and system for processing uniform boron dilution accident of nuclear power station Pending CN114974621A (en)

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CN202210567631.6A CN114974621A (en) 2022-05-24 2022-05-24 Method and system for processing uniform boron dilution accident of nuclear power station

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