CN114640453B - Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor - Google Patents

Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114640453B
CN114640453B CN202210332650.0A CN202210332650A CN114640453B CN 114640453 B CN114640453 B CN 114640453B CN 202210332650 A CN202210332650 A CN 202210332650A CN 114640453 B CN114640453 B CN 114640453B
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gni
verification
tid
user
message
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CN114640453A (en
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张凌浩
唐勇
梁晖辉
庞博
王胜
桂盛霖
张颉
唐超
向思屿
刘洋洋
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Co Ltd
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/18—Network planning tools
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

The application discloses a method suitable for authentication and key negotiation of a wireless sensor, which relates to the field of information security and has the technical scheme that: secret presetting is carried out on the offline sensor node, the online sensor node and the online user identity card; the user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, the login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored in the identity card, and an execution scene is selected to carry out authentication and key negotiation according to the position of the gateway node where the identity of the sensor node to be accessed by the user exists; the system administrator deploys new sensor nodes in the target area through offline sensor node secret presets, and introduces the new sensor nodes into the set network model through online sensor node secret presets. The application can solve the problem of identity legitimacy of the user accessing the sensor node, realize the mutual authentication and key negotiation among the user, the gateway and the node, and provide safety guarantee for data safety transmission in the wireless sensor environment.

Description

Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of information security, and more particularly, to a method for authentication and key agreement applicable to wireless sensors.
Background
The Biohashing firstly determines a fingerprint center point by solving a fingerprint direction field, removes noise interference by utilizing wavelet transformation, reduces fingerprint feature dimension, extracts translation, rotation and scaling invariance features of the processed image by Fourier-Mellin transformation, then projects fingerprint feature vectors into an orthogonal random matrix, and realizes hash operation on the fingerprint features after threshold quantization.
The hash function is a method of mapping an arbitrary length bit string to a fixed length value (e.g., 32 bytes). This value is a hash value, also called digest, hash, fingerprint. The hash function has the following security characteristics: 1) Unidirectional: given x, it is easy to solve h (x); however, given h (x), solving x is computationally difficult, i.e., it is insoluble in polynomial time. (2) collision resistance: given x and h (x), finding x '+.x makes h (x')=h (x) infeasible. (3) rapidity: the hash function is simple and fast to calculate, i.e. given x, it is easy to calculate h (x), such as a linear time. (4) avalanche effect: a change in one bit in the input will cause more than half of the bits in the output to change.
Exclusive-or encryption operations are commonly used in authentication protocols because of their ability to encrypt and decrypt easily and quickly. If a=b=c, any two of the parameters are known, the third can be easily solved; if only one of the parameters is known, solving the other two is not possible. Thus, exclusive-or encryption operations are widely used for simple encryption operations to enable private transmission of sensitive information. However, since information of the sensor is transmitted in the public network and the battery of the sensor node is limited, the security and efficiency of the wireless sensor network are paid attention to. User authentication is a security task used to limit access by providing authorized users with passwords, tokens, or biometric techniques. Therefore, passwords and tokens are easily stolen and forgotten; even biometrics has some limitations.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the defects in the prior art, the application aims to provide a method suitable for authentication and key negotiation of a wireless sensor, which can solve the problem of identity legitimacy of a user accessing a sensor node, realize bidirectional authentication and key negotiation among the user, a gateway and the node, provide safety guarantee for data safety transmission in a wireless sensor environment, have a wider application scene of the protocol, have a plurality of gateway nodes, can realize remote node deployment, and in a password changing stage, a smart card changes stored identity registration information according to a new password of the user, thereby avoiding the password leakage of the user.
The technical aim of the application is realized by the following technical scheme: a method of authentication and key agreement for a wireless sensor, comprising the steps of:
secret preset stage: secret presetting is carried out on the offline sensor node, the online sensor node and the online user identity card;
login negotiation stage: the user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, the login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored in the identity card, and after the validity of time and the validity of the login information are checked, an execution scene is selected according to the position of the gateway node where the identity of the sensor node to be accessed by the user exists for authentication and key negotiation;
a dynamic node joining stage: when a new sensor node is required to be added into a target area, a system administrator deploys the new sensor node in the target area through off-line sensor node secret preset, and the new sensor node is introduced into a set network model through on-line sensor node secret preset.
Further, the secret preset process of the offline sensor node specifically includes:
s101: the system administrator is for each sensor node S j Generating unique identity IDs Sj J is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, wherein m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor node1≤j≤m，S ran Is a secret random number shared by gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<ID Sj ，P j >，1≤j≤m；
S104: system administrator presets master key X for GNi GNi S shared by all gateways ran 。
Further, the secret preset process of the online sensor node specifically includes:
s201: each sensor node transmits registration information<ID Sj ，T r ，M j >To the current gateway node GNi, the authentication value M j ＝h(ID Sj ·P j ·T r )，T r Is the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, GNi sends an acknowledgement message to S j GNi storage of<ID Sj ，T r >，S j Store T r 。
Further, the secret preset process of the online user identity card specifically comprises the following steps:
s301: user U i Insertion of identity card IC i Select identity ID i Password PW i And a random number u, calculating an identity registration request DID i ＝h(ID i U) and RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) Transmitting over a secure channel<DID i ，RPW i >To GNi;
s302: GNi receiving identity registration request, if DID i Unregistered GNi selects a random number TID i Calculating identity registration information K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi ) AndK i for secret value between sum GNi, GNi holds<TID i ，DID i >；
S303: GNi transmitting identity registration information over a secure channel<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Give U i ，U i Will be<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Stored in IC i H () is a hash function against collision;
S304：U i input biometric fingerprint B i Calculating biological informationVerification value->IC i Preserve C i And V i 。
Further, the login process of the user specifically includes:
s401: user U i Insert identity card, input ID' i 、PW’ i And B' i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification
S402: after successful login, the identity card is used for storing gateway identity ID GNi U is set to i The access requirement X is sent to the GNi, and the GNi sends the ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement X Sj Is sent to U i ；
S403：IC i Generating random number r i DID is calculated i ＝h(ID i ·u)、RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i )、Landing request->And D 2 ＝h(DID i ·r i ·TID i ·K i ·T 1 ·ID Sj )，T 1 Is the current timestamp;
S404：U i send login message M 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >To GNi.
Further, the process of selecting an execution scene to perform authentication and key negotiation according to the position of the gateway node existing in the identity of the sensor node to be accessed by the user specifically comprises the following steps: currently GNi receives the login message and checks the requested sensor node S j Whether in the registered sensor list; if yes, executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of the scene 1; otherwise, the authentication and key negotiation phase of scenario 2 is performed.
Further, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 1 specifically includes:
s501: currently GNi at T 2 Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T 2 -T 1 The I is less than or equal to delta T, the delta T message propagates the threshold value of the delay, if the test does not pass, the connection is terminated; GNi TID is used i Retrieving DID i Calculation ofVerification->If the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated;
S502：ID Sj exists in GNi, which generates random number r h Computing an authentication request D (D) 6 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·DID i ·T r ·P j ·r h ·T 2 ) GNi send message M 2 ＝<TID i ，D 3 ，D 4 ，D 5 ，D 6 ，T 2 >To S j ；
S503：S j At T 3 Time of receipt of M 2 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：S j generating random number r j Computing an authentication requestD (D) 8 ＝h(P j ·r j ·T 2 ·r h ·TID i ·r i ·T 3 ·T r ) Send message M 3 ＝<D 7 ，D 8 ，T 3 >To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T 4 Time of receipt of message M 3 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is not passed, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is calculated +.>D (D) 11 ＝h(K i ·DID i ·r’ j ·T 1 ·r h ·T 4 ·r i ) Send message M 4 ＝<D 9 ，D 10 ，D 11 ，T 4 >To user U i ；
S506: when user U i At T 5 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is encrypted at sk=h (DID i ·r i ·r j ·ID Sj ) In U i GNi and S j Is established between them.
Further, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 2 specifically includes:
s601: currently GNi at T H Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T H -T 1 If the test passes, < ΔT, < GNi TID is used i Retrieving DID i Calculate K' i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，Verify M 1 Is>If the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated; ID (identity) Sj Is not present in GNi, which broadcasts a message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >To the remaining gateway nodes (GNj), wherein the authentication value L 1 ＝h(ID Sj ·TID i ·ID GNi ·S ran ·T H )；
S602: GNj at T F Time of receipt of message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >Checking the validity of time |T F -T H I.ltoreq.DeltaT, if the verification is valid, and ID Sj Exist in GNj, verifyIf the verification passes, a secret value K is calculated F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj ) Authentication request->L and L 2 ＝h(TID i ·ID GNi ·K F i ·ID Sj ·T F ) Send message M 5 ＝<A 1 ，ID GNj ，L 2 ，TID i ，T F >To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at T ugf Time of receipt of message M 5 Checking the validity of time |T ugf -T F If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, GNi uses TID i Retrieving DID i Calculate authentication request K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，/>L and L 3 ＝h(K i ·K F i ·ID Sj ·ID GNj ·T ugf ) Send M 6 ＝<A 2 ，L 3 ，ID GNj ，T ugf >To user U i ；
S604: when user U i At T 2 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 2 -T ugf If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, a random number r is generated i Calculate authentication request +.>L 4 ＝h(TID i ·r i ·K F i ·T 2 ·ID Sj ) Then U i Send login message M 7 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，A 3 ，L 4 ，T 2 >To GNj;
s605: GNj at T 3 Time of receipt of message M 7 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate K F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj )，Verification->GNj if the verification is passedGenerating random number r f Calculate authentication request +.> L and L 5 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·TID i ·T r ·P j ·r f ·T 3 ) Send message M 8 ＝<TID i ，A 4 ，A 5 ，L 5 ，T 3 >To S j ；
S606：S j At T 4 Time of receipt of message M 8 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, S j Generating random number r j Calculate authentication request +.>L and L 6 ＝h(P j ·r j ·T 3 ·r f ·TID i ·r i ·T 4 ·T r ) Then send M 9 ＝<A 6 ，L 6 ，T 4 >To GNj;
s607: GNj at T 5 Time of receipt of message M 9 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, calculate authentication request +.>L and L 7 ＝h(K F i ·TID i ·r j ·T 2 ·r f ·T 5 ·r i ) Send M 10 ＝<A 7 ，A 8 ，L 7 ，T 5 >Is sent to U i ；
S608: when user U i At T 6 Time of receipt of message M 10 Checking the validity of time |T 6 -T 5 If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is encrypted at sk=h (TID i ·r i ·r j ·r f ·ID Sj ) In U i GNj and S j Is established between the user U and the user U by using a session key i Can access S j 。
Further, the method also comprises a password replacement stage: after the identity card is verified to be effective, a new password is required to be input, and the identity card replaces the original value with the new value through calculation.
Further, the specific process of the password replacement stage is as follows:
s701: user U i Inputting ID i 、PW i And B i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification->If the verification is valid, the IC i Requiring a new password to be entered;
s702: when receivingTo a new password PW i new ，IC i Calculating RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) New identity information RPW i new ＝h(PW i new ·u·ID i ) Andnew verification value
S703：IC i Using V i new ，Y i new Instead of V i And Y i 。
Compared with the prior art, the application has the following beneficial effects:
1. the authentication and key negotiation method suitable for the wireless sensor can solve the problem of identity legitimacy of a user accessing the sensor node, realize bidirectional authentication and key negotiation among the user, the gateway and the node, provide safety guarantee for data safety transmission in the wireless sensor environment, and simultaneously have wider application scenes of the protocol, have a plurality of gateway nodes and can realize remote node deployment.
2. The application utilizes biological hash to help eliminate error acceptance rate without increasing incidence rate of error rejection rate; furthermore, biological hashing has a high degree of separation for imposter, true and zero error rate populations;
3. the application also supports a dynamic node adding and user-friendly password changing mechanism, and in the password changing stage, the intelligent card changes the stored identity registration information according to the new password of the user, thereby avoiding the password leakage of the user
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of embodiments of the application and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the application and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the application. In the drawings:
fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a topology of a wireless sensor network according to an embodiment of the present application;
FIG. 2 is an online user identity card secret provisioning process in an embodiment of the application;
FIG. 3 is a scenario 1 authentication and key agreement procedure in an embodiment of the present application;
fig. 4 is a scenario 2 authentication and key agreement procedure in an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
For the purpose of making apparent the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application, the present application will be further described in detail with reference to the following examples and the accompanying drawings, wherein the exemplary embodiments of the present application and the descriptions thereof are for illustrating the present application only and are not to be construed as limiting the present application.
Examples: a method suitable for authentication and key negotiation of wireless sensor, as shown in figure 1, involves five roles of user, system administrator, identity card, gateway node, sensor node, the symbols and meaning in the protocol are shown in table 1:
table 1 symbol description
The protocol comprises the following steps:
s1, a secret preset stage;
s2, logging in a negotiation stage;
s3, a dynamic node adding stage;
s4, password replacement stage.
In step S1, the secret preset stage includes three steps of off-line sensor node secret preset, on-line sensor node secret preset, and on-line user identity card secret preset.
The secret presetting process of the off-line sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s101: the system administrator is for each sensor node S j Generating unique identity IDs Sj J is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, wherein m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor node1≤j≤m，S ran Is a secret random number shared by gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<ID Sj ，P j >，1≤j≤m；
S104: system administrator presets master key X for GNi GNi S shared by all gateways ran 。
The secret presetting process of the on-line sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s201: each sensor node transmits registration information<ID Sj ，T r ，M j >To the current gateway node GNi, the authentication value M j ＝h(ID Sj ·P j ·T r )，T r Is the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, GNi sends an acknowledgement message to S j GNi storage of<ID Sj ，T r >，S j Store T r 。
As shown in fig. 2, the secret preset process of the online user identity card specifically includes:
s301: user U i Insertion of identity card IC i Select identity ID i Password PW i And a random number u, calculating an identity registration request DID i ＝h(ID i U) and RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) Transmitting over a secure channel<DID i ，RPW i >To GNi;
s302: GNi receiving identity registration request, if DID i Unregistered GNi selects a random number TID i Calculating identity registration information K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi ) AndK i for secret value between sum GNi, GNi holds<TID i ，DID i >；
S303: GNi transmitting identity registration information over a secure channel<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Give U i ，U i Will be<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Stored in IC i H () is a hash function against collision;
S304：U i input biometric fingerprint B i Calculating biological informationVerification value->IC i Preserve C i And V i 。
In step S2, the login negotiation phase is divided into two phases, i.e., a login phase and an authentication and key negotiation phase. The user first uses the identity card IC i A login session is initiated, the identity of the user is verified in the identity card, and once the user's legitimacy is verified, the login message is forwarded to the current Gateway Node (GNi). GNi after checking the validity of the time and the validity of the login message, if ID Sj Present in GNi, then the authentication and key agreement phase performs scenario 1, otherwise scenario 2 is performed.
The login process of the user specifically comprises the following steps:
s401: user U i Insert identity card, input ID' i 、PW’ i And B' i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification
S402: after successful login, the identity card is used for storing gateway identity ID GNi U is set to i The access requirement X is sent to the GNi, and the GNi sends the ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement X Sj Is sent to U i ；
S403：IC i Generating random number r i DID is calculated i ＝h(ID i ·u)、RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i )、Landing request->And D 2 ＝h(DID i ·r i ·TID i ·K i ·T 1 ·ID Sj )，T 1 Is the current timestamp;
S404：U i send login message M 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >To GNi.
As shown in fig. 3, the procedure for performing the authentication and key negotiation phase of scenario 1 is specifically:
s501: currently GNi at T 2 Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T 2 -T 1 The I is less than or equal to delta T, the delta T message propagates the threshold value of the delay, if the test does not pass, the connection is terminated; GNi TID is used i Retrieving DID i Calculate K' i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，VerificationIf the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated;
S502：ID Sj exists in GNi, which generates random number r h Computing an authentication request D (D) 6 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·DID i ·T r ·P j ·r h ·T 2 ) GNi send message M 2 ＝<TID i ，D 3 ，D 4 ，D 5 ，D 6 ，T 2 >To S j ；
S503：S j At T 3 Time of receipt of M 2 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：S j generating random number r j Computing an authentication requestD (D) 8 ＝h(P j ·r j ·T 2 ·r h ·TID i ·r i ·T 3 ·T r ) Send message M 3 ＝<D 7 ，D 8 ，T 3 >To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T 4 Time of receipt of message M 3 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is not passed, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is calculated +.>D (D) 11 ＝h(K i ·DID i ·r’ j ·T 1 ·r h ·T 4 ·r i ) Send message M 4 ＝<D 9 ，D 10 ，D 11 ，T 4 >To user U i ；
S506: when user U i At T 5 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is encrypted at sk=h (DID i ·r i ·r j ·ID Sj ) In U i GNi and S j Is established between them.
As shown in fig. 4, the procedure for performing the authentication and key negotiation phase of scenario 2 is specifically:
s601: currently GNi at T H Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T H -T 1 If the test passes, < ΔT, < GNi TID is used i Retrieving DID i Calculate K' i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，Verify M 1 Is>If the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated; ID (identity) Sj Is not present in GNi, which broadcasts a message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >To the remaining gateway nodes (GNj), wherein the authentication value L 1 ＝h(ID Sj ·TID i ·ID GNi ·S ran ·T H )；
S602: GNj at T F Time of receipt of message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >Checking the validity of time |T F -T H I.ltoreq.DeltaT, if the verification is valid, and ID Sj Exist in GNj, verifyIf the verification passes, a secret value K is calculated F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj ) Authentication request->L and L 2 ＝h(TID i ·ID GNi ·K F i ·ID Sj ·T F ) Send message M 5 ＝<A 1 ，ID GNj ，L 2 ，TID i ，T F >To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at T ugf Time of receipt of message M 5 Checking the validity of time |T ugf -T F If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, GNi uses TID i Retrieving DID i Calculate authentication request K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，/>L and L 3 ＝h(K i ·K F i ·ID Sj ·ID GNj ·T ugf ) Send M 6 ＝<A 2 ，L 3 ，ID GNj ，T ugf >To user U i ；
S604: when user U i At T 2 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 2 -T ugf If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, a random number r is generated i Calculate authentication request +.>L 4 ＝h(TID i ·r i ·K F i ·T 2 ·ID Sj ) Then U i Send login message M 7 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，A 3 ，L 4 ，T 2 >To GNj;
s605: GNj at T 3 Time of receipt of message M 7 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate K F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj )，Verification->If the verification passes, GNj generates a random number r f Calculate authentication request +.> L and L 5 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·TID i ·T r ·P j ·r f ·T 3 ) Send message M 8 ＝<TID i ，A 4 ，A 5 ，L 5 ，T 3 >To S j ；
S606：S j At T 4 Time of receipt of message M 8 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, S j Generating random number r j Calculate authentication request +.>Then send M 9 ＝<A 6 ，L 6 ，T 4 >To GNj;
s607: GNj at T 5 Time of receipt of message M 9 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, calculate authentication request +.>L and L 7 ＝h(K F i ·TID i ·r j ·T 2 ·r f ·T 5 ·r i ) Send M 10 ＝<A 7 ，A 8 ，L 7 ，T 5 >Is sent to U i ；
S608: when user U i At T 6 Time of receipt of message M 10 Checking the validity of time |T 6 -T 5 If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is encrypted at sk=h (TID i ·r i ·r j ·r f ·ID Sj ) In U i GNj and S j Is established between the user U and the user U by using a session key i Can access S j 。
In step S3, the specific contents of the dynamic node joining stage are: when a new sensor node needs to be added to the target area, a system administrator deploys the new sensor node on the target area by secret the off-line sensor node preset phase. Then, the newly added sensor node passes through an online sensor node secret preset stage, and the new sensor node is introduced into the setting network model.
The specific content of the password replacement stage in the step S4 is as follows: after the identity card is verified to be effective, a new password is required to be input, and the identity card replaces the original value by the new value through calculation, specifically:
s701: user U i Inputting ID i 、PW i And B i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification->If it isVerify valid, IC i Requiring a new password to be entered;
s702: when a new password PW is received i new ，IC i Calculating RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) New identity information RPW i new ＝h(PW i new ·u·ID i ) Andnew verification value->
S703：IC i Using V i new ，Y i new Instead of V i And Y i 。
The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the application, and is not meant to limit the scope of the application, but to limit the application to the particular embodiments, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. that fall within the spirit and principles of the application are intended to be included within the scope of the application.

Claims (3)

1. A method for authentication and key agreement for a wireless sensor, comprising the steps of:
secret preset stage: secret presetting is carried out on the offline sensor node, the online sensor node and the online user identity card;
login negotiation stage: the user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, the login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored in the identity card, and after the validity of time and the validity of the login information are checked, an execution scene is selected according to the position of the gateway node where the identity of the sensor node to be accessed by the user exists for authentication and key negotiation;
a dynamic node joining stage: when a new sensor node is required to be added into a target area, deploying the new sensor node in the target area by a system administrator through off-line sensor node secret preset, and introducing the new sensor node into a set network model by the newly added sensor node through on-line sensor node secret preset;
the secret presetting process of the off-line sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s101: the system administrator is for each sensor node S j Generating unique identity IDs Sj J is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, wherein m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor nodeS ran Is a secret random number shared by gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<ID Sj ，P j >，1≤j≤m；
S104: system administrator presets master key X for GNi GNi S shared by all gateways ran ；
The secret presetting process of the online sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s201: each sensor node transmits registration information<ID Sj ，T r ，M j >To the current gateway node GNi, the authentication value M j ＝h(ID Sj ·P j ·T r )，T r Is the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, GNi sends an acknowledgement message to S j GNi storage of<ID Sj ，T r >，S j Store T r ；
The secret presetting process of the online user identity card specifically comprises the following steps:
s301: user U i Insertion of identity card IC i Selecting identityID i Password PW i And a random number u, calculating an identity registration request DID i ＝h(ID i U) and RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) Transmitting over a secure channel<DID i ，RPW i >To GNi;
s302: GNi receiving identity registration request, if DID i Unregistered GNi selects a random number TID i Calculating identity registration information K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi ) AndK i for secret value between sum GNi, GNi holds<TID i ，DID i >；
S303: GNi transmitting identity registration information over a secure channel<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Give U i ，U i Will be<Y i ，TID i ，h(.)，ID GNi >Stored in IC i H () is a hash function against collision;
S304：U i input biometric fingerprint B i Calculating biological informationVerification value->IC i Preserve C i And V i ；
The login process of the user specifically comprises the following steps:
s401: user U i Insert identity card, input ID' i 、PW’ i And B' i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification->
S402: after successful login, the identity card is used for storing gateway identity ID GNi U is set to i The access requirement X is sent to the GNi, and the GNi sends the ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement X Sj Is sent to U i ；
S403：IC i Generating random number r i DID is calculated i ＝h(ID i ·u)、RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i )、Login request +.>And D 2 ＝h(DID i ·r i ·TID i ·K i ·T 1 ·ID Sj )，T 1 Is the current timestamp;
S404：U i send login message M 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >To GNi;
the process of selecting an execution scene to carry out authentication and key negotiation according to the position of the gateway node existing in the identity of the sensor node to be accessed by the user comprises the following steps: currently GNi receives the login message and checks the requested sensor node S j Whether in the registered sensor list; if yes, executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of the scene 1; otherwise, executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of the scene 2;
the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 1 specifically includes:
s501: currently GNi at T 2 Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T 2 -T 1 The I is less than or equal to delta T, the delta T message propagates the threshold value of the delay, if the test does not pass, the connection is terminated; GNi TID is used i Retrieving DID i Calculate K' i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，VerificationIf the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated;
S502：ID Sj exists in GNi, which generates random number r h Computing an authentication request D (D) 6 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·DID i ·T r ·P j ·r h ·T 2 ) GNi send message M 2 ＝<TID i ，D 3 ，D 4 ，D 5 ，D 6 ，T 2 >To S j ；
S503：S j At T 3 Time of receipt of M 2 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：S j generating random number r j Computing an authentication requestD (D) 8 ＝h(P j ·r j ·T 2 ·r h ·TID i ·r i ·T 3 ·T r ) Send message M 3 ＝<D 7 ，D 8 ，T 3 >To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T 4 Time of receipt of message M 3 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is not passed, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is calculated +.>D (D) 11 ＝h(K i ·DID i ·r’ j ·T 1 ·r h ·T 4 ·r i ) Send message M 4 ＝<D 9 ，D 10 ，D 11 ，T 4 >To user U i ；
S506: when user U i At T 5 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key sk=h (DID i ·r i ·r j ·ID Sj ) In U i GNi and S j The construction is carried out between the two;
the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of the scenario 2 specifically includes:
s601: currently GNi at T H Receiving the login message M at the moment 1 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，D 1 ，D 2 ，T 1 >GNi check the validity of time |T H -T 1 If the I is less than or equal to delta T, the test is passedHowever, GNi uses TID i Retrieving DID i Calculate K' i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，Verify M 1 Is>If the authentication passes, GNi confirms the user U i Identity, otherwise the connection is terminated; ID (identity) Sj Is not present in GNi, which broadcasts a message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >To the remaining gateway nodes (GNj), wherein the authentication value L 1 ＝h(ID Sj ·TID i ·ID GNi ·S ran ·T H )；
S602: GNj at T F Time of receipt of message<ID Sj ，TID i ，ID GNi ，L 1 ，T H >Checking the validity of time |T F -T H I.ltoreq.DeltaT, if the verification is valid, and ID Sj Exist in GNj, verifyIf the verification passes, a secret value K is calculated F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj ) Authentication request->L and L 2 ＝h(TID i ·ID GNi ·K F i ·ID Sj ·T F ) Send message M 5 ＝<A 1 ，ID GNj ，L 2 ，TID i ，T F >To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at T ugf Time of receipt of message M 5 Checking the validity of time |T ugf -T F If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, GNi uses TID i Retrieving DID i Calculate authentication request K i ＝h(DID i ·TID i ·X GNi )，/>L and L 3 ＝h(K i ·K F i ·ID Sj ·ID GNj ·T ugf ) Send M 6 ＝<A 2 ，L 3 ，ID GNj ，T ugf >To user U i ；
S604: when user U i At T 2 Time of receipt of message M 4 Checking the validity of time |T 2 -T ugf If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification passes, a random number r is generated i Calculate authentication request +.>L 4 ＝h(TID i ·r i ·K F i ·T 2 ·ID Sj ) Then U i Send login message M 7 ＝<TID i ，ID Sj ，A 3 ，L 4 ，T 2 >To GNj;
s605: GNj at T 3 Time of receipt of message M 7 Checking the validity of time |T 3 -T 2 If the verification is valid, calculate K F i ＝h(TID i ·X GNj )，Verification->If the verification passes, GNj generates a random number r f Calculate authentication request +.> L and L 5 ＝h(ID Sj ·r i ·TID i ·T r ·P j ·r f ·T 3 ) Send message M 8 ＝<TID i ，A 4 ，A 5 ，L 5 ，T 3 >To S j ；
S606：S j At T 4 Time of receipt of message M 8 Checking the validity of time |T 4 -T 3 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, S j Generating random number r j Calculate authentication request +.>L and L 6 ＝h(P j ·r j ·T 3 ·r f ·TID i ·r i ·T 4 ·T r ) Then send M 9 ＝<A 6 ，L 6 ，T 4 >To GNj;
s607: GNj at T 5 Time of receipt of message M 9 Checking the validity of time |T 5 -T 4 If the verification is valid, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, calculate authentication request +.>L and L 7 ＝h(K F i ·TID i ·r j ·T 2 ·r f ·T 5 ·r i ) Send M 10 ＝<A 7 ，A 8 ，L 7 ，T 5 >Is sent to U i ；
S608: when user U i At T 6 Time of receipt of message M 10 Checking the validity of time |T 6 -T 5 If the test passes, calculateVerification->If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key sk=h (TID i ·r i ·r j ·r f ·ID Sj ) In U i GNj and S j Is established between the user U and the user U by using a session key i Can access S j。
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising a password exchange stage: after the identity card is verified to be effective, a new password is required to be input, and the identity card replaces the original value with the new value through calculation.
3. The method for authentication and key agreement of a wireless sensor according to claim 2, wherein the specific procedure of the password replacement phase is:
s701: user U i Inputting ID i 、PW i And B i ，IC i Calculation ofVerification->If the verification is valid, the IC i Requiring a new password to be entered;
s702: when a new password PW is received i new ，IC i Calculating RPW i ＝h(PW i ·u·ID i ) New identity information RPW i new ＝h(PW i new ·u·ID i ) Andnew verification value->
S703：IC i Using V i new ，Y i new Instead of V i And Y i 。
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