CN114640453A - Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor - Google Patents

Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor Download PDF

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Publication number
CN114640453A
CN114640453A CN202210332650.0A CN202210332650A CN114640453A CN 114640453 A CN114640453 A CN 114640453A CN 202210332650 A CN202210332650 A CN 202210332650A CN 114640453 A CN114640453 A CN 114640453A
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gni
authentication
tid
user
message
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CN114640453B (en
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张凌浩
唐勇
梁晖辉
庞博
王胜
桂盛霖
张颉
唐超
向思屿
刘洋洋
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Co Ltd
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/18—Network planning tools
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Signal Processing (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for authentication and key negotiation applicable to a wireless sensor, which relates to the field of information security and adopts the technical scheme that: secretly presetting an offline sensor node, an online sensor node and an online user identity card; the method comprises the steps that a user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored by the identity card, and an execution scene is selected to perform authentication and key negotiation according to the gateway node position of the identity of a sensor node to be accessed by the user; a system administrator deploys new sensor nodes in a target area through off-line sensor node secret presetting, and introduces the new sensor nodes into a setting network model through on-line sensor node secret presetting. The invention can solve the problem of identity legality when a user accesses the sensor node, realizes mutual authentication and key negotiation among the user, the gateway and the node, and provides safety guarantee for data safety transmission in a wireless sensor environment.

Description

Authentication and key negotiation method suitable for wireless sensor
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of information security, and more particularly, to a method for authentication and key agreement suitable for a wireless sensor.
Background
Biohashing firstly determines a fingerprint central point by solving a fingerprint direction field, removes noise interference and reduces a fingerprint characteristic dimension by utilizing wavelet transformation, extracts invariant characteristics of translation, rotation and scaling of a processed image through Fourier-Mellin transformation, then projects a fingerprint characteristic vector into an orthogonal random matrix, and realizes hash operation on the fingerprint characteristic after threshold quantization.
A hash function is a value that maps an arbitrary length string of bits to a fixed length (e.g., 32 bytes). This value is a hash value, also known as a digest, hash, fingerprint. The hash function has security features such as: 1) unidirectional: given x, it is easy to solve for h (x); but knowing h (x), solving for x is computationally difficult, i.e., not solvable in polynomial time. (2) Impact resistance: given x and h (x), finding x '≠ x makes h (x') ═ h (x) infeasible. (3) Rapidity: the hash function is simple and fast to compute, i.e. given x, it is easy to compute h (x), e.g. linear time. (4) Avalanche effect: a change in one bit in the input will cause more than half of the bits in the output to change.
Exclusive-or encryption is often used in authentication protocols because of its ability to simply and quickly encrypt and decrypt. If a ═ b ≦ c, any two of the parameters are known, the third can be easily solved; if only one of the parameters is known, it is not possible to solve for the other two. Therefore, the exclusive-or encryption operation is widely used for a simple encryption operation to achieve private transmission of sensitive information. However, since the information of the sensor is transmitted in the public network and the battery of the sensor node is limited, the security and efficiency of the wireless sensor network are of great concern. User authentication is a security task for restricting access by equipping authorized users with passwords, tokens, or biometric techniques. Therefore, passwords and tokens are easily stolen and forgotten; even biometrics have some limitations.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the defects in the prior art, the invention aims to provide a method suitable for authentication and key negotiation of a wireless sensor, which can solve the problem of identity legality of a user accessing a sensor node, realize bidirectional authentication and key negotiation among the user, a gateway and nodes, provide safety guarantee for data safety transmission in a wireless sensor environment, simultaneously have a wide application scene of the protocol, a plurality of gateway nodes exist, remote node deployment can be realized, and in a password change stage, an intelligent card changes stored identity registration information according to a new password of the user, so that the password leakage of the user is avoided.
The technical purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a method for authentication and key agreement for a wireless sensor, comprising the steps of:
secret presetting stage: secretly presetting an offline sensor node, an online sensor node and an online user identity card;
a login negotiation stage: the method comprises the steps that a user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored by the identity card, and after time validity and login information validity are checked, an execution scene is selected to carry out authentication and key negotiation according to the gateway node position of the identity of a sensor node to be accessed by the user;
a dynamic node joining stage: when a new sensor node needs to be added into a target area, a system administrator deploys the new sensor node in the target area through off-line sensor node secret presetting, and the new sensor node is introduced into a setting network model through on-line sensor node secret presetting.
Further, the secret presetting process of the offline sensor node specifically includes:
s101: the system administrator is each sensor node SjGenerating unique identity IDsSjJ is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, and m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor node
Figure BDA0003575802590000021
1≤j≤m，SranIs a secret random number shared by the gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<IDSj，Pj>，1≤j≤m；
S104: the system administrator presets GNi a master key XGNiAnd S shared by all gatewaysran。
Further, the secret presetting process of the online sensor node specifically includes:
s201: each sensor node sends registration information<IDSj，Tr，Mj>To the current gateway node GNi, verify the value Mj＝h(IDSj·Pj·Tr)，TrIs the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, it calculates
Figure BDA0003575802590000022
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000023
If the authentication is passed through, the authentication is performed,GNi sending an acknowledgement message to SjGNi storage<IDSj，Tr>，SjStoring Tr。
Further, the secret presetting process of the online user identity card specifically comprises the following steps:
s301: user UiInserting identity card ICiSelect the identity IDiPassword PWiAnd a random number u, calculating an identity registration request DIDi＝h(IDiU) and RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) Sending over a secure channel<DIDi，RPWi>To GNi;
s302: GNi receives the identity registration request if DIDiUnregistered, GNi selects a random number TIDiCalculating identity registration information Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi) And
Figure BDA0003575802590000024
Kifor secret values between and GNi, GNi save<TIDi，DIDi>；
S303: GNi sending identity registration information over a secure channel<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>For Ui，UiWill be provided with<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>Storing into ICiH (.) is a hash function against collision;
S304：Uiinputting biological fingerprint BiCalculating biological information
Figure BDA0003575802590000025
Verification value
Figure BDA0003575802590000026
ICiPreservation of CiAnd Vi。
Further, the login process of the user specifically includes:
s401: user UiInsert identity card, input ID'i、PW’iAnd B'i，ICiComputing
Figure BDA0003575802590000027
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000028
Figure BDA0003575802590000031
S402: after successful login, the identity card is based on the stored gateway identity IDGNiWill UiThe access requirement X is sent to GNi, and the GNi sends the identification ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement XSjIs sent to Ui；
S403：ICiGenerating a random number riCalculating DIDi＝h(IDi·u)、RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi)、
Figure BDA0003575802590000032
And a login request
Figure BDA0003575802590000033
And D2＝h(DIDi·ri·TIDi·Ki·T1·IDSj)，T1Is the current timestamp;
S404：Uisending a login message M1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>To GNi.
Further, the process of selecting an execution scenario for authentication and key negotiation according to the gateway node location of the sensor node identity to be accessed by the user specifically comprises the following steps: the current GNi receives the login message, checks the requesting sensor node SjWhether it is in the registered sensor list; if so, performing an authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 1; otherwise, the authentication and key negotiation phase of scenario 2 is performed.
Further, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 1 specifically includes:
s501: current GNi at T2Receives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | T2-T1If the value of | is less than or equal to the value of delta T, the threshold value of the propagation delay of the delta T message is used, and if the test is not passed, the connection is terminated; GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000034
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000035
If the verification passes GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates;
S502：IDSjpresence in GNi, GNi generates a random number rhComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000036
Figure BDA0003575802590000037
And D6＝h(IDSj·ri·DIDi·Tr·Pj·rh·T2) GNi sending message M2＝<TIDi，D3，D4，D5，D6，T2>To Sj；
S503：SjAt T3Time of day receiving M2Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000038
Figure BDA0003575802590000039
If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：Sjgenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000310
And D8＝h(Pj·rj·T2·rh·TIDi·ri·T3·Tr) Sending a message M3＝<D7，D8，T3>To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T4Moment of receipt message M3Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000311
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000312
If the verification fails, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is computed
Figure BDA00035758025900000313
And D11＝h(Ki·DIDi·r’j·T1·rh·T4·ri) Sending a message M4＝<D9，D10，D11，T4>To user Ui；
S506: when the user UiAt T5Moment of receipt message M4Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000314
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000315
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (DID) in SKi·ri·rj·IDSj) At UiGNi and SjAre established.
Further, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage of the scenario 2 specifically includes:
s601: current GNi at THReceives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | TH-T1< DELTA.T, | if the test passes, GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating K'i＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure BDA0003575802590000041
Verification M1Effectiveness of
Figure BDA0003575802590000042
If the verification passes GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates; ID (identity)SjAbsence from GNi, GNi broadcasting a message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>To the remaining gateway node (GNj) where the value L is verified1＝h(IDSj·TIDi·IDGNi·Sran·TH)；
S602: GNj at TFTime of day receipt message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>Checking the validity of the time | TF-TH| ≦ Δ T, if validated, and IDSjPresent at GNj, then verify
Figure BDA0003575802590000043
If the verification passes, calculating a secret value KF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj) Authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000044
And L2＝h(TIDi·IDGNi·KF i·IDSj·TF) Sending a message M5＝<A1，IDGNj，L2，TIDi，TF>To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at TugfTime of day message M5Checking the validity of the time | Tugf-TFIf | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000045
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000046
If the verification passes GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiComputing an authentication request Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure BDA0003575802590000047
And L3＝h(Ki·KF i·IDSj·IDGNj·Tugf) Sending M6＝<A2，L3，IDGNj，Tugf>To user Ui；
S604: when the user UiAt T2Time of day message M4Checking the validity of the time | T2-TugfIf | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000048
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000049
If the verification is passed, a random number r is generatediComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000410
L4＝h(TIDi·ri·KF i·T2·IDSj) Then U isiSending a login message M7＝<TIDi，IDSj，A3，L4，T2>To GNj;
s605: GNj at T3Time of day message M7Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2Delta T is less than or equal to | and if the verification is valid, K is calculatedF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj)，
Figure BDA00035758025900000411
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000412
If the verification passes, GNj generates a random number rfComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000413
Figure BDA00035758025900000414
And L5＝h(IDSj·ri·TIDi·Tr·Pj·rf·T3) Sending a message M8＝<TIDi，A4，A5，L5，T3>To Sj；
S606：SjAt T4Time of day message M8Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000415
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000416
If the verification passes, SjGenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000417
And L6＝h(Pj·rj·T3·rf·TIDi·ri·T4·Tr) Then sends M9＝<A6，L6，T4>To GNj;
S607：GNj is at T5Time of day message M9Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000051
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000052
If the verification passes, computing an authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000053
And L7＝h(KF i·TIDi·rj·T2·rf·T5·ri) Sending M10＝<A7，A8，L7，T5>Is sent to Ui；
S608: when the user UiAt T6Moment of receipt message M10Checking the validity of the time | T6-T5If | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000054
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000055
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (TID) in SKi·ri·rj·rf·IDSj) At UiGNj and SjIs established by using a session key, a user UiCan access Sj。
Further, the method also comprises a password replacing stage: after the identity card is verified to be valid, a new password is required to be input, and the identity card replaces the original value with the new value through calculation.
Further, the specific process of the password replacing stage is as follows:
s701: user UiInput IDi、PWiAnd Bi，ICiComputing
Figure BDA0003575802590000056
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000057
If the verification is valid, ICiRequiring a new password to be input;
s702: when receiving new password PWi new，ICiCalculating RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) New identity information RPWi new＝h(PWi new·u·IDi) And
Figure BDA0003575802590000058
new verification value
Figure BDA0003575802590000059
S703：ICiUsing Vi new，Yi newInstead of ViAnd Yi。
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the authentication and key negotiation method suitable for the wireless sensor can solve the problem of identity legality of a user accessing the sensor node, realizes bidirectional authentication and key negotiation among the user, the gateway and the node, provides safety guarantee for data safety transmission in a wireless sensor environment, and meanwhile, the protocol has wide application scenes, a plurality of gateway nodes exist, and remote node deployment can be realized.
2. The invention utilizes the biological hash to help eliminate the false acceptance rate without increasing the incidence rate of the false rejection rate; moreover, the bio-hash has a high degree of separation for the imposter, real and zero error rate population;
3. the invention also supports dynamic node addition and a user-friendly password change mechanism, and the intelligent card changes the stored identity registration information according to the new password of the user in the password change stage, thereby avoiding the password leakage of the user
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiment(s) of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a topology of a wireless sensor network according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a process for on-line user identity card secret provisioning in an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 illustrates scenario 1 authentication and key agreement procedure in an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a scenario 2 authentication and key agreement procedure in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to examples and accompanying drawings, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not meant to limit the present invention.
Example (b): a method for authentication and key negotiation applicable to a wireless sensor is disclosed, as shown in fig. 1, the method involves five roles of a user, a system administrator, an identity card, a gateway node and a sensor node, and symbols and meanings in a protocol are shown in table 1:
TABLE 1 symbolic description
Figure BDA0003575802590000061
The protocol comprises the following steps:
s1, secret presetting stage;
s2, a login negotiation stage;
s3, adding dynamic nodes;
s4, password replacing stage.
In step S1, the secret presetting phase is divided into three steps of off-line sensor node secret presetting, on-line sensor node secret presetting, and on-line user identity card secret presetting.
The secret presetting process of the off-line sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s101: the system administrator is each sensor node SjGenerating unique identity IDsSjJ is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, and m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor node
Figure BDA0003575802590000071
1≤j≤m，SranIs a secret random number shared by the gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<IDSj，Pj>，1≤j≤m；
S104: the system administrator presets GNi a master key XGNiAnd S shared by all gatewaysran。
The secret presetting process of the online sensor node specifically comprises the following steps:
s201: each sensor node sends registration information<IDSj，Tr，Mj>To the current gateway node GNi, verify the value Mj＝h(IDSj·Pj·Tr)，TrIs the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, it calculates
Figure BDA0003575802590000072
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000073
If the verification passes, GNi sends an acknowledgement message to SjGNi storage<IDSj，Tr>，SjStorage Tr。
As shown in fig. 2, the secret presetting process of the online user identity card specifically includes:
s301: user UiInserting identity card ICiSelect the identity IDiPassword PWiAnd a random number u, calculating the identity noteVolume request DIDi＝h(IDiU) and RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) Sending over a secure channel<DIDi，RPWi>To GNi;
s302: GNi receives the identity registration request if DIDiUnregistered, GNi selects a random number TIDiCalculating identity registration information Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi) And
Figure BDA0003575802590000074
Kifor secret values between and GNi, GNi save<TIDi，DIDi>；
S303: GNi sending identity registration information over a secure channel<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>For Ui，UiWill be provided with<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>Storing into ICiH (.) is a hash function against collision;
S304：Uiinputting biological fingerprint BiCalculating biological information
Figure BDA0003575802590000075
Verification value
Figure BDA0003575802590000076
ICiPreservation CiAnd Vi。
In step S2, the login negotiation stage is divided into a login stage and an authentication and key negotiation stage. The user first uses the identity card ICiA login session is initiated, the identity of the user is verified in the identity card, and once the user's validity is verified, the login message is forwarded to the current Gateway Node (GNi). GNi checking the validity of the time and the validity of the login message, if the ID isSjPresent at GNi, the authentication and key agreement phase executes scenario 1, otherwise scenario 2 is executed.
The login process of the user specifically comprises the following steps:
s401: user UiPlug-in identity cardIs ID 'input'i、PW’iAnd B'i，ICiComputing
Figure BDA0003575802590000081
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000082
Figure BDA0003575802590000083
S402: after successful login, the identity card is based on the stored gateway identity IDGNiWill UiThe access requirement X is sent to GNi, and the GNi sends the identification ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement XSjIs sent to Ui；
S403：ICiGenerating a random number riCalculating DIDi＝h(IDi·u)、RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi)、
Figure BDA0003575802590000084
And a login request
Figure BDA0003575802590000085
And D2＝h(DIDi·ri·TIDi·Ki·T1·IDSj)，T1Is the current timestamp;
S404：Uisending a login message M1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>To GNi.
As shown in fig. 3, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage in scenario 1 specifically includes:
s501: current GNi at T2Receives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | T2-T1If the value of | is less than or equal to the value of delta T, the threshold value of the propagation delay of the delta T message is used, and if the test is not passed, the connection is terminated; GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating K'i＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure BDA0003575802590000086
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000087
If the verification passes GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates;
S502：IDSjpresence in GNi, GNi generates a random number rhComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000088
Figure BDA0003575802590000089
And D6＝h(IDSj·ri·DIDi·Tr·Pj·rh·T2) GNi sending message M2＝<TIDi，D3，D4，D5，D6，T2>To Sj；
S503：SjAt T3Time of day receiving M2Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000810
Figure BDA00035758025900000811
If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：Sjgenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000812
And D8＝h(Pj·rj·T2·rh·TIDi·ri·T3·Tr) Sending a message M3＝<D7，D8，T3>To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T4Time of day message M3Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000813
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000814
If the verification fails, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is computed
Figure BDA00035758025900000815
And D11＝h(Ki·DIDi·r’j·T1·rh·T4·ri) Sending a message M4＝<D9，D10，D11，T4>To user Ui；
S506: when the user UiAt T5Moment of receipt message M4Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000816
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000817
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (DID) at SKi·ri·rj·IDSj) At UiGNi and SjAre established.
As shown in fig. 4, the process of executing the authentication and key negotiation stage in scenario 2 specifically includes:
s601: current GNi at THReceives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | TH-T1< DELTA.T, | if the test passes, GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating K'i＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure BDA0003575802590000091
Verification M1Effectiveness of
Figure BDA0003575802590000092
If the verification passes GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates; IDSjAbsence from GNi, GNi broadcasting a message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>To the remaining gateway node (GNj) where the value L is verified1＝h(IDSj·TIDi·IDGNi·Sran·TH)；
S602: GNj at TFTime of day receipt message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>Checking the validity of the time | TF-TH| ≦ Δ T, if validated, and IDSjPresent at GNj, then verify
Figure BDA0003575802590000093
If the verification is passed, calculating a secret value KF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj) Authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000094
And L2＝h(TIDi·IDGNi·KF i·IDSj·TF) Sending a message M5＝<A1，IDGNj，L2，TIDi，TF>To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at TugfTime of day message M5Checking the validity of the time | Tugf-TF| ≦ Δ T, if the test is passed, calculate
Figure BDA00035758025900000918
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000095
If the authentication is passed GNi uses TIDiRetrieving DIDiComputing an authentication request Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure BDA0003575802590000096
And L3＝h(Ki·KF i·IDSj·IDGNj·Tugf) Sending M6＝<A2，L3，IDGNj，Tugf>To user Ui；
S604: when the user UiAt T2Time of day message M4Checking the validity of the time | T2-TugfIf | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000097
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000098
If the verification is passed, a random number r is generatediComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000099
L4＝h(TIDi·ri·KF i·T2·IDSj) Then U isiSending a login message M7＝<TIDi，IDSj，A3，L4，T2>To GNj;
s605: GNj at T3Time of day message M7Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2Delta T is less than or equal to | and if the verification is valid, K is calculatedF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj)，
Figure BDA00035758025900000910
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000911
If the verification passes, GNj generates a random number rfComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000912
Figure BDA00035758025900000913
Figure BDA00035758025900000914
And L5＝h(IDSj·ri·TIDi·Tr·Pj·rf·T3) Sending a message M8＝<TIDi，A4，A5，L5，T3>To Sj；
S606：SjAt T4Time of day message M8Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA00035758025900000915
Authentication
Figure BDA00035758025900000916
If the verification passes, SjGenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure BDA00035758025900000917
Then sends M9＝<A6，L6，T4>To GNj;
s607: GNj at T5Moment of receipt message M9Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure BDA0003575802590000101
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000102
If the verification passes, calculating an authentication request
Figure BDA0003575802590000103
And L7＝h(KF i·TIDi·rj·T2·rf·T5·ri) Sending M10＝<A7，A8，L7，T5>Is sent to Ui；
S608: when the user UiAt T6Time of day message M10Checking the validity of the time | T6-T5| ≦ Δ T, if the test is passed, calculate
Figure BDA0003575802590000104
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000105
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (TID) in SKi·ri·rj·rf·IDSj) At UiGNj and SjIs established by using a session key, a user UiCan access Sj。
In step S3, the specific content of the dynamic node joining stage is: when a new sensor node needs to be added into a target area, a system administrator deploys the new sensor node on the target area through an off-line sensor node secret presetting stage. And then, leading the new sensor node into a setting network model through an on-line sensor node secret presetting stage.
The password replacing stage of step S4 includes: after the identity card is verified to be valid, a new password is required to be input, the identity card replaces the original value with a new value through calculation, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
S701：user UiInput IDi、PWiAnd Bi，ICiComputing
Figure BDA0003575802590000106
Authentication
Figure BDA0003575802590000107
If the verification is valid, ICiRequiring a new password to be input;
s702: when receiving new password PWi new，ICiCalculating RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) New identity information RPWi new＝h(PWi new·u·IDi) And
Figure BDA0003575802590000108
new verification value
Figure BDA0003575802590000109
S703：ICiUsing Vi new，Yi newInstead of ViAnd Yi。
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A method for authentication and key negotiation of a wireless sensor is characterized by comprising the following steps:
secret presetting stage: secretly presetting an offline sensor node, an online sensor node and an online user identity card;
a login negotiation stage: the method comprises the steps that a user inserts an identity card to input identity information for identity verification, login information of the user is forwarded to a gateway node stored by the identity card, and after time validity and login information validity are checked, an execution scene is selected to carry out authentication and key negotiation according to the gateway node position of the identity of a sensor node to be accessed by the user;
a dynamic node joining stage: when a new sensor node needs to be added into a target area, a system administrator deploys the new sensor node in the target area through off-line sensor node secret presetting, and the new sensor node is introduced into a setting network model through on-line sensor node secret presetting.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the secret provisioning process of the offline sensor node specifically includes:
s101: the system administrator is each sensor node SjGenerating unique identity IDsSjJ is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to m, and m is the number of sensor nodes;
s102: system administrator calculates secret values for each sensor node
Figure FDA0003575802580000013
1≤j≤m，SranIs a secret random number shared by the gateway nodes;
s103: sensor node preservation<IDSj，Pj>，1≤j≤m；
S104: the system administrator presets GNi a master key XGNiAnd S shared by all gatewaysran。
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the secret provisioning process of the online sensor node specifically includes:
s201: each sensor node sends registration information<IDSj，Tr，Mj>To the current gateway node GNi, verify the value Mj＝h(IDSj·Pj·Tr)，TrIs the registration time;
s202: once GNi receives the message, it calculates
Figure FDA0003575802580000011
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000012
If the verification passes, GNi sends an acknowledgement message to SjGNi storage<IDSj，Tr>，SjStorage Tr。
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the secret provisioning process of the online user identity card specifically comprises:
s301: user UiInserting identity card ICiSelecting an identity IDiPassword PWiAnd a random number u, calculating an identity registration request DIDi＝h(IDiU) and RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) Sending over a secure channel<DIDi，RPWi>To GNi;
s302: GNi receives the identity registration request if DIDiUnregistered, GNi selects a random number TIDiCalculating identity registration information Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi) And Yi＝Ki⊕RPWi，KiFor secret values between and GNi, GNi save<TIDi，DIDi>；
S303: GNi sending identity registration information over a secure channel<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>For Ui，UiWill be provided with<Yi，TIDi，h(.)，IDGNi>Storing into ICiH (.) is a hash function against collision;
S304：Uiinputting biological fingerprint BiCalculating biological information
Figure FDA0003575802580000021
Verification value
Figure FDA0003575802580000022
ICiPreservation CiAnd Vi。
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the login procedure of the user specifically comprises:
s401: user UiInsert identity card, input ID'i、PW’iAnd B'i，ICiComputing
Figure FDA0003575802580000023
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000024
Figure FDA0003575802580000025
S402: after successful login, the identity card is based on the stored gateway identity IDGNiWill UiThe access requirement X is sent to GNi, and the GNi sends the identification ID of the corresponding sensor according to the access requirement XSjIs sent to Ui；
S403：ICiGenerating a random number riCalculating DIDi＝h(IDi·u)、RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi)、Ki＝Yi⊕RPWiAnd a login request
Figure FDA0003575802580000026
And D2＝h(DIDi·ri·TIDi·Ki·T1·IDSj)，T1Is the current timestamp;
S404：Uisending a login message M1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>To GNi.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the process of selecting the execution scenario for performing authentication and key negotiation according to the presence of the gateway node location in the sensor node identity to be accessed by the user specifically comprises: the current GNi receives the login message, checks the requesting sensor node SjWhether it is in the registered sensor list; if so, performing an authentication and key negotiation stage of scenario 1; otherwise, the authentication and key negotiation phase of scenario 2 is performed.
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the process of performing the authentication and key agreement phase in scenario 1 specifically comprises:
s501: current GNi at T2Receives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | T2-T1If the value of | is less than or equal to the value of delta T, the threshold value of the propagation delay of the delta T message is used, and if the test is not passed, the connection is terminated; GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating
Figure FDA0003575802580000027
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000028
If the verification passes GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates;
S502：IDSjpresence in GNi, GNi generates a random number rhComputing an authentication request
Figure FDA0003575802580000029
Figure FDA00035758025800000210
Figure FDA00035758025800000211
And D6＝h(IDSj·ri·DIDi·Tr·Pj·rh·T2) GNi sending message M2＝<TIDi，D3，D4，D5，D6，T2>To Sj；
S503：SjAt T3Time of day receiving M2Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure FDA00035758025800000212
Figure FDA00035758025800000213
If the verification is not established, the connection is terminated;
S504：Sjgenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure FDA00035758025800000214
And D8＝h(Pj·rj·T2·rh·TIDi·ri·T3·Tr) Sending a message M3＝<D7，D8，T3>To GNi;
s505: when GNi is at T4Time of day message M3Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure FDA0003575802580000031
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000032
If the verification fails, the connection is terminated, otherwise an authentication request is computed
Figure FDA0003575802580000033
Figure FDA0003575802580000034
And D11＝h(Ki·DIDi·r’j·T1·rh·T4·ri) Sending a message M4＝<D9，D10，D11，T4>To user Ui；
S506: when the user UiAt T5Time of day message M4Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure FDA0003575802580000035
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000036
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s507: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (DID) at SKi·ri·rj·IDSj) At UiGNi and SjAre established.
8. The method according to claim 6, wherein the process of performing the authentication and key agreement phase in scenario 2 specifically comprises:
s601: current GNi at THReceives the login message M at any moment1＝<TIDi，IDSj，D1，D2，T1>GNi checking the validity of the time | TH-T1< DELTA.T, | if the test passes, GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiCalculating K'i＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure FDA0003575802580000037
Verification M1Effectiveness of
Figure FDA0003575802580000038
If the authentication is passed GNi confirms user UiIdentity, otherwise the connection terminates; IDSjAbsence from GNi, GNi broadcasting a message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>To the remaining gateway node (GNj) where the value L is verified1＝h(IDSj·TIDi·IDGNi·Sran·TH)；
S602: GNj at TFTime of day receipt message<IDSj，TIDi，IDGNi，L1，TH>Checking the validity of the time | TF-TH| ≦ Δ T, if validated, and IDSjPresent at GNj, then verify
Figure FDA0003575802580000039
If the verification passes, calculating a secret value KF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj) Authentication request
Figure FDA00035758025800000310
Sending a message M5＝<A1，IDGNj，L2，TIDi，TF>To GNi;
s603: when GNi is at TugfTime of day message M5Checking the validity of the time | Tugf-TFIf | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure FDA00035758025800000316
Authentication
Figure FDA00035758025800000311
If the verification passes GNi use TIDiRetrieving DIDiComputing an authentication request Ki＝h(DIDi·TIDi·XGNi)，
Figure FDA00035758025800000312
And L3＝h(Ki·KF i·IDSj·IDGNj·Tugf) Sending M6＝<A2，L3，IDGNj，Tugf>To user Ui；
S604: when the user UiAt T2Time of day message M4Checking the validity of the time | T2-TugfIf | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure FDA00035758025800000313
Authentication
Figure FDA00035758025800000314
If the verification is passed, a random number r is generatediComputing an authentication request
Figure FDA00035758025800000315
Then UiSending a login message M7＝<TIDi，IDSj，A3，L4，T2>To GNj;
s605: GNj at T3Time of day message M7Checking the validity of the time | T3-T2Delta T is less than or equal to | and if the verification is valid, K is calculatedF i＝h(TIDi·XGNj)，
Figure FDA0003575802580000041
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000042
If the verification passes, GNj generates a random number rfComputing an authentication request
Figure FDA0003575802580000043
Figure FDA0003575802580000044
Figure FDA0003575802580000045
And L5＝h(IDSj·ri·TIDi·Tr·Pj·rf·T3) Sending a message M8＝<TIDi，A4，A5，L5，T3>To Sj；
S606：SjAt T4Time of day message M8Checking the validity of the time | T4-T3If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure FDA0003575802580000046
Authentication
Figure FDA0003575802580000047
If the verification passes, SjGenerating a random number rjComputing an authentication request
Figure FDA0003575802580000048
And L6＝h(Pj·rj·T3·rf·TIDi·ri·T4·Tr) Then sends M9＝<A6，L6，T4>To GNj;
s607: GNj at T5Moment of receipt message M9Checking the validity of the time | T5-T4If the verification is valid, calculating
Figure FDA0003575802580000049
Authentication
Figure FDA00035758025800000410
If the verification passes, calculating an authentication request
Figure FDA00035758025800000411
And L7＝h(KF i·TIDi·rj·T2·rf·T5·ri) Sending M10＝<A7，A8，L7，T5>Is sent to Ui；
S608: when the user UiAt T6Time of day message M10Checking the validity of the time | T6-T5If | ≦ Δ T, calculating
Figure FDA00035758025800000412
Authentication
Figure FDA00035758025800000413
If the verification is passed, the sensor node is true and reliable, otherwise, the connection is terminated;
s609: after the mutual authentication is successful, the session key is set as h (TID) at SKi·ri·rj·rf·IDSj) At UiGNj and SjIs established by using a session key, a user UiCan access Sj。
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising a password change stage of: after the identity card is verified to be valid, a new password is required to be input, and the identity card replaces the original value with the new value through calculation.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the password change stage comprises the following specific steps:
s701: user UiInput IDi、PWiAnd Bi，ICiComputing
Figure FDA00035758025800000414
Authentication
Figure FDA00035758025800000415
If the verification is valid, ICiRequiring a new password to be input;
s702: when receiving new password PWi new，ICiCalculating RPWi＝h(PWi·u·IDi) New identity information RPWi new＝h(PWi new·u·IDi) And
Figure FDA00035758025800000416
new verification value
Figure FDA00035758025800000417
S703：ICiUsing Vi new，Yi newInstead of ViAnd Yi。
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