CN114358495A - Nuclear power plant deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation method - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to a nuclear power plant deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation method, which comprises the following steps: (1) determining basic information of the depth defense layer independence quantitative evaluation; (2) quantifying the basic information according to a probability safety analysis model; (3) and calculating the relevance of the depth defense layers according to the qualitative and quantitative information of the depth defense layers to obtain the independence quantitative evaluation result of the depth defense layers. The method provided by the invention can more specifically and objectively analyze and understand the degree of independence between the depth defense levels, make up for the defect of only qualitative understanding, and support the optimization of the depth defense level design of the nuclear power plant.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the design technology of nuclear power plants, and particularly relates to a quantitative evaluation method for depth defense level independence of a nuclear power plant.
Background
The main means for preventing accidents and reducing accident consequences in a nuclear power plant is to apply a deep defense concept and prevent accidents from causing harm to personnel and the environment through the combination of a series of continuous and independent defense layers. The method specifically comprises the following steps: the first level prevents deviation from normal operation and prevents failure of safety critical items; detecting and controlling deviation from a normal operation state at a second level to prevent the predicted operation event from being upgraded to an accident condition; the third level assumes that an accident will occur, and the nuclear power plant is returned to a safe state through a safety system and regulations; the fourth level alleviates accident consequences caused by failure of the third level of deep defense; the purpose of the fifth and final level of defense is to mitigate the consequences of radioactivity that may be caused by the release of potential radioactivity from an accident situation.
The third level and the fourth level are realized by arranging a nuclear power plant safety system (facility), and for a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, the design advantages and disadvantages of the two levels determine the safety level of the nuclear power plant to a great extent.
The layers of the deep defense must be independent of each other as practically as possible, so as to avoid the failure of one layer of defense from reducing the effectiveness of other layers. The depth defense design of the traditional nuclear power plant is developed mainly by means of determinism and engineering judgment, the understanding of the independence of depth defense layers is qualitative, and quantitative evaluation methods and understanding are lacked.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a quantitative evaluation method for independence of depth defense layers of a nuclear power plant aiming at the defect that the depth defense design of the traditional nuclear power plant is only qualitatively known, so that the independence degree of the depth defense layers is described more specifically and objectively, and the depth defense design and optimization of the nuclear power plant are supported.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows: a nuclear power plant deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation method comprises the following steps:
(1) determining basic information of the depth defense layer independence quantitative evaluation;
(2) quantifying the basic information according to a probability safety analysis model;
(3) and calculating the relevance of the depth defense layers according to the qualitative and quantitative information of the depth defense layers to obtain the independence quantitative evaluation result of the depth defense layers.
Further, according to the method for quantitatively evaluating the independence of the depth defense levels of the nuclear power plant, the depth defense levels comprise a third level which assumes that an accident occurs, and the nuclear power plant is returned to a safe state through a safety system and a rule; the fourth level alleviates the accident consequences caused by the failure of the third level of defense in depth.
Further, according to the method for quantitatively evaluating independence of deep defense layers of the nuclear power plant, the basic information in the step (1) includes: each initiating event, the frequency of the initiating event, the system to be invested after each initiating event, the depth defense level of the system to be relieved, and the like.
Further, in the method for quantitatively evaluating independence of deep defense layers of the nuclear power plant, the step (2) of quantizing the basic information includes: the probability of failure of each system is calculated, as well as the frequency of occurrence of the accident sequence.
Further, according to the quantitative evaluation method for the independence of the deep defense layers of the nuclear power plant, the correlation calculation in the step (3) can be performed on different levels, and the correlation calculation includes the correlation of the deep defense layers of an event sequence, the correlation of the deep defense layers of an initial event and the correlation of the deep defense layers of the whole plant.
Further, according to the quantitative evaluation method for the independence of the depth defense layers of the nuclear power plant, the method for calculating the relevance of the depth defense layers in the step (3) is as follows:
for a single accident sequence, the interval of [0,1] is used for representing the correlation degree between layers, and the correlation degree is calculated by the following formula:
wherein D is the calculated correlation, S is the frequency of accident sequence calculated by a Probability Safety Analysis (PSA) model, P (A | IE) is the probability of failure of the system A, P (B | IE) is the probability of failure of the system B, and F is the probability of failure of the system BIEIs the frequency of occurrence of the originating event; the system A and the system B belong to two deep defense levels, and in a single accident sequence, the system A is firstly put into the system A to relieve accidents, and then the system B is put into the system B to relieve accidents;
on the basis of the single accident sequence correlation degree, weighting is carried out according to the system failure probability, and the correlation degree between deep defense layers aiming at a certain initial event or state (such as DEC-A) can be obtained, wherein the calculation formula is as follows:
where i represents a sequence of incidents in a certain originating event or state, from 1 to n.
Considering a plurality of initial events or states, weighting according to the occurrence probability of the initial events or states, and obtaining the correlation among the plant-wide defense deep levels for all the initial events or states, the calculation formula is as follows:
wherein,
k represents an initial event or condition that may occur at the nuclear power plant, from 1 to n.
Further, in the method for quantitatively evaluating independence of deep defense levels of the nuclear power plant, in the step (3), when no countermeasure is provided for a deep defense level, the degree of correlation between the deep defense level and the previous level is considered to be 1.
Further, the quantitative evaluation method for the independence of the deep defense layers of the nuclear power plant further comprises the step (4) of carrying out optimization feedback on the safety system according to the quantitative evaluation result of the independence of the deep defense layers.
The invention has the following beneficial effects: on the basis of the development of the traditional deep defense of the nuclear power plant by determinism and engineering judgment, the invention provides a quantitative evaluation method of the independence of the deep defense layers for the deep defense layers (mainly the third layer and the fourth layer) of the nuclear power plant by combining with the knowledge of Probability Safety Analysis (PSA), more specifically and objectively analyzes and understands the degree of the independence between the deep defense layers, makes up the defect of only qualitative understanding, and supports the optimization of the design of the deep defense layers of the nuclear power plant.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a quantitative evaluation method for independence of deep defense layers of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is an exemplary illustration of nuclear power plant accident mitigation in an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of basic information of a quantitative evaluation table of deep defense hierarchy independence of a nuclear power plant in an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating a correlation calculation of a quantitative evaluation table of deep defense hierarchy independence of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a basic information schematic diagram of a deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation table of a large LOCA accident of a certain nuclear power plant;
FIG. 6 is a correlation calculation diagram (3a and 3b levels) of a quantitative evaluation table of deep defense level independence of a large LOCA accident in a nuclear power plant;
fig. 7 is a correlation calculation diagram (3b and 4 levels) of a deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation table of a large LOCA accident in a certain nuclear power plant.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
After the nuclear power plant has an accident, a safety related system is put into the nuclear power plant to relieve the accident. The Event Tree (ET) in the use of Probabilistic Security Analysis (PSA) can be as shown in fig. 2. After an Initial Event (IE) occurs, the system A puts in relieving the accident, and if the system A runs successfully, the accident is relieved; if the system A fails, the system B is put into operation to relieve the accident; if both system a and system B fail, the incident cannot be mitigated. System a and system B are systems belonging to two levels of defense in depth.
In the above example, the originating event (IE) has a corresponding probability of occurrence, i.e., the frequency F of occurrence of the originating eventIE(ii) a System a and system B have a probability of failure (in the case of an originating event), i.e., the probability of system failure P (a | IE) and P (B | IE); the probability of failure to mitigate the incident (sequence 3) is calculated as follows:
F＝FIE*P(A∩B|IE)
if systems a and B are completely independent, the probability that the incident cannot be mitigated is: f ═ FIEP (a | IE) × P (B | IE). In this case, the accident mitigation hierarchy formed by systems a and B is completely independent, and the degree of correlation (degree of correlation) is noted as 0. If the system A fails and the system B also fails, the accident mitigation hierarchy formed by the systems A and B is completely correlated, and the correlation degree is marked as 1.
Other situation correlations are between 0 and 1, so the degree of correlation (correlation) between the defense depth levels can be represented by an interval of [0,1], and is calculated by the following formula:
wherein D is the calculated correlation, and S is the sequence occurrence probability calculated by the PSA model.
Because of a plurality of accident sequences of the nuclear power plant, on the basis of the relevance of a single accident sequence, weighting is carried out according to the system failure probability, and the relevance between deep defense levels aiming at an initial event or state (such as DEC-A) can be obtained, wherein the calculation formula is as follows:
since multiple systems may be invested in an originating event or state for incident mitigation, such as investing A, B, C, D, additional systems required after different system failures may be different, and thus there may be multiple incident sequences relative to the single sequence example, where i represents the incident sequence for an originating event or state, from 1 to n.
Similarly, considering a plurality of originating events or states, weighting according to the probability of the originating event or state, the correlation between the plant-wide defense levels for all the originating events or states can be obtained, and the calculation formula is as follows:
wherein,
k represents an initial event or condition that may occur at the nuclear power plant, from 1 to n.
In addition, in the case where no countermeasure is provided for a certain depth defense level, the above formula is still used for the correlation calculation, and the correlation between the depth defense level and the previous level is considered to be 1.
Based on the calculation method, the evaluation steps of the nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchical independence quantitative evaluation method provided by the invention are shown in fig. 1. The specific implementation steps comprise:
(1) filling basic information of a depth defense layer independence quantitative evaluation table: filling form qualitative related information including each initial event, the frequency of the initial event, a system needing to be invested after each initial event occurs, a deep defense level to which the system belongs and the like according to the design characteristics of a specific nuclear power plant;
(2) quantitative evaluation table for independence of quantitative depth defense layers: calculating the failure possibility of each system and the occurrence possibility of each accident sequence according to the probability safety analysis model;
(3) calculating the depth defense level correlation degree: and calculating the relevance of the depth defense layers based on the formulas 1 to 3 according to the qualitative and quantitative information of the depth defense layers to obtain the quantitative evaluation result of the independence of the depth defense layers. The correlation calculation can be performed on different levels, such as a certain event sequence, a certain originating event, and the depth defense level correlation of the whole plant.
Fig. 3 and 4 show a depth defense hierarchy independence quantitative evaluation table involved in the implementation step.
In fig. 4, note 1 is that the correlation is calculated according to formula 1, note 2 is that the correlation is calculated according to formula 2 on the basis of the accident sequence level calculation result, and note 3 is that the correlation is calculated according to formula 3 on the basis of the IE/state level calculation result.
Examples
The implementation steps of the invention are explained by taking a large LOCA accident of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant as an example.
1) Filling basic information of depth defense level independence quantitative evaluation table
According to the design information of the nuclear power plant, a relevant level mitigation system after a large LOCA accident occurs is shown in FIG. 5. The deep defense level comprises a level 3a (DBA), a level 3B (DEC-A) and a level 4(DEC-B), the accident mitigation system of the level 3a (DBA) comprises a safety injection box, a low-pressure safety injection and containment spraying, the accident mitigation system of the level 3B (DEC-A) comprises passive containment heat derivation (corresponding to a containment spraying accident sequence of the level 3 a), and the accident mitigation system of the level 4 comprises serious accident mitigation measures consisting of a series of systems.
2) Quantitative evaluation table for independence of quantitative depth defense layers
According to a probabilistic safety analysis model of a certain nuclear power plant, the probability of failure of each mitigation system after a large LOCA accident occurs, and the probability of occurrence of each accident sequence are shown in FIG. 5.
3) Computing depth defense level relevance
The relevance between the deep defense levels of the nuclear power plant for dealing with the large LOCA accident is calculated by using the formulas 1 to 3, the relevance between the level 3a (DBA) and the level 3B (DEC-A) is shown in figure 6, and the relevance between the level 3B (DEC-A) and the level 4(DEC-B) is shown in figure 7.
In the design of the nuclear power plant for dealing with the large LOCA accident, the correlation degree of a depth defense level 3a and a level 3b is 0.82 (the level of a plurality of accident sequences 3b is not provided with a countermeasure), and the correlation degree of the depth defense level 3b and a level 4 is 0.01, which shows that in the design of measures of the nuclear power plant for dealing with the large LOCA accident, because the level 3b lacks the countermeasure, the independence of the level 3a and the level 3b is low, and because a special serious accident relieving system is arranged, the independence of the level 3b and the level 4 is extremely high and is basically completely independent.
4) Optimized feedback to a safety system (facility)
Based on the analysis results, the following optimization feedbacks are as follows:
the depth defense levels 3a and 3b are high in correlation degree, and the design parameters of the high-pressure safety injection system can be adjusted to a certain degree in consideration of failure of low-pressure safety injection, the high-pressure safety injection system is used for relieving accidents, and the accident relieving capacity is improved.
The correlation degree between the depth defense levels 3b and 4 is extremely low, and from the aspect of level 4 measure configuration, certain optimization can be considered, for example, a containment filtration and discharge system is cancelled, so that the independence is slightly influenced, the project cost can be saved, and the economy is improved.
It will be evident to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the foregoing illustrative embodiments, and that the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential attributes thereof. The present embodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention being indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description, and all changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein. Any reference sign in a claim should not be construed as limiting the claim concerned.
Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment may contain only a single embodiment, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should integrate the description, and the embodiments may be combined as appropriate to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
Claims (8)
1. A nuclear power plant deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) determining basic information of the depth defense layer independence quantitative evaluation;
(2) quantifying the basic information according to a probability safety analysis model;
(3) and calculating the relevance of the depth defense layers according to the qualitative and quantitative information of the depth defense layers to obtain the independence quantitative evaluation result of the depth defense layers.
2. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchy independence quantitative evaluation method of claim 1, characterized in that the deep defense hierarchy includes a third level which assumes that an accident will occur and returns the nuclear power plant to a safe state through a safety system and regulations; the fourth level alleviates the accident consequences caused by the failure of the third level of defense in depth.
3. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchical independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the basic information in the step (1) includes: each initiating event, the occurrence frequency of the initiating event, a system needing to be invested after each initiating event occurs, and a deep defense level of the system is relieved.
4. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchical independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 3, characterized in that quantifying the basic information in the step (2) comprises: the probability of failure of each system is calculated, as well as the frequency of occurrence of the accident sequence.
5. The nuclear power plant defense hierarchy independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 4, wherein the correlation calculation in the step (3) can be performed on different levels, including the defense hierarchy correlation of an incident sequence, the defense hierarchy correlation of an originating incident, and the defense hierarchy correlation of a whole plant.
6. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchy independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 5, characterized in that the method for calculating the deep defense hierarchy relevancy in the step (3) is as follows:
for a single accident sequence, the interval of [0,1] is used for representing the correlation degree between layers, and the correlation degree is calculated by the following formula:
wherein D is the calculated correlation, S is the frequency of accident sequence calculated by a Probability Safety Analysis (PSA) model, P (A | IE) is the probability of failure of the system A, P (B | IE) is the probability of failure of the system B, and F is the probability of failure of the system BIEIs the frequency of occurrence of the originating event; the system A and the system B belong to two deep defense levels, and in a single accident sequence, the system A is firstly put into the system A to relieve accidents, and then the system B is put into the system B to relieve accidents;
on the basis of the single accident sequence correlation degree, weighting is carried out according to the system failure probability, and the correlation degree between deep defense layers aiming at a certain initial event or state can be obtained, wherein the calculation formula is as follows:
considering a plurality of initial events or states, weighting according to the occurrence probability of the initial events or states, and obtaining the correlation among the plant-wide defense deep levels for all the initial events or states, the calculation formula is as follows:
wherein,
k represents an initial event or condition that may occur at the nuclear power plant, from 1 to n.
7. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchy independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 6, characterized in that in the step (3), in the case where no countermeasure is provided for the deep defense hierarchy, the degree of correlation between the deep defense hierarchy and the previous hierarchy is considered to be 1.
8. The nuclear power plant deep defense hierarchical independence quantitative evaluation method according to claim 1, characterized by further comprising the step (4) of optimizing and feeding back a safety system according to a deep defense hierarchical independence quantitative evaluation result.
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| CN202111473313.5A CN114358495A (en) | 2021-12-02 | 2021-12-02 | Nuclear power plant deep defense level independence quantitative evaluation method |
| GBGB2407321.5A GB202407321D0 (en) | 2021-12-02 | 2022-11-07 | Quantitative evaluation method for evaluating independence of defense-in-depth levels for nuclear power plant, and system for implementing same |
| PCT/CN2022/130223 WO2023098410A1 (en) | 2021-12-02 | 2022-11-07 | Quantitative evaluation method for evaluating independence of defense-in-depth levels for nuclear power plant, and system for implementing same |
| ARP220103116A AR127656A1 (en) | 2021-12-02 | 2022-11-11 | METHOD FOR QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE DEFENSE IN DEPTH LEVELS OF A NUCLEAR PLANT AND SYSTEM TO IMPLEMENT SUCH METHOD |
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