CN106548279A - A kind of safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage - Google Patents
A kind of safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage Download PDFInfo
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- CN106548279A CN106548279A CN201610950208.9A CN201610950208A CN106548279A CN 106548279 A CN106548279 A CN 106548279A CN 201610950208 A CN201610950208 A CN 201610950208A CN 106548279 A CN106548279 A CN 106548279A
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage, including：By qualitative security feature, step S1, examines that instrument identifies the advantage of design, shortcoming, and advises；Step S2, evaluates physical phenomenon and its importance sorting under certain scenarios by phenomenon identification and sequencing table；Step S3, goes out Security Target and security function institute facing challenges by defense function tree analysis system evaluation；Step S4, according to the implementing result of step S1 S3, confirms the reasonability of safety measure and system design, completes Preliminary design.The present invention is based on security legislation, depth defense and basic security function, according to the information bank of system design, accident analysiss, experimental data and code analysis, with reference to different field expertise, simultaneously according to the needs and purpose studied, from system to part, and deeper local hierarchy, more comprehensive analysis result can be quickly obtained on horizontal and vertical.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to npp safety analysis technical field, more particularly to it is a kind of for advanced reactor master-plan rank
The safety analytical method of section.
Background technology
At present, reactor safety analysis traditional method mainly has determination by accident analysiss method and theory of probability accident analysiss side
Method.It is determined that being mainly used in the analysis of design basis accident by accident analysiss method.It is determined that discussing safety analytical method with system and portion
The failure of part or the error of personnel select conservative or real model as origination event according to the specific requirement of institute's problem analysis
And a series of corresponding rules and hypothesis (such as the original state that single failure is assumed, guarded), analytical calculation nuclear power plant is related
The response of system, obtains the Radiological Consequences of the accident.Wherein guard model and consider worst situation, thus obtain accident
The ultimate value of consequence, leaves sizable margin of safety to nuclear power plant.
Theory of probability accident analysiss method lays particular emphasis on the analysis of major accident.Theory of probability safety analysis is patrolled by system structure
Property reasoning is collected, the failure probability of subsystem probability and it of thrashing at all levels, part and external condition etc. is contacted
Get up, so as to obtain the probability that each accident occurs.Probability theory method is with the analysis to " event tree " and " fault tree " as base
Plinth.ETA method first carries out function modelling, after origination event, every security-related function by failure
Whether launch step by step, obtain a series of different sequence of events of consequences.Fault Tree Analysis, then using the failure of system as point
The target of analysis, thus counter to push away, searching directly results in whole factors of failure, till the reason for need not going into seriously its generation again,
So as to obtain a series of gate of component failures of descriptive system failure.On the basis of two above analysis, nuclear power plant
Probabilistic safety analysis is generally divided into three ranks to carry out：One-level is to determine the sequence of events and these sequences that reactor core can be caused to damage
The estimated probability of row；Two grades are to determine that nuclear power plant can occur the approach of radioactivity release, and estimate its quantity and frequency, can be from putting
Explanation in terms of penetrating property release seriousness causes the relative importance of each sequence of events of reactor core damage, the weak ring of searching system
Section；Three-level is that public health risk and other social risks are estimated.
The shortcoming that above-mentioned reactor safety analysis method is present has：
1st, concept phase and construction documents design phase are primarily adapted for use in；And for the master-plan stage, due to reaction
Heap detail parameters (such as system and the parameter of part) are not yet obtained, it is impossible to carried out and determined by accident analysiss and theory of probability accident point
Analysis；
2nd, its enforcement needs to expend larger workload, and in the reactor master-plan stage, design may be repeatedly
Modification, causes the workload that the stage accident analysiss, exclusion program overturn sexual factor to be multiplied, complete the difficulty of work also into
Increase again；
3rd, its exploitation mainly for existing proven reactor (secondary heap, three generations's heap), for using numerous new techniques
Advanced reactor is not necessarily suitable for, and routine suitability, the suitability of accident analysiss method are required for costly energy to comment again
Estimate.
The content of the invention
The technical problem to be solved is, there is provided a kind of safety for the advanced reactor master-plan stage
Analysis method, to carry out comprehensive, quick safety analysis for advanced reactor.
In order to solve above-mentioned technical problem, the present invention provides a kind of safety for the advanced reactor master-plan stage point
Analysis method, including：
By qualitative security feature, step S1, examines that instrument identifies the advantage of design, shortcoming, and advises；
Step S2, evaluates physical phenomenon and its importance sorting under certain scenarios by phenomenon identification and sequencing table；
Step S3, goes out Security Target and security function institute facing challenges by defense function tree analysis system evaluation；
Step S4, according to the implementing result of step S1-S3, confirms the reasonability of safety measure and system design, completes just
Step design.
Wherein, step S1 is specifically included：
Design feature, based on the principle of grading of depth defense, with reference to safety recommendation, is decomposed into depth defense by step S11
Functional objective, the security function for realizing depth defense target, three levels of design for realizing security function；
Step S12, design this level to realizing security function examine, obtains inspection result and corresponding advises.
Wherein, step S2 is specifically included：
Step S21, it is determined that it is for assessing General layout Plan to formulate phenomenon identification and sequencing table；
Step S22, obtains database information, the database information include detailed design description and parameter, event lists,
The accident analysiss result and experimental calculation result of accident sequence, this nuclear power plant or other related nuclear power plants；
Step S23, to complete phenomenon identification and sequencing table, selects border, scene and the system unit being adapted to；
Step S24, sets up for evaluating the evaluation points of each phenomenon significance level；
Step S25, according to the information that step S22 and step S23 are obtained, recognizes be likely to occur phenomenon, and formulates
Phenomenon table, the definition for determining each phenomenon；
Step S26, according to evaluation points, judges for the significance level of each phenomenon, and phenomenon importance is entered
Row sequence；
Step S27, evaluates human-subject test, and the human-subject test refers specifically to the professional degree of expert team, the matter of data base
Amount and the understanding to evaluation points.
Wherein, in step S3, defense function tree analysis system includes five levels：It is five layers of depth defense, three big
The possible event of basic security function, facing challenges, adoptable safety measure.
Wherein, step S23 is specifically included：
The target of scene and research according to phenomenon identification with sequencing table research, sets up phenomenon identification with sequencing table research
The border of nuclear power plant；
Scene is divided into into different time phases, and the importance for phenomenon being carried out from time dimension judges；
Nuclear power plant is divided into into different systems, and the importance for phenomenon being carried out from Spatial Dimension judges.
Wherein, if research scene is presurized water reactor large break LOCA, goal in research is assessment reactor system
System General layout Plan, then the border of phenomenon identification and sequencing table is a secondary coolant circuit system.
Wherein, for presurized water reactor large break accident scenarios, the time phase of division includes spurting, pour water again, flood in early days,
Late period floods this four time phases.
Wherein, for the water immersion accident of very high temperature gas cooled reactor, it is cold that nuclear power plant is divided into reactor pressure vessel, reactor
But loop, reactor cavity cooling system and residual heat removal system；Reactor pressure vessel is further divided into turnover oral chamber, rises
Pipe, upper cover and its component, reactor core and reflecting layer, low head.
Wherein, the depth defense is further divided into five levels, including prevention abnormal operation and error, control anon-normal
Often run and error measurement, design basis accident control, Accident prevention upgrading and mitigation major accident consequence, mitigation radioactive material
Matter is discharged into the Radiological Consequences outside factory；Step S3 also includes setting up tree analysis system respectively to each level.
Wherein, described three big basic security functions include reactive control, and reactor core heat is discharged, and limits radioactive substance.
The beneficial effect of the embodiment of the present invention is：
Present invention is primarily based on the working method of qualitative evaluation, expert judgments, therefore relatively conventional safety analytical method
For, analysis result can be obtained within a short period of time；
The present invention is based on security legislation, depth defense and basic security function, according to system design, accident analysiss, experiment
The information bank of data and code analysis, with reference to different field expertise, transversely obtains than more comprehensive analysis result；Together
When, according to the needs and purpose of research, from system to part, and deeper partial layer is inferior, obtains comparison comprehensive on longitudinal direction
Analysis result；
The present invention within a short period of time, can find the weakness of design, propose safety-related measure, obtain nuclear power plant comprehensive
Qualitative safety analysis result.And these results have continuity, follow-up Preliminary design and quantitative safety can be effectively instructed
Analysis；
The present invention due to its it is quick the characteristics of, it is repeatable higher, with higher plasticity.Master-plan stage design
There is more change in scheme, and with the change of General layout Plan, the analysis result of the method that can upgrade in time, support design
The carrying out of work.
Description of the drawings
In order to be illustrated more clearly that the embodiment of the present invention or technical scheme of the prior art, below will be to embodiment or existing
Accompanying drawing to be used needed for having technology description is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only this
Some embodiments of invention, for those of ordinary skill in the art, on the premise of not paying creative work, can be with
Other accompanying drawings are obtained according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is that a kind of flow process of the safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage of the embodiment of the present invention is shown
It is intended to.
Fig. 2 is a kind of another stream of the safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage of the embodiment of the present invention
Journey schematic diagram.
Fig. 3 is qualitative security feature examination schematic flow sheet in the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the structural representation of defense function tree analysis system in the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is that the defense function tree analysis system of the security function 2 of depth defense level 3 in the embodiment of the present invention is illustrated
Figure.
Specific embodiment
The explanation of following embodiment is refer to the attached drawing, can be to the specific embodiment implemented to the example present invention.
The design phase of current nuclear power projects is mainly divided into master-plan-Preliminary design-construction drawing design.To reprint electricity
For standing, master-plan seeks to determine and the difference with reference to power station, and determines that each system and the design of subitem become
More and improve；And for without the new design nuclear power plant with reference to power station, then more it is necessary that carrying out brand-new and detailed totality sets
Meter.The technical scheme of each system, subitem and Preliminary design need to complete detailed safety analysis, is implemented, main equipment specification is worked out
Book and list of (machinery) equipment and materials, the condition for possessing external bid and purchase.
Safety analytical method (the Safety Analysis Method for Overall that the embodiment of the present invention is proposed
Design reactor, SAMO), it is mainly used in nuclear power plant's master-plan stage.The method was provided for the master-plan stage
A kind of qualitative analysis tool, target are the reasonability for confirming General layout Plan, and are laid the foundation for Preliminary design.
Refer to shown in Fig. 1, the embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of safety for the advanced reactor master-plan stage point
Analysis method, including：
By qualitative security feature, step S1, examines that instrument identifies the advantage of design, shortcoming, and advises；
Step S2, evaluates physical phenomenon and its importance sorting under certain scenarios by phenomenon identification and sequencing table；
Step S3, goes out Security Target and security function institute facing challenges by defense function tree analysis system evaluation；
Step S4, according to the implementing result of step S1-S3, confirms the reasonability of safety measure and system design, completes just
Step design.
The safety analytical method of the present embodiment contains three sub- methods and instruments：Qualitative security feature examines instrument
(Qualitative Safety Features Review, QSR), phenomenon are recognized and sequencing table (Phenomena
Identification and Ranking Table, PIRT) and defense function tree analysis system (Protect
Function Tree, PFT), they are complementary, realize security study from scene to phenomenon, from system to subsystem
The safety analysis of system and part.
Specifically, qualitative security feature examines instrument QSR as a systematic methods and instruments, advanced anti-for examining
Design and design alteration of the shut-down system in the master-plan stage are answered, the weak link of current design is recognized, subsequent design is proposed
Directivity suggestion, it is ensured which just possesses expected security feature in the master-plan stage.
Qualitative security feature examines instrument using structurized form to instruct whole process, it is desirable to each professional designer
Consider how to realize depth defense and greater security in their respective fields, and insert form.
Qualitative security feature is examined and mainly complete qualitative security feature review table, and concrete steps are as shown in Figure 3：
1. the principle of grading based on depth defense, combing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), general safety assessment method
(ISAM), international nuclear safety consulting group (INSAG) and innovation type nuclear reactor and fuel recycle international item (INPRO) are formulated
Safety recommendation, while considering depth defense principle；
2. from safety recommendation and depth defense principle, design feature is decomposed, from totality to being specifically decomposed into
Three levels (depth defense functional objective, realize the security function of depth defense target, realize the design of security function), the 3rd
Level (level most specifically) is the object of qualitative Safety Examination；
3. expert examined to third layer level, will draw " agreeing with ", " neutrality ", the conclusion of " not agreeing with ", wherein agreeing with
Represent and support the design, " not agreeing with " then represents and do not support that the design or this respect need more researchs, and provides necessary
Suggestion.
Table 1 gives certain pool type natrium cold fast reactor partial results that qualitative security feature is examined.
" the first level " qualitative security feature of 1 certain pool type natrium cold fast reactor of table examines example
Phenomenon identification is extensively applied in industrial quarters with sequencing table (PIRT), it is applied to reactor system, can be recognized
The phenomenon for affecting reactor system safety-related, and these phenomenons are carried out with the sequence of importance degree.
Formulate phenomenon identification 7 steps are included with sequencing table：(1) problem definition and target → (2) obtain database information
→ (3) define scene and system → (4) are set up quality factor → (5) identification phenomenon → (6) phenomenon importance ranking → (7) and evaluated
Human-subject test.
(1) problem definition and target
Point out why to formulate PIRT and PIRT, elaboration how will be used to need the problem that PIRT is processed, such as commenting
Estimate General layout Plan, guiding experiment modelling, assessment process suitability etc., PIRT is used to assess master-plan in the present embodiment
Scheme.
(2) obtain database information
The information of data base includes detailed design description and parameter, event lists, accident sequence, also includes this core as far as possible
The accident analysiss result and experimental calculation result of power plant or other related nuclear power plants.
(3) scene and system are defined
PIRT is completed to formulate, border, scene and the system unit for selecting to be adapted to is needed.
A) scene and the purpose studied according to PIRT researchs is first had to, " border " of the nuclear power plant of PIRT researchs is set up.
It is presurized water reactor large break LOCA such as to study scene, and goal in research is assessment reactor system master-plan side
Case, then " border " that can determine that PIRT is a secondary coolant circuit system, can ignore containment and conventional island system.
B) scene is divided into into different time phases, the importance in order to phenomenon is carried out from time dimension judges.Such as
For presurized water reactor large break accident scenarios, can be divided into spurt, pour water again, flooding in early days, late period floods this four-stage.
C) nuclear power plant is divided into into different systems, the importance in order to phenomenon is carried out from Spatial Dimension judges, and is
System can also be further subdivided into part.In such as the water immersion accident of very high temperature gas cooled reactor (VHTR), nuclear power plant is divided into instead
Answer core pressure vessel, reactor cooling loop, reactor cavity cooling system and residual heat removal system etc.；And pressure vessel can enter one
Step is subdivided into turnover oral chamber, tedge, upper cover and its component, reactor core and reflecting layer, low head etc..If what division was thinner is
System or part are not affected on PIRT, then without the need for further segmenting；In addition, if further subdivision additionally depends on the mesh of PIRT
's.
(4) evaluation points are set up
Evaluation points are the evaluation criterions for evaluating each phenomenon significance level, evaluation points must be had consistent and clearly be recognized
Know, be clear how based on evaluation points to sort, not so for same phenomenon may provide the sequence for differing greatly.Evaluation points
Can check and accept from accident and derive.
(5) recognize phenomenon
According to step 2) and step 3) obtain information to recognize be likely to occur phenomenon, and formulate phenomenon table, clearly
The definition of each phenomenon, has to each phenomenon and jointly, clearly recognizes.
(6) importance ranking
According to evaluation points, judge for the significance level of each phenomenon, significance level is divided into H, M, L, I this four
Grade (table 2).When significance level is judged, carrying out that can be in the angle in time and space from coarse to fine first judge
In whole scene, which more important in stage, and in first judging whole nuclear power plant, which system is more important.After carrying out independent sequence, will row
Sequence collection takes the mean mode to process together.
The definition of 2 important level of table
(7) evaluate human-subject test
Importance ranking is a step of PIRT most criticals, the order of accuarcy of sequence depend on the professional degree of expert team,
The quality of data base, the understanding to evaluation points, are more than referred to as human-subject test.Human-subject test need to be evaluated, cognitive water
It is flat to be divided into four grades (table 3).
If identifying importance rate high and the low phenomenon of human-subject test, then it is assumed that to need to give during subsequent design
Pay close attention to, such as more tested and analyzed.
The grade of 3 human-subject test of table
| Grade | Meaning |
| 4 | Recognize completely, uncertainty is little |
| 3 | Understanding, uncertainty are medium |
| 2 | Part recognizes, and uncertainty is big |
| 1 | Very limited understanding, uncertainty cannot determine |
Table 4 gives an applicating example, and expert A and expert B has tentatively formulated PIRT to an advanced reactor.
The preliminary PIRT (part) of table 4 expert A and expert B
Defense function tree analysis system (PFT) purpose is that " protective wire " (" protection is formulated to phenomenon important in PIRT
Line " refers to a series of measures for completing to control or protect task), prevention, control or the alleviation for assuring success may cause wind
The important phenomenon of danger.
PIRT and PFT is complementary, and PIRT identifications phenomenon potentially to security-critical, PFT identifications are adoptable
Prevent, control or alleviate the safety measure of these important phenomenons, then designer can further confirm that system schema.
Defense function tree analysis system is using tree structure (referring to Fig. 4) from top to bottom, the highest of the tree structure
Security Target of the node for depth defense, depth defense are divided into five levels, including prevention abnormal operation and error, control it is non-
It is normal to run and error measurement, design basis accident control, Accident prevention upgrading and mitigation major accident consequence, mitigation radioactivity
Radiological Consequences of the substance release to outside factory, set up tree analysis system respectively to each level.
The tree analysis system includes five levels：The big basic security function of five layers of depth defense → tri- (reactivity control,
Reactor core heat is discharged, and limits radioactive substance) → facing challenges → possible event → adoptable safety measure.From depth
Defence is set out, and sets up the content of follow-up level, final " protective wire " for determining the various Possible events of reply, so as to also determine that
All safety measures of depth defense Security Target can be realized.
Fig. 5 gives an example application, for the 3 (design basis of depth defense level that a certain advanced reactor is set up
Accident control) security function 2 (discharge of reactor core hot-fluid) PFT figure.
By described above, the beneficial effects of the present invention is：
Present invention is primarily based on the working method of qualitative evaluation, expert judgments, therefore relatively conventional safety analytical method
For, analysis result can be obtained within a short period of time；
The present invention is based on security legislation, depth defense and basic security function, according to system design, accident analysiss, experiment
The information bank of data and code analysis, with reference to different field expertise, transversely obtains than more comprehensive analysis result；Together
When, according to the needs and purpose of research, from system to part, and deeper partial layer is inferior, obtains comparison comprehensive on longitudinal direction
Analysis result；
The present invention within a short period of time, can find the weakness of design, propose safety-related measure, obtain nuclear power plant comprehensive
Qualitative safety analysis result.And these results have continuity, follow-up Preliminary design and quantitative safety can be effectively instructed
Analysis；
The present invention due to its it is quick the characteristics of, it is repeatable higher, with higher plasticity.Master-plan stage design
There is more change in scheme, and with the change of General layout Plan, the analysis result of the method that can upgrade in time, support design
The carrying out of work.
Above disclosed is only present pre-ferred embodiments, and the right model of the present invention can not be limited certainly with this
Enclose, therefore the equivalent variations made according to the claims in the present invention, still belong to the scope covered by the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of safety analytical method for the advanced reactor master-plan stage, including：
By qualitative security feature, step S1, examines that instrument identifies the advantage of design, shortcoming, and advises；
Step S2, evaluates physical phenomenon and its importance sorting under certain scenarios by phenomenon identification and sequencing table；
Step S3, goes out Security Target and security function institute facing challenges by defense function tree analysis system evaluation；
Step S4, according to the implementing result of step S1-S3, confirms the reasonability of safety measure and system design, completes tentatively to set
Meter.
2. safety analytical method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that step S1 is specifically included：
Design feature, based on the principle of grading of depth defense, with reference to safety recommendation, is decomposed into depth defense function by step S11
Target, the security function for realizing depth defense target, three levels of design for realizing security function；
Step S12, design this level to realizing security function examine, obtains inspection result and corresponding advises.
3. safety analytical method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that step S2 is specifically included：
Step S21, it is determined that it is for assessing General layout Plan to formulate phenomenon identification and sequencing table；
Step S22, obtains database information, and the database information includes detailed design description and parameter, event lists, accident
The accident analysiss result and experimental calculation result of sequence, this nuclear power plant or other related nuclear power plants；
Step S23, to complete phenomenon identification and sequencing table, selects border, scene and the system unit being adapted to；
Step S24, sets up for evaluating the evaluation points of each phenomenon significance level；
Step S25, according to the information that step S22 and step S23 are obtained, recognizes be likely to occur phenomenon, and formulates phenomenon
Table, the definition for determining each phenomenon；
Step S26, according to evaluation points, judges for the significance level of each phenomenon, and phenomenon importance is arranged
Sequence；
Step S27, evaluates human-subject test, the human-subject test refer specifically to the professional degree of expert team, the quality of data base and
Understanding to evaluation points.
4. safety analytical method according to claim 1, it is characterised in that in step S3, tree-like point of defense function
Analysis system includes five levels：Five layers of depth defense, three big basic security functions, the possible event of facing challenges, can adopt
Safety measure.
5. safety analytical method according to claim 3, it is characterised in that step S23 is specifically included：
According to the target of the scene and research of phenomenon identification and sequencing table research, the nuclear power of phenomenon identification and sequencing table research is set up
The border of factory；
Scene is divided into into different time phases, and the importance for phenomenon being carried out from time dimension judges；
Nuclear power plant is divided into into different systems, and the importance for phenomenon being carried out from Spatial Dimension judges.
6. safety analytical method according to claim 5, it is characterised in that if research scene is that presurized water reactor large break is cold
But accident is lost in agent, and goal in research is assessment reactor system General layout Plan, then the border of phenomenon identification and sequencing table is
One secondary coolant circuit system.
7. safety analytical method according to claim 5, it is characterised in that for presurized water reactor large break accident scenarios, draws
Point time phase include spurting, pour water again, flood in early days, late period floods this four time phases.
8. safety analytical method according to claim 5, it is characterised in that for the water immersion thing of very high temperature gas cooled reactor
Therefore, nuclear power plant is divided into reactor pressure vessel, reactor cooling loop, reactor cavity cooling system and residual heat removal system；Instead
Core pressure vessel is answered to be further divided into turnover oral chamber, tedge, upper cover and its component, reactor core and reflecting layer, low head.
9. safety analytical method according to claim 4, it is characterised in that the depth defense is further divided into five layers
Level, including prevention abnormal operation and error, control abnormal running and error measurement, design basis accident control, prevents thing
Therefore upgrading and mitigation major accident consequence, mitigation radioactive substance are discharged into the Radiological Consequences outside factory；Step S3 is also wrapped
Include and tree analysis system is set up respectively to each level.
10. safety analytical method according to claim 4, it is characterised in that the three big basic security function includes instead
The control of answering property, reactor core heat are discharged, and limit radioactive substance.
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| CN108009722A (en) * | 2017-12-01 | 2018-05-08 | 安徽中科超安科技有限公司 | A kind of nuclear facilities reliability evaluation system and method for knowing risk |
| CN110119878A (en) * | 2019-04-09 | 2019-08-13 | 华能山东石岛湾核电有限公司 | A kind of risk-informed decision-making technique suitable for the provisional change of specific power plant |
| CN112233827A (en) * | 2020-09-10 | 2021-01-15 | 福建福清核电有限公司 | Method for controlling content of dissolved hydrogen before oxidation shutdown of reactor coolant system of nuclear power station |
| CN113761749A (en) * | 2021-09-10 | 2021-12-07 | 哈尔滨工程大学 | Nuclear reactor probability safety margin analysis method, system, terminal and storage medium |
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