CN114338517B - Distributed network-oriented multilayer connected dominating set construction method - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to a multilayer connected dominating set construction method facing to a distributed network, which comprises the following steps: constructing a random distributed network; marking all low-level dominating nodes as higher-level dominated nodes, and updating the degree and the neighborhood of the high level of the low-level dominated nodes; for any node of each layer, if the node and the neighbor thereof have no dominant node in the current layer, selecting one node as the dominant node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node; for each layer of dominated nodes, if the dominated nodes in two hops of the dominated nodes can not form a connected set, marking the dominated nodes as connected nodes; and repeating the steps until the domination node of each layer is smaller than a preset value, and obtaining a multi-layer connected domination set. The multilayer connected dominating set constructed by the invention can be used for trusted routing in a trust model.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of wireless sensor networks, in particular to a distributed network-oriented multilayer connected dominating set construction method.
Background
One of the structural features of distributed networks is the lack of trust relationships, as in many scenarios, communication nodes may be physically attacked and may join or leave dynamically. To address this issue, a trust model is crucial to facilitating secure communications between nodes, which may be described as a centralized reputation management mechanism, a distributed algorithm, or a combination of both. However, regardless of the form of the model, the disruption of the communication network by the compromise of the nodes represents a significant risk.
To reduce the risk, many methods have been devised to protect networks from different perspectives. In the mechanism, historical information of the nodes and recommendation of trustworthy neighbors are considered in calculation of trust values. On the other hand, from the perspective of the whole network, designing a non-similarity matrix is a feasible defense scheme, for example, the non-similarity matrix is calculated by utilizing the statistical distribution of different recommended groups by Iltaf et al. For compromised nodes, filtering is a common defense method, and the filtering technology proposed in the early days is a full iteration probability method based on belief propagation. Thereafter, Shabut et al dynamically filter out dishonest recommendations using clustering techniques, whose calculations involve the number of interactions, compatibility of information, and compactness between nodes, thereby eliminating nodes that do not participate in the communication. In addition, scholars have proposed a probabilistic model with two filters to reduce the impact of dishonest scorers so that good files with negative feedback are not completely excluded from the system. In contrast, there is also a trust management model without filtering feedback, which mainly discusses the use of service requestor feedback, rather than a feedback filtering mechanism.
On the other hand, the Connected Dominating Set (CDS) is considered as an effective solution for broadcast storms, which can be used for information exchange in the trust model, some researchers construct the CDS by dominating set pruning, while others construct the CDS by selecting algorithms, and further, some researchers have proposed methods of constructing an energy balanced CDS. However, these distributed trust models fail to cope with broadcast storm problems when the number of distributed nodes increases significantly, and these CDS mechanisms ignore the risk of node damage.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problem of providing a distributed network-oriented multilayer connected dominating set construction method which can be used for trusted routing in a trust model.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problem is as follows: the method for constructing the multilayer connected dominating set facing to the distributed network comprises the following steps:
(1) constructing a random distributed network;
(2) marking all low-level dominant nodes as dominant nodes of a high level, and updating the degree and the neighbors of the high level of the low-level dominant nodes;
(3) for any node of each layer, if the node and the neighbor thereof have no dominant node in the current layer, selecting one node as the dominant node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node;
(4) for each layer of dominated nodes, if the dominated nodes in two hops of the dominated nodes can not form a connected set, marking the dominated nodes as connected nodes;
and (4) repeating the steps (2) to (4) until the domination node of each layer is smaller than a preset value, and obtaining a multilayer connected domination set.
Selecting a node as a dominant node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node in the step (3), specifically: comparing the degree of the node with a degree threshold, comparing the compromise probability of the node with the degree exceeding the degree threshold with a compromise probability threshold, and selecting the node with the lowest compromise probability as a dominant node; or comparing the compromise probability of the node with a compromise probability threshold, comparing the degree of the node with which the compromise probability is smaller than the compromise probability threshold with a degree threshold, and selecting the node with the maximum degree as a dominant node.
The multilayer connected dominating centralizes the first layer branchThe loss due to the compromise of the node is expressed as
L i Represents the loss, p, due to the compromise of the first level dominating node i i Representing the probability of compromise, N, of the dominant node i of the first layer 1d (i) Representing a set of nodes in the first layer that are dominated by a first-layer dominated node i, N sum Representing the number of all nodes, len (n (j)) represents the number of neighbor nodes that dominate the node.
The loss of the first layer of connected nodes in the multilayer connected domination set is expressed as
Wherein N is 1c (i) A set of connected nodes, f, in the first-level connected dominance set adjacent to the first-level dominance node i p (c 1 ...c k ) Represents a connected node c i Probability of being isolated, len (N) 1d (i) Represents the number of nodes in the first-tier connectivity dominance set that are dominated by the first-tier dominance node i.
The loss caused by the compromise of the high-level dominating nodes in the multi-level connected dominating set is expressed as
Wherein L is i ' represents the loss due to compromise of the k-th dominant node i, p i ' denotes the probability of compromise, N, of the k-th dominant node i kd (i) Represents a set of nodes at layer k that are dominated by layer k dominating node i, N d (i) Represents a set of nodes, len (N), dominated by the k-th layer dominated node i among all layers d (j) Represents the number of nodes at the k-th level governed by the k-th level governed node i, len (N) d (i) Represents the number of nodes in all layers that are dominated by the k-th layer dominated node i, N sum Indicating the number of all nodes.
The loss of the high-level communication node in the multi-level communication domination set is expressed as
Wherein N is kc (i) Represents a set of connected nodes in the k-th layer connected dominance set adjacent to the k-th layer dominance node i, f p ′(c 1 ′...c k ') denotes a connected node c i ' probability of being isolated.
Advantageous effects
Due to the adoption of the technical scheme, compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and positive effects: according to the method, the multilayer connected dominating set is constructed according to the probability that each node is a compromise node, so that the method can be used for trusted routing in a trust model, the influence of the compromise node on a communication network can be quantized into a loss expectation, and a simulation result shows that the influence of the compromise node on the communication network can be effectively reduced by establishing the routing through the method.
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FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of MLCDS with different node numbers constructed by the method of the present embodiment;
fig. 3 is a graph showing an expected comparison of the loss of the MLDS constructed by the method of the present embodiment and the MLCDS constructed by the prior art.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further illustrated with reference to the following specific examples. It should be understood that these examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Further, it should be understood that various changes or modifications of the present invention may be made by those skilled in the art after reading the teaching of the present invention, and such equivalents may fall within the scope of the present invention as defined in the appended claims.
The embodiment of the invention relates to a multilayer connected dominating set construction method facing to a distributed network, which considers the node compromise probability and constructs a multilayer connected dominating set according to the probability that each node is a compromise node, as shown in fig. 1, the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, constructing a random distributed network;
step 2, marking all low-level dominating nodes as higher-level dominated nodes, updating the degree and the neighbors of the high level of the low-level dominating nodes, and sending updated information to the neighbors;
step 3, for any node of each layer, if the node and the neighbor thereof have no dominant node in the current layer, selecting one node as the dominant node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node; when selecting the dominant node, either of the following two methods may be employed.
The first method is as follows: and comparing the degree of the node with a degree threshold, comparing the compromise probability of the node with the degree exceeding the degree threshold with a compromise probability threshold, and selecting the node with the lowest compromise probability as a dominant node.
The second method comprises the following steps: and comparing the compromise probability of the node with a compromise probability threshold, comparing the degree of the node with the compromise probability smaller than the compromise probability threshold with a degree threshold, and selecting the node with the maximum degree as a dominant node.
The dominant node selected by the method has the characteristics of high degree and low compromise probability.
Step 4, for each layer of dominated nodes, if the dominated nodes in two hops of the dominated nodes can not form a connected set, marking the dominated nodes as connected nodes; the dominant node connected by the node at this time serves as a neighbor of the next layer.
And then, repeating the steps (2) - (4) until the dominant node of each layer is smaller than a preset value, and obtaining a multilayer connected dominant set.
The loss of functionality of the nodes themselves due to the compromise of the nodes is the same regardless of how the communication network is constructed. Therefore, this embodiment considers only the loss of the network communication function.
Assuming that communication between any two nodes is equally important, the loss of network communication functionality by a corrupted node is determined by its location in the network:
the dominated point is: since the dominant node does not assume responsibility for intermediate forwarding, no loss of network communication functionality is involved.
Dominating node of the first layer: when a node is controlled by only one dominant node, its communication with other nodes is controlled by the dominant node. If the dominant node is compromised, the dominated point will be isolated from other nodes than its neighbors. The loss due to dominating node compromise can be expressed as:
L i represents the loss, p, due to the compromise of the first level dominating node i i Representing the probability of compromise, N, of the dominant node i of the first layer 1d (i) Representing a set of nodes in the first layer that are dominated by a first-layer dominated node i, N sum Represents the number of all nodes, len (n (j)) represents the number of neighbor nodes that dominate the node.
A first-layer connected node: a dominant node typically has multiple connections going out, breaking a connecting node does not crash the dominant node, and the loss expectation of the connecting node needs to be computed from the dominant node:
N 1c (i) a set of connected nodes, f, in the first-level connected dominance set adjacent to the first-level dominance node i p (c 1 ...c k ) Represents a connected node c i Probability of being isolated, len (N) 1d (i) Represents the number of nodes in the first-tier connectivity dominance set that are dominated by the first-tier dominance node i.
A high-level dominant node: compromise of a higher level dominating node affects its communication with the outside but not its internal communication. The expected loss due to the k-th layer dominating node compromise can be expressed as:
L i ' denotes the k-th layerLoss due to compromise of a node i, p i ' denotes the compromise probability, N, of the k-th dominant node i kd (i) Represents a set of nodes in the k-th layer governed by a k-th layer governed node i, N d (i) Represents the set of nodes, len (N), at all levels governed by level k governing node i d (j) Represents the number of nodes at layer k governed by layer k governed node i, len (N) d (i) N) represents the number of nodes in all layers that are dominated by the k-th layer dominated node i, N sum Indicating the number of all nodes.
A high-level connected node: the expected loss calculation of the high-level connected node is similar to that of the first-level connected node, and is calculated by the adjacent dominant node:
N kc (i) represents a set of connected nodes in the k-th layer connected dominance set adjacent to the k-th layer dominance node i, f p ′(c 1 ′...c k ') denotes a connected node c i ' probability of being isolated.
The invention is further illustrated by the following specific example.
The network topology is represented as udg (unitdistkgraph), and is denoted as G ═ V, E, where V is a node set and E is an edge set. Squares with a range of 100 x 100, containing 200, 500, 800 and 1000 randomly scattered nodes, one of which is the central trusted node and nodes less than 10 away are neighbors.
Fig. 2 is a MLCDS with different numbers of nodes constructed by the method of the present embodiment, in which (a) the number of nodes is 200, (b) the number of nodes is 500, (c) the number of nodes is 800, and (d) the number of nodes is 1000. When the number of the nodes is 200, part of the nodes are not connected, the reason is that the nodes are distributed too sparsely, G is not a connected graph, and if G is a connected graph, MLCDS can be constructed successfully. Fig. 3 compares the loss expectation for MLCDS with and without consideration of the probability of compromise, and it can be seen from fig. 3 that the overall loss expectation is reduced by 57.72% with consideration of the probability of compromise.
According to the method, the multilayer connected dominating set is constructed according to the probability that each node is a compromised node, so that the method can be used for a trusted route in a trust model, robustness is provided for internal attack initiated by the compromised node, the influence of the compromised node on a communication network can be quantized into a loss expectation, and simulation results show that the influence of the compromised node on the communication network can be effectively reduced by establishing the route through the method.
Claims (6)
1. A multilayer connected dominating set construction method facing to a distributed network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) constructing a random distributed network;
(2) marking all low-level dominating nodes as higher-level dominated nodes, and updating the degree and the neighborhood of the high level of the low-level dominated nodes;
(3) for any node of each layer, if the node and the neighbor of the node have no dominant node in the current layer, selecting a node as the dominant node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node;
(4) for each layer of dominated nodes, if the dominated nodes in two hops of the dominated nodes can not form a connected set, marking the dominated nodes as connected nodes;
and (4) repeating the steps (2) to (4) until the domination node of each layer is smaller than a preset value, and obtaining a multilayer connected domination set.
2. The distributed network-oriented multilayer connected dominating set construction method according to claim 1, wherein in the step (3), one node is selected as a dominating node according to the degree and the compromise probability of the node, and specifically: comparing the degree of the node with a degree threshold, comparing the compromise probability of the node with the degree exceeding the degree threshold with a compromise probability threshold, and selecting the node with the lowest compromise probability as a dominant node; or comparing the compromise probability of the node with a compromise probability threshold, comparing the degree of the node with the compromise probability smaller than the compromise probability threshold with a degree threshold, and selecting the node with the maximum degree as a dominant node.
3. The method for constructing the multilayer connected dominating set oriented to the distributed network according to claim 1, wherein the loss caused by the compromise of the first layer dominating node in the multilayer connected dominating set is expressed as
L i Represents the loss, p, due to the compromise of the first level dominating node i i Representing the probability of compromise, N, of the dominant node i of the first layer 1d (i) Representing a set of nodes in the first layer governed by a first layer governing node i, N sum Represents the number of all nodes, len (n (j)) represents the number of neighbor nodes that dominate the node.
4. The method for constructing the multilayer connection dominating set oriented to the distributed network according to claim 3, wherein the loss of the first layer of connection nodes in the multilayer connection dominating set is expressed as
Wherein N is 1c (i) A set of connected nodes, f, in the first-level connected dominance set adjacent to the first-level dominance node i p (c 1 ...c k ) Represents a connected node c i Probability of being isolated, len (N) 1d (i) Represents the number of nodes in the first-tier connectivity dominance set that are dominated by the first-tier dominance node i.
5. The method for constructing the multilayer connected dominating set oriented to the distributed network according to claim 1, wherein the loss caused by the compromise of the upper dominating nodes in the multilayer connected dominating set is expressed as
Wherein L is i ' represents the loss due to compromise of the k-th dominant node i, p i ' watchShowing the probability of compromise, N, of the k-th dominant node i kd (i) Represents a set of nodes at layer k that are dominated by layer k dominating node i, N d (i) Represents a set of nodes, len (N), dominated by the k-th layer dominated node i among all layers d (j) Represents the number of nodes at the k-th level governed by the k-th level governed node i, len (N) d (i) N) represents the number of nodes in all layers that are dominated by the k-th layer dominated node i, N sum Indicating the number of all nodes.
6. The distributed network-oriented multilayer connectivity dominating set construction method according to claim 5, wherein the loss of the high-level connectivity node in the multilayer connectivity dominating set is expressed as
Wherein, N kc (i) Represents a set of connected nodes in the k-th layer connected dominance set adjacent to the k-th layer dominance node i, f p ′(c 1 ′...c k ') denotes a connected node c i ' probability of being isolated.
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