CN114270926B

CN114270926B - Radio communication

Info

Publication number: CN114270926B
Application number: CN201980099336.9A
Authority: CN
Inventors: B·塞比尔; 吴春丽; S·图尔蒂南
Original assignee: Nokia Shanghai Bell Co Ltd; Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy
Current assignee: Nokia Shanghai Bell Co Ltd; Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy
Priority date: 2019-08-15
Filing date: 2019-08-15
Publication date: 2024-04-12
Anticipated expiration: 2039-08-15
Also published as: CN114270926A; EP4014537A4; WO2021026911A1; EP4014537A1

Abstract

An apparatus comprising means for: monitoring transmissions of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and based on the monitoring, temporarily ceasing transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.

Description

Radio communication

Technical Field

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to radio communications. In particular, embodiments of the present disclosure relate to using the use of integrity protection for radio communications in a cellular network.

Background

The integrity protection of the logical data channel includes generating a cryptographic checksum that enables receiver-based authentication of data transmitted via the logical data channel.

For example, the cryptographic checksum may be generated by a cryptographic function using a cryptographic key and an input that depends on the message, synchronization time value, and sequence number order conveyed by the logical data channel.

For example, the receiver may use the same cryptographic key and cryptographic function to generate its own cryptographic checksum version using its own synchronization time value and sequence order tracking value, as well as the received message. The received message is authenticated based on the received checksum verifying the checksum generated by the receiver.

In 3GPP, currently, the synchronization time value is a 28-bit hyper frame number HFN, the sequence number is an RRC message sequence number (PDCP SN), the ciphering checksum is a message authentication code MAC-I, the ciphering key is an integrity key IK and the ciphering function is f9.

The new radio extends the use of Radio Access Network (RAN) Integrity Protection (IP) to the user plane. Integrity protection may be configured per data radio bearer (per logical data channel).

Because IP is a computationally intensive task, data rate limitations are imposed in 3 GPP.

Current 3GPP proposes to delegate the network to ensure that the maximum integrity-protected data rate does not exceed the maximum supported data rate (limit) for integrity protection. The maximum supported data rate per User Equipment (UE) for integrity protection is communicated by the UE to the network.

In radio communication systems, the radio spectrum is a scarce resource, and efficient use of the radio spectrum is desirable.

The network cannot reliably schedule the logical data channels individually. It may be difficult to ensure that the integrity-protected data rate limit is not reached.

In 3GPP, user plane security enforcement information provides a Radio Access Network (RAN) with user plane security policies for PDU sessions. Which indicates whether UP integrity protection is:

-the necessary: for all traffic on the PDU session, application should be performed.

-preferably: for all traffic on the PDU session, application should be performed.

-no need: UP integrity protection should not be applied to PDU sessions.

Once determined at the PDU session establishment, the user plane security enforcement information is applicable to the PDU session lifecycle.

The user plane security enforcement information for the user plane of the PDU session is based on:

-a subscribed user plane security policy or a user plane security policy in the network; and

-a maximum supported data rate per UE for integrity protection of the DRB, provided by the UE in an integrity protection maximum data rate IE during PDU session establishment.

Disclosure of Invention

According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided an apparatus comprising means for:

monitoring transmissions of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and

based on the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.

According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments there is provided an apparatus comprising:

at least one processor; and

at least one memory including computer program code

The at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform:

According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided a method comprising:

According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments there is provided computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform at least the following or for performing at least the following:

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring the transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection includes: the transmission of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection is monitored.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, temporarily ceasing transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection includes: transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity is temporarily stopped.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the execution within the logical channel prioritization procedure: monitoring transmissions of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and based on the monitoring, temporarily ceasing transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, logical channel prioritization includes: performing token-based allocation of resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order; and prioritizing the allocation of remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending order of priority.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on and includes maintaining for each logical data channel j an allocation token bucket (Bj) that is increased over time to a maximum value and decreased as a result of resource allocation to the respective logical data channel.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the rate of increase of the allocation token bucket (Bj) is different for different logical data channels (j).

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the maximum value of the assigned token bucket (Bj) is different for different logical data channels (j).

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring includes: the resource allocation for integrity protection is compared to the restricted allowed use value.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the constrained allowed use value depends on the maximum integrity protection bit rate for the apparatus.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the restricted allowed use value is a common value for all integrity-protected logical data channels.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring includes: maintaining integrity protection token bucket (B) _IP ) The integrity protection token bucket is increased over time to a maximum value and is reduced due to resource allocation of a logical data channel corresponding to a radio bearer configured with integrity protection.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the integrity protection token bucket is for the device, not for each logical data channel.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the integrity protection of the logical data channel includes: a cryptographic checksum is generated that enables receiver-based authentication of data in the logical data channel.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the cryptographic checksum is generated using a cryptographic key and a cryptographic function having inputs that depend on the message, synchronization time value, and sequence order for transmission via the logical data channel.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the apparatus is configured as a mobile device for a cellular network or a user equipment for a cellular network.

According to various, but not necessarily all, embodiments, examples are provided according to what is claimed in the appended claims.

Drawings

Some example embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example embodiment of the subject matter described herein;

FIG. 2 shows another example embodiment of the described subject matter;

FIG. 3 shows another example embodiment of the described subject matter;

FIG. 4 shows another example embodiment of the described subject matter;

FIGS. 5A, 5B, 5C illustrate example embodiments of the described subject matter;

FIG. 6A illustrates another example embodiment of the described subject matter;

fig. 6B illustrates another example embodiment of the subject matter described herein.

Detailed Description

Fig. 1 illustrates an example of a network 100 comprising a plurality of network nodes including a terminal node 110, an access node 120, and one or more core nodes 130. Terminal node 110 and access node 120 communicate with each other. One or more core nodes 130 are in communication with access node 120.

In some examples, one or more core nodes 130 may communicate with each other. In some examples, one or more access nodes 120 may communicate with each other.

Network 100 may be a cellular network including a plurality of cells 122, the plurality of cells 122 being served by access node 120. In this example, the interface between the terminal node 110 and the access node 120 defining the cell 122 is a wireless interface 124.

The access node 120 is a cellular radio transceiver. End node 110 is a cellular radio transceiver.

In the illustrated example, the cellular network 100 is a third generation partnership project (3 GPP) network, wherein the terminal node 110 is a User Equipment (UE) and the access node 120 is a base station.

In the particular example illustrated, the network 100 is a Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN). The UTRAN consists of UTRAN nodebs 120 providing UTRA user plane and control plane (RRC) protocol terminals to the UE 110. The nodebs 120 are interconnected with each other and are also connected to a Mobility Management Entity (MME) 130 by means of an interface 128.

The term 'user equipment' is used to designate a mobile device, such as a User Identity Module (UIM), with or without a smart card for authentication/encryption or the like.

The NodeB may be any suitable base station. The base station is an access node. Which may be a network element in a radio access network responsible for radio transmission and reception in one or more cells to or from a user equipment.

For example, the UTRAN may be a 3G, 4G or 5G network. Which may be, for example, a New Radio (NR) network using the gNB as access node 120. The new radio is the 3GPP name for 5G technology.

Fig. 2 illustrates a method 200 comprising:

at block 202, monitoring transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and at block 204, based on the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.

The transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection resumes at a later time (e.g., at the next transmission).

For example, method 200 may be performed by end node 110 (e.g., a user device).

Thus, the method provides a terminal-based mechanism to limit the uplink transmission of integrity protection from the terminal node 110 to the access node 120. The method avoids resource waste when using integrity protection.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the method includes:

monitoring transmissions of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection; and

based on the monitoring, transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring the transmission of one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection includes: resource allocation and constrained allowed use value for integrity protection (e.g., B _IP ) A comparison is made. The constrained allowed use value may depend on the maximum bit rate of end node 110.

The constrained allowed use value may represent an average allowed use and may increase over time without using integrity protection. The restricted allowed use value may be restricted so that it does not exceed a maximum value.

In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the restricted allowed use value is a common value for all integrity-protected logical data channels. Which is a value per end node 110 rather than a value per logical data channel.

In 3GPP implementations, radio Resource Control (RRC) configures the radio bearers with integrity protection. The radio bearer arrives as a logical channel to the MAC entity after passing through PDCP and RLC. The MAC entity allocates resources (transport channels) for logical channels and other logical channels configured with integrity protection. The MAC entity creates transport blocks for transmission via the physical layer. If the monitoring indicates that there has been excessive resource allocation for integrity protection (i.e., for logical channels/bearers configured with integrity protection), the MAC entity temporarily ceases enabling transmission of the logical channels configured with integrity protection. The MAC entity temporarily stops including the logical channel configured with integrity protection in the transport block for transmission. The MAC entity resumes including the logical channel configured with integrity protection in the transport block for the next transmission.

Fig. 3 illustrates how a method 300 may be incorporated into logical channel prioritization.

Thus, monitoring the transmission of one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection and based on the monitoring, temporarily ceasing the transmission of one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection is performed within logical channel prioritization process 300.

Logical channel prioritization 300 includes token-based allocation of resources. The method 300 involves a valid token(s).

In the absence of an integrity protection requirement, during the first phase there is a token-based allocation of resources to the logical data channels in descending order of priority. During the first phase, each logical data channel is allocated once. The token-based allocation is based on a per logical data channel token bucket Bj. The valid token(s) is Bj. The validity is defined with respect to a threshold value.

In the absence of an integrity protection requirement, during a subsequent second phase, there is a prioritized allocation of the remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order. The prioritization based allocation is independent of tokens used in the token based allocation of resources. There is no valid token.

During the first phase, where integrity protection requirements exist, token-based allocation is based on each logical channel token bucket Bj and on each terminal node integrity protection bucket B _IP . The valid token(s) are Bj and B _IP . The effectiveness of each is defined relative to a different threshold.

During a subsequent second phase, in the presence of an integrity protection requirement, there is a prioritized allocation of the remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order, but the allocation of the integrity protection logical channels is still a token-based allocation of the resources. The valid token(s) are sum B _IP . The validity is defined with respect to a threshold value.

This approach ensures both controlled sharing of resources and prioritization of resources while managing integrity protection allocation.

Fig. 4 illustrates a table 400 of examples of defining valid token(s).

During the first phase, the effective token is Bj > 0 (allocation is both priority-based and single token-based) for logical data channels without integrity protection requirements, and Bj > 0 and B for logical data channels with integrity protection requirements _IP > 0 (allocation is both priority based and dual token based).

During the second phase, for logical data channels with no integrity protection requirement, no valid tokens are present (allocation is based on priority only, not token), and for logical data channels with integrity protection requirement, the valid tokens are Bj > 0 and B _IP > 0 (allocation is both priority based and single token based).

The end node variable Bj is used by the end node 110 for the logical channel prioritization procedure. The variable Bj is the token bucket maintained for each logical channel j.

The token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on an allocation token bucket Bj for the logical data channel and includes maintaining an allocation token bucket Bj for each logical data channel that is increased over time to a maximum value and decreased due to resource allocation for the corresponding logical data channel.

The rate of increase is different for different logical data channels. The Prioritized Bit Rate (PBR) is configured per bearer, i.e., per logical data channel (LCH). PBR ensures that high priority LCHs are scheduled first while starvation of lower priority LCHs is avoided.

The maximum value is different for different logical data channels. The parameter bucketSizeDuration may set the Bucket Size Duration (BSD). The maximum value is the product of BSD and PBR (BSD PBR). Thus, the maximum value is proportional to the rate of increase (PBR).

The network schedules uplink data by signaling for each logical channel:

priority, wherein an increased priority value indicates a lower priority level,

prioritisedbittrate, which sets the Prioritized Bit Rate (PBR)

bucketSizeDuration, which sets the Bucket Size Duration (BSD).

Method 300 introduces integrity protected token bucket B _IP For controlling the allocation of integrity-protected logical data channels.

Terminal node variable B _IP For use by the end node 110 in the logical channel prioritization procedure. Variable B _IP Is a token bucket maintained for end node 110 (in this example, not for each logical channel j).

The token-based allocation of a logical data channel depends not only on the allocation token bucket Bj for that logical data channel, but also on the integrity protection token bucket B _IP 。

The token-based allocation includes not only maintaining an allocation token bucket Bj for each logical data channel (which is increased over time to a maximum value and decreased due to resource allocation to the corresponding logical data channel), but also maintaining integrity protection tokens for all logical data channels in commonBarrel B _IP The integrity protected token bucket B _IP Is increased to a maximum over time and is reduced due to resource allocation to the integrity-protected logical data channel.

The rate of increase of the integrity protection token bucket (IPR) is an IP bit rate limit (which may be configured via RRC in case there is a processing limit at the receiving end at the network or derived from the IP capabilities of the UE).

The integrity protection token bucket size duration BSD is used to calculate the integrity protection token bucket limit (which may be configured via RRC with respect to other buckets or fixed in specification).

The maximum value is the product of BSD and IPR (BSD IPR).

The monitoring 202 described with respect to fig. 2 includes: maintaining integrity protection token bucket B _IP The token bucket B _IP Is increased to a maximum value over time and is reduced due to resource allocation to logical channels configured with integrity protection.

The IP token bucket is configured for IP bit rate constraints and each radio bearer configured with IP is from the same bucket of tokens.

When the bucket is empty, radio bearers configured with IP cannot be scheduled, and the LCP selects data (if any) from other LCHs that do not need radio bearers of IP to fill the grant.

If there is no data for other LCHs, padding may optionally be sent (without integrity protection).

Referring back to the example method 300 illustrated in fig. 3, the logical channel prioritization process begins at block 302 when a new transmission is to be performed. In this example, end node 110 has an Uplink (UL) grant of resources.

At block 304, the required token(s) are updated. This includes the token Bj and B in case there is a need for integrity protection _IP 。

Bj and B when the associated logical channel is established _IP Initialized to zero.

At block 306, the next logical data channel (current logical data channel j) is selected for allocation. This is the next logical data channel in priority order, which has valid tokens for logical data channel allocation and has resource allocation requirements.

At block 308, if there is an allocation of resources to the current logical data channel j, the valid token(s) is adjusted. For example, the valid token(s) respectively decrement the assigned size.

At block 310, if there are no resources for allocation, then the method 300 ends, otherwise the method 300 continues to block 312.

At block 312, if the current logical data channel j is not the lowest priority logical data channel with valid token(s) for channel allocation, the method returns 312 to block 306. In this way, method 300 performs a constrained allocation of resources to all logical data channels during a first phase, where the resource allocation is required to be prioritized (subject to the constraint that there are sufficient resources). The allocation is constrained for each logical data channel independently using token-based allocation.

At block 312, if the current logical data channel j is the lowest priority logical data channel with valid token(s) for channel allocation, then the first phase ends. The method 300 moves to block 314 to perform the second phase. The valid token(s) are redefined and the method returns 303 to block 306 but again begins with the highest priority logical data channel.

Thus, in the method 300, in a first phase, for each logical data channel that does not require integrity protection, a constraint is assigned by a single assignment token per channel and for each logical data channel that does require integrity protection, a constraint is assigned by a single assignment token per channel and a single integrity protection token per end node 110.

Thus, in the second phase, the allocation is not constrained by a single allocation token per channel for each logical data channel that does not require integrity protection, and is constrained by a single allocation token per channel and a single integrity protection token per end node for each logical data channel that does require integrity protection.

Fig. 5A illustrates an example of block 304. At block 304, the required token(s) are updated. This includes the token Bj and B in the presence of a requirement for integrity protection _IP 。

For each logical channel j, the end node 110 should:

1> before each instance of the LCP procedure, bj is incremented by the product PBR x T, where T is the time elapsed since Bj was last incremented, and PBR is the prioritized bit rate of logical channel j.

1> if the value of Bj is greater than the maximum bucket size (i.e., PBR x BSD):

2> sets Bj to the maximum bucket size.

The value of Bj cannot exceed the maximum bucket size and if the value of Bj is greater than the maximum bucket size of logical channel j, then Bj should be set to the maximum bucket size. The maximum allocation bucket size of the logical channels is equal to PBR x BSD.

For each integrity-protected logical data channel j, the UE should:

1>before each instance of the LCP procedure, B will be _IP The product IPR x T is incremented, where T is from B _IP The time elapsed since the last increment.

1>If B is _IP The value of (a) is greater than the maximum bucket size (i.e., IPR x BSD):

2>will B _IP Set to the maximum bucket size.

B _IP It is not possible for the value of (a) to exceed the maximum bucket size, and if B _IP The value of j is greater than the maximum bucket size, then B should be _IP j is set to the maximum bucket size. The maximum IP bucket size is equal to IPR x BSD.

Fig. 5B illustrates an example of block 306. At block 306, the next logical data channel (current logical data channel j) is selected for allocation. This is the next logical data channel in priority order, with valid token(s) for logical data channel allocation and with resource allocation requirements.

In this example, the valid token(s) of the logical data channel that do not have a requirement for integrity protection is B _j ＞0。

In this example, the valid token(s) of the logical data channel with requirements for integrity protection is B _j > 0 and B _IP ＞0。

Fig. 5C illustrates an example of block 308. At block 308, if there is an allocation of resources to the current logical data channel j, the valid token(s) is adjusted. For example, the valid token(s) respectively decrement the assigned size.

For example:

bj decrements the total size of the MAC SDU for logical channel j

B _IP The total size of the MAC SDU for the integrity-protected logical channel j is reduced

When B is _IP Below threshold (B) _IP And 0) the allocation of resources to any integrity-protected logical channel is suspended.

Thus B _IP Is a token bucket variable that increases as time passes and decreases each time data from the bearer/LCH requiring IP is processed/included.

This ensures that the MAC layer will not need more data than the UE can handle, which data requires IP from PDCP. Since IP processing restrictions are per UE, tokens are common bearers among all bearers that need integrity protection. When some of the bearers consume all IP processing power and end node 110 is deemed unable to perform integrity protection on other data from other bearers or even the same bearer, the token bucket will become empty.

Possible modifications to the currently proposed 3GPP specifications are highlighted using bold and underlined fonts:

/>

it should be noted that the change in 5.4.3.1.2 is not strictly required, but simplifies the resource allocation in 5.4.3.1.3.

Fig. 6A illustrates an example of a controller 400. Embodiments of the controller 400 may function as controller circuitry. The controller 400 may be implemented solely in hardware, with certain aspects in software including only firmware, or may be a combination of hardware and software (including firmware).

As illustrated in fig. 6A, the controller 400 may be implemented using instructions that enable hardware functionality, for example, by using executable instructions of a computer program 406 in a general-purpose or special-purpose processor 402, which may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium (disk, memory, etc.) for execution by such processor 402.

The processor 402 is configured to read from the memory 404 and write to the memory 404. The processor 402 may also include an output interface via which data and/or commands are output by the processor 402 and an input interface via which data and/or commands are input to the processor 402.

The memory 404 stores a computer program 406 comprising computer program instructions (computer program code) that, when loaded into the processor 402, controls the operation of the apparatus 110. The computer program instructions of the computer program 406 provide the logic and routines that enables the apparatus 110 including the controller 400 to perform the methods illustrated in fig. 1-5C. The processor 402 is capable of loading and executing a computer program 406 by reading the memory 404.

Thus, the apparatus 110 comprises:

at least one processor 402; and

at least one memory 404 including computer program code

The at least one memory 404 and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor 402, cause the apparatus 10 at least to perform:

As shown in fig. 6B, the computer program 406 may reach the apparatus 110 via any suitable delivery mechanism 410. The delivery mechanism 410 may be, for example, a machine-readable medium, a computer-readable medium, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, a computer program product, a memory device, a recording medium such as a compact disc read only memory (CD-ROM) or a Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) or solid state memory, an article of manufacture that includes or tangibly embodies the computer program 406. The delivery mechanism may be a signal configured to reliably communicate the computer program 406. The apparatus 110 may propagate or transmit the computer program 406 as a computer data signal.

Computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform at least the following or for performing at least the following:

The computer program instructions may be included in a computer program, a non-transitory computer readable medium, a computer program product, a machine readable medium. In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the computer program instructions may be distributed over more than one computer program.

Although memory 404 is illustrated as a single component/circuitry, it may be implemented as one or more separate components/circuitry, some or all of which may be integrated/removable and/or may provide permanent/semi-permanent/dynamic/cached storage.

Although the processor 402 is illustrated as a single component/circuitry, it may be implemented as one or more separate components/circuitry, some or all of which may be integrated/removable. Processor 402 may be a single core or multi-core processor.

References to 'computer-readable storage medium', 'computer program product', 'tangibly embodied computer program' etc. or a 'controller', 'computer', 'processor' etc. should be understood to encompass not only computers having different architectures such as single/multi-processor architectures and sequential (von neumann)/parallel architectures, but also specialized circuits such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), application specific circuits (ASIC), signal processing devices and other processing circuitry. References to computer programs, instructions, code etc. should be understood to mean software including a programmable processor or firmware, such as, for example, the programmable content of a hardware device, whether instructions of the processor or configuration settings of a fixed-function device, gate array or programmable logic device etc.

As used in this application, the term 'circuitry' may refer to one or more or all of the following:

(a) Hardware-only circuitry implementations (such as implementations in analog-only and/or digital circuitry)

(b) A combination of hardware circuitry and software, such as (as applicable):

(i) Combination of analog and/or digital hardware circuit(s) with software/firmware and

(ii) The hardware processor(s) work together with any portion of software, including the digital signal processor(s), software, and memory(s), to cause a device, such as a mobile phone or server, to perform various functions, and

(c) Hardware circuit(s) and/or processor(s), such as microprocessor(s) or portions of microprocessor(s), that require software (e.g., firmware) to operate, but may not exist when software is not required to operate.

This definition of circuitry applies to all uses of this term in this application, including in any claims. As another example, as used in this application, the term "circuitry" also encompasses embodiments of the processor circuit alone or the processor and its (or their) accompanying software and/or firmware. The term "circuitry" also encompasses, for example (and if applicable to the particular claim element) a baseband integrated circuit or server for a mobile device, a cellular network device, or a similar integrated circuit in another computing or network device.

The blocks illustrated in fig. 2, 3, 5 may represent steps in a method and/or code segments in the computer program 406. The illustration of a particular order of the blocks does not necessarily imply that there is a required or preferred order for the blocks, and the order and arrangement of the blocks may be different. Furthermore, some blocks may be omitted.

In some applications, the message is configured to provide data to or from the vehicle. In some applications, the message includes sensor data. In some applications, the message is configured to control an autonomous vehicle or assist a user in controlling the vehicle.

Where structural features have been described, they may be replaced by means for performing one or more of the functions of the structural features, whether the function or functions are explicitly described or implicitly described.

The examples described above can be used as enabling components for:

an automotive system; a telecommunications system; an electronic system comprising a consumer electronic product; a distributed computing system; a media system for generating or rendering media content including audio, visual and audiovisual content as well as mixed, intermediate, virtual and/or augmented reality; a personal system including a personal wellness system or a personal fitness system; a navigation system; a user interface, also known as a human-machine interface; networks, including cellular, non-cellular and optical networks; an ad hoc network; the Internet; the Internet of things; virtualizing a network; related software and services.

The term 'comprising' as used herein is intended to have an inclusive rather than exclusive meaning. That is, a reference to X including Y indicates that X may include only one Y or may include more than one Y. If 'comprising' is intended to be used in an exclusive sense, it will be explicitly specified in the context by reference to "comprising only one.

In this specification, various examples have been referred to. The description of features or functions with respect to an example indicates that those features or functions are present in the example. The use of the term ' example ' or ' e.g. "capable of ' or ' may" in this text indicates that such feature or function is present at least in the described example (whether described as an example or not) and such feature or function may, but need not, be present in some or all other examples, whether explicitly stated or not. Thus, 'example', 'e.g', 'capable' or 'may' refer to a specific instance in a class of examples. The attributes of an instance may be the attributes of only that instance or the attributes of the class or the attributes of a subclass of the class (which includes some but not all of the instances in the class). Thus, it is implicitly disclosed that features described with reference to one example but not with reference to another example can be used in that other example as part of a working combination where possible, but are not necessarily required.

Although the embodiments have been described in the preceding paragraphs with reference to various examples, it should be appreciated that modifications to the examples given can be made without departing from the scope of the claims.

The features described in the foregoing description may be used in combinations other than those explicitly described above.

Although functions have been described with reference to certain features, these functions may be performed by other features, whether described or not.

Although features have been described with reference to certain embodiments, these features may also be present in other embodiments, whether described or not.

The terms a or an, as used herein, are intended to be inclusive and not exclusive. That is, any reference to X including Y indicates that X may include only one Y or may contain more than one Y unless the context clearly indicates to the contrary. If an exclusive meaning of 'a' or 'the' is intended to be used, it will be explicitly described in the context. In some instances, the use of "at least one" or "one or more" may be used to emphasize an inclusive meaning, but the absence of such terms should not be taken as an inferred or exclusive meaning.

The presence of a feature (or combination of features) in the claims is a reference to that feature or (combination of features) itself and also to a feature (equivalent feature) that achieves substantially the same technical result. For example, equivalent features include features that are variations and that achieve substantially the same results in substantially the same way. Equivalent features include, for example, features that perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.

In this specification, various examples have been referenced using adjectives or adjective phrases to describe characteristics of the examples. Such description of the characteristics about the examples indicates that the characteristics in some examples exist entirely as described and in other examples exist substantially as described.

Whilst endeavoring in the foregoing specification to draw attention to those features of interest it should be understood that the applicant may seek protection in respect of any patentable feature or combination of features hereinbefore referred to and/or shown in the drawings whether or not particular emphasis has been placed thereon.

Claims

1. An apparatus comprising means for:

monitoring transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection, and

temporarily ceasing transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection, wherein the at least one logical data channel is allocated resources in descending order of priority based on the monitoring; and

the priority-based allocation of the remaining resources to the at least one logical data channel is performed in descending priority order.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein monitoring the transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection comprises: monitoring transmissions of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection; and

wherein temporarily ceasing transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection comprises:

temporarily stopping transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2, wherein the token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on allocating a token bucket for the logical data channels, and comprising: an allocation token bucket is maintained for each logical data channel, the allocation token bucket being increased over time to a maximum value and decreased as a result of resource allocation to the respective logical data channel.

4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein a rate of increase of allocation token buckets is different for different logical data channels.

5. The apparatus of claim 3 or 4, wherein the maximum value of an allocated token bucket is different for different logical data channels.

6. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein the monitoring comprises: the resource allocation for integrity protection is compared to the restricted allowed use value.

7. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the constrained allowed use value depends on a maximum integrity protection bit rate for the apparatus.

8. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the restricted allowed use value is a common value for all integrity-protected logical data channels.

9. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein the monitoring comprises: an integrity protection token bucket is maintained that is increased over time to a maximum value and decreased due to resource allocation of a logical data channel corresponding to a radio bearer configured with integrity protection.

10. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the integrity protection token bucket is for the apparatus and not for each logical data channel.

11. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein the integrity protection of the logical data channel comprises: a cryptographic checksum is generated that enables receiver-based authentication of data in the logical data channel.

12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the cryptographic checksum is generated using a cryptographic key and a cryptographic function, the cryptographic function having an input that depends on a message, a synchronization time value, and a sequence order for transfer over the logical data channel.

13. The apparatus of any preceding claim, configured as a mobile device for a cellular network or a user equipment configured for a cellular network.

14. A method, comprising:

15. An apparatus, comprising:

at least one processor; and

at least one memory including computer program code,

16. A computer readable storage medium storing computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform or at least the following: