CN114270926A - Radio communication - Google Patents
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- CN114270926A CN114270926A CN201980099336.9A CN201980099336A CN114270926A CN 114270926 A CN114270926 A CN 114270926A CN 201980099336 A CN201980099336 A CN 201980099336A CN 114270926 A CN114270926 A CN 114270926A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L47/00—Traffic control in data switching networks
- H04L47/10—Flow control; Congestion control
- H04L47/34—Flow control; Congestion control ensuring sequence integrity, e.g. using sequence numbers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L47/00—Traffic control in data switching networks
- H04L47/10—Flow control; Congestion control
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Abstract
An apparatus comprising means for: monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection in dependence on the monitoring.
Description
Technical Field
Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to radio communications. In particular, embodiments of the present disclosure relate to the use of integrity protection for radio communication in cellular networks.
Background
Integrity protection of the logical data channel includes generating a cryptographic checksum that enables receiver-based authentication of data transmitted via the logical data channel.
For example, a cryptographic checksum may be generated by a cryptographic function using a cryptographic key and inputs that depend on a message transmitted by a logical data channel, a synchronization time value, and a sequence number order.
For example, the receiver may use the same cryptographic key and cryptographic function to generate its own cryptographic checksum version using its own synchronization time value and sequence order tracking value and the received message. The received message is authenticated based on the received checksum and the checksum generated by the receiver is verified.
In 3GPP, currently, the synchronization time value is a 28-bit hyper frame number HFN, the sequence number is the RRC message sequence number (PDCP SN), the cryptographic checksum is the message authentication code MAC-I, the cryptographic key is the integrity key IK and the cryptographic function is f 9.
The new radio extends the use of Radio Access Network (RAN) Integrity Protection (IP) to the user plane. The integrity protection may be configured per data radio bearer (per logical data channel).
Since IP is a computationally intensive task, data rate limitations are imposed in 3 GPP.
Current 3GPP proposals mandate that the network ensure that the maximum integrity protected data rate does not exceed the maximum supported data rate for integrity protection (limit). The maximum supported data rate per User Equipment (UE) for integrity protection is communicated by the UE to the network.
In radio communication systems, radio spectrum is a scarce resource, and efficient utilization of radio spectrum is desirable.
The network cannot reliably schedule logical data channels individually. It may be difficult to ensure that the integrity protection data rate limit is not reached.
In 3GPP, the user plane security enforcement information provides the Radio Access Network (RAN) with user plane security policies for PDU sessions. It indicates whether the UP integrity protection is:
-the necessary: it should be applied for all traffic on the PDU session.
-preferably: it should be applied for all traffic on the PDU session.
-not required: UP integrity protection should not be applied on PDU sessions.
Once determined at PDU session establishment, the user plane security enforcement information is applicable to the life cycle of the PDU session.
The user plane security enforcement information for the user plane of the PDU session is based on:
-a subscribed user plane security policy or a user plane security policy in the network; and
-a maximum supported data rate per UE for integrity protection of DRB, which is provided by the UE in the integrity protected maximum data rate IE during PDU session setup.
Disclosure of Invention
According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided an apparatus comprising means for:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided an apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one memory including computer program code
The at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided a method comprising:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there is provided computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform at least the following or for performing at least the following:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring the transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection includes: monitoring for transmission of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection includes: temporarily halting transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the following is performed within a logical channel prioritization procedure: monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection in dependence on the monitoring.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, logical channel prioritization includes: token-based allocation of resources to logical data channels in descending priority order; and making a priority-based allocation of the remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on an allocation token bucket (Bj) for the logical data channel and includes maintaining, for each logical data channel j, an allocation token bucket (Bj) that is increased to a maximum over time and is decreased due to resource allocation for the respective logical data channel.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the rate of increase of the allocation token bucket (Bj) is different for different logical data channels (j).
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the maximum value of the allocation token bucket (Bj) is different for different logical data channels (j).
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring includes: the resource allocation for integrity protection is compared to the constrained allowed usage value.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the constrained allowed usage value depends on a maximum integrity protection bit rate for the apparatus.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the constrained allowed usage value is a common value for all integrity protected logical data channels.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring includes: maintaining integrity protected token buckets (B)IP) The integrity protection token bucket is increased to a maximum value over time and is reduced due to resource allocation of a logical data channel corresponding to a radio bearer configured with integrity protection.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, integrity protection token buckets are for devices, rather than for each logical data channel.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, integrity protection of logical data channels includes: a cryptographic checksum is generated that enables receiver-based authentication of data in the logical data channel.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the cryptographic checksum is generated using a cryptographic key and a cryptographic function having an input that depends on a message, a synchronization time value, and a sequence order for transmission via the logical data channel.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the apparatus is configured as a mobile device for a cellular network or a user equipment configured for a cellular network.
According to various (but not necessarily all) embodiments, there are provided examples as claimed in the appended claims.
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Some example embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 illustrates an example embodiment of the subject matter described herein;
FIG. 2 illustrates another example embodiment of the described subject matter;
FIG. 3 illustrates another example embodiment of the described subject matter;
FIG. 4 illustrates another example embodiment of the described subject matter;
5A, 5B, 5C illustrate example embodiments of the described subject matter;
FIG. 6A illustrates another example embodiment of the described subject matter;
fig. 6B illustrates another example embodiment of the subject matter described herein.
Detailed Description
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of a network 100 comprising a plurality of network nodes including a terminal node 110, an access node 120, and one or more core nodes 130. The end node 110 and the access node 120 communicate with each other. One or more core nodes 130 communicate with the access node 120.
In some examples, one or more core nodes 130 may communicate with each other. In some examples, one or more access nodes 120 may communicate with each other.
The network 100 may be a cellular network including a plurality of cells 122, the plurality of cells 122 being served by an access node 120. In this example, the interface between the terminal node 110 and the access node 120 defining the cell 122 is a radio interface 124.
The access node 120 is a cellular radio transceiver. The terminal node 110 is a cellular radio transceiver.
In the illustrated example, the cellular network 100 is a third generation partnership project (3GPP) network, where the terminal node 110 is a User Equipment (UE) and the access node 120 is a base station.
In the particular example illustrated, the network 100 is a Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN). The UTRAN consists of UTRAN nodebs 120 providing UTRA user plane and control plane (RRC) protocol terminals to the UE 110. The nodebs 120 are interconnected to each other and are also connected by means of an interface 128 to a Mobility Management Entity (MME) 130.
The term 'user equipment' is used to designate a mobile device, such as a User Identity Module (UIM), with or without a smart card for authentication/encryption or the like.
The NodeB may be any suitable base station. The base station is an access node. It may be a network element in a radio access network responsible for radio transmission and reception in one or more cells to or from user equipment.
For example, the UTRAN may be a 3G, 4G or 5G network. It may be, for example, a New Radio (NR) network that uses the gNB as an access node 120. The new radio is the 3GPP name for 5G technology.
Fig. 2 illustrates a method 200, comprising:
at block 202, monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and, at block 204, temporarily ceasing transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection, in accordance with the monitoring.
The transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is resumed at a later time (e.g., at the next transmission).
For example, the method 200 may be performed by the end node 110 (e.g., user equipment).
Thus, the method provides a terminal-based mechanism to limit integrity-protected uplink transmissions from terminal node 110 to access node 120. The method avoids resource waste when integrity protection is used.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the method comprises:
monitoring for transmission of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, monitoring for transmission of one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection includes: allocating resources for integrity protection with a constrained allowed usage value (e.g., B)IP) A comparison is made. The constrained allowed usage value may depend on the maximum bit rate of the terminal node 110.
The constrained allowed usage value may represent an average allowed usage and may increase over time without the use of integrity protection. The constrained allowed usage value may be constrained such that it does not exceed a maximum value.
In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the constrained allowed usage value is a common value for all integrity protected logical data channels. Which is a value per terminal node 110 rather than a value per logical data channel.
In 3GPP implementations, Radio Resource Control (RRC) has integrity protection for radio bearer configuration. The radio bearer reaches the MAC entity as a logical channel after passing through the PDCP and RLC. The MAC entity allocates resources (transport channels) for the logical channels configured with integrity protection and other logical channels. The MAC entity creates transport blocks for transmission via the physical layer. If the monitoring indicates that there has been excessive resource allocation for integrity protection (i.e., for logical channels/bearers configured with integrity protection), the MAC entity temporarily stops enabling transmission of the logical channels configured with integrity protection. The MAC entity temporarily stops including the logical channel configured with integrity protection in the transport block for transmission. The MAC entity recovers the logical channel included in the transport block that is configured with integrity protection for the next transmission.
Fig. 3 illustrates how the method 300 may be incorporated into logical channel prioritization.
Thus, monitoring the transmission of the one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection and, upon monitoring, temporarily stopping the transmission of the one or more logical data channels configured with integrity protection is performed within the logical channel prioritization procedure 300.
In the absence of integrity protection requirements, during the first phase there is token-based allocation of resources to logical data channels in descending priority order. During the first phase, one allocation is made for each logical data channel. Token-based allocation is based on per logical data channel token bucket Bj. The valid token(s) is Bj. The validity is defined relative to a threshold.
In the absence of integrity protection requirements, during a subsequent second phase, there is a prioritization-based allocation of the remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order. The prioritization-based allocation is independent of the tokens used in the token-based allocation of resources. There is no valid token.
During the first phase, token-based allocation is based on each logical channel token bucket Bj and on each end node integrity protection bucket B in the presence of integrity protection requirementsIP. The valid token(s) are Bj and BIP. The validity of each is defined with respect to a different threshold.
During the subsequent second phase, in the presence of integrity protection requirements, there is a prioritized allocation of the remaining resources to the logical data channels in descending priority order, but the allocation of the integrity protected logical channels is still a token-based allocation of resources. Valid token(s) is and BIP. The validity is defined relative to a threshold.
This approach ensures both controlled sharing of resources and prioritization of resources while managing integrity-protected allocations.
Fig. 4 illustrates a table 400 defining an example of valid token(s).
During the first phase, the target does not have completionLogical data channels for which integrity protection is required, valid tokens are Bj > 0 (allocation is both priority based and single token based), and for logical data channels with integrity protection requirements valid tokens are Bj > 0 and BIP> 0 (allocation is both priority based and dual token based).
During the second phase, for logical data channels without integrity protection requirements, there are no valid tokens (the allocation is only priority based, not token based), and for logical data channels with integrity protection requirements, valid tokens are Bj > 0 and BIP> 0 (allocation is both priority based and single token based).
The terminal node variable Bj is used by the terminal node 110 for the logical channel prioritization procedure. The variable Bj is a token bucket maintained for each logical channel j.
The token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on an allocation token bucket Bj for the logical data channel and comprises maintaining, for each logical data channel, an allocation token bucket Bj that is increased to a maximum value over time and decreased due to resource allocation to the respective logical data channel.
The rate of increase is different for different logical data channels. The Prioritized Bit Rate (PBR) is configured per bearer, i.e., per logical data channel (LCH). The PBR ensures that high priority LCHs are scheduled first while avoiding starvation of lower priority LCHs.
The maximum value is different for different logical data channels. The bucketSizeDuration parameter may set the Bucket Size Duration (BSD). The maximum is the product of BSD and PBR (BSD PBR). Therefore, the maximum value is proportional to the increase rate (PBR).
The network schedules the uplink data by signaling for each logical channel:
a priority, wherein an increasing priority value indicates a lower priority level,
PRIORITESEDBIT, which sets a Prioritized Bit Rate (PBR)
bucketSizeDuration, which sets the Bucket Size Duration (BSD).
Terminal node variable BIPUsed by the terminal node 110 for the logical channel prioritization procedure. Variable BIPIs a token bucket maintained for the end node 110 (in this example, not for each logical channel j).
Token-based allocation of a logical data channel depends not only on the allocated token bucket Bj for that logical data channel, but also on the integrity protection token bucket BIP。
Token-based allocation includes not only maintaining an allocation token bucket Bj for each logical data channel (which increases to a maximum over time and decreases due to resource allocation to the respective logical data channel), but also maintaining an integrity protection token bucket B collectively for all logical data channelsIPThe integrity protection token bucket BIPIs increased to a maximum value over time and is decreased due to resource allocation to the integrity protected logical data channel.
The rate of increase of the integrity protection token bucket (IPR) is an IP bit rate limit (which may be configured via RRC in case there is a processing limit at the receiving end at the network or derived from the IP capabilities of the UE).
The integrity-protected token bucket size duration BSD is used to compute the integrity-protected token bucket limit (which may be configured via RRC with respect to other buckets or fixed in the specification).
The maximum is the product of BSD and IPR (BSD × IPR).
The monitoring 202 described with respect to fig. 2 includes: maintaining integrity protected token bucket BIPThe token bucket BIPIs increased to a maximum value over time and is reduced due to resource allocation for logical channels configured with integrity protection.
The IP token bucket is configured for IP bit rate limitation and each radio bearer configured with IP comes from the same bucket of tokens.
When the bucket is empty, radio bearers configured with IP cannot be scheduled, and the LCP selects data (if any) to fill the grant from other LCHs that do not require radio bearers with IP.
If there is no data for other LCHs, padding (without integrity protection) may optionally be sent.
Referring back to the example method 300 illustrated in fig. 3, when a new transmission is to be performed, the logical channel prioritization process begins at block 302. In this example, terminal node 110 has an Uplink (UL) grant of resources.
At block 304, the required token(s) is updated. This includes the token Bj and B if there is a need for integrity protectionIP。
When the relevant logical channel is established, Bj and BIPIs initialized to zero.
At block 306, the next logical data channel for allocation (current logical data channel j) is selected. This is the next logical data channel in priority order that has a valid token for logical data channel allocation and has resource allocation requirements.
At block 308, if there is an allocation of resources to the current logical data channel j, then the valid token(s) is adjusted. For example, the valid token(s) are each decremented by the size of the allocation.
At block 310, if there are no resources for allocation, the method 300 ends, otherwise the method 300 continues to block 312.
At block 312, if the current logical data channel j is not the lowest priority logical data channel with valid token(s) for channel assignment, then the method returns 312 to block 306. In this manner, the method 300 performs a constrained allocation of resources to all logical data channels during the first phase, where the resource allocation requires prioritization (subject to the limitation that sufficient resources exist). The allocation is constrained for each logical data channel independently using token-based allocation.
At block 312, if the current logical data channel j is the lowest priority logical data channel with valid token(s) for channel assignment, then the first phase ends. The method 300 moves to block 314 to perform the second phase. The valid token(s) is redefined and the method returns 303 to block 306 but again starting with the highest priority logical data channel.
Thus, in method 300, in the first phase, the allocation is constrained by a single allocation token per channel for each logical data channel that does not require integrity protection, and by a single allocation token per channel and a single integrity protection token per terminal node 110 for each logical data channel that does require integrity protection.
Thus, in method 300, in the second phase, the allocation is not constrained by a single allocation token per channel for each logical data channel that does not require integrity protection, and is constrained by a single allocation token per channel and a single integrity protection token per terminal node for each logical data channel that does require integrity protection.
Fig. 5A illustrates an example of block 304. At block 304, the required token(s) is updated. This includes the token Bj and, if there is a requirement for integrity protection, BIP。
For each logical channel j, terminal node 110 should:
1> before each instance of the LCP procedure, Bj is incremented by the product PBR × T, where T is the time elapsed since Bj was last incremented, and PBR is the prioritized bit rate of logical channel j.
1> if the value of Bj is greater than the maximum bucket size (i.e., PBR × BSD):
2> set Bj to the maximum bucket size.
The value of Bj cannot exceed the maximum bucket size, and if the value of Bj is greater than the maximum bucket size of logical channel j, Bj should be set to the maximum bucket size. The maximum allocation bucket size for a logical channel is equal to PBR × BSD.
For each integrity protected logical data channel j, the UE should:
1>before each instance of the LCP procedure, BIPIncremented by the product IPR T, where T is from BIPThe time elapsed since the last time it was incremented.
1>If B is presentIPIs greater than the maximum bucket size (i.e., IPR × BSD):
2>b is to beIPSet to the maximum bucket size.
BIPCannot exceed the maximum bucket size, and if BIPThe value of j is greater than the maximum bucket size, then B should be setIPj is set to the maximum bucket size. The maximum IP bucket size is equal to IPR BSD.
Fig. 5B illustrates an example of block 306. At block 306, the next logical data channel for allocation (current logical data channel j) is selected. This is the next logical data channel in priority order that has valid token(s) for logical data channel allocation and has resource allocation requirements.
In this example, the valid token(s) for the logical data channel that do not have the requirement for integrity protection is Bj＞0。
In this example, the valid token(s) of the logical data channel with the requirement for integrity protection is Bj> 0 and BIP＞0。
Fig. 5C illustrates an example of block 308. At block 308, if there is an allocation of resources to the current logical data channel j, then the valid token(s) is adjusted. For example, the valid token(s) are each decremented by the size of the allocation.
For example:
bj decrements the total size of MAC SDU for logical channel j
BIPReducing the total size of MAC SDU for integrity protected logical channel j
When B is presentIPBelow a threshold value (B)IP≦ 0), the allocation of resources to any integrity protected logical channels is suspended.
Thus, BIPIs a token bucket variable that becomesThe volume increases as time passes and decreases whenever data from IP-demanding bearers/LCHs is processed/included.
This ensures that the MAC layer will not need more data than the UE can handle, which requires IP from PDCP. Since the IP processing restriction is per UE, the token is a common bearer among all bearers that require integrity protection. The token bucket will become empty when some of the bearers run out of all IP processing capacity and the end node 110 is deemed unable to perform integrity protection on other data from other bearers or even the same bearer.
Possible modifications to the currently proposed 3GPP specifications are highlighted using bold and underlined fonts:
it should be noted that the change in 5.4.3.1.2 is not strictly required, but simplifies the resource allocation in 5.4.3.1.3.
Fig. 6A illustrates an example of the controller 400. Embodiments of the controller 400 may be implemented as controller circuitry. The controller 400 may be implemented solely in hardware, with certain aspects in software including only firmware, or may be a combination of hardware and software (including firmware).
As illustrated in fig. 6A, the controller 400 may be implemented using instructions that enable hardware functionality, for example, by using executable instructions of a computer program 406 in a general-purpose or special-purpose processor 402, which may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium (disk, memory, etc.) for execution by such a processor 402.
The processor 402 is configured to read from and write to the memory 404. The processor 402 may also include an output interface via which data and/or commands are output by the processor 402 and an input interface via which data and/or commands are input to the processor 402.
The memory 404 stores a computer program 406 comprising computer program instructions (computer program code), which computer program 406 controls the operation of the apparatus 110 when loaded into the processor 402. The computer program instructions of the computer program 406 provide the logic and routines that enables the apparatus 110, including the controller 400, to perform the methods illustrated in fig. 1-5C. The processor 402 by reading the memory 404 is able to load and execute the computer program 406.
Thus, the apparatus 110 comprises:
at least one processor 402; and
at least one memory 404 comprising computer program code
The at least one memory 404 and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor 402, cause the apparatus 10 at least to perform:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
As shown in fig. 6B, the computer program 406 may arrive at the apparatus 110 via any suitable delivery mechanism 410. Delivery mechanism 410 may be, for example, a machine-readable medium, a computer-readable medium, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, a computer program product, a memory device, a recording medium such as a compact disc read only memory (CD-ROM) or Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) or solid state memory, an article of manufacture that includes or tangibly embodies computer program 406. The delivery mechanism may be a signal configured to reliably transfer the computer program 406. The apparatus 110 may propagate or transmit the computer program 406 as a computer data signal.
Computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform or to perform at least the following:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is temporarily stopped.
The computer program instructions may be embodied in a computer program, a non-transitory computer readable medium, a computer program product, a machine readable medium. In some (but not necessarily all) examples, the computer program instructions may be distributed over more than one computer program.
Although memory 404 is illustrated as a single component/circuitry, it may be implemented as one or more separate components/circuitry, some or all of which may be integrated/removable and/or may provide permanent/semi-permanent/dynamic/cached storage.
Although the processor 402 is illustrated as a single component/circuitry, it may be implemented as one or more separate components/circuitry, some or all of which may be integrated/removable. Processor 402 may be a single core or multi-core processor.
References to 'computer-readable storage medium', 'computer program product', 'tangibly embodied computer program' etc. or a 'controller', 'computer', 'processor' etc. should be understood to encompass not only computers having different architectures such as single/multi-processor architectures and sequential (von neumann)/parallel architectures, but also special purpose circuits such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), application specific circuits (ASIC), signal processing devices and other processing circuitry. References to computer program, instructions, code etc. should be understood to encompass software as a programmable processor or firmware such as, for example, the programmable content of a hardware device whether instructions for a processor, or configuration settings for a fixed-function device, gate array or programmable logic device etc.
As used in this application, the term 'circuitry' may refer to one or more or all of the following:
(a) hardware-only circuitry implementations (such as implementations in analog-only and/or digital circuitry) and
(b) a combination of hardware circuitry and software, such as (as applicable):
(i) analog and/or digital hardware circuit(s) with software/firmware in combination with
(ii) Any portion of hardware processor(s) and software (including digital signal processor (s)), software and memory(s) that work together to cause a device, such as a mobile phone or server, to perform various functions, and
(c) hardware circuit(s) and/or processor(s), such as microprocessor(s) or portions of microprocessor(s), that require software (e.g., firmware) for operation, but which may not be present when software is not required for operation.
This definition of circuitry applies to all uses of this term in this application, including in any claims. As another example, as used in this application, the term "circuitry" also encompasses embodiments in which only processor circuitry or a processor and its (or their) accompanying software and/or firmware. The term "circuitry" also encompasses, for example (and if applicable to a particular claim element), a baseband integrated circuit for a mobile device or a similar integrated circuit in a server, a cellular network device, or another computing or network device.
The blocks illustrated in fig. 2, 3, 5 may represent steps in a method and/or code segments in the computer program 406. The specification of a particular order to the blocks does not necessarily imply that a required or preferred order exists for the blocks and the order and arrangement of the blocks may be different. Furthermore, some blocks may be omitted.
In some applications, the message is configured to provide data to or from the vehicle. In some applications, the message includes sensor data. In some applications, the message is configured to control an autonomous vehicle or assist a user in controlling a vehicle.
Where a structural feature has been described, it may be replaced by means for performing one or more of the functional steps of the structural feature, whether such function or functions are explicitly described or implicitly described.
The examples described above can be used as enabling components for:
an automotive system; a telecommunications system; an electronic system, including consumer electronics; a distributed computing system; a media system for generating or rendering media content including audio, visual and audiovisual content as well as mixed, intermediate, virtual and/or augmented reality; a personal system, including a personal health system or a personal fitness system; a navigation system; a user interface, also known as a human-machine interface; a network comprising a cellular, a non-cellular, and an optical network; an ad hoc network; an internet; the Internet of things; a virtualized network; and related software and services.
The term 'comprising' as used herein has an inclusive rather than exclusive meaning. That is, a reference to X including Y indicates that X may include only one Y or may include more than one Y. If the exclusive meaning of 'including' is intended, then in this context it will be expressly stated that "includes only one.
In this specification, reference has been made to various examples. The description of features or functions with respect to the examples indicates that those features or functions are present in the examples. The use of the terms 'example' or 'e.g.' or 'can' in this document indicates that such feature or functionality is present in at least the described example (whether described as an example or not), and that such feature or functionality may, but need not, be present in some or all of the other examples, whether or not explicitly described. Thus, 'examples', 'e.g', 'can' or 'can' refer to particular instances in a class of examples. The properties of an instance may be the properties of only that instance or the properties of that class or the properties of a subclass of that class that includes some but not all of the instances in that class. Thus, it is implicitly disclosed that features described with reference to one example but not with reference to another may be used in this other example as part of a working combination where possible, but do not necessarily have to be used in this other example.
Although embodiments have been described in the preceding paragraphs with reference to various examples, it should be appreciated that modifications to the examples given can be made without departing from the scope of the claims.
Features described in the foregoing description may be used in combinations other than those explicitly described above.
Although functions have been described with reference to certain features, those functions may be performed by other features, whether described or not.
Although features have been described with reference to certain embodiments, such features may also be present in other embodiments whether described or not.
The terms 'a' or 'an' as used herein have an inclusive rather than exclusive meaning. That is, any reference to X including Y indicates that X may include only one Y or may include more than one Y, unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. If the use of 'a' or 'the' is intended to have an exclusive meaning, this will be clear from the context. In some cases, the use of "at least one" or "one or more" may be used to emphasize inclusive meanings, but the absence of such terms should not be taken to infer or exclusive meanings.
The presence of a feature (or a combination of features) in a claim is a reference to that feature or to (a combination of features) itself, and also to features which achieve substantially the same technical effect (equivalent features). For example, equivalent features include features that are varied and that achieve substantially the same result in substantially the same way. Equivalent features include, for example, features that perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.
In this specification, reference has been made to various examples using adjectives or adjective phrases to describe characteristics of the examples. Such description of a characteristic with respect to an example indicates that the characteristic exists entirely as described in some examples and substantially as described in other examples.
Whilst endeavoring in the foregoing specification to draw attention to those features believed to be of importance it should be understood that the applicant may seek protection in respect of any patentable feature or combination of features hereinbefore referred to and/or shown in the drawings whether or not particular emphasis has been placed thereon.
Claims (18)
1. An apparatus comprising means for:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein monitoring transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection comprises: monitoring for transmission of a plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection; and
wherein temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection comprises:
temporarily stopping transmission of the plurality of logical data channels configured with integrity protection.
3. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein:
monitoring for transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection is performed within a logical channel prioritization procedure.
4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the logical channel prioritization comprises:
token-based allocation of resources to logical data channels in descending priority order; and
the logical data channels are assigned the remaining resources in descending priority order based on prioritization.
5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the token-based allocation of logical data channels depends on an allocation token bucket for the logical data channels, and comprises: maintaining, for each logical data channel, an allocation token bucket that is increased to a maximum value over time and decreased due to resource allocation for the respective logical data channel.
6. The apparatus of claim 5, wherein a rate of increase of allocation token buckets is different for different logical data channels.
7. The apparatus of claim 5 or 6, wherein the maximum value to allocate token buckets is different for different logical data channels.
8. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein the monitoring comprises: the resource allocation for integrity protection is compared to the constrained allowed usage value.
9. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the constrained allowed usage value depends on a maximum integrity protection bit rate for the apparatus.
10. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the constrained allowed usage value is a common value for all integrity protected logical data channels.
11. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein the monitoring comprises: maintaining an integrity protection token bucket that is increased to a maximum value over time and is decreased due to resource allocation of a logical data channel corresponding to a radio bearer configured with integrity protection.
12. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the integrity-protected token bucket is for the apparatus and not for each logical data channel.
13. The apparatus of any preceding claim, wherein integrity protection of logical data channels comprises: generating a cryptographic checksum that enables receiver-based authentication of data in the logical data channel.
14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the cryptographic checksum is generated using a cryptographic key and a cryptographic function, the cryptographic function having an input that depends on a message for transmission over the logical data channel, a synchronization time value, and a sequence order.
15. The apparatus of any preceding claim, configured as a mobile device for a cellular network or a user equipment configured for a cellular network.
16. A method, comprising:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.
17. An apparatus, comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one memory including computer program code
The at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.
18. Computer program instructions for causing an apparatus to perform or to perform at least the following:
monitoring for transmission of at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection; and
in accordance with the monitoring, temporarily stopping transmission of the at least one logical data channel configured with integrity protection.
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| PCT/CN2019/100861 WO2021026911A1 (en) | 2019-08-15 | 2019-08-15 | Radio communication |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103607775A (en) * | 2008-02-01 | 2014-02-26 | 交互数字专利控股公司 | Method for prioritizing logical channel implemented in WTRU and WTRU |
| US20160142934A1 (en) * | 2014-11-14 | 2016-05-19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | BUFFER STATUS REPORT FOR eDCS |
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| CN100583821C (en) * | 2006-03-17 | 2010-01-20 | 华为技术有限公司 | Method and system for realizing multicast |
| CN106912099B (en) * | 2017-01-13 | 2019-07-09 | 广州慧睿思通信息科技有限公司 | The uplink synchronisation method when RRC state of UE is PCH state in WCDMA direction-finding system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103607775A (en) * | 2008-02-01 | 2014-02-26 | 交互数字专利控股公司 | Method for prioritizing logical channel implemented in WTRU and WTRU |
| US20160142934A1 (en) * | 2014-11-14 | 2016-05-19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | BUFFER STATUS REPORT FOR eDCS |
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| WO2021026911A1 (en) | 2021-02-18 |
| EP4014537A1 (en) | 2022-06-22 |
| CN114270926B (en) | 2024-04-12 |
| EP4014537A4 (en) | 2023-05-10 |
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