CN114221713A - Entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method - Google Patents

Entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method Download PDF

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CN114221713A
CN114221713A CN202111409658.4A CN202111409658A CN114221713A CN 114221713 A CN114221713 A CN 114221713A CN 202111409658 A CN202111409658 A CN 202111409658A CN 114221713 A CN114221713 A CN 114221713A
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CN114221713B (en
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盛宇波
施建弘
周澜
钟伟
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
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    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
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Abstract

The invention provides an entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method, wherein a user 1 and a user 2 respectively prepare a group of determined entanglement states for entanglement exchange to establish entanglement channels. Similarly, the user 3 prepares 2 groups of determined entanglement states, and sends two photons of one group and one photon of the other group to the fourth measuring terminal for Bell state measurement, so that an entanglement channel is established with the fourth measuring terminal. User 1, user 2, and user 3 randomly encode photons in the hand. And the user 2 sends the photons in the hand to the fourth measuring end to perform Bell state measurement with the photons in the hand and publishes a result. Then, the user 1 and the user 3 send the remaining photons in the hand to the fourth measurement end for Bell state measurement, and publish the result. The user 2 can deduce the coding operation of the user 1 and the user 3 according to the result of the bell state measurement, thereby reading the secret information transmitted by the user 1 and the user 3.

Description

Entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method
Technical Field
The invention relates to an entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method, and belongs to the technical field of quantum communication.
Background
Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) was first proposed by professor Longgui Lu in 2000. In 2000, the major central distribution theorem of Longgui Lu and Liu Xiao eosin of Qinghua university is popularized to a quantum system, a quantum data block transmission and distribution transmission method is initiated for the first time, a first two-step efficient QSDC scheme based on EPR entangled photon pairs is provided, and the problem of information leakage in the communication process can be solved. In 2003, Longgui Lu, Liu Xiao Shu and Deng Fu and the like clarify the definition and construction principle of quantum secure direct communication and provide a two-step QSDC scheme based on EPR entangled photon pair with more complete structural meaning. In 2004, dun and longgui have proposed a quantum one-time pad direct communication scheme based on a single-photon sequence, also called DL04 scheme, giving conditions that QSDC needs to meet and clarifying its physical mechanism. The two early typical schemes provide a construction principle and a safety criterion of quantum secure direct communication, and lay a solid theoretical foundation for the further development of QSDC.
In the following years, QSDC theory research is mature and perfect day by day, a plurality of novel QSDC schemes based on single photon and entangled photon pairs emerge, and meanwhile, the safety of a QSDC system under noise and various attack modes gradually becomes a key restriction point for the development of the QSDC system. In 2007, Saururus Fujiri university full-faith et al analyzes the security of a GHZ-state-based three-party QSDC scheme proposed by Furan university Jinxing Ri et al, finds that an eavesdropper can obtain partial confidentiality according to public information, and provides an improved scheme. In 2008, the research of high-flying et al of beijing post and telecommunications university analyzed the security problem of a two-way QSDC scheme under different attack modes, indicating that an eavesdropper can obtain part of confidential content by using public classical information. In 2012, Huangwei et al, Beijing post and telecommunications university, proposed a fault-tolerant QSDC scheme based on quantum encryption, which can resist collective noise to some extent. In 2014, Anhui Huori et al, Beijing university, studied a QSDC scheme in noisy channels based on a stable subcode that can error detection and correction of single-quantum phase and bit errorsAnd errors are generated, and the communication error rate is reduced. In 2015, longgui lu studied quantum secure direct communication in noisy environments. Meanwhile, research on quantum secure direct communication is also gradually being conducted by foreign research groups. 2002, Germany
Figure BDA0003373839980000021
K Bostrom, T Felbinger at Wilhelms university proposed a "ping-pong" communication scheme that did not have security checks in the first round of transmission, but later proved to be insecure. In 2004, the korean high research institute Nguyen et al proposed a QSDC scheme that can realize two-way communication. In 2006, the korean information security technology center Lee et al proposed a QSDC scheme that could implement authentication, which later proved vulnerable, and should enhance security by preventing an authenticator from obtaining information. The 2008 university of Cornell Stefano Priandola et al proposed a QSDC scheme using continuous variables. In 2010, university of Cornell Ola m.hegazy et al proposed a QSDC scheme based on entangled states and super dense coding. In 2015, Urkland International university of aviation, Sergiy Gnatyuk, Tetyana Zhmurko and Poland
Figure BDA0003373839980000022
The university Pawel Falat provides an efficiency acceleration thought for a QSDC scheme, and quantum security amplification is carried out on a ping-pong protocol based on a ternary pseudorandom sequence and related conversion in a finite field, so that the scheme security can be increased, and the communication rate can be increased. In 2016, Milad Nanvakenari et al, International university of Imam Reza, Iran, proposed a four-particle swarm-based efficient QSDC scheme, which can realize an authentication function.
In recent years, QSDC has made important advances both experimentally and theoretically. In 2016, Shanxi university Shoulian et al experimentally implemented the DL04 protocol using a simplified frequency encoding method. In 6 months of 2017, the quantum storage is used for the first time in a combined manner of China university of science and technology and Nanjing post and telecommunications university, and the QSDC scheme based on entanglement is experimentally realized. In 11 months of 2017, Qinghua university and Nanjing post and telecommunications university cooperate, QSDC is realized in 500-meter annular optical fiber for the first time, and theoretical analysis proves that the feasibility of two-party communication with a distance of dozens of kilometers can be verified by means of the current experimental conditions. In 2019 and 2020, longgui lu, the shengyu wave research team proposed a Device Independent (DI) QSDC scheme and a Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QSDC scheme for the first time. However, although the MDI-QSDC protocol can effectively resist all attacks from the probe end, the number of communication parties is limited to two parties, so that the number of communication parties is limited, and the communication rate is low.
In view of the above, it is necessary to provide a secure direct communication method based on entangled measuring device independent three-party quantum, so as to solve the above problems.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method, which can realize quantum secure direct communication among three parties, effectively improve the communication efficiency, resist all attacks from a detector end and ensure the security of a transmission process.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides an entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method, which mainly comprises:
step 1: user 1 and user 2 prepare a number of quantum states of | Φ+If EPR photon pair is greater than, user 3 prepares two groups of quantum states with phi+The EPR photon pairs of > S5, S6 and (S7, S8); the EPR photon pair sequences of user 1 are referred to as S1 and S2, and the EPR photon pair sequences of user 2 are referred to as S3 and S4; the user 1 and the user 2 randomly insert a plurality of single photons randomly prepared under an X base or a Z base as security detection photons in S2 and S4 sequences respectively, and the user 3 randomly inserts a plurality of security detection photons in S6 and S7 sequences respectively;
step 2: the user 1 and the user 2 transmit the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences to the fourth measuring terminal; meanwhile, the user 3 sends photons of the S5, S6, S7 sequence to the fourth measuring terminal;
and step 3: the fourth measuring terminal carries out Bell State Measurement (BSM) on the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences, meanwhile, the fourth measuring terminal carries out BSM on the photons of the S6 and S7 sequences, and the measuring result is published; if both photons of the BSM are security photons, the measurement result of the BSM is used for security detection; if the error rate of the security detection is higher than the set threshold, the communication is cancelled, and if the error rate of the security detection is lower than the set threshold, the communication is continued;
and 4, step 4: if the two photons of the BSM are both from EPR photon pairs, using the result of the BSM to construct an entanglement channel; according to the result of the BSM, an entanglement channel is established between the user 1 and the user 2, and an entanglement channel is also established between the user 3 and the fourth party to be measured;
and 5: according to the information to be transmitted, the user 1 and the user 3 respectively encode the residual single photons in the hand entanglement state; user 1 has an invariant operation (I) and a bit flip operation (σ)x) Respectively representing classical information 0 and 1; the subscriber 3 has an invariant operation (I) and a phase flip operation (sigma)z) Respectively representing classical information 0 and 1;
at the same time, S2 operates randomly on the S4 sequence of photons in the hand (I or σ)x) (ii) a In the sequences of S1 and S5, user 1 and user 3 randomly select a portion of photons as security detection photons and randomly encode them;
step 6: after the encoding is completed, the user 2 sends photons of the S4 sequence to a fourth measurement terminal to perform BSM and publish the measurement result, so as to establish an entangled channel between the user 1 and the user 3;
and 7: the user 1 and the user 3 respectively send the photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to a fourth measurement terminal for BSM and publish the measurement results; according to the measurement results, users 1 and 3 publish the location of the security detection photons;
if the two photons of the BSM are both from the security detection photon pair, the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 publish application operation and perform security detection by combining with the BSM result; if the security detection is passed, the user 2 obtains the information to be transmitted by the users 1 and 3 according to the measurement result measured by the fourth end.
As a further improvement of the present invention, step 1 specifically comprises: the initial preparation of the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 has an entanglement state of | Φ+>. and are each one of the following 4 orthogonal Bell states,the form is as follows:
Figure BDA0003373839980000041
Figure BDA0003373839980000042
the single photons randomly prepared under the X group and the Z group comprise the following four quantum states:
Figure BDA0003373839980000043
as a further improvement of the present invention, step 2 and step 3 are specifically: if two photons of the BSM are security detection single photons of the same preparation base, the measurement result is used for security detection, and the specific process is as follows:
Figure BDA0003373839980000051
Figure BDA0003373839980000052
Figure BDA0003373839980000053
Figure BDA0003373839980000054
the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 disclose the base and the position of the inserted single photon, and after the measurement is finished, the measuring party discloses the measurement result; and the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 calculate the error rate according to the BSM result, if the error rate is higher than a set threshold value, the photon transmission is unsafe, the communication is cancelled, and if the error rate is lower than the set threshold value, the photon transmission process is safe, and the communication is continued.
As a further improvement of the present invention, step 4 specifically comprises:
after the user 1 and the user 2 respectively send the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences to the fourth measuring end for measurement, the quantum state of the system is as follows:
Figure BDA0003373839980000055
after the user 3 sends the photons of the sequences S6, S7 and S8 to the fourth measurement end for BSM, the quantum state of the system is:
Figure BDA0003373839980000056
and according to the BSM result, the user 1 and the user 2 establish an entangled channel, and the user 3 and the fourth measuring terminal establish an entangled channel.
As a further improvement of the present invention, step 5 specifically comprises: user 1 and user 3 encode photons of S1 and S5 sequences in the hand according to the information to be transmitted, respectively, and in the encoding process, user 1 can apply I operation (code 0) and sigmaxOperation (representing 1), I represents invariant operation, specifically, I ═ 0 > < 0| + |1 > < 1|, σxFor bit-flipping operations, particularly sigmaxI0 > < 1| + |1 > < 0| user 3 can apply I operation (encoding 0) and σzOperation (representing 1), σzFor phase-flip operations, particularly sigmaz0-1. user 2 randomly performs I-operations or σ on photons of the S4 sequence in the handxAnd (5) operating.
As a further improvement of the present invention, step 6 specifically is: the user 2 sends the photons of the S4 photon sequence to the fourth measurement end, and performs BSM with the photons of the S8 sequence, so that the photons of the S1 sequence and the S5 sequence establish an entangled channel.
As a further improvement of the present invention, step 7 specifically comprises: the user 1 and the user 3 send the coded photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to the fourth measuring terminal for BSM, and the fourth measuring terminal publishes a BSM result; if the photons for performing the BSM in the S1 and S5 sequences are security photons, the user 1, the user 2, and the user 3 all publish encoded operation information for security detection; if the detection is passed, the user 2 deduces the coding results of the users 1 and 3 according to the result of the BSM and the random operation of the user 2 so as to obtain the secret information transmitted by the users 1 and 3.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: compared with the prior art, the invention expands the traditional two-user MDI-QSDC and traditional three-party QSDC, increases the communication party of the MDI-QSDC to three parties, solves the problem that measuring equipment is easy to attack, has a greater promotion effect on the practicability of the QSDC, can increase the number of the communication parties and improve the communication efficiency, and can resist all attacks from a detector end in fact, thereby ensuring the safety of the information transmission process.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a communication flow diagram of an entanglement-based measuring device irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method of the invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of the principle of the entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method of the invention.
Wherein, fig. 2(a) is a schematic structural diagram of user 1, user 2 and user 3 preparing entanglement in the present invention;
FIG. 2(b) is a schematic diagram of the present invention, wherein photons of the S2, S3, S6 and S7 sequences are sent to the fourth measurement end;
fig. 2(c) is a schematic structural diagram of the present invention, in which user 1 and user 3 perform encoding operation, user 2 randomly performs operation on S4, and performs measurement on the measurement end;
FIG. 2(d) is a schematic diagram of the structure of the user 1 and the user 3 forming entanglement in the present invention;
fig. 2(e) is a schematic structural diagram of the user 2 determining the codes of the user 1 and the user 3 according to the measurement result in the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the invention provides an entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method, which mainly comprises the following steps:
step 1: user 1 and user 2 prepare a number of quantum states of | Φ+If EPR photon pair is greater than, user 3 prepares two groups of quantum states with phi+The EPR photon pairs of > S5, S6 and (S7, S8); the EPR photon pair sequences of user 1 are referred to as S1 and S2, and the EPR photon pair sequences of user 2 are referred to as S3 and S4; the user 1 and the user 2 randomly insert a plurality of single photons randomly prepared under an X base or a Z base as security detection photons in S2 and S4 sequences respectively, and the user 3 randomly inserts a plurality of security detection photons in S6 and S7 sequences respectively;
step 2: the user 1 and the user 2 transmit the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences to the fourth measuring terminal; meanwhile, the user 3 sends photons of the S5, S6, S7 sequence to the fourth measuring terminal;
and step 3: the fourth measuring terminal carries out Bell State Measurement (BSM) on the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences, meanwhile, the fourth measuring terminal carries out BSM on the photons of the S6 and S7 sequences, and the measuring result is published; if both photons of the BSM are security photons, the measurement result of the BSM is used for security detection; if the error rate of the security detection is higher than the set threshold, the communication is cancelled, and if the error rate of the security detection is lower than the set threshold, the communication is continued;
and 4, step 4: if the two photons of the BSM are both from EPR photon pairs, using the result of the BSM to construct an entanglement channel; according to the result of the BSM, an entanglement channel is established between the user 1 and the user 2, and an entanglement channel is also established between the user 3 and the fourth party to be measured;
and 5: according to the information to be transmitted, the user 1 and the user 3 respectively encode the residual single photons in the hand entanglement state; user 1 has an invariant operation (I) and a bit flip operation (σ)x) Respectively representing classical information 0 and 1; the subscriber 3 has an invariant operation (I) and a phase flip operation (sigma)z) Each representsClassical information 0 and 1; at the same time, S2 operates randomly on the photons of the S4 sequence in the hand (I or σ)x) (ii) a In the sequences of S1 and S5, user 1 and user 3 randomly select a portion of photons as security detection photons and randomly encode them;
step 6: after the encoding is completed, the user 2 sends photons of the S4 sequence to a fourth measurement terminal to perform BSM and publish the measurement result, so as to establish an entangled channel between the user 1 and the user 3;
and 7: the user 1 and the user 3 respectively send the photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to a fourth measurement terminal for BSM and publish the measurement results; according to the measurement results, users 1 and 3 publish the location of the security detection photons; if both photons of the BSM originate from a security detection photon pair, user 1, user 2, and user 3 publish the applied operation, and perform security detection in combination with the BSM result; if the security detection is passed, the user 2 obtains the information to be transmitted by the user 1 and the user 3 according to the BSM measurement results measured by the third round of fourth end.
The process of the invention is analyzed below with reference to specific examples:
as shown in FIG. 2(a), user 1 and user 2 each prepare a quantum state containing a large amount of quantum
Figure BDA0003373839980000081
With EPR photon pair sequences (S1, S2) and (S3, S4), user 3 prepared two photonic pairs containing a plurality of quantum states of
Figure BDA0003373839980000082
The EPR photon pair sequences of (S5, S6) and (S7, S8). L Φ+Belongs to one of the following 4 orthogonal bell states,
Figure BDA0003373839980000083
Figure BDA0003373839980000084
at the same time, three usersRandomly preparing a large number of single photons under a Z base and an X base, wherein the Z base is { |0 >, |1 > }, and the X base is
Figure BDA0003373839980000091
These single photons are randomly inserted into the sequences S2, S3, S6 and S7 for later safety detection.
As shown in fig. 2(b), next, user 1 and user 2 send each photon in the S2, S3 sequence to the fourth measurement terminal for Bell State Measurement (BSM). Meanwhile, the user 3 sends the photons in the sequences S6, S7, S8 to the fourth measuring terminal, which performs BSM on the photons in the sequences S6, S7. After the measurement is completed, users 1,2,3 publish the location and quantum state of the security detection photons.
Photons for performing BSM include the following:
in the first case, both photons for BSM are from EPR photon pairs. In this case, the entanglement swapping is used to entangle the remaining photons in the S1 and S4 sequences in user 1 and user 2, specifically (the subscript indicates the sequence number of the photon):
Figure BDA0003373839980000092
entanglement is generated between the corresponding remaining photons in the sequences of S5 and S8 in the user 3 and the fourth measuring terminal by the following specific process (subscript indicates the sequence number of the photon):
Figure BDA0003373839980000093
in this case, based on the measurement result of the fourth party, the users 1 and 2 know which bell status the entangled state shared by both the users belongs to, and similarly, the users 3 and the fourth party know which bell status the entangled state shared by both the users belongs to.
In the second case, both photons performing the BSM are security detection single photons. If the preparation bases of the two single photons are different, the following four conditions are corresponded:
Figure BDA0003373839980000101
Figure BDA0003373839980000102
Figure BDA0003373839980000103
Figure BDA0003373839980000104
since the BSM result appears in 4 kinds of bell states with equal probability, the user cannot judge whether there is eavesdropping through the BSM result. Therefore, the BSM result corresponding to this case cannot be subjected to security detection and can only be discarded.
If the preparation groups of two single photons are the same, such as Z groups or X groups, then there are several cases:
Figure BDA0003373839980000105
Figure BDA0003373839980000106
Figure BDA0003373839980000107
Figure BDA0003373839980000108
it can be seen that the BSM results in only 2 BSMs, which, if there is eavesdropping, may result in the BSM obtaining two other erroneous results and thus being discoverable by the user. Therefore, the BSM result corresponding to this case can be used for security detection.
And if the error rate obtained by the safety detection is higher than the set threshold, the photon transmission process is considered unsafe, the user terminates the communication, and if the error rate obtained by the safety detection is lower than the set threshold, the photon transmission process is considered safe, and the scheme is continued.
In the third case, the two photons for BSM are one from the EPR photon pair and one is the security detection photon. In this case, both the BSM result and the remaining photons in the corresponding EPR photon pair in the user's hand can only be discarded.
When the security check is passed, entangled channels are established between the user 1 and the user 2, the user 3 and the measuring party.
As shown in fig. 2(c), user 1, user 3 then encode the photons of the S1 and S5 sequences in the hand, respectively. User 1 has two coding operations, namely an invariant operation (I) and a bit flip operation (σ)x) Respectively, representing classical information 0 and 1. The user 3 has two encoding operations, namely an invariant operation (I) and a phase flip operation (sigma)z) Respectively, representing classical information 0 and 1. Simultaneously, the user 1 and the user 3 respectively select a part of EPR pairs as security detection photon pairs and carry out random operation (I or sigma)x). To prevent the fourth measurement end from obtaining useful information, user 2 also performs a random operation (I or σ) on each photon of the S4 sequencexOr σzOperation). Next, the user 2 sends the photons of the S4 sequence in the hand to the fourth measuring terminal to perform BSM measurement with the photons of the S8 sequence.
As shown in fig. 2(d), user 1 and user 3 also send photons of the S1 and S5 sequences in the hand to the measurement end for BSM measurement. And the measuring end publishes the measuring result.
As shown in fig. 2(e), user 1 and user 3 further send photons of the S1 and S5 sequences in the hand to the fourth measurement end for BSM. After the measurement is completed, the user 1 and the user 3 publish the positions of the security detection photon pairs and publish the encoding operation of the users on all the security detection photon pairs. User 2 also publishes that it operates randomly on all security detection photon pairs. And 3, the user at the side 3 can perform the second round of security detection according to the measurement results of the BSM twice, and if the error rate of the security detection is higher than the set threshold value, the photon transmission in the second round is considered to be unsafe, and the communication is abandoned. And if the safety detection error rate is lower than the set threshold value, the second round of photon transmission is considered to be safe, and the communication is continued.
If the security detection is passed, the user 2 can deduce the encoding operations of the user 1 and the user 3 according to the four BSM results, namely obtaining the secret information transmitted by the two parties.
Suppose the result of BSM after the first round of photon transmission for user 1 and user 2 is | Ψ+＞23The result of BSM after the first round of photon transmission by user 3 is | Ψ - >67. The entanglement states established by user 1 and user 2 are | Ψ+＞14The user 3 and the user 4 establish an entangled state of | Ψ-＞58. If the encoded information that user 1 wants to deliver to user 2 is 0(I operation), the encoded information that user 3 wants to deliver to user 2 is 1(σ)zOperation), the random encoding by user 2 is σxAnd (5) operating.
After passing through the second round of photon transmission and BSM,
Figure BDA0003373839980000121
suppose the result of BSM is | Ψ+＞48. Finally, user 1 and user 3 send photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to the fourth party for measurement, and the BSM result obtained by the fourth party is | Φ |+＞15. Based on these two measurements, user 2 can reverse the 3-way encoded quantum state to | Φ+＞14|Ψ+＞58And then combines the random operation of itself as sigmaxThe state of the system after encoding by user 1 and user 3 can be obtained as | Ψ+＞14|Ψ+＞58So that the user 2 gets the encoded information of the users 1 and 3 as 0 and 1.
In summary, the present invention specifically includes user 1 and user 2 preparing a set of determined entanglement statuses respectively. And the user 1 and the user 2 send one photon in the entangled state to a fourth measuring end to carry out Bell state measurement, and an entangled channel is established through entanglement swapping. Similarly, the user 3 prepares 2 groups of determined entanglement states, and sends two photons of one group and one photon of the other group to the fourth measuring terminal for Bell state measurement, so that an entanglement channel is established with the fourth measuring terminal. And the user 1 and the user 3 respectively carry out operation coding on the rest photons in the hand according to the information needing to be transmitted. User 2 also randomly encodes photons in the hand. And the user 2 sends the photons in the hand to the fourth measuring end to perform Bell state measurement with the photons in the hand and publishes a result. Then, the user 1 and the user 3 send the remaining photons in the hand to the fourth measurement end for Bell state measurement, and publish the result. The user 2 can deduce the coding operation of the user 1 and the user 3 according to the result of the bell state measurement, thereby reading the secret information transmitted by the user 1 and the user 3. The invention can realize the safe direct communication of the three-party quantum, and can completely resist all attacks from the measuring end by handing all measuring tasks to the fourth party. The protocol has an important propulsion effect on the practicability of QSDC.
Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes may be made and equivalents may be substituted for elements thereof without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (7)

1. An entanglement-based measuring device irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method is characterized by comprising the following steps: the quantum secure direct communication method mainly comprises the following steps:
step 1: user 1 and user 2 prepare a number of quantum states of | Φ+If EPR photon pair is greater than, user 3 prepares two groups of quantum states with phi+The EPR photon pairs of > S5, S6 and (S7, S8); the EPR photon pair sequences of user 1 are referred to as S1 and S2, and the EPR photon pair sequences of user 2 are referred to as S3 and S4; user 1 and user 2 randomly insert several single photons randomly prepared under X base or Z base as security detection photons in S2 and S4 sequences respectively, and user 3 also randomly inserts several security detection photons in S6 and S7 sequences respectivelyMeasuring photons;
step 2: the user 1 and the user 2 transmit the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences to the fourth measuring terminal; meanwhile, the user 3 sends photons of the S5, S6, S7 sequence to the fourth measuring terminal;
and step 3: the fourth measuring terminal carries out Bell State Measurement (BSM) on the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences, meanwhile, the fourth measuring terminal carries out BSM on the photons of the S6 and S7 sequences, and the measuring result is published; if both photons of the BSM are security photons, the measurement result of the BSM is used for security detection; if the error rate of the security detection is higher than the set threshold, the communication is cancelled, and if the error rate of the security detection is lower than the set threshold, the communication is continued;
and 4, step 4: if the two photons of the BSM are both from EPR photon pairs, using the result of the BSM to construct an entanglement channel; according to the result of the BSM, an entanglement channel is established between the user 1 and the user 2, and an entanglement channel is also established between the user 3 and the fourth party to be measured;
and 5: according to the information to be transmitted, the user 1 and the user 3 respectively encode the residual single photons in the hand entanglement state; user 1 has an invariant operation (I) and a bit flip operation (σ)x) Respectively representing classical information 0 and 1; the subscriber 3 has an invariant operation (I) and a phase flip operation (sigma)z) Respectively representing classical information 0 and 1;
at the same time, S2 operates randomly on the S4 sequence of photons in the hand (I or σ)xOr σzOperation); in the sequences of S1 and S5, user 1 and user 3 randomly select a portion of photons as security detection photons and randomly encode them;
step 6: after the encoding is completed, the user 2 sends photons of the S4 sequence to a fourth measurement terminal to perform BSM and publish the measurement result, so as to establish an entangled channel between the user 1 and the user 3;
and 7: the user 1 and the user 3 respectively send the photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to a fourth measurement terminal for BSM and publish the measurement results; users 1 and 3 publish the location of security detection photons;
if the two photons of the BSM are both from the security detection photon pair, the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 publish an application operation and perform security detection by combining the BSM result; if the security check is passed, the user 2 obtains the information to be transmitted by the users 1 and 3 according to the four BSM measurement results.
2. The entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein the step 1 specifically comprises: the initial preparation of the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 has an entanglement state of | Φ+>. and are each one of the following 4 orthogonal Bell states, of the form:
Figure FDA0003373839970000021
Figure FDA0003373839970000022
the single photons randomly prepared under the X group and the Z group comprise the following four quantum states:
Figure FDA0003373839970000023
3. the entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein the steps 2 and 3 are specifically: if two photons of the BSM are security detection single photons of the same preparation base, the measurement result is used for security detection, and the specific process is as follows:
Figure FDA0003373839970000024
Figure FDA0003373839970000025
Figure FDA0003373839970000026
Figure FDA0003373839970000027
the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 disclose the base and the position of the inserted single photon, and after the measurement is finished, the measuring party discloses the measurement result; the user 1, the user 2 and the user 3 calculate the error rate according to the BSM result, if the error rate is higher than a set threshold value, the photon transmission is unsafe, and the communication is cancelled; and if the error rate is lower than the set threshold, the photon transmission process is safe, and the communication is continued.
4. The entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein the step 4 is specifically:
after the user 1 and the user 2 respectively send the photons of the S2 and S3 sequences to the fourth measuring end for measurement, the quantum state of the system is as follows:
Figure FDA0003373839970000031
after the user 3 sends the photons of the sequences S6, S7 and S8 to the fourth measurement end for BSM, the quantum state of the system is:
Figure FDA0003373839970000032
and according to the BSM result, the user 1 and the user 2 establish an entangled channel, and the user 3 and the fourth measuring terminal establish an entangled channel.
5. The entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein the step 5 is specifically: user 1 and user 3 encode photons of S1 and S5 sequences in the hand according to the information to be transmitted, respectively, and in the encoding process, user 1 can apply I operation (code 0) and sigmaxOperation (code 1), I stands for invariant operation, in particular I ═ 0 > < 0| + |1 > < 1|, σxFor bit-flipping operations, particularly sigmaxI0 > < 1| + |1 > < 0| user 3 can apply I operation (encoding 0) and σzOperation (code 1), σzFor phase-flip operations, particularly sigmaz0-1. user 2 randomly performs I-operations or σ on photons of the S4 sequence in the handxOperation or σzAnd (5) operating.
6. The entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein step 6 specifically comprises: the user 2 sends the photons of the S4 photon sequence to the fourth measurement end, and performs BSM with the photons of the S8 sequence, so that the photons of the S1 sequence and the S5 sequence establish an entangled channel.
7. The entanglement-based measuring device-independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method according to claim 1, wherein step 7 specifically comprises: the user 1 and the user 3 send the coded photons of the S1 and S5 sequences to the fourth measuring terminal for BSM, and the fourth measuring terminal publishes a BSM result; if the photons for performing the BSM in the S1 and S5 sequences are security detection photons, the user 1, the user 2, and the user 3 all publish operation information for security detection; if the detection is passed, the user 2 deduces the coding results of the users 1 and 3 according to the measurement results of the four times of BSMs and the random operation of the user 2, so as to obtain the secret information transmitted by the users 1 and 3.
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