CN113612601A - Measuring equipment irrelevant quantum direct communication method - Google Patents

Measuring equipment irrelevant quantum direct communication method Download PDF

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CN113612601A
CN113612601A CN202110739567.0A CN202110739567A CN113612601A CN 113612601 A CN113612601 A CN 113612601A CN 202110739567 A CN202110739567 A CN 202110739567A CN 113612601 A CN113612601 A CN 113612601A
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quantum
alice
bob
state
charlie
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李相洁
龙桂鲁
胡敏
郭邦红
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National Quantum Communication Guangdong Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/07—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems
    • H04B10/075—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal
    • H04B10/079—Arrangements for monitoring or testing transmission systems; Arrangements for fault measurement of transmission systems using an in-service signal using measurements of the data signal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/70—Photonic quantum communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/80—Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
    • H04B10/85—Protection from unauthorised access, e.g. eavesdrop protection

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Optics & Photonics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Optical Modulation, Optical Deflection, Nonlinear Optics, Optical Demodulation, Optical Logic Elements (AREA)
  • Optical Communication System (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a measuring equipment independent quantum direct communication method, which randomly prepares one measuring equipment independent quantum through Alice
Figure DDA0003142569170000011
The two-photon entangled-state qubit of (1) is prepared by Bob randomly in a single-photon state of one of four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; alice sends the quantum bit of one photon in the entangled state to Charlie, the rest quantum bit of the photon in the entangled state is reserved, and Bob sends the randomly prepared quantum bit of the single photon state to Charlie; after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, Charlie executesAnd (4) measuring the Bell state, publishing the measurement result through a classical channel, and executing the unitary operation by Alice to finish the quantum invisible state. The encoding mode of the invention can eliminate quantum storage.

Description

Measuring equipment irrelevant quantum direct communication method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quantum information and optical communication, in particular to a measuring equipment irrelevant quantum direct communication method.
Background
Quantum communication uses physical principles to ensure unconditional security of communication information, and currently, there are many internationally popular quantum communication protocols, including Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC), and the like. QKD uses quantum state transport keys, and QSDC transports confidential information directly in a quantum channel.
In the measurement equipment irrelevant quantum secure direct communication, two steps of eavesdropping detection are mainly included: the first step is detection of security, which is used to detect whether there is eavesdropper in communication; and the second step of detecting the integrity of the call, which is used for detecting whether the information encrypted by the classic password is stolen by a person, namely whether the information is complete. Information encoding exists between the first step detection and the second step detection. The quantum storage mainly exists in the second step of detection, and the first step of detection and the rest steps have no dependence on the quantum storage. The safety of quantum secure direct communication depends on block transmission of data, while the block transmission technology requires quantum storage, but the current quantum storage technology is still immature and is difficult to be put into practical use. Therefore, further improvement on the existing device independent quantum direct communication technology is needed to reduce the dependence of the measurement device independent quantum secure direct communication protocol on quantum storage.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problem, a quantum secure direct communication protocol without quantum storage is provided, and dynamic joint error control codes are applied to a measuring equipment independent protocol, so that the dependence of the measuring equipment independent quantum secure direct communication protocol on quantum storage is eliminated, and the practicability of the system is improved.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a measuring equipment independent quantum direct communication method comprises a user side Alice, a user side Bob and a measuring end Charlie, wherein the user side Alice and the user side Bob are used for generating, sending and receiving quantum bits, and the measuring end Charlie is used for measuring the quantum bits;
the method comprises an invisible transitive state, wherein the invisible transitive state comprises the following steps:
step 1, instituteThe Alice randomly prepares one
Figure BDA0003142569150000021
The two-photon-state entangled-state qubit of (1), the two-photon-state entangled state being used for information transmission;
the Bob randomly prepares a single-photon quantum bit in one of four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, | - >;
step 2, Alice sends one optical qubit in the entangled state to Charlie, and reserves the remaining optical qubit, and Bob sends the randomly prepared single photon state qubit to Charlie;
step 3, after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement, and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
and 4, the Alice executes the unitary operation to complete the quantum invisible transfer state, and the quantum state of the quantum bit reserved by the Alice is the same as the quantum state of the quantum bit sent by the Bob.
A measuring equipment independent quantum direct communication method comprises a user side Alice, a user side Bob and a measuring end Charlie, wherein the user side Alice and the user side Bob are used for generating, sending and receiving quantum bits, and the measuring end Charlie is used for measuring the quantum bits;
the method comprises the following steps of security detection and integrity detection, wherein the security detection steps are as follows:
step A, the Alice prepares a random single photon state quantum bit in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the Bob randomly prepares single-photon quantum bits in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the single photon state quantum bit is used for eavesdropping detection;
b, simultaneously sending respective quantum bits to Charlie by Alice and Bob;
c, after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement, and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
and D, the Alice informs Bob through a classical channel, both the Alice and the Bob publish the prepared quantum states, and then executes eavesdropping detection in a quantum key distribution protocol irrelevant to the measuring equipment, if the error rate is less than a maximum threshold value, it is judged that eavesdropping does not exist, otherwise, it is judged that eavesdropping exists in the communication.
Preferably, the bit error rate maximum threshold is in the range of 0-11%, and preferably the bit error rate maximum threshold is 7%. Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
performing exclusive or operation on information M to be transmitted and a randomly generated secret key K by Alice to obtain a ciphertext M', namely M ═ M ^ K; then, JEEC encoding is carried out on the ciphertext M', and finally, the encoded ciphertext is modulated to a quantum bit;
sending the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and the randomly selected random number to Charlie by Alice;
c, the Charlie measures the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and publishes the measurement result through a classical channel;
if the random number is sent by the Alice, the Alice compares the Charlie published measurement result with the random number prepared by the Alice: if the error rate is smaller than the maximum threshold value, the ciphertext transmitted this time is judged to be complete, otherwise, the fact that an eavesdropper steals the ciphertext is judged.
Preferably, the bit error rate maximum threshold is in the range of 0-5%, and preferably the bit error rate maximum threshold is 5%.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
step d, the Bob decodes the ciphertext published by the Charlie, and obtains the transmitted information M by using the ciphertext of the randomly generated key K;
if the frame is not transmitted, returning to the step 1 or A; otherwise, adopting the error rate in the step c to estimate the safety capacity of the communication in the current round by the Alice and the Bob, and calculating the number of the keys which can be extracted; and finally, respectively extracting the secret keys by Alice and Bob and inserting the secret keys into the secret key pool for encrypting and decoding the cryptograph of the next round.
A memory device having stored therein a plurality of instructions adapted to be loaded by a processor and to perform the steps of the measuring device independent quantum direct communication method as described above.
An intelligent terminal comprising a processor for executing instructions and a storage device for storing a plurality of instructions, the instructions being adapted to be loaded by the processor and to perform the steps of the measuring device independent quantum direct communication method as described above.
The invention has the beneficial technical effects that: the invention directly adopts the coding mode of dynamic joint error control coding in the information coding process, and the transmitted information is encrypted by a classical password and then loaded on a quantum state, namely the quantum transmission is the encrypted ciphertext. The invention ensures that the data transmitted in each round not only contains the information transmitted in the round, but also contains the key for encrypting the information transmitted in the next round, and the number of the keys can be calculated according to the safety capacity of the communication in the round, thereby eliminating the dependence of the quantum safety direct communication protocol irrelevant to the measuring equipment on quantum storage.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the overall structure of the application of the measuring device independent quantum direct communication method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a measurement terminal Charlie in the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of stealth pass-state process steps;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the steps of the security detection process of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the steps of the integrity check and information communication process of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following embodiments, but the scope of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1 to 5, a method for measuring device-independent quantum direct communication includes a user side Alice, a user side Bob, and a measuring end Charlie, where the user side Alice and the user side Bob are configured to generate, send, and receive a qubit, and the measuring end Charlie is configured to measure the qubit; the user side Alice and the user side Bob can be used as a sender and a receiver, a random quantum key K can be generated between the user side Alice and the user side Bob, and the quantum key K is shared in the communication process.
The method comprises the steps of security detection and integrity detection, wherein the steps of security detection are as follows:
step 1: the Alice randomly prepares one
Figure BDA0003142569150000052
The two-photon-state entangled-state qubit of (1), the two-photon-state entangled state being used for information transmission;
the Bob randomly prepares a single-photon quantum bit in one of four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, | - >;
wherein |0> represents the horizontal state, |1> represents the vertical state, | + > and | - > are their superimposed states, as follows:
Figure BDA0003142569150000051
step 2, Alice sends one optical qubit in the entangled state to Charlie, and reserves the remaining optical qubit, and Bob sends the randomly prepared single photon state qubit to Charlie;
the entangled state prepared by Alice is an entangled state of two photons, Alice sends the qubit of one of the photons to Charlie, and reserves the qubit of the other photon. The reason that Alice reserves the quantum bit of one photon is to complete subsequent quantum invisible state transfer operation, the quantum state in the hand of Bob needs to be transferred to Alice, and Alice subsequently needs to perform unitary operation according to the reserved photon quantum bit of the measurement result of Charlie.
And step 3: after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
the Bell state measurement is carried out through a Bell state measuring device, the Bell state measuring device comprises a beam splitter, two polarization beam splitters are connected to the beam splitter, the two polarization beam splitters are respectively connected with one single photon detector, and after single photon quantum bits enter the beam splitter, the two paths of the single photon quantum bits respectively reach the two polarization beam splitters and are finally detected by the four single photon detectors.
The Bell state measurement results have two | psi->、|ψ+>The possible quantum states for two single photons are shown in the following table:
TABLE 1
Measurement results 00 01 10 11 ++ +- -+ --
|ψ-> × √ √ × × √ √ ×
|ψ+> × √ √ × √ × × √
In table 1 √ denotes a measurement result in which the quantum state of the first row may occur, and × denotes that the measurement result in which the quantum state of the first row may not occur.
And 4, step 4: and the Alice executes the unitary operation to complete the quantum invisible state.
The unitary operation is a reversible operation in quantum mechanics, and according to a quantum secure direct communication protocol irrelevant to measuring equipment, the specific operation method and the function are as follows:
the quantum states in the first row of Table 2 represent Bell state measurements, with U following each Bell stateTThe first column represents the quantum states that Bob prepared, representing the unitary operations Alice needs to take based on the bell state measurements.
The purpose of the entire quantum invisible state is to transfer the quantum state prepared by Bob to Alice. And Alice adopts the unitary operation according to the Bell state measurement result, so that the single photon retained in the hand can be changed into the quantum state same as Bob.
TABLE 2
Figure BDA0003142569150000061
The values indicated for the individual parameters in table 2 are as follows:
σX,Y,Zis a pauli matrix，σXThe single bit can be flipped, i.e. |0>Change to |1>，|1>Change to |0>；iσYCan make |0>Change to- |1>，|1>Change to |0>；σZCan make |0>Change to |0>，|1>Change to- |1>. I is the identity matrix and this operation does not change the bit state.
For example, in the first three columns and the first two rows of Table 2, the subscripts indicate the a, b, c photons labeled in FIG. 2, when the Charlie measurement is | φ |+ 23>When, the state representing Bob is |0>3Or |1>3And the state of the 1 photon of Alice corresponding to it is- |1>1Or |0>1Alice needs to perform i σYThe operation causes photons in the hand to change to the same state as Bob.
Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:
performing exclusive or operation on information M to be transmitted and a secret key K by Alice to obtain a ciphertext M', namely M ═ M ^ K; and then, JEEC encoding is carried out on the ciphertext M' to ensure the safety and the effectiveness of ciphertext transmission and improve the safety capacity. Then Alice modulates the classical ciphertext onto the qubits, i.e., encodes 0 using the I operation, I σYTo encode 1. Alice also randomly chooses to send some random numbers for later integrity checking.
The secret key K is a quantum secret key randomly generated by Alice or Bob during the first communication, and is shared by Alice or Bob during the communication process, after the first communication is completed, the secret key K respectively extracts secret keys by adopting Alice and Bob in the step d, and the secret keys are inserted into the secret key pool.
Sending the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and the randomly selected random number to Charlie by Alice;
c, the Charlie measures the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and publishes the measurement result through a classical channel;
charlie publishes the measurement results: if the random number is sent by the Alice, the Alice compares the Charlie published measurement result with the random number prepared by the Alice: if the error rate is smaller than the maximum threshold value, the ciphertext transmitted this time is judged to be complete, otherwise, the fact that an eavesdropper steals the ciphertext is judged. The maximum threshold range of the error rate is 0-5%, in this embodiment, the error rate is 5%, the optimal value of the error rate is 0%, that is, there is no error rate, and the maximum value is 5%, that is, the maximum error rate is lower than 5%, and it is determined that there is no eavesdropping behavior.
Step d, the Bob decodes the ciphertext published by the Charlie, and obtains the transmitted information M by using the ciphertext of the randomly generated key K;
if the frame is not transmitted, returning to the step 1 or A; otherwise, adopting the error rate in the step c to estimate the safety capacity of the communication in the current round by the Alice and the Bob, and calculating the number of the keys which can be extracted; and finally, respectively extracting the secret keys by Alice and Bob and inserting the secret keys into the secret key pool for encrypting and decoding the cryptograph of the next round.
The number of keys is calculated in order to calculate how many bits of information can be transferred for the next round of communication, since the next round of communication requires encryption of the key extracted in this round.
A memory device having stored therein a plurality of instructions adapted to be loaded by a processor and to perform the steps of the measuring device independent quantum direct communication method as described above.
An intelligent terminal comprising a processor for executing instructions and a storage device for storing a plurality of instructions, the instructions being adapted to be loaded by the processor and to perform the steps of the measuring device independent quantum direct communication method as described above.
Example 2
Embodiment 2 differs from embodiment 1 in the following security detection steps, which are performed as follows:
step A, the Alice prepares a random single photon state in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the Bob randomly prepares single-photon quantum bits in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the single photon state quantum bit is used for eavesdropping detection;
b, simultaneously sending respective quantum bits to Charlie by Alice and Bob;
c, after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement, and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
step D: and the Alice informs Bob through a classical channel, and both the Alice and the Bob publish the prepared quantum states respectively and then execute eavesdropping detection like a measuring device-independent quantum key distribution protocol. The eavesdropping detection means that quantum direct communication can detect whether an eavesdropper exists in the communication. The method is that a part of keys of two communication parties are published, the error rate of the keys received by the two communication parties is checked, if the error rate is very high, the eavesdropping is considered to exist, and if the error rate is not considered to exist, the eavesdropping is not considered to exist.
The invention directly adopts the coding mode of dynamic joint error control coding in the information coding process, encrypts the transmitted information by a classical password and then loads the information on a quantum state, namely, the actual encrypted ciphertext is transmitted by the quantum. The dynamic joint error control coding can ensure that the data transmitted in each round comprises the information transmitted in the round and the key for encrypting the information transmitted in the next round, and the content of the key can be calculated according to the safety capacity of the communication in the round. The quantum storage can be eliminated by adopting the coding mode.
Variations and modifications to the above-described embodiments may occur to those skilled in the art, which fall within the scope and spirit of the above description. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed and described above, and some modifications and variations of the present invention should fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention. Furthermore, although specific terms are employed herein, they are used in a generic and descriptive sense only and not for purposes of limitation.

Claims (8)

1. A measuring equipment independent quantum direct communication method is characterized by comprising a user side Alice, a user side Bob and a measuring end Charlie, wherein the user side Alice and the user side Bob are used for generating, sending and receiving quantum bits, and the measuring end Charlie is used for measuring the quantum bits;
the method comprises an invisible state, and the invisible state comprises the following steps:
step 1, the Alice prepares one
Figure FDA0003142569140000011
The two-photon-state entangled-state qubit of (1), the two-photon-state entangled state being used for information transmission;
the Bob randomly prepares a single-photon quantum bit in one of four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >;
step 2, Alice sends one quantum bit in the entangled state to Charlie, the rest quantum bit is reserved, and Bob sends the randomly prepared single photon state quantum bit to Charlie;
step 3, after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement, and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
and 4, the Alice executes the unitary operation to complete the quantum invisible transfer state, and the quantum state of the quantum bit reserved by the Alice is the same as the quantum state of the quantum bit sent by the Bob.
2.A measuring equipment independent quantum direct communication method is characterized by comprising a user side Alice, a user side Bob and a measuring end Charlie, wherein the user side Alice and the user side Bob are used for generating, sending and receiving quantum bits, and the measuring end Charlie is used for measuring the quantum bits;
the method comprises the following steps of security detection and integrity detection, wherein the security detection steps are as follows:
step A, the Alice prepares a random single photon state quantum bit in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the Bob randomly prepares single-photon quantum bits in one of the following four quantum states { |0>, |1>, | + >, and | - >; the single photon state quantum bit is used for eavesdropping detection;
b, simultaneously sending respective quantum bits to Charlie by Alice and Bob;
c, after receiving the quantum bits sent by Alice and Bob, the Charlie executes Bell state measurement, and then publishes a measurement result through a classical channel;
step D: and the Alice informs Bob through a classical channel, and both the Alice and the Bob publish the prepared quantum states respectively, and then executes eavesdropping detection in a quantum key distribution protocol irrelevant to the measuring equipment, wherein if the error rate is less than a maximum threshold value, the eavesdropping behavior is judged not to exist, and otherwise, the eavesdropping behavior in the communication is judged to exist.
3. The method for measuring device-independent quantum direct communication according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the integrity check comprises the steps of:
performing XOR operation on information M to be transmitted and a randomly generated secret key K by Alice to obtain a ciphertext M ', performing JEEC encoding on the ciphertext M' to obtain a secret key C, and modulating the secret key C to a qubit of the Alice in claim 1 for performing unitary operation;
sending the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and the randomly selected random number to Charlie by Alice;
c, the Charlie measures the quantum bit containing the ciphertext and publishes the measurement result through a classical channel;
if the random number is sent by the Alice, the Alice compares the Charlie published measurement result with the random number prepared by the Alice, if the error rate is smaller than the maximum threshold value, the ciphertext transmitted at this time is judged to be complete, otherwise, the ciphertext is judged to be stolen by an eavesdropper.
4. The method of measuring device independent quantum direct communication according to claim 3, further comprising the steps of:
step d, the Bob decodes the ciphertext published by the Charlie, and obtains the transmitted information M by using the ciphertext of the randomly generated key K;
if the frame is not transmitted, returning to the step 1 or A; otherwise, adopting the error rate in the step c to estimate the safety capacity of the communication in the current round by the Alice and the Bob, and calculating the number of the keys which can be extracted;
after the key number is extracted, Alice and Bob respectively extract the keys and insert the keys into the key pool for encrypting and decoding the ciphertext of the next round.
5. The method of claim 2, wherein the maximum threshold for the bit error rate is in the range of 0-11%.
6. The method according to claim 3, wherein the maximum threshold of the bit error rate is 0-5%.
7. A memory device having stored therein a plurality of instructions adapted to be loaded by a processor and to perform the steps of any of claims 1-6.
8. An intelligent terminal comprising a processor for executing instructions and storage means for storing a plurality of instructions, characterized in that said instructions are adapted to be loaded by said processor and to perform the steps operations of any of claims 1-6.
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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114221713A (en) * 2021-11-25 2022-03-22 南京邮电大学 Entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method
CN114244507A (en) * 2021-12-15 2022-03-25 北京量子信息科学研究院 Quantum direct communication method, device, equipment and system based on single-path transmission
CN114465801A (en) * 2022-02-11 2022-05-10 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Method and device for reporting trusted data and electronic equipment
US11973861B2 (en) 2022-02-09 2024-04-30 Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation Secure key generation

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114221713A (en) * 2021-11-25 2022-03-22 南京邮电大学 Entanglement-based measuring equipment irrelevant three-party quantum secure direct communication method
CN114221713B (en) * 2021-11-25 2023-07-28 南京邮电大学 Entanglement-based measurement equipment independent three-party quantum secure direct communication method
CN114244507A (en) * 2021-12-15 2022-03-25 北京量子信息科学研究院 Quantum direct communication method, device, equipment and system based on single-path transmission
CN114244507B (en) * 2021-12-15 2024-03-12 北京量子信息科学研究院 Quantum direct communication method, device, equipment and system based on single-path transmission
US11973861B2 (en) 2022-02-09 2024-04-30 Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation Secure key generation
CN114465801A (en) * 2022-02-11 2022-05-10 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 Method and device for reporting trusted data and electronic equipment

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Application publication date: 20211105