CN114050887A - 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method, system and electronic equipment in channel correlation scene - Google Patents

4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method, system and electronic equipment in channel correlation scene Download PDF

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CN114050887A
CN114050887A CN202111220618.5A CN202111220618A CN114050887A CN 114050887 A CN114050887 A CN 114050887A CN 202111220618 A CN202111220618 A CN 202111220618A CN 114050887 A CN114050887 A CN 114050887A
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eavesdropping
wfrft
antenna
transmitting
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CN114050887B (en
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吴宣利
张久宁
李勇
潘天助
吴玮
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Harbin Institute of Technology
CETC 54 Research Institute
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04KSECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00Secret communication
    • H04K1/003Secret communication by varying carrier frequency at or within predetermined or random intervals
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02DCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
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    • Y02D30/70Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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Abstract

The invention provides a physical layer secure transmission method, a physical layer secure transmission system and electronic equipment based on 4-WFRFT (wireless local area network radio frequency transmission) in a channel correlation scene, wherein the method is applied to a transmitting terminal with NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; the method fully utilizes the change of the 4-WFRFT technology to the signal characteristics of the communication signals, reduces the signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping end while not influencing the signal-to-noise ratio of a legal receiving end, and achieves the effect of improving the ergodic privacy capacity.

Description

4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method, system and electronic equipment in channel correlation scene
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of secret communication, and particularly relates to a 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method, a system and electronic equipment in a channel-related scene.
Background
In the process of social development, information security is always a hot topic. Traditional information security relies on cryptographic algorithms at the application layer, corresponding to computational security. But as new computing power increases, there is a risk that the encryption algorithm will be compromised. Physical layer security aims at establishing secure communication using the random nature of the wireless channel, and is an absolute security implemented on the basis of information theory.
Correlation between the main channel and the eavesdropping channel may occur due to reflection and refraction of the signal or due to the eavesdropping actively approaching the legitimate receiver. When a 4-Weighted-type Fractional Fourier Transform (4-WFRFT) technology is applied, the traversal security capacity can be remarkably increased under the scene of channel correlation, and the purpose of secure communication is achieved.
4-WFRFT is equivalent to rotating and splitting the constellation points of the modulated signal. Only when the transmitting end and the receiving end share the modulation order, the receiving end can recover the constellation point and demodulate the constellation point. If the receiving end does not know the modulation order, the received signal is divided into two parts, one part can be used for correctly demodulating information, and the other part is equivalent to artificial noise, so that the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end is greatly reduced.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problem of limited traversal secret capacity improvement effect in a scene that a main channel and a wiretap channel have channel correlation, and provides a physical layer secure transmission method, a physical layer secure transmission system and electronic equipment based on 4-WFRFT in the scene of channel correlation.
The invention is realized according to the scheme, and provides a 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method in a channel correlation scene, which is applied to a transmitting terminal with NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, a legal receiving end sends a training sequence to a transmitting end for channel estimation;
step 2, searching N by the transmitting terminalA×NBThe method comprises the following steps of (1) calculating fading coefficients of each fading channel subset, and selecting 1 optimal sub-channel, wherein a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of the sub-channel are determined as a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of communication;
step 3, the transmitting terminal performs 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data, and then obtains a sending signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
step 4, the legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
and 5, the eavesdropping end carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
Further, the transmission signal S obtained in step 3k:Sk=Fα[xk]And is subject to a rayleigh fading channel,
signal y to legitimate receiverk
Figure BDA0003312488350000021
Signal z reaching the eavesdropping pointk
Figure BDA0003312488350000022
In the formula, Fα[·]Is a weighted fractional Fourier transform of order alpha, xkRepresenting the symbol data after baseband mapping, P is the transmission power, hM、hEChannel fading coefficients of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel respectively,subject to complex Gaussian distributions, i.e.
Figure BDA0003312488350000023
Figure BDA0003312488350000024
nM、nEAdditive white Gaussian noise for the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, respectively, obeys a Gaussian distribution, i.e. nM~N(0,NM)、nE~N(0,NE);NMRepresenting the noise power, N, of the legitimate receiverERepresenting the noise power at the eavesdropping end,
Figure BDA0003312488350000025
respectively representing the magnitudes of the path transmission losses of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel.
Further, in the presence of channel correlation, the channel fading coefficients h of the main channel and the eavesdropping channelMAnd hEExpressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000026
Figure BDA0003312488350000027
in the formula, XM、YM、XE、YE、X0、Y0All represent random variables and are independent of each other and all follow a gaussian distribution of N (0, 1/2); eta and lambda are weight coefficients respectively meeting the conditions that eta is less than 1 and lambda is less than 1; j represents an imaginary unit;
the channel fading coefficient hMAnd hEThe correlation coefficient between them is expressed as:
ρ=ηλ。
further, after the legal receiving end in step 4 performs 4-WFRFT with the transform order of- α, the signal is further processed as follows:
rBk=F[yk],rBKindicating a legal spliceReceiving signals before demapping of a receiving end baseband;
the legal receiver instantaneous snr is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000028
furthermore, after the eavesdropping end in the step 5 carries out conversion of 4-WFRFT with the order of-beta, the estimation deviation is defined
Figure BDA0003312488350000031
The signal is further processed as:
rEk=F[zk],rEKrepresenting the received signal before baseband demapping of the eavesdropping terminal;
the eavesdropping-end instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000032
wherein, ω is0(Δ α) represents a weighting coefficient;
the instantaneous privacy capacity is expressed as:
CS=[log(1+γM)-log(1+γE)]+
traversal privacy capacity is the statistical average of the instantaneous privacy capacity, i.e.:
Figure BDA0003312488350000033
the invention also provides a 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission system in a channel correlation scene, which is applied to a transmitting terminal with NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the eavesdropping terminal is in a passive eavesdropping state and does not generate any influence on the main channelWhat form of interference; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the system comprises:
a sending module: a legal receiving end sends a training sequence to a transmitting end for channel estimation;
an optimal channel selection module: transmitting end searching NA×NBThe method comprises the following steps of (1) calculating fading coefficients of each fading channel subset, and selecting 1 optimal sub-channel, wherein a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of the sub-channel are determined as a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of communication;
a transmitting end Fourier transform module: the transmitting terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data and then obtains a transmitting signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
a legal receiving end demodulation module: a legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
the eavesdropping end demodulation module: the eavesdropping terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
The present invention also proposes an electronic device, comprising:
at least one processor; and the number of the first and second groups,
a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform a 4-WFRFT based physical layer secure transfer method in the channel-related scenario.
The invention processes the signal by 4-WFRFT technology, the transmitting terminal and the legal receiving terminal share the modulation order, the interception terminal can not accurately obtain the modulation order, therefore, the introduction of 4-WFRFT can deteriorate the signal-to-noise ratio of the interception terminal, thereby improving the traversal secrecy capacity of the communication system and achieving the purpose of secrecy communication. The larger the deviation estimated by the eavesdropping terminal is, the larger the traversal secrecy capacity is improved. The invention greatly improves the secrecy transmission capability of the communication system.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the antenna selection technique of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an eavesdropping channel model of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a physical layer secure transmission method according to the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the 4-WFRFT module structure of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a simulation of traversal of the relationship of privacy capacities as a function of estimated bias and correlation coefficient;
fig. 6 is a diagram of a simulation that traverses the secret capacity as a function of transmit power and estimated bias.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
With reference to fig. 1-6, the present invention proposes a 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method in a channel correlation scenario, where the method is applied to a transmitting end having NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, assume there is no antenna correlation, thus generating NA×NBThe legal receiving end sends a training sequence to the transmitting end for channel estimation;
step 2, searching N by the transmitting terminalA×NBEach fading channel subset, calculating the fading coefficient of each channel subset, selecting the optimal 1 sub-channel, the transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna of which are connectedDetermining a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna for communication;
calculating the fading coefficients h of each subset of channelsM,ijA channel matrix H of the main channel can be obtainedMThe following can be written:
Figure BDA0003312488350000051
from NA×NBSelecting the best sub-channel from the channels, i.e. | hM,ijThe maximum channel, the transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna of which are determined as the transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna of the communication;
step 3, the transmitting terminal performs 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data, and then obtains a sending signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
step 4, the legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
and 5, the eavesdropping end carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
The transmission signal S obtained in step 3k:Sk=Fα[xk]And is subject to a rayleigh fading channel,
signal y to legitimate receiverk
Figure BDA0003312488350000052
Signal z reaching the eavesdropping pointk
Figure BDA0003312488350000053
In the formula, Fα[·]Is a weighted fractional Fourier transform of order alpha, xkRepresenting the symbol data after baseband mapping, P is the transmission power, hM、hEThe channel fading coefficients of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, respectively, obeying a complex gaussian distribution, i.e.
Figure BDA0003312488350000054
Figure BDA0003312488350000055
nM、nEAdditive white Gaussian noise for the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, respectively, obeys a Gaussian distribution, i.e. nM~N(0,NM)、nE~N(0,NE);NMRepresenting the noise power, N, of the legitimate receiverERepresenting the noise power at the eavesdropping end,
Figure BDA0003312488350000056
respectively representing the magnitudes of the path transmission losses of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel.
Channel fading coefficients h of main channel and eavesdropping channel in the presence of channel correlationMAnd hEExpressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000057
Figure BDA0003312488350000058
in the formula, XM、YM、XE、YE、X0、Y0All represent random variables and are independent of each other and all follow a gaussian distribution of N (0, 1/2); eta and lambda are weight coefficients respectively meeting the conditions that eta is less than 1 and lambda is less than 1; j represents an imaginary unit;
the channel fading coefficient hMAnd hEThe correlation coefficient between them is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000061
where Cov (-) is the covariance and D (-) is the variance.
After the legal receiving end in step 4 performs 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha, the signal is further processed as follows:
Figure BDA0003312488350000062
rBKrepresenting the received signal before demapping of the legal receiving end baseband; n isM' represents the transform domain noise obtained after 4-WFRFT of additive white Gaussian noise of a main channel;
the legal receiver instantaneous snr is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000063
after the eavesdropping end in the step 5 carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta, the estimation deviation is defined
Figure BDA0003312488350000064
The signal is further processed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000065
rEKrepresenting the received signal before baseband demapping of the eavesdropping terminal; n isE' represents the transform domain noise obtained after 4-WFRFT of additive white Gaussian noise of an eavesdropping channel; omega1(.),ω2(.),ω3(.) are all weighting coefficients;
the eavesdropping-end instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000066
wherein, ω is0(Δ α) represents a weighting coefficient;
the instantaneous privacy capacity is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003312488350000071
traversal privacy capacity is the statistical average of the instantaneous privacy capacity, i.e.:
Figure BDA0003312488350000072
the invention also provides a 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission system in a channel correlation scene, which is applied to a transmitting terminal with NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the system comprises:
a sending module: a legal receiving end sends a training sequence to a transmitting end for channel estimation;
an optimal channel selection module: transmitting end searching NA×NBThe method comprises the following steps of (1) calculating fading coefficients of each fading channel subset, and selecting 1 optimal sub-channel, wherein a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of the sub-channel are determined as a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of communication;
a transmitting end Fourier transform module: the transmitting terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data and then obtains a transmitting signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
a legal receiving end demodulation module: a legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
the eavesdropping end demodulation module: the eavesdropping terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
The present invention also proposes an electronic device, comprising:
at least one processor; and the number of the first and second groups,
a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform a 4-WFRFT based physical layer secure transfer method in the channel-related scenario.
The security performance of the secret communication method of the present invention is verified as follows.
K is defined herein as the channel state ratio,
Figure BDA0003312488350000081
figure 5 shows the effect of variations in the estimated bias and correlation coefficient on the traversal of the privacy capacity. The number of antennas at the transmitting end and the number of antennas at the legal receiving end N in the figureA×NBSet to 2 × 2; path transmission loss of main channel
Figure BDA0003312488350000082
Path transmission loss of eavesdropping channel
Figure BDA0003312488350000083
Noise power NM=NE-100 dBm; the transmitting power of the transmitting end is set to be 10 dBm; the correlation coefficients ρ are set to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9.
It can be seen that the larger the estimated deviation is, the more the traversal security capacity is within the range of the estimated deviation 0 ≦ Δ α ≦ 1
Figure BDA0003312488350000084
The larger. This is because, as Δ α increases, the power of the received signal decreases and the power of the artificial noise increases for the eavesdropping side, so that the snr of the eavesdropping side decreases, while the snr of the legitimate receiving side does not change, and therefore the traversal security capacity is not changed
Figure BDA0003312488350000085
And gradually increases.
Figure 6 shows the effect of variations in transmit power and estimation bias on privacy capacity. The number of antennas at the transmitting end and the number of antennas at the legal receiving end N in the figureA×NBSet to 2 × 2; path transmission loss of main channel
Figure BDA0003312488350000086
Path transmission loss of eavesdropping channel
Figure BDA0003312488350000087
Noise power NM=NE-100 dBm; the correlation coefficient ρ is set to 0.3.
It can be seen that when Δ α is equal to 0, that is, the eavesdropping end accurately estimates the transformation order α negotiated by the transmitting end and the legal receiving end, the 4-WFRFT technique cannot achieve the purpose of reducing the snr of the eavesdropping end, so that the secret capacity is traversed as the transmission power P increases
Figure BDA0003312488350000088
The lift is small. However, when Δ α ≠ 0, i.e. there is estimation bias, the 4-WFRFT technique can effectively reduce the SNR of the eavesdropping end, thus traversing the privacy capacity with increasing P
Figure BDA0003312488350000089
There is a great lift.
The 4-WFRFT-based physical layer secure transmission method, system and electronic device in the channel-related scenario proposed by the present invention are described in detail above, and a specific example is applied in the present document to explain the principle and implementation of the present invention, and the description of the above embodiment is only used to help understanding the method and core idea of the present invention; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present invention, there may be variations in the specific embodiments and the application scope, and in summary, the content of the present specification should not be construed as a limitation to the present invention.

Claims (7)

1. The physical layer safe transmission method based on 4-WFRFT under the channel correlation scene is characterized in that: the method is applied to a transmitting terminal with NARoot antenna, legal receiving end having NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with best channel state from independent channels to carry out informationTransmitting; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, a legal receiving end sends a training sequence to a transmitting end for channel estimation;
step 2, searching N by the transmitting terminalA×NBThe method comprises the following steps of (1) calculating fading coefficients of each fading channel subset, and selecting 1 optimal sub-channel, wherein a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of the sub-channel are determined as a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of communication;
step 3, the transmitting terminal performs 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data, and then obtains a sending signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
step 4, the legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
and 5, the eavesdropping end carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein: the transmission signal S obtained in step 3k:Sk=Fα[xk]And is subject to a rayleigh fading channel,
signal y to legitimate receiverk
Figure FDA0003312488340000011
Signal z reaching the eavesdropping pointk
Figure FDA0003312488340000012
In the formula, Fα[·]Is a weighted fractional Fourier transform of order alpha, xkRepresenting the symbol data after baseband mapping, P is the transmission power, hM、hEThe channel fading coefficients of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, respectively, obeying a complex gaussian distribution, i.e.
Figure FDA0003312488340000013
Figure FDA0003312488340000014
nM、nEAdditive white Gaussian noise for the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, respectively, obeys a Gaussian distribution, i.e. nM~N(0,NM)、nE~N(0,NE);NMRepresenting the noise power, N, of the legitimate receiverERepresenting the noise power at the eavesdropping end,
Figure FDA0003312488340000015
respectively representing the magnitudes of the path transmission losses of the main channel and the eavesdropping channel.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein: channel fading coefficients h of main channel and eavesdropping channel in the presence of channel correlationMAnd hEExpressed as:
Figure FDA0003312488340000016
Figure FDA0003312488340000017
in the formula, XM、YM、XE、YE、X0、Y0All represent random variables and are independent of each other and all follow a gaussian distribution of N (0, 1/2); eta and lambda are weight coefficients respectively meeting the conditions that eta is less than 1 and lambda is less than 1; j represents an imaginary unit;
the channel fading coefficient hMAnd hEThe correlation coefficient between them is expressed as:
ρ=ηλ。
4. the method of claim 3, wherein: after the legal receiving end in step 4 performs 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha, the signal is further processed as follows:
rBk=F[yk],rBKrepresenting the received signal before demapping of the legal receiving end baseband;
the legal receiver instantaneous snr is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003312488340000021
5. the method of claim 4, wherein: after the eavesdropping end in the step 5 carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta, the estimation deviation is defined
Figure FDA0003312488340000022
The signal is further processed as:
rEk=F[zk],rEKrepresenting the received signal before baseband demapping of the eavesdropping terminal;
the eavesdropping-end instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003312488340000023
wherein, ω is0(Δ α) represents a weighting coefficient;
the instantaneous privacy capacity is expressed as:
CS=[log(1+γM)-log(1+γE)]+
traversal privacy capacity is the statistical average of the instantaneous privacy capacity, i.e.:
Figure FDA0003312488340000024
6. the physical layer safe transmission system based on 4-WFRFT under the channel correlation scene is characterized in that: the system is applied to a transmitting terminal and has NARoot antenna, loopThe method receiving end has NBThe eavesdropping end is provided with 1 antenna; the main channel uses antenna selection technique, from NA×NBSelecting 1 channel with the best channel state from independent channels to transmit information; the interception end is in a passive interception state and does not generate any interference on the main channel; both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel experience slow fading; the system comprises:
a sending module: a legal receiving end sends a training sequence to a transmitting end for channel estimation;
an optimal channel selection module: transmitting end searching NA×NBThe method comprises the following steps of (1) calculating fading coefficients of each fading channel subset, and selecting 1 optimal sub-channel, wherein a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of the sub-channel are determined as a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna of communication;
a transmitting end Fourier transform module: the transmitting terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of alpha on the data and then obtains a transmitting signal through digital-to-analog conversion;
a legal receiving end demodulation module: a legal receiving end carries out 4-WFRFT with the transformation order of-alpha and then carries out demodulation;
the eavesdropping end demodulation module: the eavesdropping terminal carries out 4-WFRFT with the conversion order of-beta and then carries out demodulation.
7. An electronic device, characterized in that the electronic device comprises:
at least one processor; and the number of the first and second groups,
a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform a 4-WFRFT based physical layer secure transfer method in a channel dependent scenario as claimed in any of claims 1-5.
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TAO XU ET AL.: "Secrecy Capacity Analysis of 4- WFRFT Based Physical Layer Security in MIMO System", COMPUTER SCIENCE *
吴宣利等: "基于信道相关性的物理层安全性能分析", 通信学报, vol. 42, no. 3 *

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