CN111988783B - Safe transmission method and system for uplink non-orthogonal multiple access - Google Patents

Safe transmission method and system for uplink non-orthogonal multiple access Download PDF

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CN111988783B
CN111988783B CN202010772292.6A CN202010772292A CN111988783B CN 111988783 B CN111988783 B CN 111988783B CN 202010772292 A CN202010772292 A CN 202010772292A CN 111988783 B CN111988783 B CN 111988783B
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energy
jammer
friendly
base station
energy acquisition
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CN111988783A (en
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曹堃锐
丁海洋
陈华梁
荆锋
李海鹏
辛可为
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National University of Defense Technology
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
    • H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
    • H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and discloses a safe transmission method and system of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access. The invention considers the condition that an uplink NOMA link has an eavesdropper, and a friendly energy acquisition interference unit in the network is selected to send artificial noise to deteriorate the receiving quality of the eavesdropper, thereby ensuring the safe communication from NOMA users to a base station. According to the channel state information acquired by the network, three energy acquisition jammer selection strategies are correspondingly provided, namely a random energy acquisition jammer selection (REJS), a maximum energy acquisition jammer selection (MEJS) and an optimal energy acquisition jammer selection (OEJS). Compared with the traditional uplink NOMA transmission method without the assistance of the energy acquisition disturber, the method can obviously improve the physical layer safety performance of the NOMA system.

Description

Safe transmission method and system for uplink non-orthogonal multiple access
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and particularly relates to a safe transmission method and system of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access.
Background
In order to meet the rapidly increasing demand of mobile communication services under the condition of increasingly scarce spectrum resources, Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) technology is increasingly gaining attention in the industry. The NOMA technology realizes high-spectrum-efficiency transmission by bearing information of different users on the same frequency time resource, and is considered as a multiple access mode with great application prospect in the 5G and later 5G times. Among them, the power domain NOMA technology has received wide attention due to the characteristics of low implementation complexity and high compatibility. The basic idea of power domain NOMA (hereinafter referred to as NOMA) is that at a sending end, superposition coding is used for distributing power with different sizes to different user signals, and at a receiving end, a Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC) technology is used for eliminating Interference among users and detecting multi-user information.
On the other hand, the Physical Layer Security (Physical Layer Security) technology that has emerged in recent years is a supplement or replacement to the upper Layer encryption technology in order to secure information Security of wireless communication from the viewpoint of the Physical Layer. Although NOMA techniques can improve spectrum utilization, NOMA does not guarantee the security of information transmission in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. In order to ensure the safe communications of NOMA, the documents "Enhancing the physical layer security of NOMA in large-scale networks", "Secure MISO-NOMA transmission with an specific noise", "Beamforming design and power allocation for security transmission with NOMA" utilize physical layer security techniques to improve the security performance of downstream NOMA transmissions. Specifically, the base station with multiple antennas transmits useful signals and artificial noise signals simultaneously through a beamforming technology, and the designed artificial noise signals only reduce the receiving quality of a malicious eavesdropper, so that the safety capacity of a downlink NOMA user is improved.
However, for uplink NOMA transmissions, the physical size and energy limitations of practical network nodes make it difficult to deploy multiple antennas, and therefore beamforming-based downlink NOMA transmission schemes cannot be applied to uplink NOMA transmissions of practical single-antenna nodes. Based on this, cooperative interference in physical layer security techniques can be considered as a more suitable technique to be applied in uplink NOMA transmission. Considering the energy limited characteristic of the actual cooperative node and the optimal selection problem of the external cooperative node, there is a certain difficulty in directly applying the cooperative interference technology. Therefore, the invention can be applied to the safe transmission method of the uplink NOMA physical layer of the practical system.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method and a system for safe transmission of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access, which are used for solving the problems of safety and the like in uplink NOMA transmission in the prior art.
In order to realize the task, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a safe transmission method of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access is used for selecting a proper friendly jammer and interfering a malicious eavesdropper under the condition that the malicious eavesdropper exists, so that uplink NOMA safe transmission of a user to a base station is realized, and the steps of selecting the proper friendly jammer and interfering the malicious eavesdropper comprise:
step 1: acquiring channel state information between a base station and energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper, and selecting one of the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer according to an acquired result;
if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
step 2: the friendly jammer selected in the step 1 transmits an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to a base station and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer;
and step 3: the base station detects and removes the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence, and a malicious eavesdropper receives the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence and is interfered.
Further, the randomly selected friendly jammer is represented by formula i:
Figure BDA0002617092640000031
wherein R isrDenotes a randomly selected friendly interferer, RjIndicating the jth energy harvestA node, rand {. denotes that each energy collection node is selected as a jammer with equal probability, Δ ═ 1, 2., N }, where N denotes the total number of energy collection nodes;
the energy collection node with the maximum transmitting power is expressed as a friendly jammer as a formula II:
Figure BDA0002617092640000032
wherein R isvIndicating the friendly interferer selected according to the transmit power maximum,
Figure BDA0002617092640000033
representing energy-harvesting nodes RjTransmit power of artificial noise when acting as a jammer and
Figure BDA0002617092640000034
Ejrepresenting energy-harvesting nodes RjCollected wireless radio frequency energy and
Figure BDA0002617092640000035
alpha represents the time distribution ratio of two stages of energy transmission and information transmission in a time frame length T, and alpha belongs to (0, 1), eta represents the energy conversion rate, and PbWhich represents the transmit power of the base station,
Figure BDA0002617092640000036
representing base stations and RjChannel coefficients between;
the energy collection node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by a malicious eavesdropper is expressed as a friendly jammer in a formula III:
Figure BDA0002617092640000037
wherein R isoRepresenting friendly jammers, selected on the basis of a signal-to-noise ratio which minimizes the reception of a signal by a malicious eavesdropper, gammaeRepresenting the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received by a malicious eavesdropper.
A safe transmission system of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access comprises a base station, a user, a plurality of energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the user executes uplink NOMA transmission information to the base station in an information transmission stage, the malicious eavesdropper attempts to intercept the information transmitted by the user in the information transmission stage, the base station comprises a main control module, and the main control module is used for acquiring channel state information between the base station and the energy acquisition nodes and between the malicious eavesdropper and selecting one of the plurality of energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer according to the acquired channel state information result;
the main control module selects one of the multiple energy collection nodes as the friendly jammer according to the obtained channel state information result, and the selection refers to: if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
the friendly jammer is used for transmitting an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to the base station and a malicious eavesdropper, and the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer.
Further, the randomly selected friendly jammer is represented by formula i:
Figure BDA0002617092640000041
wherein R isrDenotes a randomly selected friendly interferer, RjRepresenting a jth energy collection node, rand {. denotes that each energy collection node is selected as a jammer with equal probability, wherein Δ ═ 1, 2.. multidot.n }, and N represents the total number of the energy collection nodes;
the energy collection node with the maximum transmitting power is expressed as a friendly jammer as a formula II:
Figure BDA0002617092640000051
wherein R isvIndicating the friendly interferer selected according to the transmit power maximum,
Figure BDA0002617092640000052
representing energy-harvesting nodes RjTransmit power of artificial noise when acting as a jammer and
Figure BDA0002617092640000053
Ejrepresenting energy-harvesting nodes RjCollected wireless radio frequency energy and
Figure BDA0002617092640000054
alpha represents the time distribution ratio of two stages of energy transmission and information transmission in a time frame length T, and alpha belongs to (0, 1), eta represents the energy conversion rate, and PbWhich represents the transmit power of the base station,
Figure BDA0002617092640000055
representing base stations and RjChannel coefficients between;
the energy collection node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by a malicious eavesdropper is expressed as a friendly jammer in a formula III:
Figure BDA0002617092640000056
wherein R isoRepresenting friendly jammers, selected on the basis of a signal-to-noise ratio which minimizes the reception of a signal by a malicious eavesdropper, gammaeRepresenting the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received by a malicious eavesdropper.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following technical characteristics:
(1) compared with the existing uplink non-orthogonal multiple access transmission mechanism, the invention obviously improves the physical layer safety performance of the uplink NOMA system.
(2) Due to power limitation or selfishness of nodes in the network, the interfering nodes are not willing to consume energy of the interfering nodes to transmit artificial noise to improve the safety performance of the system. The invention compensates the energy required by the interference node to transmit the artificial noise by using the energy acquisition technology, and compared with the prior art, the invention can be better applied to the actual network.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a model of the proposed energy harvesting jammer selection based uplink NOMA safe transmission;
FIG. 2 is a graph comparing the probability of a safety outage for the proposed method of safe transmission of the present invention with the existing uplink NOMA transmission method without the assistance of an energy harvesting jammer under Rayleigh channel conditions;
fig. 3 is a graph comparing the safety throughput of strong users in the rayleigh channel condition by the safety transmission method proposed by the present invention and the existing uplink NOMA transmission method without the assistance of an energy collecting jammer;
fig. 4 is a graph comparing the safety throughput of the present invention with respect to weak users under rayleigh channel conditions, compared to the existing uplink NOMA transmission method without energy harvesting jammer assistance.
Detailed Description
The embodiment discloses a secure transmission method of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access, which is used for selecting a proper friendly jammer and interfering a malicious eavesdropper under the condition that the malicious eavesdropper exists, so that uplink NOMA (non-orthogonal multiple access) secure transmission of a user to a base station is realized, and for each time frame, communication is divided into an energy transmission stage and an information transmission stage. In the energy transmission stage, a base station transmits wireless radio frequency energy to a plurality of energy acquisition nodes, and the energy acquisition nodes perform energy acquisition; in the information transmission stage, a user executes uplink NOMA to transmit information to a base station, and meanwhile, one of the energy acquisition nodes transmits an artificial noise signal by using the energy acquired in the energy transmission stage to interfere a malicious eavesdropper; the method for selecting the proper friendly jammer and disturbing the malicious eavesdropper comprises the following steps:
step 1: acquiring channel state information between a base station and energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper by utilizing a channel estimation technology, and selecting one of the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer according to an acquired result;
if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power (namely, the energy can be acquired from the energy transmission stage to the maximum) as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
step 2: the friendly jammer selected in the step 1 transmits an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to a base station and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer;
and step 3: a base station receives information transmitted by a user, and detects and removes an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence; the artificial noise can be matched with a channel between the base station and the energy acquisition interference device, so that the artificial noise can be detected and removed by the base station, and the receiving quality of the base station is not influenced;
a malicious eavesdropper receives interference on the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence, the signal eavesdropping quality of the eavesdropper is deteriorated, and information transmitted by a user cannot be intercepted.
Specifically, the Random Energy Harvesting Jammer Selection (REJS) strategy is to randomly select an Energy Harvesting node as a friendly Jammer, and the friendly Jammer R at this timerCan be represented by formula I:
Figure BDA0002617092640000071
wherein rand {. denotes that each energy collection node is selected as an interferer with equal probability, Δ ═ 1, 2., N }, where N denotes the total number of energy collection nodes;
the maximum Energy Harvesting Jammer Selection (MEJS) strategy is to select an Energy Harvesting node capable of emitting the maximum power artificial noise (i.e., capable of Harvesting the most Energy from the Energy transmission phase) as the friendly Jammer, which is the friendly Jammer R at this timevCan be represented by formula II:
Figure BDA0002617092640000072
wherein
Figure BDA0002617092640000073
Representing energy-harvesting nodes RjTransmit power of artificial noise when acting as a jammer and
Figure BDA0002617092640000074
Ejrepresenting energy-harvesting nodes RjCollected wireless radio frequency energy and
Figure BDA0002617092640000075
alpha represents the time distribution ratio of two stages of energy transmission and information transmission in a time frame length T and belongs to the group of (0, 1), and belongs to the group of (0, 1)]Representing the energy conversion rate, PbRepresents the transmission power of the base station and Pb>0，
Figure BDA0002617092640000081
The representation represents a base station and RjThe value of the channel coefficient in the scheme is complex;
channel state information is required for execution of the MEJS policy
Figure BDA0002617092640000082
With the aid of (1), thus RvIt can also be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002617092640000083
the Optimal Energy Harvesting Jammer Selection (OEJS) strategy is to select an Energy Harvesting node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a receiving signal of a malicious eavesdropper as a friendly Jammer, namely the friendly Jammer RoCan represent formula III:
Figure BDA0002617092640000084
wherein, γeRepresenting the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by a malicious eavesdropper;
execution of the OEJS policy requires channel state information
Figure BDA0002617092640000085
And
Figure BDA0002617092640000086
with the aid of (1), thus RoIt can also be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002617092640000087
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002617092640000088
representing base stations and RjThe channel coefficients of the channel between the two channels,
Figure BDA0002617092640000089
representing the channel coefficients between the energy harvesting node and a malicious eavesdropper.
The embodiment also discloses a safe transmission system of the uplink non-orthogonal multiple access, which comprises a base station, a user, a plurality of energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the user executes uplink NOMA to transmit information to the base station in the information transmission stage, and the malicious eavesdropper attempts to intercept the information transmitted by the user in the information transmission stage. In the present embodiment, for each time frame, the communication is divided into an energy transmission phase and an information transmission phase; in the energy transmission stage, a base station transmits wireless radio frequency energy to a plurality of energy acquisition nodes, and the energy acquisition nodes perform energy acquisition; in the information transmission stage, a user executes uplink NOMA to transmit information to a base station, and meanwhile, one of the energy acquisition nodes transmits an artificial noise signal by using the energy acquired in the energy transmission stage to interfere a malicious eavesdropper; the method comprises the following steps that a main control module of a base station selects one of a plurality of energy collection nodes as a friendly jammer according to an energy collection jammer selection strategy and carries out interference, the energy collection nodes which are not selected as the friendly jammers are used as energy storage devices in a system and are used as alternatives of the jammers when environment changes;
the base station comprises a main control module, wherein the main control module is used for acquiring channel state information between the base station and the energy acquisition nodes and channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper, and selecting one of the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer according to an acquired result;
the main control module selects one of the multiple energy collection nodes as the friendly jammer according to the obtained channel state information result, and the selection refers to: if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power (namely, the energy can be acquired from the energy transmission stage to the maximum) as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
the friendly jammer is used for transmitting an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to the base station and a malicious eavesdropper, and the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer.
Specifically, the artificial noise pseudo-random sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer by a physical layer key generation technology.
Specifically, the malicious eavesdroppers include passive eavesdroppers and active eavesdroppers. The active eavesdropper is typically a transceiver in the network that has a lower level of trustworthiness and whose channel state information is known. The channel state information of the passive eavesdropper is unknown. There are different interferer selection strategies depending on whether the channel state information is known or not.
Specifically, the strategies of random energy collection jammer selection, maximum energy collection jammer selection, and optimal energy collection jammer selection in this embodiment are the same as those in the above embodiments.
Referring to fig. 1, a secure transmission system using uplink non-orthogonal multiple access includes a base station and M users (denoted as U ═ M ═ U {, in1,...,UM}), N energy-harvesting nodes (denoted R ═ R1,...,RN}) and a malicious eavesdropper. The communication per unit time frame is divided into two phases, respectively an energy transmission phase (occupation time α T) and an information transmission phase (occupation time (1- α) T).
In the energy transmission stage, the base station transmits wireless radio frequency energy for the energy collection nodes, namely any energy collection node RjThe upper collected energy may be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002617092640000101
where eta represents the energy conversion rate, PbWhich represents the transmit power of the base station,
Figure BDA0002617092640000102
representing base stations and RjThe channel coefficients in between.
In the information transmission stage, users execute uplink NOMA transmission to a base station, in order to reduce interference between the users of NOMA and processing time delay of SIC, the users are paired randomly, each pair of users is allocated with orthogonal transmission resources, and simultaneously each pair of users executes NOMA transmission internally. Without loss of generality, assume UnAnd Um(UnChannel quality of better than Um) For a pair of NOMA users, the base station decodes U according to the uplink NOMA principlenAnd UmThe achievable signal-to-noise ratio of the signal is respectively expressed as
Figure BDA0002617092640000103
And
Figure BDA0002617092640000104
wherein
Figure BDA0002617092640000105
For the transmission signal-to-noise ratio of the user, N0Power of additive white Gaussian noise, Pu(Pu>0) Which is indicative of the transmit power of the user,
Figure BDA0002617092640000106
and
Figure BDA0002617092640000107
respectively representing base station and UnAnd UmThe channel coefficients in between. At the same time, due to the openness of the radio channel, an eavesdropper attempts to intercept the information transmitted by the NOMA user. In order to ensure the safe communication of the information and reduce the system overhead caused by full participation, one of the energy collection nodes is selected as a friendly jammer in the information transmission phase,
from the above analysis, it can be found that the probability P of the outage for the system user is the safe outage probability under the transmission method proposed by the present inventions,κAnd a secure throughput Ts,κRespectively as follows:
Figure BDA0002617092640000108
Figure BDA0002617092640000109
wherein, k belongs to { n, m }, EJS belongs to { REJS, MEJS, OEJS }, Rt,κRepresents UκCode rate of Rs,κRepresents UκTarget safe rate of Rt,κ-Rs,κRepresenting a redundant rate against eavesdropping,
Figure BDA0002617092640000111
indicating base station decoding UnAnd UmThe achievable signal-to-noise ratio of the signal.
Example 1
On the basis of the above embodiment, the present embodiment discloses the following technical features:
the system parameters are set as follows: M-N-5, the average gain of the channel between nodes is
Figure BDA0002617092640000112
Rt,κ＝1.5BPCU，Rs,κ＝0.8BPCU，ρu10dB, α is 0.4, and η is 0.8. The simulation shows the variation curves of the user outage probability and the safety throughput with the average signal-to-noise ratio of the uplink non-orthogonal multiple access system under the rayleigh channel condition by using the existing energy-free acquisition jammer transmission method (NEJS) and by using the transmission method proposed by the present invention, as shown in fig. 2, 3 and 4, where fig. 2 is the user UκFig. 3 and 4 are strong user U, respectivelynAnd weak user UmSecure throughput simulation of (1).
As can be seen from fig. 2, the proposed method significantly reduces the probability of a safe interruption of the user transmission compared to the existing NEJS method. Meanwhile, the OEJS strategy is superior to the MEJS strategy, and the MEJS strategy is superior to the REJS strategy.
As can be seen from fig. 3 and 4, the proposed method significantly improves the secure throughput of user transmissions compared to the existing NEJS method. Meanwhile, under the condition of medium and low signal to noise ratio, the OEJS strategy is superior to the MEJS strategy, and the MEJS strategy is superior to the REJS strategy; however, at high snr, the three energy harvesting jammer selection strategies converge to the same safe throughput value. This is due to the fact that at high snr, the connection interruption of the user transmission becomes a performance bottleneck that limits the safety throughput compared to the impact caused by the safety interruption.

Claims (4)

1. A safe transmission method of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access is used for selecting a proper friendly jammer and interfering a malicious eavesdropper under the condition that the malicious eavesdropper exists, and realizing uplink NOMA safe transmission of a user to a base station, and is characterized in that the step of selecting the proper friendly jammer and interfering the malicious eavesdropper comprises the following steps:
step 1: acquiring channel state information between a base station and energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper, and selecting one of the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer according to an acquired result;
if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
step 2: the friendly jammer selected in the step 1 transmits an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to a base station and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer;
and step 3: the base station detects and removes the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence, and a malicious eavesdropper receives the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence and is interfered.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the randomly selected friendly interferer is represented by formula i:
Figure FDA0002617092630000011
wherein R isrDenotes a randomly selected friendly interferer, RjRepresenting a jth energy collection node, rand {. denotes that each energy collection node is selected as a jammer with equal probability, wherein Δ ═ 1, 2.. multidot.n }, and N represents the total number of the energy collection nodes;
the energy collection node with the maximum transmitting power is expressed as a friendly jammer as a formula II:
Figure FDA0002617092630000021
wherein R isvIndicating the friendly interferer selected according to the transmit power maximum,
Figure FDA0002617092630000022
representing energy-harvesting nodes RjTransmit power of artificial noise when acting as a jammer and
Figure FDA0002617092630000023
Ejrepresenting energy-harvesting nodes RjCollected wireless radio frequency energy and
Figure FDA0002617092630000024
alpha represents the time distribution ratio of two stages of energy transmission and information transmission in a time frame length T, and alpha belongs to (0, 1), eta represents the energy conversion rate, and PbWhich represents the transmit power of the base station,
Figure FDA0002617092630000025
representing base stations and RjChannel coefficients between;
the energy collection node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by a malicious eavesdropper is expressed as a friendly jammer in a formula III:
Figure FDA0002617092630000026
wherein R isoRepresenting friendly jammers, selected on the basis of a signal-to-noise ratio which minimizes the reception of a signal by a malicious eavesdropper, gammaeRepresenting the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal received by a malicious eavesdropper.
3. A safe transmission system of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access comprises a base station, a user, a plurality of energy acquisition nodes and a malicious eavesdropper, wherein the user executes uplink NOMA transmission information to the base station in an information transmission stage, and the malicious eavesdropper attempts to intercept the information transmitted by the user in the information transmission stage;
the main control module selects one of the multiple energy collection nodes as the friendly jammer according to the obtained channel state information result, and the selection refers to: if no channel state information is acquired, randomly selecting one energy acquisition node from all the energy acquisition nodes as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the energy acquisition node is acquired and the channel state information of a malicious eavesdropper is not acquired, selecting the energy acquisition node with the maximum transmission power as a friendly jammer; if the channel state information of the malicious eavesdropper is obtained, selecting an energy acquisition node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by the malicious eavesdropper as a friendly jammer;
the friendly jammer is used for transmitting an artificial noise pseudorandom sequence to the base station and a malicious eavesdropper, and the artificial noise pseudorandom sequence is generated according to channel information between the base station and the friendly jammer.
4. The system of claim 3, wherein the randomly selected friendly interferer is represented by formula i:
Figure FDA0002617092630000031
wherein R isrDenotes a randomly selected friendly interferer, RjRepresents the jth energy-harvesting node, rand {. DEG } represents each energy-harvesting node to have an equal outlineThe rate is selected as the jammer, Δ ═ 1, 2.., N, where N represents the total number of energy harvesting nodes;
the energy collection node with the maximum transmitting power is expressed as a friendly jammer as a formula II:
Figure FDA0002617092630000032
wherein R isvIndicating the friendly interferer selected according to the transmit power maximum,
Figure FDA0002617092630000033
representing energy-harvesting nodes RjTransmit power of artificial noise when acting as a jammer and
Figure FDA0002617092630000034
Ejrepresenting energy-harvesting nodes RjCollected wireless radio frequency energy and
Figure FDA0002617092630000035
alpha represents the time distribution ratio of two stages of energy transmission and information transmission in a time frame length T, and alpha belongs to (0, 1), eta represents the energy conversion rate, and PbWhich represents the transmit power of the base station,
Figure FDA0002617092630000036
representing base stations and RjChannel coefficients between;
the energy collection node capable of minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio of a signal received by a malicious eavesdropper is expressed as a friendly jammer in a formula III:
Figure FDA0002617092630000037
wherein R isoRepresenting friendly jammers, selected on the basis of a signal-to-noise ratio which minimizes the reception of a signal by a malicious eavesdropper, gammaeSignal-to-noise ratio representing a signal received by a malicious eavesdropperAnd (4) the ratio.
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