CN113840162B - IPTV video file tamper-proof method - Google Patents
IPTV video file tamper-proof method Download PDFInfo
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- CN113840162B CN113840162B CN202111138136.5A CN202111138136A CN113840162B CN 113840162 B CN113840162 B CN 113840162B CN 202111138136 A CN202111138136 A CN 202111138136A CN 113840162 B CN113840162 B CN 113840162B
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 26
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 49
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000005070 sampling Methods 0.000 claims description 64
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000052 comparative effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
- H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
- H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
- H04N21/234—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams, manipulating MPEG-4 scene graphs
- H04N21/2347—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams, manipulating MPEG-4 scene graphs involving video stream encryption
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
Abstract
The invention discloses a tamper-proof method for IPTV video files, which is characterized in that: a first signature module and a second signature module are added on the original flow, and the method is specifically realized by injecting a video file into a CDN source server through a video injection system by a live stream/on-demand file, and generating a signature file 1 according to the video file by the first signature module and storing the signature file 1 in the CDN source server; the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate signature files and verify the signatures of the video files on the CDN source server and the push server according to whether the push server has cache contents or not, and if the verification is passed, the video files are respectively streamed on the CDN source server and the push server. The method provided by the invention is simple to realize, does not depend on hardware, does not depend on a terminal player, does not influence the playing speed, and effectively prevents the video data which is tampered locally from flowing to the terminal or a downstream server.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of IPTV network televisions, in particular to an IPTV video file tamper-proof method.
Background
With the comprehensive popularization of 4K televisions and the gradual popularization of 8K televisions, the requirements of television users on video definition are higher and higher, the internetworking of IPTV services is accelerated, and the Internet brings the risk of safe broadcasting while enriching ultra-high definition content for the IPTV services.
The comparative document CN201710997096.7 discloses a tamper-proof method for IPTV video files, which has the following two technical drawbacks:
1. depending on the support of the terminal player, the terminal manufacturers have more, development difficulty and upgrading difficulty.
2. It is necessary to wait for the terminal player to receive the entire slice file before verifying whether the video has been tampered with. The remaining video data can be played. If the video is not tampered, waiting (the downloading time of the slice file is-1 s) is needed to play the rest video data, and the rest video data may be blocked; if the video file is tampered with, it may result in playing 1s of tampered data.
The comparison document CN201910844096.2 discloses a method and a system for implementing tamper resistance of CDN streaming media data, which can achieve the effect of effectively preventing locally tampered video data from flowing to a terminal or a lower server, but the implementation of the technical scheme is complex.
Therefore, how to study and design a device which is simple to implement, independent of hardware, independent of a terminal player and free of influencing playing speed is a problem which needs to be solved at present.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method for signing video sampling, which does not influence playing speed on the basis of guaranteeing tamper-proof safety of video content, does not need to process video data and effectively prevents the locally tampered video data from flowing to a terminal or a lower server.
The technical aim of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a tamper-proof method for IPTV video files is characterized in that a first signature module and a second signature module are newly added in links of video injection system, CDN source server, push stream server and terminal playing, and the method is concretely realized as follows:
the live stream/on-demand file is injected into a CDN source server by acquiring a video file through a video injection system, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file 1 in the CDN source server;
the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate signature files and verify the signatures of the video files on the CDN source server and the push server according to whether the push server has cache contents or not, and if the verification is passed, the video files are respectively streamed on the CDN source server and the push server.
According to the invention, the signature is generated four times and the signature is verified twice on the CDN source server and the push server according to the existence of the cache content of the push server, and whether the video played at the terminal is streamed on the CDN source server or the push server is controlled according to the verification result, so that the effect that the video played at the terminal is not tampered is achieved, the video data is not analyzed, the time consumption of a video analysis part is avoided, and the influence of the tamper-proof function on the video playing speed is reduced. Signature generation and verification are both performed on the server, and the server ensures that the video data of the streaming is not tampered.
Further, when the push server does not have the cached content, the push server returns to the CDN source server through the CDN distribution network, the first signature module generates a signature value 2 for the video file in the CDN source server and verifies the signature file 1 stored in the CDN source server, if the verification result is the same, the video file is sent to the push server and cached, and the second signature module reads the cached video file to generate a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push server.
Further, when the push server has the cache content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 and a signature file 3 for the video file cached in the push server to verify, if the verification result is the same, the video data is sent to the terminal player, if the verification result is different, the verification is not passed, and the source video file data needs to be returned through the CDN distribution network again.
Further, the generation of the signature file 1 and the signature file 3 is specifically implemented as follows:
signature file 1 generation includes the steps of:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples video files in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video files;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
storing the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with ". Md5" as a suffix;
the signature file 3 generation includes the steps of:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the push server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is stored in the signature file 3 with ". Md5" as a suffix.
Further, the verification of the signature by the first signature module is specifically implemented as follows:
sampling video files in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 with the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, verifying the signature to succeed, and if the CDN source server flows, otherwise, verifying the CDN source server fails, and refusing to flow.
Further, the verification of the signature by the second signature module is specifically implemented as follows:
sampling a video file in a push server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 with the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, pushing the streaming server to stream, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server again.
Further, sampling the video file includes the steps of:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the front N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, sampling by uniformly distributed discrete points, setting the size of a video file as S, the number of sampling points N3, reading the 1 st byte from the position of N1+Smod ((S-N1-N2)/N3), reading the next 1 byte at each interval (S-N1-N2)/N3, and sampling N3 bytes;
and C, according to the head and tail sampling and discrete point sampling of the files in the step A and the step B, the N1+N2+N3 bytes are sampled altogether.
Further, the CDN source server and the push server independently perform signature generation and verification, the generated signature is not transmitted between the two servers, and verification of the signature does not involve cross-server and cross-terminal verification.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. according to the invention, the video file is not modified, the terminal player is not required to support, each CDN service independently generates and verifies the tamper-proof signature, and the outputted video content is ensured not to be tampered.
2. The invention uses the file sampling signature to replace the full file signature, improves the signature efficiency, and reduces the influence of tamper-proof detection on playing performance.
3. The invention adds the relative path and the file size of the video file into the signature, increases the complexity of the signature content, makes the abstract of each file different and unique, and can effectively prevent the video file from being replaced by other video files in the platform.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiments of the invention. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system architecture for implementing the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of signature generation of a first signature module and a second signature module provided by the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of video file sampling provided by the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flowchart of a verification signature of the first signature module and the second signature module provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
For the purpose of making apparent the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the following examples and the accompanying drawings, wherein the exemplary embodiments of the present invention and the descriptions thereof are for illustrating the present invention only and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention.
It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being "mounted" or "disposed" on another element, it can be directly on the other element or be indirectly on the other element. When an element is referred to as being "connected to" another element, it can be directly or indirectly connected to the other element.
It is to be understood that the terms "length," "width," "upper," "lower," "front," "rear," "left," "right," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inner," "outer," and the like are merely for convenience in describing and simplifying the description based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings, and do not indicate or imply that the devices or elements referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus are not to be construed as limiting the invention.
Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," and the like, are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying a relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defining "a first" or "a second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more such feature. In the description of the present invention, the meaning of "a plurality" is two or more, unless explicitly defined otherwise.
Examples
In the internet mode, an IPTV system generally adopts a video slicing technology to provide video services. Video is injected to play, and links such as a video injection system, CDN distribution, terminal play and the like are needed, wherein the video injection system comprises live broadcast recording service/on-demand injection service. In order to realize the video tamper-proof function, the invention adds two functional modules of the first signature module and the second signature module in the original flow. The two functional modules and the overall inventive concept will be explained in detail below.
As shown in fig. 1, this embodiment provides a tamper-proof method for an IPTV video file, in which a first signature module and a second signature module are newly added in links of a video injection system, a CDN source server, a push server, and a terminal playing, which is specifically implemented as follows:
the live stream/on-demand file is injected into a CDN source server through a video injection system, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN source server;
the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate signature files and verify the signatures of the video files on the CDN source server and the push server according to whether the push server has cache contents or not, and if the verification is passed, the video files are respectively streamed on the CDN source server and the push server.
Preferably, when the push server does not have the cached content, the push server returns to the CDN source server through the CDN delivery network, the first signature module generates a signature value 2 for the video file in the CDN source server and verifies the signature file 1 stored in the CDN source server, if the verification result is the same, the video file is issued to the push server, and the second signature module reads the cached video file to generate a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push server.
Preferably, when the push server has the cached content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 and a signature file 3 for the video file cached in the push server to verify, if the verification result is the same, the video data is sent to the terminal player, if the verification result is different, the verification is not passed, and the source video file data needs to be returned through the CDN distribution network again.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 2, fig. 2 is a flowchart for generating a signature, and the generation of signature file 1 and signature file 3 is specifically implemented as follows:
signature file 1 generation includes the steps of:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples video files in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video files;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
storing the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with ". Md5" as a suffix;
the signature file 3 generation includes the steps of:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the push server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is stored in the signature file 3 with ". Md5" as a suffix.
Specifically, the signature needs to be stored in two servers after the signature is generated, so that a flow of storing the signature also appears in fig. 2, and the two signatures are respectively stored in folders to generate a signature file.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 4, fig. 4 is a flowchart of signature verification, and the first signature module verifies the signature as follows:
sampling video files in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 with the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, verifying the signature to succeed, and if the CDN source server flows, otherwise, verifying the CDN source server fails, and refusing to flow.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 4, fig. 4 is a flowchart of signature verification, and the second signature module verifies the signature as follows:
sampling a video file in a push server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 with the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, pushing the streaming server to stream, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server again.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 3, fig. 3 is a video sampling flow chart, and sampling a video file includes the following steps:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the front N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, sampling by uniformly distributed discrete points, setting the size of a video file as S, the number of sampling points N3, reading the 1 st byte from the position of N1+Smod ((S-N1-N2)/N3), reading the next 1 byte at each interval (S-N1-N2)/N3, and sampling N3 bytes;
and C, according to the head and tail sampling and discrete point sampling of the files in the step A and the step B, the N1+N2+N3 bytes are sampled altogether.
Specifically, the sampling points are specifically described, N1 and N2 are 1024 bytes, N3 is 2048 bytes, 4096 bytes are sampled in total, and when S is 10M, the sampling ratio is four parts per million; when S is 1G, the sampling ratio is four parts per million.
Preferably, the CDN origin server and the push server independently perform signature generation and verification, the generated signature is not transferred between the two servers, and verification of the signature does not involve cross-server and cross-terminal verification.
Specifically, signature generation and verification are not transmitted between servers, each server considers that the input video is not tampered, and the output video is required to be ensured to be tampered, so that the video output to the terminal player is not tampered, and the terminal player does not need to verify.
Working principle: the invention generates the video file object selection stage of signature:
1) The video sampling is used for replacing a complete video file, and sampling points cover the complete file, so that the video signature efficiency can be effectively improved.
2) The video sampling is not subjected to video analysis, and only the data at the designated position is extracted. Thus, when the video file is read to carry out signature verification, video analysis is not needed, the signature process is faster, and the influence of the signature verification on playing delay is reduced to the minimum.
3) The sampling points are random but deterministic. For different video files, sampling points are random, and because different video files have different sizes, an attacker cannot easily find out a rule imitation signature; for the same video file, the sampling points are determined, so that the sampling points of the same video file are the same, and the signature is calculated to be the same, so that the verification can be passed.
4) In addition to using video content samples, the file relative path and file size in the file feature are also signed. The complexity of the signature is increased, so that the signature is not easy to imitate; the video file can be effectively prevented from being replaced by other video files in the platform.
The invention generates and verifies the signature of the video file:
1) Each CDN service independently performs generation and verification of tamper-resistant signatures. Each service considers the incoming video as untampered and, as such, needs to ensure that the outgoing video is untampered. Therefore, the video output to the terminal player is not tampered, and the terminal player does not need to check.
2) The signature uses the md5 hash algorithm. The same input must obtain the same output, different inputs have different outputs with large probability, and the influence of hash collision with small probability is negligible.
It should be noted that, since the present invention does not involve parsing a video file, any file may be the object of tamper-proof verification.
The present embodiment also provides a specific example to illustrate the tamper-proof effect of video content, including the following three points:
if the video file A is replaced by the video file B, if the file sizes of the video file B and the video file A are different, the signature is different, and the verification is failed.
If the video file a is replaced with the video file B, if the video file B is the same as the video file a in file size, but any byte in the sampling point is different, the signature is different, and the verification is not passed. It should be noted that, in the case where there are enough sampling points, the probability that all the sampling points of the two different video files a and B are the same is extremely small, and the more sampling points, the smaller the probability, but the lower the efficiency.
If the video file A is replaced by the video file B, the signature of the video file A is replaced by the signature of the video file B, and when the signature is generated, the signatures are different because the file paths of the video file A and the video file B are different, and the verification is failed.
The foregoing description of the embodiments has been provided for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the invention, and is not meant to limit the scope of the invention, but to limit the invention to the particular embodiments, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. that fall within the spirit and principles of the invention are intended to be included within the scope of the invention.
Claims (7)
1. The IPTV video file tamper-proof method is characterized in that a first signature module and a second signature module are newly added in the links of video injection system, CDN source server, push stream server and terminal playing, and the method is specifically realized as follows:
the live stream/on-demand file is injected into a CDN source server through a video injection system, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN source server;
the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate signature files and verify the signatures of the video files on the CDN source server and the push server according to whether the push server has cache contents or not, and if the verification is passed, the video files are respectively streamed on the CDN source server and the push server;
the generation of the signature file 1 and the signature file 3 is specifically implemented as follows:
signature file 1 generation includes the steps of:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples video files in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video files;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
storing the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with ". Md5" as a suffix;
the signature file 3 generation includes the steps of:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the push server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to the MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is stored in the signature file 3 with ". Md5" as a suffix.
2. The method for preventing the IPTV video file from being tampered according to claim 1, wherein when the push server does not have the cache content, the push server returns to the CDN source server through the CDN distribution network, the first signature module generates a signature value 2 for the video file in the CDN source server and verifies the signature file 1 stored in the CDN source server, if the verification result is the same, the video file is issued to the push server and cached, and the second signature module reads the cached video file to generate a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push server.
3. The method for preventing IPTV video files from being tampered according to claim 2, wherein when the push server has the cached content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 and a signature file 3 for the video files cached in the push server to verify, if the verification result is the same, the video data is delivered to the terminal player, if the verification result is different, the verification is not passed, and the source video file data needs to be returned through the CDN distribution network again.
4. The method for tamper resistance of an IPTV video file according to claim 1, wherein the verification signature by the first signature module is specifically implemented as follows:
sampling video files in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 with the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, verifying the signature to succeed, and if the CDN source server flows, otherwise, verifying the CDN source server fails, and refusing to flow.
5. The method for tamper resistance of an IPTV video file according to claim 1, wherein the verification signature by the second signature module is specifically implemented as follows:
sampling a video file in a push server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file, and generating a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 with the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, pushing the streaming server to stream, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server again.
6. An IPTV video file tamper resistant method according to claim 1, characterized in that the sampling of the video file comprises the steps of:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the front N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, sampling by uniformly distributed discrete points, setting the size of a video file as S, and sampling the number of points as N3, wherein the number of the sampling points is equal to the number of the video fileByte 1 is read every interval +.>Reading the next 1 byte, sampling N3 bytes;
and C, according to the head and tail sampling and discrete point sampling of the files in the step A and the step B, the N1+N2+N3 bytes are sampled altogether.
7. The method for preventing IPTV video file tampering according to claim 1, wherein the CDN origin server and the push server independently perform signature generation and verification, the generated signature is not transferred between the two servers, and verification of the signature does not involve cross-server and cross-terminal verification.
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| CN110719494A (en) * | 2019-09-06 | 2020-01-21 | 烽火通信科技股份有限公司 | Method and system for preventing CDN streaming media data from being tampered |
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| WO2017193949A1 (en) * | 2016-05-11 | 2017-11-16 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Code stream tampering monitoring method and device and communication system |
| WO2017198069A1 (en) * | 2016-05-18 | 2017-11-23 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Streaming media file processing method and apparatus |
| CN107547915A (en) * | 2017-10-23 | 2018-01-05 | 江苏省公用信息有限公司 | A kind of IPTV video contents tamper resistant method |
| CN109472150A (en) * | 2018-10-31 | 2019-03-15 | 佛山科学技术学院 | A kind of setting read method of the file information |
| CN110719494A (en) * | 2019-09-06 | 2020-01-21 | 烽火通信科技股份有限公司 | Method and system for preventing CDN streaming media data from being tampered |
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