CN113840162A - IPTV video file tamper-proof method - Google Patents
IPTV video file tamper-proof method Download PDFInfo
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- CN113840162A CN113840162A CN202111138136.5A CN202111138136A CN113840162A CN 113840162 A CN113840162 A CN 113840162A CN 202111138136 A CN202111138136 A CN 202111138136A CN 113840162 A CN113840162 A CN 113840162A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 34
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 45
- 238000002347 injection Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 11
- 239000007924 injection Substances 0.000 claims abstract description 11
- 238000005070 sampling Methods 0.000 claims description 62
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 abstract description 4
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000243 solution Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
- H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
- H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
- H04N21/234—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs
- H04N21/2347—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing of video streams or manipulating encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream encryption
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
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Abstract
The invention discloses an IPTV video file tamper-proofing method, which has the key points of the scheme that: a first signature module and a second signature module are added to the original process, and the specific implementation is that a live streaming/on-demand file injects a video file into a CDN origin server through a video injection system, and the first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN origin server; and the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate a signature file and verify the signature of the video file on the CDN source server and the plug flow server according to whether the plug flow server has cache content, and if the verification is passed, the video file respectively flows out of the CDN source server and the plug flow server. The method provided by the invention is simple to realize, does not depend on hardware, a terminal player and playing speed, and effectively prevents local tampered video data from flowing out to a terminal or a downstream server.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of IPTV network televisions, in particular to an IPTV video file tamper-proof method.
Background
With the comprehensive popularization of 4K televisions and the gradual popularization of 8K televisions, the requirements of television users on video definition are higher and higher, the internet networking of IPTV services is accelerated, and the risk of safe broadcasting is brought to the Internet while rich ultrahigh-definition content is brought to the IPTV services.
The comparison document CN201710997096.7 discloses an IPTV video file tamper-proofing method, which has the following two technical defects:
1. depending on the support of the terminal player, the terminal manufacturers are more, the development difficulty is high, and the upgrading difficulty is high.
2. It is necessary to wait for the terminal player to receive the entire slice file to verify whether the video is tampered. The remaining video data can be played. If the video is not tampered, the remaining video data can be played only by waiting for (the downloading time of the slice file is-1 s), and the video is possibly blocked; if the video file is tampered with, it may result in playing 1s of tampered data.
The comparison document CN201910844096.2 discloses a method and a system for implementing CDN streaming media data tamper resistance, which can achieve the effect of effectively preventing local tampered video data from flowing out to a terminal or a lower-level server, but the implementation of the technical scheme itself is complex.
Therefore, how to research and design a problem that is easy to implement, independent of hardware, independent of a terminal player, and free of influence on the playing speed is an urgent need to solve at present.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention solves the technical problems that the existing video anti-tampering method is complex to realize and depends on hardware and a terminal player, and aims to provide the IPTV video file anti-tampering method.
The technical purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
a method for preventing IPTV video file from being tampered comprises the steps of adding a first signature module and a second signature module in a video injection system, a CDN source server, a plug flow server and a terminal playing link, and is specifically realized as follows:
the method comprises the steps that a live streaming/on-demand file is injected into a CDN source server after a video injection system obtains a video file, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN source server;
and the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate a signature file and verify the signature of the video file on the CDN source server and the plug flow server according to whether the plug flow server has cache content, and if the verification is passed, the video file respectively flows out of the CDN source server and the plug flow server.
According to the method and the device, the signature is generated four times and the signature is verified two times in the CDN origin server and the push flow server according to the existence of the cache content of the push flow server, whether the stream flows out of the CDN origin server or the push flow server is controlled according to the verification result, the effect that the video played at the terminal is not tampered is achieved, the time consumed by a video analysis part is not analyzed, and the influence of the anti-tampering function on the video playing speed is reduced. Signature generation and verification are performed on the server, and the server ensures that the video data of the outflow is not tampered.
Further, when the push streaming server has no cache content, the push streaming server returns to the CDN origin server through the CDN delivery network, the first signature module generates a signature value 2 for a video file in the CDN origin server and verifies the signature file 1 stored in the CDN origin server, if the verification results are the same, the video file is delivered to the push streaming server and cached, and the second signature module reads the cached video file to generate a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push streaming server.
Further, when the push streaming server has cache content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 for the video file cached in the push streaming server and verifies the signature file 3, if the verification result is the same, the video file passes the verification result, and if the verification result is different, the video data is issued to the terminal player, and if the verification result is different, the video file data does not pass the verification result, and the video file data needs to be re-sent to the source through the CDN delivery network.
Further, the generation of the signature file 1 and the signature file 3 is specifically realized as follows:
the generation of the signature file 1 comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples a video file in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
saving the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with a suffix of ". md 5";
the generation of the signature file 3 comprises the following steps:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the plug-flow server to obtain the sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is saved in the signature file 3 with a suffix ". md 5".
Further, the first signature module verifies the signature specifically as follows:
sampling a video file in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 and the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the stream by the CDN source server, otherwise, failing to verify, and rejecting the stream.
Further, the second signature module verifies the signature as follows:
sampling a video file in a plug-flow server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN origin server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 and the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the streaming server, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server.
Further, sampling the video file comprises the following steps:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the first N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, uniformly distributed discrete point sampling is adopted, the size of a video file is set to be S, the number of sampling points is N3, the 1 st byte is read from the position of N1+ S mod ((S-N1-N2)/N3), the next 1 byte is read every interval (S-N1-N2)/N3, and N3 bytes are sampled;
and step C, sampling N1+ N2+ N3 bytes in total according to the file head and tail sampling and the discrete point sampling in the steps A and B.
Furthermore, the CDN origin server and the streaming server independently generate and verify the signature, the generated signature is not transmitted between the two servers, and the verification of the signature does not involve cross-server and cross-terminal verification.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention does not modify the video file, does not need the support of a terminal player, and each CDN service independently generates and verifies the anti-tampering signature, thereby ensuring that the output video content is not tampered.
2. The invention uses the file sampling signature to replace the full file signature, improves the signature efficiency and reduces the influence of tamper-proof detection on the playing performance.
3. The invention adds the relative path and file size of the video file into the signature, increases the complexity of the signature content, makes the abstract of each file different and unique, and can effectively prevent the video file from being replaced by other video files in the platform.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiment(s) of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system architecture for implementing the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of signature generation for a first signature module and a second signature module provided by the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a video file sampling provided by the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flow chart of signature verification for the first signature module and the second signature module provided in the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to examples and accompanying drawings, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not meant to limit the present invention.
It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being "secured to" or "disposed on" another element, it can be directly on the other element or be indirectly on the other element. When an element is referred to as being "connected to" another element, it can be directly or indirectly connected to the other element.
It will be understood that the terms "length," "width," "upper," "lower," "front," "rear," "left," "right," "vertical," "horizontal," "top," "bottom," "inner," "outer," and the like, as used herein, refer to an orientation or positional relationship indicated in the drawings that is solely for the purpose of facilitating the description and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element being referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and is therefore not to be construed as limiting the invention.
Furthermore, the terms "first", "second" and "first" are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of the present invention, "a plurality" means two or more unless specifically defined otherwise.
Examples
In the internet mode, the IPTV system generally uses a video slicing technique to provide video services. From injection to playing, the video needs to pass through links such as a video injection system, CDN (content delivery network) delivery, terminal playing and the like, wherein the video injection system comprises live broadcast recording service/on-demand injection service. In order to realize the video tamper-proof function, the invention adds two functional modules, namely a first signature module and a second signature module, in the original process. Two functional blocks and the overall inventive concept will be explained in detail below.
As shown in fig. 1, this embodiment provides a method for preventing IPTV video file from being tampered, in which a first signature module and a second signature module are added in a video injection system, a CDN origin server, a push streaming server, and a terminal playing link, and the method is specifically implemented as follows:
the method comprises the steps that a live streaming/on-demand file injects a video file into a CDN source server through a video injection system, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN source server;
and the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate a signature file and verify the signature of the video file on the CDN source server and the plug flow server according to whether the plug flow server has cache content, and if the verification is passed, the video file respectively flows out of the CDN source server and the plug flow server.
Preferably, when the push streaming server has no cache content, the push streaming server returns to the CDN origin server through the CDN delivery network, the first signature module generates a signature value 2 for the video file in the CDN origin server and verifies the signature file 1 stored in the CDN origin server, if the verification results are the same, the video file is delivered to the push streaming server, and the second signature module reads the cached video file and generates a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push streaming server.
Preferably, when the push streaming server has cache content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 for the video file cached in the push streaming server and verifies the signature file 3, if the verification result is the same, the video file passes the verification, and if the verification result is different, the video file passes the verification, and the video file data needs to be returned to the source through the CDN distribution network.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 2, fig. 2 is a flowchart for generating a signature, and the generation of the signature file 1 and the signature file 3 is implemented as follows:
the generation of the signature file 1 comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples a video file in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
saving the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with a suffix of ". md 5";
the generation of the signature file 3 comprises the following steps:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the plug-flow server to obtain the sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is saved in the signature file 3 with a suffix ". md 5".
Specifically, after the signature is generated, the signature needs to be stored in two servers, so a process of storing the signature also appears in fig. 2, and the two signatures are stored in folders respectively to generate a signature file.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 4, fig. 4 is a flowchart of signature verification, and the first signature module verifies the signature as follows:
sampling a video file in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 and the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the stream by the CDN source server, otherwise, failing to verify, and rejecting the stream.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 4, fig. 4 is a flowchart of signature verification, and the second signature module verifies the signature as follows:
sampling a video file in a plug-flow server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN origin server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 and the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the streaming server, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server.
Preferably, as shown in fig. 3, fig. 3 is a video sampling flow chart, and sampling a video file includes the following steps:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the first N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, uniformly distributed discrete point sampling is adopted, the size of a video file is set to be S, the number of sampling points is N3, the 1 st byte is read from the position of N1+ S mod ((S-N1-N2)/N3), the next 1 byte is read every interval (S-N1-N2)/N3, and N3 bytes are sampled;
and step C, sampling N1+ N2+ N3 bytes in total according to the file head and tail sampling and the discrete point sampling in the steps A and B.
Specifically, the sampling points are specifically described, where N1 and N2 are 1024 bytes, N3 is 2048 bytes, 4096 bytes are sampled in the whole text, and when S is 10M, the sampling ratio is four ten thousandths; when S is 1G, the sampling ratio is four millionths.
Preferably, the CDN origin server and the push streaming server generate and verify the signature independently, the generated signature is not passed between the two servers, and the verification of the signature does not involve verification across servers and across terminals.
Specifically, the generation and verification of the signature are not transmitted between the servers, each server considers that the input video is not tampered, and it is required to ensure that the output video is not tampered, so that the video output to the terminal player is not tampered, and the terminal player does not need to verify.
The working principle is as follows: the invention generates the video file object selection stage of the signature:
1) the video sampling is used for replacing a complete video file, and the sampling points cover the whole file, so that the video signature efficiency can be effectively improved.
2) The video sampling does not need video analysis, and only data at a specified position is extracted. Therefore, when the video file is read for signature verification, video analysis is not needed, the signature process is faster, and the influence of the signature verification on the playing delay is reduced to the minimum.
3) The sampling points are random but deterministic. For different video files, sampling points are random, and due to the fact that the sizes of the different video files are different, an attacker cannot find a regular imitation signature easily; for the same video file, the sampling point is determined, so that the same video file sampling point is the same, the signature calculation is the same, and the verification can be passed.
4) In addition to using video content samples, the relative path of the file and the file size in the file characteristics are also signed. Not only increases the complexity of the signature and makes the signature not easy to be imitated; the video file can be effectively prevented from being replaced by other video files in the platform.
The invention generates and verifies the signature of the video file:
1) each CDN service independently performs generation and verification of a tamper-resistant signature. Each service considers incoming video as being untampered and, as such, it is necessary to ensure that outgoing video is untampered. Therefore, the video output to the terminal player is not tampered, and the terminal player does not need to be verified.
2) The signature uses the md5 hash algorithm. The same input can obtain the same output, different inputs can obtain different outputs with high probability, and the influence caused by Hash collision with low probability can be ignored.
It should be noted that, since the present invention does not involve parsing a video file, any file may be an object of tamper-proof verification.
The embodiment also provides a specific example to illustrate the effect of tamper resistance of video content, which includes the following three points:
if the video file A is replaced by the video file B, if the file sizes of the video file B and the video file A are different, the signature is different, and the verification is not passed.
If the video file A is replaced by the video file B, if the file size of the video file B is the same as that of the video file A, but any byte in a sampling point is different, the signature is different, and the verification is not passed. It should be noted that, in the case that the sampling points are enough, the probability that all sampling points of two different video files a and B are the same is extremely small, and the more sampling points, the smaller the probability, but the lower the efficiency.
If the video file A is replaced by the video file B, the signature of the video file A is replaced by the signature of the video file B, and the signature is different and the verification is not passed because the file paths of the video file A and the video file B are different when the signature is generated.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An IPTV video file tamper-proofing method is characterized in that a first signature module and a second signature module are added in a video injection system, a CDN source server, a push stream server and a terminal playing link, and the method is specifically realized as follows:
the method comprises the steps that a live streaming/on-demand file injects a video file into a CDN source server through a video injection system, and a first signature module generates a signature file 1 according to the video file and stores the signature file in the CDN source server;
and the first signature module and the second signature module respectively generate a signature file and verify the signature of the video file on the CDN source server and the plug flow server according to whether the plug flow server has cache content, and if the verification is passed, the video file respectively flows out of the CDN source server and the plug flow server.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein when the push streaming server has no cache content, the push streaming server returns to the CDN origin server through the CDN delivery network, the first signature module verifies that the signature value 2 for the video file in the CDN origin server is generated and the signature file 1 stored in the CDN origin server is verified, and if the verification results are the same, the video file is delivered to the push streaming server and cached, and the second signature module reads the cached video file to generate a locally stored signature file 3 corresponding to the push streaming server.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein when the push streaming server has cache content, the second signature module generates a signature value 4 and a signature file 3 for the video file cached in the push streaming server to verify, if the verification result is the same, the signature value is passed, video data is sent to the terminal player, if the verification result is different, the verification is not passed, and the source video file data needs to be returned through the CDN delivery network.
4. The method for preventing the IPTV video file from being tampered with according to claim 1, wherein the generation of the signature file 1 and the signature file 3 is specifically realized as follows:
the generation of the signature file 1 comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a first signature module samples a video file in a CDN source server to obtain sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 1 of the video file;
saving the signature value 1 in a signature file 1 with a suffix of ". md 5";
the generation of the signature file 3 comprises the following steps:
the second signature module samples the video file cached in the plug-flow server to obtain the sampling data of the video file;
calculating the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file according to an MD5 hash algorithm to generate a signature value 3 of the video file;
the signature value 3 is saved in the signature file 3 with a suffix ". md 5".
5. The method for preventing the IPTV video file from being tampered according to claim 4, wherein the first signature module verifies the signature specifically as follows:
sampling a video file in a CDN source server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 2 of the video file;
reading a signature value 1 of a signature file 1 stored in a CDN source server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 1 and the signature value 2, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the stream by the CDN source server, otherwise, failing to verify, and rejecting the stream.
6. The method for preventing the IPTV video file from being tampered according to claim 4, wherein the second signature module verifies the signature specifically as follows:
sampling a video file in a plug-flow server;
calculating an MD5 signature value according to the sampling data of the video file, the relative path of the video file and the size of the video file to generate a signature value 4 of the video file;
reading a signature value 3 of a signature file 3 stored in a CDN origin server;
and comparing and verifying the signature value 3 and the signature value 4, if the verification results are the same, successfully verifying the signature, and outputting the streaming server, otherwise, failing to verify, and needing to return the source video file from the CDN source server.
7. The method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the sampling the video file comprises the following steps:
step A, sampling the head and the tail of a video file, and reading the first N1 bytes and the last N2 bytes of the video file;
step B, uniformly distributed discrete point sampling is adopted, the size of a video file is set to be S, the number of sampling points is N3, the 1 st byte is read from the position of N1+ S mod ((S-N1-N2)/N3), the next 1 byte is read every interval (S-N1-N2)/N3, and N3 bytes are sampled;
and step C, sampling N1+ N2+ N3 bytes in total according to the file head and tail sampling and the discrete point sampling in the steps A and B.
8. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the CDN origin server and the push streaming server independently generate and verify the signature, the generated signature is not transmitted between the two servers, and the verification of the signature does not involve verification across servers and across terminals.
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