CN113656828B - Block chain privacy protection method based on lattice code and oriented to financial system transaction - Google Patents

Block chain privacy protection method based on lattice code and oriented to financial system transaction Download PDF

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CN113656828B
CN113656828B CN202110820938.8A CN202110820938A CN113656828B CN 113656828 B CN113656828 B CN 113656828B CN 202110820938 A CN202110820938 A CN 202110820938A CN 113656828 B CN113656828 B CN 113656828B
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key
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CN113656828A (en
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盖珂珂
陈思源
祝烈煌
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Beijing Institute of Technology BIT
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    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management

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Abstract

The invention relates to a block chain privacy protection method based on a lattice code and oriented to financial system transaction, and belongs to the technical field of block chain application. The method anonymously stores the transaction information in the global account block chain, and other nodes cannot know any useful information of the transaction except banks and users related to the transaction. The superior node can check the transaction records of the subordinate nodes, the subordinate nodes cannot directly inquire the transaction records of the superior node and other subordinate nodes, and the inquiry can be realized only when the inquiry is needed and the recovery condition of a secret sharing mechanism is required to be met. The encryption system adopted by the method is designed based on the lattice difficulty problem, and the method is still safe and usable even after the quantum computer is put into practical use. The method can effectively protect transaction data, has flexible authority management, and can effectively resist quantum attack.

Description

Block chain privacy protection method based on lattice code and oriented to financial system transaction
Technical Field
The invention relates to a block chain privacy protection method, in particular to a block chain privacy protection method based on a lattice code and oriented to financial system transaction, and belongs to the technical field of block chain application.
Background
With the continued development and popularity of blockchain technology, blockchains are receiving more and more extensive attention from government and financial institutions. In the financial field, banks and financial institutions wish to reduce data maintenance costs and improve data security through blockchains. Also, since the blockchain is based on a peer-to-peer network, which means that the blockchain mechanism does not process and store data from the central node, all transaction records must be disclosed to all nodes, which is very detrimental to user privacy. Particularly in the financial field, user data is one of the core competencies of an enterprise, and a financial institution does not want to see transaction information of a user exposed on a chain.
The transaction record may reflect some sensitive knowledge that may reveal the privacy of the user, e.g., the transaction record of the user may reflect the consumption level and the living condition of the user. In a blockchain, the first node to forward a transaction may be the originating node for the transaction, meaning that it is only necessary to connect to the server as much as possible and record the time when the transaction is received from different servers, so that the originating node for the transaction can be inferred and the true identity of the anonymous address can be known.
Privacy protection is generally regarded as one of the most important aspects in the field of financial security, and protecting data privacy is a key task in formulating privacy protection policies. In a coalition chain based banking transaction system, transaction data is also important. Neither party wants the banks other than the transaction to know the transaction data, and some upper banks want to manage the data of the lower banks. For example, the superordinate node may audit the subordinate node, it may decide whether the subordinate node is entitled to view the transaction data, etc. A simple method is to encrypt all transaction data to hide the identity information and transaction information of both parties, but this method is not a viable option in practical applications. Therefore, some supervision means is also required while privacy is secured.
Currently, the overall structure of a blockchain is not consistent with that of a modern financial system. It is clear that direct P2P transactions in bitcoin and other similar digital currencies pose significant challenges to financial institutions in customer service and regulatory fashion. The financial industry is exploring a new mode, namely, assets are not directly moved through point-to-point transactions among users, a centralized transaction system is not adopted, on the contrary, transactions of a large number of users are managed through a few entities (usually banks), the banks complete stock transaction records of millions of users in an intermediary form through an account book, the banks can be ensured to complete asset circulation according to the wishes of the users through system design and technical means, and a plurality of privacy protection problems also exist. Therefore, in order to promote the long-term healthy development of the block chain in the financial system, it is necessary to seek a balance between privacy protection and transaction supervision according to the characteristics and needs of the actual financial system.
To solve these problems, many researchers have proposed various solutions.
The mixed currency scheme is a simple method and has the following principle: the user first transfers funds to a third party, who then transfers the funds to a designated account through multiple transfers. However, high handling and capital guarantees are significant drawbacks to this approach.
Another method is encryption, and the signature technology is widely applied to the design of block chains. In bitcoin, an elliptic curve cipher is used to generate a public key corresponding to a private key. As the wallet address of the user, the public key can distinguish different user IDs, and each user has a plurality of public key addresses to realize the anonymity of the transaction. To ensure secure authorization of transactions, bitcoin systems digitally sign each transaction datum. The elliptic curve signature algorithm (ECDSA) is adopted by the bitcoin and the EtherFang, the shape of an ellipse is determined by the parameters of the secp256kl, and an asymmetrical efficient signature algorithm is realized.
A hash function is also a common encryption method. In bitcoin, the user's public key address is generated by a hash value calculated by the SHA256 algorithm when the transaction is started. When transaction data is verified, the public key of the user is used for verifying the signature, and non-repudiation of the transaction is realized.
With the increasing rise of quantum computing, the traditional signature algorithm faces huge security challenges. Menlo currency is known for its privacy protection. The address of each transaction is updated by the menou coin using a random number to ensure that the viewer cannot find a connection between the address and the recipient, but using a time-series analysis method makes it possible to track the transaction. 0. Coins introduced zero knowledge proof techniques to hide transaction parameters, but its high computational overhead made the proof process very slow.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to creatively provide a block chain privacy protection method based on a lattice code for financial system transaction, aiming at overcoming the defects and shortcomings in the prior art and solving the technical problem of privacy disclosure risks in the transaction process of the financial system.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme.
First, the concept will be explained.
Definition 1: bank intermediary account book system
The system is a transaction system for carrying out fund delivery settlement by utilizing a bank system in a modern financial system;
definition 2: bank
The system is an organization for undertaking financial transaction activities, different banks comprise a general bank and a plurality of branch banks, and the banks have account lists and asset balance information of users;
definition 3: global account book
The system is a system for recording and storing all bank transaction information, wherein a global account book is composed of a plurality of consensus nodes and adopts a block chain system of a safe consensus algorithm;
definition 4: user' s
The system is an object engaged in financial transaction activities, belongs to a branch bank of a certain bank and can apply for a transaction request to the branch bank of the bank;
definition 5: lattice code
The method is a cryptosystem established based on the lattice difficulty problem and is a well-known quantum attack resistant cryptoscheme;
definition 6: secret sharing
The method is characterized in that the secret is split in a proper mode, each split share is managed by different participants, a single participant cannot recover the secret information, and only when a specific participant participates and the number of the participants reaches a certain minimum threshold value, the participants cooperate together to recover the secret information.
Generally, secret sharing only requires a certain number of participants to cooperate together to recover the secret message. From the practical point of view, the invention increases the limiting conditions that specific participants need to participate, and better meets the requirements of practical scenes.
Definition 7: hash function
Refers to a function that can map an input of arbitrary length (also called a function pre-image) to a fixed length output (i.e., a hash value).
Hash functions, which were originally used for digital signatures, are one of the basic building blocks of modern cryptography. The hash function has the characteristics of unidirectionality, collision resistance and the like.
A block chain privacy protection method based on a lattice code facing to financial system transaction comprises the following steps:
step 1: and initializing the whole system, including initializing a global account book, a bank and a user.
Specifically, step 1 comprises the steps of:
step 1.1: and initializing a global account book.
The global ledger blockchain system is initialized and a public-private key pair is generated for encrypting transaction information, the key being generated and managed by the highest authority owner designated by the entire system (which may be considered a central bank). Similar to the actual bank system, the global ledger administrator can check all the transaction information of the system class, and the lower-level bank can only inquire the transaction information.
Step 1.2: and (5) initializing the bank.
The bank initializes and generates a signature public and private key pair and an encryption and decryption public and private key pair, and initializes the account and balance information of the user to which the respective key pair belongs, wherein the signature public key is used for digital signature and also used as a bank address.
Step 1.3: and (4) user initialization.
The user initiates generation of a signature public-private key pair and an encryption-decryption public-private key pair, wherein the public signature key is used for digital signature as well as the user's personal address (i.e., user name).
Step 2: the transaction is initiated and the user submits a request for a transfer transaction to the system.
Specifically, step 2 comprises the steps of:
step 2.1: the user submits a transaction request.
The user submits the transaction request to the affiliated bank branch, the transaction information comprises the personal address of the transfer receiver user and the transfer amount, and the transaction information is encrypted by using an encryption key and signed by using a signature key.
Step 2.2: and (5) performing verification in rows.
And the branch receives the user transaction request, verifies the transaction signature and judges whether the transfer amount does not exceed the balance of the user.
Step 2.3: the branch bank encrypts the verified transaction information by using an encryption key, signs by using a signature key, and forwards the transaction information to the head office.
Step 2.4: and the head office verifies the transaction signature, encrypts the transaction information by using the encryption key of the head office of the receiver after the verification is passed, signs by using the signature key of the head office to which the transaction submitting party belongs and forwards the head office of the receiver.
Step 2.5: the receiving party head office verifies the transaction signature, negotiates a random number with the transaction requesting party head office after the transaction signature passes verification to serve as an internal transaction certificate number, and forwards the internal transaction certificate number to related branches and users.
Step 2.6: the head offices of both parties submit transaction requests to the global account book respectively, the transaction information comprises a transaction requester user address, a transaction receiver user address, a transaction amount and an internal transaction certificate number, and the transaction information is encrypted by using respective encryption keys and signed by using a signature key.
Step 2.7: the global account book verifies signatures for the transaction requests of the head offices of both parties and verifies whether the transaction information is consistent; if so, go to step 3, otherwise, stop the transaction.
And 3, step 3: and transaction processing, namely, carrying out uplink and execution on the transaction.
Specifically, step 3 comprises the steps of:
step 3.1: all nodes of the global account block chain network carry out consensus on the transaction, and the transaction information comprises user addresses of both transaction parties, transaction amount and a transaction internal certificate number; the transaction information is encrypted by using an encryption key, a hash value of a transaction internal certificate number is calculated by using a hash function and is used as an external transaction sequence number, and the external transaction sequence number and the encrypted transaction information are added to a block chain by the global account book;
step 3.2: after the branches of both transaction parties inquire the transaction in the global account book according to the external transaction sequence number, the transaction is regarded as successful, and then the branches update the balance information of the corresponding users;
and 4, step 4: and (5) inquiring the transaction.
The user can inquire the transaction situation at any time. When inquiring, firstly, an inquiry request is submitted to the global account book, the request content comprises the transaction internal transaction certificate number, the global account book calculates the hash value of the internal transaction certificate number by using a hash function, and then transaction information corresponding to the external transaction sequence number which is equal to the hash value in the block chain is decrypted and sent to the user.
And 5: secret sharing and recovery.
And the head office distributes the own secret key to the affiliated branch office through secret sharing according to actual requirements. When the branch bank needs to inquire other branch bank transactions, after the agreement of the head bank and a plurality of branch banks is solicited, the key is recovered by the joint agreement.
After the inquiry is finished, the head office can replace the secret key and carry out secret sharing again.
Advantageous effects
Compared with the prior art, the method of the invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. transaction data can be effectively protected. According to the method, transaction information is stored anonymously on a global ledger block chain, and other nodes cannot learn any useful information of the transaction except for the bank and the user related to the transaction. Meanwhile, as the transaction data is stored in the block chain, the transaction information is prevented from being tampered, and the authenticity of the data is ensured;
2. and flexible authority management is achieved. According to the method, a superior node can check the transaction records of a subordinate node, the subordinate node cannot directly inquire the transaction records of the superior node and other subordinate nodes, the inquiry can be realized only when the inquiry is needed, and the secret sharing mechanism is introduced to ensure that the authority configuration is more flexible;
3. can effectively resist quantum attack. The encryption system applied by the method is designed based on the lattice difficulty problem, which means that the method is safe before the lattice difficulty problem is solved, and the method is still safe and usable even after the quantum computer is put into practical use because the lattice password is the currently accepted post-quantum password.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow diagram of the process of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following will explain the specific implementation process of the method of the present invention in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the implementation process of the block chain based financial system privacy protection transaction method using the block cipher is elaborated.
In the bank intermediary ledger system, B 1 ,B 2 ,···,B m Representing the head office of a different bank,
Figure BDA0003171956980000071
represents head office B i Is selected in the jth branch, branch->
Figure BDA0003171956980000072
Having a user pick>
Figure BDA0003171956980000073
(i n-th user in total row j).
Financial system privacy protection transaction method based on block chain by using lattice code to realize user
Figure BDA0003171956980000074
(p-th user of i general row j branch) based on the status of the subscriber->
Figure BDA0003171956980000075
(r the tth user in the head office s branch) transfer process comprising the steps of:
step 1: and (5) initializing the system. The whole system is initialized and divided into three parts, namely a global account book, a bank and a user.
Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
step 1.1: and initializing a global ledger. And initializing the global ledger block chain system, and generating a public and private key pair { Lepk, lesk }, which is used for encrypting the transaction information. The key is generated and managed by a highest authority owner (which can be regarded as a central bank) appointed by the whole system, similar to an actual bank system, a global account book manager can check all transaction information of the system class, and a lower bank can only inquire the transaction information;
step 1.2: and (5) initializing the bank. The bank head office initiatively generates a public and private key pair { Bsignpk with respective signature i ,Bsignsk i And public and private encryption and decryptionKey pair Bepk i ,Besk i And initializing each branch to generate a public and private key pair with respective signature
Figure BDA0003171956980000081
And a public and private key pair for encryption and decryption>
Figure BDA0003171956980000082
And initializing each belonging user account>
Figure BDA0003171956980000083
And balance information->
Figure BDA0003171956980000084
The public signature key is used for digital signature and also used as a bank address.
Step 1.3: user initialization, wherein the user initialization generates a signature public and private key pair
Figure BDA0003171956980000085
And a public and private key pair for encryption and decryption>
Figure BDA0003171956980000086
Wherein, the public signature key is used for digital signature and also used as a user personal address (namely a user name).
And generating a key by using a grid code encryption mode.
Step 2: a transaction is initiated. The user submits a request for a transfer transaction to the system, the user
Figure BDA0003171956980000087
Needs to be picked up and picked up by the user>
Figure BDA0003171956980000088
And transferring the account V element.
Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
step 2.1: user' s
Figure BDA0003171956980000089
Submitting a transaction request Trequest。
User' s
Figure BDA00031719569800000810
Submitting a transaction request Trequest to the bank branch to which it belongs>
Figure BDA00031719569800000811
Transaction information includes the transfer recipient user's personal address->
Figure BDA00031719569800000812
The transfer amount v. Transaction information is encrypted using an encryption key->
Figure BDA00031719569800000813
Encrypted and signed key->
Figure BDA00031719569800000814
Signature:
Figure BDA00031719569800000815
wherein,
Figure BDA0003171956980000091
representing by means of a key->
Figure BDA0003171956980000092
Encrypted->
Figure BDA0003171956980000093
Figure BDA0003171956980000094
Means for>
Figure BDA0003171956980000095
V is encrypted.
Step 2.2: the branch verifies the transaction request.
Is divided into rows
Figure BDA0003171956980000096
After receiving a user transaction request Trequest, verifying a transaction signature and judging whether the transfer amount v does not exceed the balance of the user/is based on the value>
Figure BDA0003171956980000097
Figure BDA0003171956980000098
Wherein "? "means a decision, if not, step 2.3 is performed, otherwise the transaction is terminated.
Step 2.3: is divided into rows
Figure BDA0003171956980000099
Using an encryption key to ÷ based on the verified transaction information>
Figure BDA00031719569800000910
Encryption, using signature keys
Figure BDA00031719569800000911
Signing and forwarding transaction Trequest' to its head office B i ：
Figure BDA00031719569800000912
Wherein,
Figure BDA00031719569800000913
means for>
Figure BDA00031719569800000914
Encrypted->
Figure BDA00031719569800000915
Figure BDA00031719569800000916
Means for>
Figure BDA00031719569800000917
V is encrypted.
Step 2.4: the head office verifies the Trequest' transaction signature. After the verification is passed, the receiving party's head office is used to encrypt the key Bepk r Encrypting transaction information, using transaction requester Broker B i Signature key Bsignpk i Sign and sign the transaction T i,r Forwarding receiver head office B r ：
Figure BDA00031719569800000918
Step 2.5: receiver head office B r Verifying a transaction T i,r Signing, verifying and then making the transaction request party head office B i The random number r is co-negotiated as the internal transaction credential number txidiner, and the internal transaction credential number is forwarded to the relevant branch and user (i.e.,
Figure BDA00031719569800000919
)。
step 2.6: two-party head office B i 、B r Submit transaction requests T to global ledger L respectively i,r ' and T r,i ' the transaction information includes the address of the user of the transaction requester
Figure BDA00031719569800000920
User address->
Figure BDA00031719569800000921
The transaction amount v, the internal transaction voucher number txidiner. Transaction information uses respective encryption keys Bepk i And Bepk r Encrypted and signed with a signature key Bsignpk i And Bsignpk r Signature:
Figure BDA00031719569800000922
Figure BDA0003171956980000101
wherein,
Figure BDA0003171956980000102
expressed in Bepk i Encrypted->
Figure BDA0003171956980000103
And Txindiner, encrypt (Bepk) i V) by Bepk i V is encrypted.
Step 2.7: the global account book L verifies the signature of the transaction request of the head office of both parties and verifies whether the transaction information is consistent,
Figure BDA0003171956980000104
wherein, "? "means judgment.
The encryption process in the above steps is realized by using a lattice code encryption method.
And step 3: and transaction processing, namely, carrying out uplink and execution on the transaction.
Step 3.1: all nodes of the global account book L-block chain network agree on a transaction T, and transaction information comprises user addresses of both parties of the transaction
Figure BDA0003171956980000105
And &>
Figure BDA0003171956980000106
The transaction amount v, the transaction internal voucher number txidiner. The transaction information is encrypted by using an encryption key Lepk, and a hash value of a transaction internal certificate number is calculated by using a hash function and is used as an external transaction serial number Txid. The global account book adds the external transaction sequence number and the encrypted transaction information on the blockchain:
Figure BDA0003171956980000107
wherein,
Figure BDA0003171956980000108
indicating encryption by Lepk>
Figure BDA0003171956980000109
v and txidiner.
The encryption process involved in the step is realized by using a grid code encryption method.
Step 3.2: both sides of the transaction branch
Figure BDA00031719569800001010
And &>
Figure BDA00031719569800001011
And after the transaction is inquired in the global account book according to the external transaction sequence number, the transaction is considered to be successful. Subsequently, the corresponding subscriber balance is updated in lines &>
Figure BDA00031719569800001012
And &>
Figure BDA00031719569800001013
And 4, step 4: transaction inquiry, user can inquire transaction condition at any time, and when inquiring, firstly, it submits inquiry request u to global account book query The request content includes an internal transaction certificate number txidiner of the inquired transaction, the global ledger L calculates a hash value of the internal transaction certificate number by using a hash function, and then decrypts and sends a transaction T corresponding to an external transaction sequence number Txid which is equal to the hash value in the block chain to the user.
The decryption process in the step is realized by using a lattice code decryption method.
And 5: the private key is shared and recovered, the head office can distribute the private key to the affiliated branch lines through private sharing according to actual requirements, when the branch lines want to inquire other branch line transactions, the head office and a plurality of branch lines can jointly cooperate to recover the private key after asking for agreement, and the head office can replace the private key and perform the private sharing again after finishing inquiring.
In the above steps, the used lattice code encryption method is as follows:
wherein the parameters are set as:
γ is the public key length of the global decryption square W, γ i Is an encryption side W i (i =1,2 · · n) public key length; eta is the private key length of W, eta i Is W i The length of the private key of (c); ρ is the interference length of W, ρ i Is W i The interference length of (2); λ is a safety parameter. τ represents the integer number of W contained in the public key, τ i Sign W i The public key of (2) contains an integer number.
Let γ = O (λ) 6 )，γ i ＝O(λ 6 )，η＝O(λ 5 )，η i ＝O(λ 5 )，ρ＝λ，ρ i ＝λ，τ＝λ+γ， τ i ＝λ+γ。
The key generation method comprises the following steps:
the encryption system consists of a global decryptor W and a plurality of encryptors W i (i =1,2 · · n), W generating a public key pk =<x 0 ,x 1 ,···,x τ >Randomly selecting a random number w as a private key sk, wherein w belongs to [2 ] η-1 ,2 η )。W i Randomly selecting a random number w i As its private key sk i ，
Figure BDA0003171956980000111
$ represents random selection, Z represents an integer set; w is a i Random permutation pk =<x 0 ,x 1 ,···,x τ >Get->
Figure BDA0003171956980000112
Figure BDA0003171956980000113
Represents the sequence of pk after a random permutation transformation>
Figure BDA0003171956980000114
Indicates the τ -th number after the conversion. Then, w i Randomly selecting a number q i,0 ,q i,1 ,···,q i,τ And gamma i,0 ,γ i,1 ,···,γ i,τ ，q i,τ Denotes w i Randomly selected q i,0 ,q i,1 ,···,q i,τ Number of (1), γ i,τ Denotes w i Randomly selected gamma i,0 ,γ i,1 ,···,γ i,τ In which it is greater than or equal to>
Figure BDA0003171956980000115
Figure BDA0003171956980000116
And calculate
Figure BDA0003171956980000117
x i,0 Is x i,j Medium maximum value, and finally recalculated
Figure BDA0003171956980000121
Putting pk i ＝< x i,0 ,x i,1 ,···,x i,τ >As w i The public key of (2).
The encryption method comprises the following steps:
w i random selection
Figure BDA0003171956980000122
And a random number t i ,
Figure BDA0003171956980000123
For plaintext m i E is encrypted according to {0,1} and the ciphertext is output>
Figure BDA0003171956980000124
s i Represents the set {1,2 }, τ i A certain number randomly selected.
The decryption method comprises the following steps:
W i using sk i ＝w i Computing
Figure BDA0003171956980000125
And then the decryption can be carried out. Alternatively, W calculates m using sk = W i ← [[c i ] sk ] 2 And also decrypted.
As can be seen from the above encryption method, W can be decrypted arbitrarily i Each W of the ciphertext of i Can only decrypt the ciphertext of itself, and cannot decrypt the rest of W i And the cryptograph of W, the encryption and decryption key designed in the method of the invention can be generated step by the encryption mode, thereby realizing that the superior node can decrypt the transaction information of the subordinate node, and the subordinate node can not decrypt the transaction information of the superior node and other nodes at the same level.
In step 5, the secret sharing and recovering method used is as follows:
a preparation stage:
F q is a finite field, U, over a prime number q i Representing the ith participant, share i Represents U i Resulting secret sharing, share i ∈F q 。
share is the secret that the participant U wants to share, random is the random number generated by the participant U, and the participant U randomly generates a polynomial of order n-1:
f(x)≡share+random+a 1 x+…+a n-1 x n-1 (modq) (8)
wherein, a 1 、a n-1 Respectively represent a 1-time term x and an n-1 term x in f (x) n-1 Mod represents the modulo operation, modulo q. x is the number of n-1 N-1 degree terms representing f (x).
Secret sharing stage:
participant U randomly selects y i Calculating z i ＝f(y i ) Will (z) i ,y i ) Is sent to U i 。z i Denotes f (y) i ) Value of (a), y i Represents U to U i Randomly selected value y of x i 。
A secret recovery phase:
when k is larger than or equal to n, the n sub-secret owners recover share + random:
Figure BDA0003171956980000131
wherein, y i Represents U to U i Randomly selecting the value y of x i . k represents the number of child secret owners that participate in recovering the secret.
At this time, U is required to provide random to further recover share.
According to the secret sharing scheme, the secret sharing recovery of the sub-secret owner can be realized only by the cooperation of the participator U and the sub-secret owners with the number k being more than or equal to n, and by utilizing the property, the secret sharing recovery in the method can distribute the secret key of the head office to the affiliated branch through secret sharing according to the actual requirement, and when the branch wants to inquire other branch transactions, the secret key can be recovered through cooperation after the agreement of the head office and a plurality of branches is solicited.

Claims (2)

1. A block chain privacy protection method based on lattice codes facing financial system transaction firstly explains related concepts:
definition 1: bank intermediary account book system
The system refers to a transaction system for carrying out fund delivery settlement by utilizing a bank system in a modern financial system;
definition 2: bank
The financial transaction system is characterized in that the financial transaction system is an organization for undertaking financial transaction activities, different banks comprise a main bank and a plurality of branch banks, and the banks have account lists and asset balance information of users;
wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
represents a head office of a different bank>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Represents a total row +>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
Is based on the fifth->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
Each branch is divided into rows and is divided into rows>
Figure 776180DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Having a user pick>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
To representiHead officejGo in different rowsnA user;
definition 3: global account book
The system is used for recording and storing all bank transaction information, and the global account book is a block chain system which consists of a plurality of consensus nodes and adopts a safe consensus algorithm;
definition 4: user' s
The system is characterized in that an object engaged in financial transaction activities belongs to a branch of a certain bank and can apply for a transaction request to the branch of the bank;
definition 5: lattice code
The method is characterized by comprising the following steps of (1) establishing a cryptosystem based on the lattice difficulty problem;
definition 6: secret sharing
The secret is split, each split share is managed by different participants, a single participant cannot recover secret information, and only when a specific participant participates and the number of the participants reaches a certain minimum threshold value, the participants cooperate together to recover the secret information;
definition 7: hash function
The function is a function capable of mapping an input with any length into an output with a fixed length;
the method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: initializing the whole system, including initializing a global account book, a bank and a user, comprising the following steps:
step 1.1: initializing a global account book;
initializing global account book blockchain system and generating public and private key pair
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
The key is generated and managed by the highest authority owner appointed by the whole system; similar to an actual bank system, the global account book manager can check all transaction information of the system class, and lower-level banks can only inquire the transaction information of the lower-level banks;
step 1.2: initializing a bank;
each head office initializes to generate a signature public and private key pair
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
And public and private key pair for encryption and decryption
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Row initialization generates respective signed public and private key pairs { (R { })>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
And a public and private key pair for encryption and decryption { (R) }>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
And initializing user accounts which belong to the user accounts>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And balance information->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
The public signature key is used for digital signature and also used as a bank address;
step 1.3: initializing a user;
user initialized generating signature public and private key pair
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
Male and female key pair for encryption and decryption
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
Wherein the public signature key is used for digital signatureAlso as a user's personal address;
in step 1, a secret key is generated using a lattice code, the method being as follows:
the parameter setting comprises the following steps:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
is->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
Length of the public key of (4), and>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
is encrypted square>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
The public key length of (c);
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Is->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Length of the private key of (4)>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Is->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
The length of the private key of (c);
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Is
Figure 807502DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Is greater than or equal to>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
Is->
Figure 305349DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
The interference length of (2);
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
Is a safety parameter;
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
represents->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
An integer number contained in the public key>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
Identification>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
The integer number contained in the public key;
order to
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE064
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE066
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE068
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE070
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE072
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE074
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE076
；
The key generation method comprises the following steps:
the encryption system consists of a global decryptor
Figure 167736DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
And a plurality of encryption sides>
Figure 670524DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
Make up and/or are present>
Figure 430670DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Generating public keys
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE078
Selecting a random number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE080
As private key->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE082
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE084
,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE086
Randomly selecting a random number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
As its private key->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE090
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE092
,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE094
)，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE096
Indicates a random selection>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE098
Representing a set of integers;
Figure 215479DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
Is randomly arranged->
Figure 352063DEST_PATH_IMAGE078
Get->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE100
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE102
Represents->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE104
The sequences after random permutation and transformation are true>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE106
Indicates the changed ^ th->
Figure 958625DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
The number of the cells; then, is taken up or taken off>
Figure 483147DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
Randomly selecting a number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE108
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE110
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE112
Represents->
Figure 988209DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
Randomly selected>
Figure 662904DEST_PATH_IMAGE108
Is greater than or equal to>
Figure 862986DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
Number and/or unit>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE114
Represents->
Figure 151884DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
Selected randomly->
Figure 65614DEST_PATH_IMAGE110
Is based on the fifth->
Figure 29153DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
Number, wherein>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE116
,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE118
And calculates->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE120
+
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE122
,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE124
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE126
Is->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE128
Medium maximum, and finally recalculated>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE130
Will >>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE132
=
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE134
As->
Figure 564302DEST_PATH_IMAGE088
The public key of (2); step 2: initiating a transaction, the user submitting a transfer transaction request to the system, the user @>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE136
Needs to be picked up and picked up by the user>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE138
Transfer box>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE140
A cell, comprising the steps of:
step 2.1: user' s
Figure 650200DEST_PATH_IMAGE136
Submit a transaction request pick>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE142
；
User' s
Figure 5221DEST_PATH_IMAGE136
Will transaction request->
Figure 615194DEST_PATH_IMAGE142
Submit the affiliated bank branch->
Figure 50854DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
The transaction information includes the transfer recipient user's personal address->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE144
And transfer amount->
Figure 947135DEST_PATH_IMAGE140
Transaction information is encrypted using an encryption key>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE146
Encrypting and using a signing key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE148
Signing;
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE150
wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE152
representing key->
Figure 71342DEST_PATH_IMAGE146
Encrypted->
Figure 891531DEST_PATH_IMAGE144
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE154
Means for>
Figure 803203DEST_PATH_IMAGE146
Encrypted->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE156
；
Step 2.2: verifying by lines;
is divided into rows
Figure 870385DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
Receiving a user transaction request->
Figure 246003DEST_PATH_IMAGE142
Verifying the transaction signature and determining the transfer amount>
Figure 355036DEST_PATH_IMAGE140
Whether or not the user balance is not exceeded>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE158
；
Step 2.3: is divided into rows
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE160
Using an encryption key to ^ the authenticated transaction information>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE162
Encryption, using a signing key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE164
Sign and combine the transaction>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE166
Forward its row in>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE168
：
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE170
Wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE172
means for>
Figure 594649DEST_PATH_IMAGE162
Encrypted->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE174
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE176
Means for>
Figure 35995DEST_PATH_IMAGE162
Encrypted->
Figure 649641DEST_PATH_IMAGE156
；
Step 2.4: head office verification
Figure 14894DEST_PATH_IMAGE166
The transaction is signed and verified, and then the encryption key is encrypted by the receiver's bank>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE178
Encrypting the transaction information, based on the transaction requester's chief line>
Figure 201025DEST_PATH_IMAGE168
Signature key->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE180
Signs and puts the transaction->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE182
Forward receiver column>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE184
：
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE186
Step 2.5: receiver head office
Figure 721262DEST_PATH_IMAGE184
Validating transaction>
Figure 71472DEST_PATH_IMAGE182
Signature, and after passing the verification, the transaction requester's chief line>
Figure 489683DEST_PATH_IMAGE168
Co-negotiating a random number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE188
As an internal transaction credential number &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE190
And forwards the internal transaction voucher number to the relevant branch and the user, i.e. &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE192
；
Step 2.6: two-party head office
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE194
Respectively to a global credit>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE196
Submitting a transaction request +>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE198
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE200
The transaction information includes the address of the user of the transaction requester>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE202
Subscriber address of the transaction receiver>
Figure 364274DEST_PATH_IMAGE174
The transaction amount pickand place>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE204
Internal transaction voucher number->
Figure 507942DEST_PATH_IMAGE190
Transaction information is encrypted using a respective encryption key>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE206
And &>
Figure 797978DEST_PATH_IMAGE178
Encrypting and using a signing key
Figure 301772DEST_PATH_IMAGE180
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE208
Signature:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE210
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE212
wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE214
for indicating
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE216
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE218
Means for>
Figure 262162DEST_PATH_IMAGE206
Encrypted->
Figure 888315DEST_PATH_IMAGE156
；
Step 2.7: global account book
Figure 213117DEST_PATH_IMAGE196
The signature is verified for the transaction request of the head office of both parties and the transaction information is verified
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE220
Whether the two are consistent;
and step 3: transaction processing, linking and executing transactions, comprising the steps of:
step 3.1: global account book
Figure 707553DEST_PATH_IMAGE196
Node pairs in a block chain network having transaction on/off>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE222
Making a consensus, the transaction information including the address of the user of both parties of the transaction>
Figure 489826DEST_PATH_IMAGE202
And &>
Figure 473832DEST_PATH_IMAGE174
The transaction amount pickand place>
Figure 20351DEST_PATH_IMAGE204
Transaction internal voucher number->
Figure 882258DEST_PATH_IMAGE190
Transaction information is encrypted using an encryption key>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE224
Encryption, using a hash function to calculate a hash of the transaction's internal credential number as the external transaction sequence number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE226
The global account book adds the external transaction sequence number and the encrypted transaction information to the blockchain: />
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE228
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE230
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE232
，
Wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE234
means for>
Figure 953044DEST_PATH_IMAGE224
Encryption
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE236
；
Step 3.2: both sides of the transaction branch
Figure 311213DEST_PATH_IMAGE160
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE238
After the transaction is inquired in the global account book according to the external transaction sequence number, the transaction is considered to be successful, and then the corresponding user balance is updated in different banks and based on the fact that the user balance is on or off>
Figure 33444DEST_PATH_IMAGE158
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE240
；
And 2, encrypting by using a lattice code in the steps 3, wherein the method comprises the following steps:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE242
is selected at random>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE244
And a random number->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE246
,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE248
For clear text->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE250
Encrypt and output the encrypted text->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE252
Indicates that the collection is->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE254
A certain number selected randomly;
and 4, step 4: transaction inquiry, user can inquire transaction condition at any time, and when inquiring, firstly, it submits inquiry request to global account book
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE256
The request content contains the internal transaction voucher number @' of the queried transaction>
Figure 574409DEST_PATH_IMAGE190
Global ledger->
Figure 377280DEST_PATH_IMAGE196
Calculating a hash value of the internal transaction credential number using a hash function, and then concatenating the external transaction sequence numbers in the block chain equal to the hash value
Figure 470132DEST_PATH_IMAGE226
The corresponding transaction->
Figure 991243DEST_PATH_IMAGE222
Decrypting and sending to the user;
in the decryption process in the step 4, the lattice code is used for decryption, and the method comprises the following steps:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE258
use>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE260
Calculate->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE262
Or
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE264
Use>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE266
Calculate->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE268
；
And 5: secret sharing and recovery;
the head office distributes the own secret key to the affiliated branch lines through secret sharing according to actual requirements; when the branch lines need to inquire other branch line transactions, after the agreement of the head line and a plurality of branch lines is solicited, the key is recovered by cooperation together;
the secret sharing and recovering method used in step 5 is as follows:
a preparation stage:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE270
is a prime numberqUpper finite field, is greater than or equal to>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE272
Represents a fifth->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE274
Is involved in>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE276
Represents->
Figure 867057DEST_PATH_IMAGE272
The resulting share of the secret is shared with,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE278
；/>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE280
is the party participating in>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Secret that wants to be shared, based on the number of times that the user has selected>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE284
Is the party participating in>
Figure 868643DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Generated random numbers, parties involved
Figure 527202DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Is randomly generated>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE286
Order polynomial:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE288
wherein,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE290
、
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE292
respectively denote->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE294
Sub-term->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE296
And &>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE298
Is greater than or equal to>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE300
Representing a modulo operation with a modulus ofq；
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE302
Represents->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE304
Is/are>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE306
A secondary term;
secret sharing stage:
participant side
Figure 178019DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Random selection>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE308
Calculate->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE310
Will >>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE312
Is sent to>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE314
Represents->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE316
，
Figure 575634DEST_PATH_IMAGE308
Represents->
Figure 353097DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Give/pick>
Figure 787752DEST_PATH_IMAGE272
Selected randomly->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE318
Value->
Figure 204826DEST_PATH_IMAGE308
；
Secret recovery phase:
when in use
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE320
When, is greater or less>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE322
Sub-secret owner recovers>
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE324
：
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE326
Wherein,
Figure 281498DEST_PATH_IMAGE308
represents->
Figure 664200DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Give/pick>
Figure 456707DEST_PATH_IMAGE272
Is selected at random>
Figure 688974DEST_PATH_IMAGE318
Value->
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE328
Represents the number of child secret owners that are involved in recovering the secret;
at this time, it is necessary to
Figure 818604DEST_PATH_IMAGE282
Providing +>
Figure 67531DEST_PATH_IMAGE284
Can be further restored>
Figure 93256DEST_PATH_IMAGE280
。
2. The financial system transaction-oriented block chain privacy protection method based on the lattice code as claimed in claim 1, wherein after the query is completed, the head office changes the key and performs secret sharing again.
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