CN112364331A - Anonymous authentication method and system - Google Patents
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- CN112364331A CN112364331A CN202110032458.5A CN202110032458A CN112364331A CN 112364331 A CN112364331 A CN 112364331A CN 202110032458 A CN202110032458 A CN 202110032458A CN 112364331 A CN112364331 A CN 112364331A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
Abstract
The invention relates to an anonymous authentication method and system. The method comprises the following steps: generating a key pair by the CA; generating a tracking key and a group public key on a CA through a group signature technology; the CA generates a user private key based on a master private key of the key pair; according to the certificate request of the user, the CA verifies; when the verification is passed, based on the private value of the key pair and the certificate applied by the user, the CA issues the certificate for the user; based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate and the message issued by the CA, the user generates a presented certificate; based on the certificate presented by the user, the master public key, the group public key and the privacy value which is not hidden, the verifier verifies the certificate presented by the user; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is adopted; when the verification is passed, allowing the user to access; and when the dispute is generated in the verification, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key. The invention can improve the safety performance of the authentication process.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of privacy protection, in particular to an anonymous authentication method and system.
Background
With the development of the internet, the information and privacy of people on the internet are more and more huge. Privacy disclosure and information stealing are becoming more and more common things, and the trust problem and the privacy protection problem between people gradually become hot topics. Security technologies such as identity authentication technology and privacy protection technology also become a hot research direction.
Identity authentication technology is applied to various important fields, such as finance, banking, medical treatment and the like, and the several aspects are serious areas of privacy disclosure, so that privacy protection is particularly important. The high parallel computing is popularized in the era of rapid development of the hardware level, and the quantum computing is at the present. In order to solve the above problems, the authentication system is constructed and completed by using the problems of large integer decomposition and discrete logarithm solution in the prior art, so as to verify the privacy of the user. The method has important safety defect when resisting the attack in the aspect of forthcoming quantum computation, and the quantum computation can easily break through the verification system through the Shor algorithm, so the authentication mode in the prior art cannot cope with the attack in the aspect of quantum computation, and the safety performance is low.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an anonymous authentication method and system to improve the safety performance of an authentication process and effectively resist attacks in the aspect of quantum computation.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following scheme:
an anonymous authentication method comprising:
generating a key pair by the CA; the key pair comprises a master private key and a master public key;
generating a tracking key and a group public key on the CA through a group signature technique;
the CA generating a user private key based on the master private key;
according to the certificate request of the user, the CA carries out verification;
when the CA passes the verification, the CA issues a certificate for the user based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user; the privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value;
based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate issued by the CA, and the message, the user generates a presented certificate;
based on the user presented credential, the master public key, the group public key, and the privacy value that is not concealed, a verifier verifies the user presented credential; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is adopted;
when the verifier verifies, allowing the user to access;
and when the verifier verifies that the dispute is generated, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key.
Optionally, the non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol is a format-password-based non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol.
Optionally, the method further includes:
and recording an authentication record between the user and the verifier by adopting a block chain network, confirming the authentication record by all nodes in the block chain network, and synchronously storing the authentication record in a local database.
Optionally, after the CA generates the user private key based on the master private key, the CA further includes:
the CA binds the user's private key with the user's identity.
The invention also provides an anonymous authentication system, comprising:
a CA certification authority for generating a key pair; the key pair comprises a master private key and a master public key; the tracking key and the group public key are generated through a group signature technology; further for generating a user private key based on the master private key; the authentication server is also used for carrying out authentication according to the certificate request of the user; when the verification is passed, the CA certification authority is used for issuing a certificate for the user based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user; the privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value;
a user certificate generation module for generating a presented certificate based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate and the message issued by the CA;
a verifier verification module for verifying the certificate presented by the user based on the certificate presented by the user, the master public key, the group public key, and an privacy value that is not hidden; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is adopted; when the verifier verifies, allowing the user to access; and when the verifier verifies that the dispute is generated, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key.
Optionally, the non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol is a format-password-based non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol.
Optionally, the method further includes: a block chain network; the block chain network is used for recording authentication records between the user and the verifier, and all nodes in the block chain network confirm the authentication records and synchronously store the authentication records in a local database.
Optionally, the CA certification authority is further configured to bind the user private key and the identity of the user after generating the user private key based on the master private key.
According to the specific embodiment provided by the invention, the invention discloses the following technical effects:
according to the invention, the private information of the user is concealed through the group signature system of the CA certification authority, so that a large amount of private information of the user is prevented from being leaked, and the safety performance of certification is improved. Furthermore, the authentication records are stored through the blockchain network, if an attacker wants to attack the blockchain system and needs to change more than half of the local data in the blockchain nodes, the attack mode is difficult to realize, so that the privacy of the user is well protected, and the security performance of authentication is improved. In addition, the verifier interacts with the user based on the zero-knowledge proof protocol of the lattice code, so that the forthcoming quantum computing attack can be better resisted, and the safety performance of authentication is further improved.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art to obtain other drawings without inventive exercise.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of the anonymous authentication method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of knowledge protocol based on a lattice code according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the anonymous authentication method based on the blockchain network according to the present invention;
fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of the anonymous authentication system of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The invention further reduces data leakage during information interaction by improving the conventional online Certificate Authority (CA), further optimizes the system by using a lattice code, a group signature, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and a block chain system, and designs and invents a supervision anonymous authentication scheme based on the lattice code zero-knowledge proof and the block chain improvement.
The Identity Mixer technology is improved by the group signature and zero knowledge proof technology, a supervised (tracing) anonymous authentication system based on zero knowledge proof is obtained, and further decentralized improvement is performed through a block chain, so that single-point attack is prevented. And then, a zero-knowledge proof protocol based on the RLWE lattice cipher difficulty problem is adopted, so that future quantum computation can be better coped with, the stability and the safety of the system are ensured, and active attack and passive attack can be better prevented.
In order to make the aforementioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention comprehensible, embodiments accompanied with figures are described in further detail below.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the anonymous authentication method of the present invention. As shown in fig. 1, the anonymous authentication method of the present invention includes the following steps:
step 100: the key pair is generated by the CA. The key pair autonomously generated by the CA comprises a master private key and a master public key.
Generally, the privacy information of the user comprises a plurality of types, the privacy protection in the process is not perfect in the existing system, and a large amount of user privacy can be leaked, so that the invention proposes to optimize the system by using a zero-knowledge proof and group signature system. The specific process is shown as step 200-step 900.
Step 200: the tracking key and the group public key are generated on the CA by a group signature technique. The tracking key is kept by the CA and tracks the user identity in the future when a conflict occurs (conflict or dispute means that the prover does not acknowledge the verification process after verification), while the group public key is used for the verification process of the subsequent integer.
Step 300: the CA generates a user private key based on the master private key. The private key of the user is used for generating a certificate and preparing for the next verification process of the user; in addition, the CA binds the user's private key with the user's identity in preparation for subsequent optimization using the blockchain.
Step 400: the CA performs authentication according to the user's certificate request. The user sends a certificate request to the CA, the CA verifies the request, the verification process is completed by the CA calculating whether a challenge value in the traditional zero-knowledge proof process is equal to a hash value of a user request parameter, if so, the verification is passed, otherwise, the verification fails.
Step 500: when the CA verifies, based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user, the CA issues the certificate for the user. And after receiving the certificate of the CA method, the user stores the certificate to the local part of the user, wherein the certificate comprises all privacy values of the user. The privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value, and the privacy value refers to a secret value which the user needs to prove to the verifier but does not want to be known by the verifier or is known as little as possible, that is, a value which the prover (user) needs to prove to the verifier that the prover (user) has. For example, in a warehouse management system, the privacy value is the key of the prover, while the verifier is equivalent to the warehouse administrator. The prover proves to the verifier that he owns the key of the warehouse, but does not reveal the specific information of the key (meaning information relating to the privacy of the user) to the verifier, and after the fact, the prover cannot rely on himself not to have used the key in the warehouse.
Step 600: based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate issued by the CA, and the message, the user generates a presented certificate. When the user verifies the verifier, the user private key, the secret value (the secret value is randomly generated by the user and guarantees the traditional zero-knowledge proof and the value of the certificate verification process), the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate issued by the CA and the message m are used for generating the certificate for presentation.
Step 700: based on the user presented credential, the master public key, the group public key, and the privacy value that is not hidden, the verifier verifies the user presented credential. The process adopts a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol to ensure the privacy security of the user in the process of the interaction between the user and the verifier.
Specifically, the invention adopts a format-based non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol, so that the disclosure of user privacy can be further reduced, the calculation amount of the zero knowledge proof process is small, and the information exchanged by the two parties is less, so that the communication cost cannot be greatly increased. As shown in fig. 2, this solution needs to operate on the ideal grid, i.e. work on the ring
At this time, all 0 s<i，j<n，
Must belong to the set
. Thus givenBAndtthen the short vector can be knownsSo thatBs=2t. Albeit withBs=tNot, but sufficient to satisfy the requirements of proof of plaintext knowledge.
In order to enable the verifier to verify the correctness of the encrypted information submitted by the prover, a commitment mechanism is introduced, which can commit the information before the prover encrypts, then the prover can send the commitment value and the encrypted value to the verifier together, the verifier verifies the received data, and if the verification result shows that the encrypted data and the commitment data are the same, the verifier accepts the proof. We do not mention any commitment mechanism, and we define it with only one triplet (aSetup, aacommit, aOpen), where aSetup is used to generate commitment parameters, aacommit calculates the commitment parameters and the message m to be verified to generate commitment cmt and submit, and aOpen is used to open verification commitment. In fact, it is reasonable under the present protocol as long as the commitment mechanism is computationally binding and hidden. The specific protocol flow is as follows:
the scheme mirrors the NTRU encryption scheme and employs the Pedersen commitment mechanism. The scheme is executed by being divided into two parts, namely a prover and a verifier, and the specific flow is as follows:
the prover part: first of all parametersN，p，q，λ. WhereinNIs in a polynomialxThe highest power of the first,p，qrespectively, the two moduli are used as the modulus,p <qand gcd (p，q)=1；λSecurity parameters for the Pedersen commitment mechanism. Then, using a KeyGenerator function in the NTRU encryption scheme, a public and private key pair is calculated, and a public key is returned, wherein the public key ish=KeyGenerate(N，p，q) And the original message m is obtained by encrypting and processing the original message m through the NTRU schemey=Encrypt(m). By selectingr s ，
，
Computingt=hr s +pr e +r m And committing t by using Commit function in Perdersen commitment to obtain commitment value
By means of a hash function
Generating and placing challenge values in a set
In (1), it is called a challenge set. By calculation of
，
，
To hide the original message and the selected parameters. After the prover finishes calculating
And sending to the verifier.
A verifier part: the verifier receives from the prover
Whether certification is completed is judged by judging whether the following two formulas are satisfied:
step 800: when the verifier verifies, the user is allowed to access.
Step 900: when the verifier verifies that the dispute occurs, the identity of the user is confirmed by using the tracking key. Due to the binding of the private key and the identity of the user, the private key of the user can be tracked by tracking the secret key, so that the identity of the user can be further confirmed.
In order to further improve the safety performance of the authentication process, the invention adopts a block chain network to record the authentication record between the user and the verifier. The block chain has the characteristics of decentralization, robust network, flexibility, safety, reliability and the like. Firstly, a block chain establishes a trust relationship among distributed nodes by adopting a pure mathematical method to form a decentralized trusted distributed system, and the activities of generating transactions, verifying transactions, recording transaction information, synchronizing and the like are all completed based on a distributed network, so that the decentralized is thorough. Secondly, the block chain adopts a unique economic incentive mechanism to attract the nodes to complete work (such as mining), so that the nodes are promoted to provide computing power or other resources, and the smooth operation of the whole distributed network is ensured. The more nodes the whole distributed network contains, the stronger the robustness, and the distributed network will always operate safely unless more than half of the nodes have problems at the same time. Third, the blockchain provides a user programmable scripting system, greatly increasing the flexibility of blockchain applications. In bitcoin, the script is not very mature, and is mostly used for transaction purposes; in the ether house, more complete and more powerful script system intelligent contracts enable more complex and higher-level distributed application to be realized. Finally, the security of the blockchain is guaranteed by encryption technology, the power provided by the whole distributed network is very remarkable, and the data in the blockchain is to be tampered with, although the data is feasible in theory, but the cost of the power, equipment and the like is not paid.
The invention replaces a CA center system with a blockchain network, and provides a block chain federal learning architecture, wherein each authentication record of a user and a verifier is recorded in the blockchain network, each authentication between the user and the verifier is recorded in the blockchain system and is used for tracing and preventing falsification when conflict occurs, so that the trust problem between the verifier and a prover is solved, the block chain network also stores the privacy of the user stored in the CA system, a generated block with continuous privacy information is recorded in the blockchain system under the support of the blockchain, all nodes in the blockchain network at the same time confirm the blocks recorded in the blockchain and store the blocks in a local database of the local nodes, the local database is updated at fixed time intervals, the recorded authentication process is compared with the authentication records recorded in the blockchain through the local database, and synchronously recording the data of the block chain to a local database if the difference exists. If an attacker wants to attack the blockchain system, more than half of the local data in the blockchain nodes needs to be changed, and the attack mode is difficult to realize from the characteristic of the blockchain.
The specific process is shown in fig. 3, and specifically includes the following processes:
1) the identity authentication binding platform comprises two parts, namely a supervised anonymous authentication CA system and a block chain module, wherein the CA system provides guarantee for anonymous reliable authentication of the system and comprises a certificate for verifying corresponding attribute certification, only the attribute which should be shown of the part is shown in the process of showing the certificate to a verifier, and the rest of the attributes can be hidden. And the interactive system of the information adopts a non-interactive zero knowledge proof, and the two can ensure that the information of the user can not be leaked.
2) The blockchain module is responsible for binding identity information (information corresponding to the identity of the user by the private key), anonymous certificates and attribute information of the user during the authentication process. The problem that the centralization of a single CA system is vulnerable can be solved through the addition of the block chain.
3) The user applies for and takes the certificate to the optimized CA system.
4) The user presents part of the information to the verifier by using the certificate, and the challenge of the verifier is accepted through zero-knowledge proof, so that the user can prove that the user really has the attribute to be presented.
5) The verifier chains the authentication record (containing the user's anonymous credential and attribute information).
6) The optimized CA system can look up the attribute information shown by the user through the block chain, and if disputes occur, the identity information of the user can be recovered according to the anonymous certificate.
Based on the above method, the present invention also provides an anonymous authentication system, and fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of the anonymous authentication system of the present invention. As shown in fig. 4, the anonymous authentication system of the present invention includes:
a CA certificate authority 401 for generating a key pair; the key pair comprises a master private key and a master public key; the tracking key and the group public key are generated through a group signature technology; further for generating a user private key based on the master private key; the authentication server is also used for carrying out authentication according to the certificate request of the user; when the verification is passed, the CA certification authority is used for issuing a certificate for the user based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user; the privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value;
a user certificate generation module 402, configured to generate a presented certificate based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, and the certificate and message issued by the CA;
a verifier verification module 403, configured to verify the certificate presented by the user based on the certificate presented by the user, the master public key, the group public key, and a privacy value that is not hidden; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol is adopted, and the non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol is a non-interactive zero knowledge proof protocol based on a lattice code. When the verifier verifies, allowing the user to access; and when the verifier verifies that the dispute is generated, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key.
As a specific embodiment, the anonymous authentication system of the present invention further includes: a block chain network; the block chain network is used for recording authentication records between the user and the verifier, and all nodes in the block chain network confirm the authentication records and synchronously store the authentication records in a local database.
As a specific embodiment, the CA certification authority 401 in the anonymous certification system of the present invention is further configured to bind the user private key with the identity of the user after generating the user private key based on the master private key.
The embodiments in the present description are described in a progressive manner, each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same and similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other. For the system disclosed by the embodiment, the description is relatively simple because the system corresponds to the method disclosed by the embodiment, and the relevant points can be referred to the method part for description.
The principles and embodiments of the present invention have been described herein using specific examples, which are provided only to help understand the method and the core concept of the present invention; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present invention, the specific embodiments and the application range may be changed. In view of the above, the present disclosure should not be construed as limiting the invention.
Claims (8)
1. An anonymous authentication method, comprising:
generating a key pair by the CA; the key pair comprises a master private key and a master public key;
generating a tracking key and a group public key on the CA through a group signature technique;
the CA generating a user private key based on the master private key;
according to the certificate request of the user, the CA carries out verification;
when the CA passes the verification, the CA issues a certificate for the user based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user; the privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value;
based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate issued by the CA, and the message, the user generates a presented certificate;
based on the user presented credential, the master public key, the group public key, and the privacy value that is not concealed, a verifier verifies the user presented credential; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is adopted;
when the verifier verifies, allowing the user to access;
and when the verifier verifies that the dispute is generated, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key.
2. The anonymous authentication method as recited in claim 1, wherein said non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is a format-based non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol.
3. The anonymous authentication method according to claim 1, further comprising:
and recording an authentication record between the user and the verifier by adopting a block chain network, confirming the authentication record by all nodes in the block chain network, and synchronously storing the authentication record in a local database.
4. The anonymous authentication method of claim 1, after the CA generating a user private key based on the master private key, further comprising:
the CA binds the user's private key with the user's identity.
5. An anonymous authentication system, comprising:
a CA certification authority for generating a key pair; the key pair comprises a master private key and a master public key; the tracking key and the group public key are generated through a group signature technology; further for generating a user private key based on the master private key; the authentication server is also used for carrying out authentication according to the certificate request of the user; when the verification is passed, the CA certification authority is used for issuing a certificate for the user based on the secret key pair and the privacy value of the certificate applied by the user; the privacy value of the user application certificate is a hidden privacy value;
a user certificate generation module for generating a presented certificate based on the user private key, the group public key, the privacy value, the certificate and the message issued by the CA;
a verifier verification module for verifying the certificate presented by the user based on the certificate presented by the user, the master public key, the group public key, and an privacy value that is not hidden; when the user interacts with the verifier, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is adopted; when the verifier verifies, allowing the user to access; and when the verifier verifies that the dispute is generated, the identity of the user is confirmed by adopting the tracking secret key.
6. The anonymous authentication system as recited in claim 5, wherein said non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol is a format-based non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol.
7. The anonymous authentication system of claim 5, further comprising: a block chain network; the block chain network is used for recording authentication records between the user and the verifier, and all nodes in the block chain network confirm the authentication records and synchronously store the authentication records in a local database.
8. The anonymous authentication system of claim 5, wherein the CA authority is further configured to bind the user private key to the identity of the user after generating the user private key based on the master private key.
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| CN114168923A (en) * | 2022-02-10 | 2022-03-11 | 亿次网联(杭州)科技有限公司 | Group CA certificate generation method and system based on digital certificate |
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