CN113640840B - Non-compressed GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression method based on antenna array - Google Patents
Non-compressed GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression method based on antenna array Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a non-compressed GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression method based on an antenna array, which comprises the following steps: s1, detecting a deception signal, and if no deception interference exists, entering a step S4; s2, searching a group of real signals; s3, identifying the real signals and the deception signals based on the found set of real signals; and S4, performing positioning calculation by using the pseudo-range or carrier phase observation value of the real signal. The deception jamming detection inhibition method has strong deception protection capability, can detect deception signals, and can distinguish true signals from deception signals; as long as the real signal is not completely suppressed by the interference, the receiver can still work normally, outputting a correctly usable position time result.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of satellite navigation, in particular to a non-compressed GNSS (Global Navigation SATELLITE SYSTEM) deception jamming detection and suppression method based on an antenna array.
Background
The current satellite navigation system is widely applied to aspects of national life. However, GNSS signals arriving at the ground are susceptible to interference due to their weak nature. Wherein the spoofing interference can be controlled by controlling the target receiver to output false position and time results, thereby controlling the target system, and thus the hazard is the greatest. The current anti-deception method mainly focuses on detection of deception interference and only plays a role of warning. Only if the deception jamming is suppressed, the receiver can still work normally. The gain of the deception signal is adjusted to 0 through the antenna array zero setting technology, so that the influence of deception interference can be eliminated, but the power of a real signal near the 0 gain can be weakened at the same time, and the performance of a receiver is reduced, so that the antenna array zero setting technology is generally used in a scene of suppressing interference; in addition, the spoofing signal can be eliminated by the "co-located cancellation" technique, but such methods require accurate estimates of the spoofing signal power, phase, etc., otherwise the spoofing signal cannot be eliminated and even the spoofing signal power is enhanced.
Currently, the signal power for suppressing the fraud-like interference is far greater than that of a real signal, and is easy to detect; the power of the deception signal which is not broadcast by the pressing deception interference is slightly larger than that of the real signal, so that the deception signal has stronger concealment and is difficult to detect.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides an antenna array-based non-compressed GNSS deception jamming detection inhibition method, which is used for solving the problem of non-compressed deception jamming detection.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows:
an antenna array-based non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection suppression method comprises the following steps:
S1, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount based on a difference value between a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value; determining a detection threshold according to the statistical characteristics of the detection quantity of the deception signal; when the detection quantity of the deception signal is higher than the detection threshold, judging that deception interference exists currently;
S2, grouping all received signals to obtain a group of signal groups which are all real signals;
S3, respectively forming signal groups by the signals with unknown authenticity and the obtained real signals, sequentially calculating the detection quantity and the detection threshold of the spoofing signals of each group of signals, and comparing the detection quantity and the detection threshold of the spoofing signals to distinguish the signals with unknown authenticity as the real signals or as the spoofing information;
s4, positioning calculation is carried out by using the pseudo range or carrier phase observed quantity of the real signal.
Preferably, the method for suppressing the deception jamming detection of the non-compressed GNSS based on the antenna array further includes, in S1, when the detected amount of the deception signal is less than or equal to a detection threshold, determining that there is no deception jamming currently, and executing S4.
Preferably, in S1, the method for calculating the carrier phase single difference measurement value is as follows:
Wherein, De＝[γe,1,…γe,N]；Representing carrier phase single differences between adjacent array elements; lambda is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal; For the unit direction vector between the array element j and the array element j+1 under the body coordinate system where the detection system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system; T denotes vector transposition; gamma e,i is the unit incident direction vector from the signal i to the detection system under the geocentric geodetic coordinate system, and the superscript 'e' represents the geodetic coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric ground fixed coordinate system; For measuring noise, obeying zero-mean Gaussian distribution; n represents the number of currently received signals; m represents the number of array elements;
the plane in which the antenna array is located is defined as the xoy plane of the body coordinate system, and the above equation can be simplified as:
Wherein the matrix And R 2 represent matrices of the first two rows of elements of matrices a b and R, respectively.
Preferably, in S1, the method for calculating the carrier phase single difference expected value is as follows:
Wherein, Representing an estimate of the coordinate rotation matrix R 2,Indicating the desired direction of incidence of the real signal,Representing the receiver's trusted location, p e,i＝[xi,yi,zi]T represents the ith satellite location.
Preferably, in S1, the method for calculating the detection amount of the spoofing signal includes:
The difference between the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value is calculated as follows: e=Φ - Φ s
The spoofing signal detection amount T is acquired as follows:
Wherein E n is the column vector of the difference matrix E, i.e. the difference between all carrier phase single difference measurement values and the carrier phase single difference expected value of the signal n, and the matrix Q n is the covariance matrix of E n.
Preferably, in S1, the method for determining the detection threshold includes:
When the received signals are all real signals, the signal incidence direction difference matrix E=0, so that the average value mu n =0 of the vector E n, and thus E n obeys 0-average-value joint Gaussian distribution, and the detection quantity T obeys the central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom (M-1) N-6; when the received signal has a deception signal, the average value mu n is not equal to 0, and the e n is subjected to non-zero average value joint Gaussian distribution, so that the detection quantity T is subjected to non-central chi-square distribution with the non-central parameter rho of (M-1) N-6, wherein
According to the neoman-pearson criterion, the decision threshold can be determined by:
Wherein alpha is false alarm probability; f (x|h 0) represents the probability density function of the spoofing signal detection quantity T under the condition of H 0; th is the determined detection threshold.
Preferably, the S2 specifically includes:
S21, dividing N current signals into 4 groups A group; A combination number representing a combination number of 4 selected from the N;
s22, calculating a detection threshold th 4 when only 4 signals exist; let group number i=1;
s23, comparing whether the group number i is larger than the array element number M, if not, entering S24, otherwise entering S26;
S24, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount T i of the ith group of signals;
s25, comparing the detection quantity T i of the deception signal with a detection threshold th 4; if the detection quantity T i of the spoofing signals of the ith group of signals is smaller than the detection threshold th 4, judging that the group of 4 signals are all true signals, and stopping searching; otherwise, the group number i is added with 1, and S23 is entered;
S26, if the detection quantity of the spoofing signals of all the groups is higher than a detection threshold th 4, indicating that the number of real signals in the current received signals is smaller than 4, marking the current received signals as spoofing signals, and capturing and tracking aiming at other pseudo code carrier intervals of the current tracking signals; and then proceeds to S21 to regroup the newly acquired signals.
Preferably, the S3 specifically includes:
S31, based on 4 real signals, forming L signals with unknown signal authenticity and 4 known real signals into signal groups respectively, and forming L groups with 5 signal numbers;
S32, calculating a detection threshold th 5 when the number of signals is 5; let group number j=1;
S33, comparing whether the group number j is larger than L, and if so, judging to be finished;
S34, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount T j of the j-th group signal;
S35, judging whether the detection quantity T j of the deception signal is higher than a detection threshold th 5, and if so, judging that the j-th signal is the deception signal; otherwise, judging the j signal as a real signal;
s36, adding 1 to the group number j, and returning to S33.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows:
according to the non-compressed GNSS deception jamming detection and suppression method based on the antenna array, deception protection capability is strong, deception signals can be detected, and real signals and deception signals can be distinguished; as long as the real signal is not completely suppressed by the interference, the receiver can still work normally, outputting a correctly usable position time result.
The following describes the present invention in further detail with reference to the drawings and embodiments, but the method for suppressing the non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on the antenna array of the present invention is not limited to the embodiments.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the spoofing signal presence detection of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the true signal group finding of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is a flow chart of the process of distinguishing the true signal from the spoofed signal according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical scheme of the invention is specifically described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Referring to fig. 1, the method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on an antenna array of the present embodiment includes the following steps:
S1, detecting a deception signal, and if no deception interference exists, entering a step S4; the processing flow of the spoofing signal detection is shown in fig. 2, and comprises the following steps:
s11, calculating a carrier phase single difference measurement value phi; carrier phase single differences are defined as the differences between carrier phase measurements of the same signal at different array elements. And (3) recording the number of array elements as M, wherein all the array elements of the antenna array are on the same plane, and for each received signal, the number of carrier phase single difference measurement values which are not linearly related is M-1. Then for satellite signal i, the carrier-phase single difference between adjacent elements can be expressed as:
Wherein, Is the carrier phase measurement of signal i at element j; lambda is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal; For the unit direction vector between the array element j and the array element j+1 under the body coordinate system where the detection system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system; T denotes vector transposition; gamma e,i is the unit incident direction vector from the signal i to the detection system under the geocentric geodetic coordinate system, and the superscript 'e' represents the geodetic coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric ground fixed coordinate system; is an integer and represents the integer ambiguity of the carrier; to measure noise, a zero-mean gaussian distribution is obeyed.
To eliminate carrier phase single difference measurement valueThe term first estimates the carrier integer ambiguity using the following equation:
wherein sign (·) represents taking the sign; representing a downward rounding; the expression of absolute value.
Therefore, the carrier phase single difference measurement without whole-cycle ambiguity can be obtained as:
Assuming that the number of currently received signals is N, all carrier phase single difference measurement values may be organized into a matrix form as follows:
Wherein, De＝[γe,1,…γe,N]。
The plane in which the antenna array is located is defined as the xoy plane of the body coordinate system, and the above equation can be simplified as:
matrix in matrix R 2 represents the matrix of the first two rows of elements of matrix A b and R, respectively.
S12, estimating a carrier phase single difference expected value phi s; in order to estimate the carrier phase single difference expected value, it is first necessary to obtain the expected incident direction of the real signalAnd a coordinate rotation matrix R 2.
Recording the trusted position of the receiver asThe position of the ith satellite is p e,i＝[xi,yi,zi]T The expression of I and II represents calculation of Euler distance; thus (2)
The estimated value of the coordinate rotation matrix R 2 can be obtained by using a least squares algorithm as follows:
The carrier phase single difference expectation is therefore:
S13, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount T; the detection amount of the deception signal is constructed by utilizing the difference value between the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the expected value, wherein the difference value between the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the expected value is as follows: e=Φ - Φ s. The spoofing signal detection amount is T: where E n is the difference matrix E column vector, i.e., the difference between all carrier phase single difference measurements of signal n and the expected value, and matrix Q n is the covariance matrix of E n.
S14, determining a deception signal detection threshold th; the spoofing signal detection threshold is determined based on a statistical characteristic of the amount of spoofing signal detection. When the received signals are all real signals, the signal incidence direction difference matrix E=0, so that the average value mu n =0 of the vector E n, and thus E n obeys 0-average-value joint Gaussian distribution, and the detection quantity T obeys the central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom (M-1) N-6; when the received signal has a deception signal, the average value mu n is not equal to 0, and the e n is subjected to non-zero average value joint Gaussian distribution, so that the detection quantity T is subjected to non-central chi-square distribution with the non-central parameter rho of (M-1) N-6, whereinThe hypothesis test based on the detected amount T is therefore:
According to the newman-Pearson (Neyman-Pearson) criterion, the decision threshold can be determined by:
Wherein alpha is false alarm probability; f (x|h 0) represents the probability density function of T under H 0; th is the determined detection threshold.
S15, detecting and judging that deception jamming exists currently when the detection quantity is higher than a detection threshold; when the detection amount is smaller than the detection threshold, judging that no deception jamming exists currently.
S2, searching a group of real signals, wherein the processing flow is shown in the figure 3 and comprises the following steps:
S21: first, all received signals are grouped, and in order to make matrix D e full rank, the number of required signals is equal to or greater than 4, so the number of signals in each group is set to be 4, and all received signals are divided into A plurality of groups of 4 received signals,The number of combinations is a number of combinations selected from n;
S22, calculating a detection threshold th 4 when only 4 signals are obtained according to the method in the step S14; let group number i=1;
s23, comparing whether the group number is larger than M, if not, entering S24, otherwise entering S26;
s24, calculating and obtaining a spoofing signal detection quantity T i of the ith group of signals according to the method in the step S13;
S25, comparing the detection quantity T i of the deception signal with a detection threshold th 4; if the detected quantity T i of the ith group of signals is smaller than the detection threshold th 4, judging that the group of 4 signals are all true signals, and stopping searching; otherwise, the group number i is added with 1, and S23 is entered;
S26, if the detection quantity T 4 of all the packets is higher than the detection threshold th 4, indicating that the number of real signals in the current received signal is smaller than 4, marking the current received signal as a deception signal, and controlling the receiver to capture and track other pseudo code carrier intervals of the current received signal through a signal capturing and scheduling module of the receiver, wherein the signals are necessarily captured and tracked under the condition that the real signals do not interfere and are completely suppressed; and then proceeds to S21 to regroup the newly acquired signals.
S3, identifying the real signals and the deception signals based on the found set of real signals; the process flow is shown in fig. 4, and specifically comprises the following steps:
s31, based on the 4 real signals found in the step S2, forming a signal group by the L signals with unknown signal authenticity and the 4 known real signals respectively, and forming groups with L signal numbers of 5;
S32, calculating a detection threshold th 5 when the number of signals is 5 according to the method in the step S14; let group number j=1;
S33, comparing whether the group number is larger than L, if so, judging to be finished;
S34, calculating the detected quantity T j of the obtained spoofed signal of the j-th group of signals according to the method in the step S1;
S35, judging the authenticity of the jth signal; if the detection quantity T j is higher than the detection threshold th 5, the j signal is a deception signal; otherwise the jth signal is a true signal.
S36, adding 1 to the group number j, and proceeding to S33.
S4: and positioning calculation is performed by using the pseudo-range or carrier phase observation value of the real signal.
The above is only one preferred embodiment of the examples of the present invention. However, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and all equivalent changes and modifications can be made according to the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. An antenna array-based non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection suppression method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
S1, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount based on a difference value between a carrier phase single difference measurement value and a carrier phase single difference expected value; determining a detection threshold according to the statistical characteristics of the detection quantity of the deception signal; when the detection quantity of the deception signal is higher than the detection threshold, judging that deception interference exists currently; if no deception jamming exists, the step S4 is entered;
S2, grouping all received signals to obtain a group of signal groups which are all real signals;
S3, respectively forming signal groups by the signals with unknown authenticity and the obtained real signals, sequentially calculating the detection quantity and the detection threshold of the spoofing signals of each group of signals, and comparing the detection quantity and the detection threshold of the spoofing signals to distinguish the signals with unknown authenticity as the real signals or as the spoofing information;
s4, positioning calculation is carried out by using the pseudo range or carrier phase observed quantity of the real signal;
the step S2 specifically comprises the following steps:
S21, dividing N current signals into 4 groups A group; A combination number representing a combination number of 4 selected from the N;
s22, calculating a detection threshold th 4 when only 4 signals exist; let group number i=1;
s23, comparing whether the group number i is larger than the array element number M, if not, entering S24, otherwise entering S26;
S24, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount T i of the ith group of signals;
s25, comparing the detection quantity T i of the deception signal with a detection threshold th 4; if the detection quantity T i of the spoofing signals of the ith group of signals is smaller than the detection threshold th 4, judging that the group of 4 signals are all true signals, and stopping searching; otherwise, the group number i is added with 1, and S23 is entered;
S26, if the detection quantity of the spoofing signals of all the groups is higher than a detection threshold th 4, indicating that the number of real signals in the current received signals is smaller than 4, marking the current received signals as spoofing signals, and capturing and tracking aiming at other pseudo code carrier intervals of the current tracking signals; and then proceeds to S21 to regroup the newly acquired signals.
2. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing detection based on an antenna array according to claim 1, further comprising, in S1, when the detected amount of spoofing signals is equal to or less than a detection threshold, determining that there is no spoofing at present, and executing S4.
3. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on an antenna array according to claim 1, wherein in S1, the method for calculating the carrier phase single difference measurement value is as follows:
Wherein, De＝[γe,1,…γe,N]；Representing carrier phase single differences between adjacent array elements; lambda is the carrier wavelength of the satellite signal; For the unit direction vector between the array element j and the array element j+1 under the body coordinate system where the detection system is located, the superscript 'b' represents the body coordinate system; T denotes vector transposition; gamma e,i is the unit incident direction vector from the signal i to the detection system under the geocentric geodetic coordinate system, and the superscript 'e' represents the geodetic coordinate system; r is a coordinate transformation matrix between a detection system body coordinate system and a geocentric ground fixed coordinate system; For measuring noise, obeying zero-mean Gaussian distribution; n represents the number of currently received signals; m represents the number of array elements;
the plane in which the antenna array is located is defined as the xoy plane of the body coordinate system, and the above equation can be simplified as:
Wherein the matrix And R 2 represent matrices of the first two rows of elements of matrices a b and R, respectively.
4. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on an antenna array according to claim 3, wherein in S1, the method for calculating the carrier phase single difference expectation is as follows:
Wherein, Representing an estimate of the coordinate rotation matrix R 2, Indicating the desired direction of incidence of the real signal, Representing a trusted location of the receiver; p e,i＝[xi,yi,zi]T denotes the ith satellite position.
5. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing detection based on an antenna array according to claim 4, wherein in S1, the method for calculating the spoofing signal detection amount includes:
The difference between the carrier phase single difference measurement value and the carrier phase single difference expected value is calculated as follows: e=Φ - Φ s
The spoofing signal detection amount T is acquired as follows:
Wherein E n is the column vector of the difference matrix E, i.e. the difference between all carrier phase single difference measurement values and the carrier phase single difference expected value of the signal n, and the matrix Q n is the covariance matrix of E n.
6. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on an antenna array of claim 4 wherein in S1, the method for determining the detection threshold comprises:
When the received signals are all real signals, the signal incidence direction difference matrix E=0, so that the average value mu n =0 of the vector E n, and thus E n obeys 0-average-value joint Gaussian distribution, and the detection quantity T obeys the central chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom (M-1) N-6; when the received signal has a deception signal, the average value mu n is not equal to 0, and the e n is subjected to non-zero average value joint Gaussian distribution, so that the detection quantity T is subjected to non-central chi-square distribution with the non-central parameter rho of (M-1) N-6, wherein
According to the neoman-pearson criterion, the decision threshold can be determined by:
Wherein alpha is false alarm probability; f (x|h 0) represents the probability density function of the spoofing signal detection quantity T under the condition of H 0; th is the determined detection threshold.
7. The method for suppressing non-compressed GNSS spoofing interference detection based on an antenna array according to claim 1, wherein S3 specifically comprises:
S31, based on 4 real signals, forming L signals with unknown signal authenticity and 4 known real signals into signal groups respectively, and forming L groups with 5 signal numbers;
S32, calculating a detection threshold th 5 when the number of signals is 5; let group number j=1;
S33, comparing whether the group number j is larger than L, and if so, judging to be finished;
S34, calculating a spoofing signal detection amount T j of the j-th group signal;
S35, judging whether the detection quantity T j of the deception signal is higher than a detection threshold th 5, and if so, judging that the j-th signal is the deception signal; otherwise, judging the j signal as a real signal;
s36, adding 1 to the group number j, and returning to S33.
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| CN110244323A (en) * | 2019-05-24 | 2019-09-17 | 中国科学院光电研究院 | Micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detection and air navigation aid |
| CN111522031A (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2020-08-11 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司超高压输电公司 | Multi-receiver deception detection method for GNSS time service application |
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| CN110244323A (en) * | 2019-05-24 | 2019-09-17 | 中国科学院光电研究院 | Micro-, light-duty unmanned plane GNSS anti-spoofing system and curve detection and air navigation aid |
| CN111522031A (en) * | 2020-04-28 | 2020-08-11 | 中国南方电网有限责任公司超高压输电公司 | Multi-receiver deception detection method for GNSS time service application |
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