CN113612602B - Quantum key security assessment method, quantum key security assessment device and medium - Google Patents
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Abstract
The disclosure relates to a quantum key security assessment method, a quantum key security assessment device and a medium. The quantum key security assessment method comprises the following steps: and acquiring an optical pulse signal sequence of which the quantum key security is to be determined, wherein the optical pulse signal sequence comprises the quantum key sent by a sender to a receiver. In response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that a post-pulse effect exists for the optical pulse signal sequence, security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the first detection rate at which the optical pulse signal sequence is detected. According to the quantum key security assessment method, the security of the quantum key sent from the sender to the receiver can be determined according to the influence of the post-pulse effect and based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence in the process of sending the optical pulse signal sequence, and the accuracy of detecting the quantum key security is further improved, so that the obtained assessment result is more accurate.
Description
Technical Field
The disclosure relates to the technical field of communication, in particular to a quantum key security assessment method, a quantum key security assessment device and a medium.
Background
Quantum secret communication technology utilizes physical properties of quanta to ensure unconditional security of communication. In the last twenty years after the BB84 protocol was proposed, the security proof of the quantum key distribution (Quantum Key Distribution, QKD) protocol is mostly based on the infinite code length, however, in practical conditions, the data transmitted by both communication parties must be limited, so the security analysis of the QKD protocol under the limited code length condition is a focus of attention. In the existing quantum communication protocol, the measuring device independent quantum key distribution (Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution, MDI-QKD) scheme has strong practicability, but the statistical fluctuation problem of the measuring parameters of the measuring device independent quantum key distribution (Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution, MDI-QKD) scheme is considered under the condition of limited code length.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the problems in the related art, the present disclosure provides a quantum key security assessment method, a quantum key security assessment device, and a medium.
According to a first aspect of embodiments of the present disclosure, there is provided a quantum key security assessment method, including: and acquiring an optical pulse signal sequence of which the quantum key security is to be determined, wherein the optical pulse signal sequence comprises the quantum key sent by a sender to a receiver. In response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that a post-pulse effect exists for the optical pulse signal sequence, determining a security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence based on detecting a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In an embodiment, the determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect comprises: and determining pulse values corresponding to the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence. Based on the pulse values, an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at a first code length and an expected value at a second code length, the second code length being substantially larger than the first code length, are determined. And if the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect. The first threshold interval is determined based on the average value, and the expected value belongs to the first threshold interval.
In another embodiment, the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by: and determining a second probability and a third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the optical pulse signal sequence of a third code length. The second probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal of the third code length is monitored under the condition of no post-pulse effect, and the third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal of the third code length is monitored under the condition of post-pulse effect. And determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second probability and the third probability and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In a further embodiment, determining the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence comprises: and determining sequences of the optical pulse signal sequences based on the third probability and the optical pulse signal sequences with the third code length. From the sequence, the transmission loss of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by the alzhuma inequality. And determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the transmission loss and the second probability.
According to a second aspect of embodiments of the present disclosure, there is provided a quantum key security assessment apparatus comprising: and the acquisition unit is used for acquiring an optical pulse signal sequence of which the quantum key security is to be determined, wherein the optical pulse signal sequence comprises the quantum key sent by the sender to the receiver. And the determining unit is used for determining the security of the quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence in response to the fact that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect.
In an embodiment, the determining unit determines the optical pulse signal sequence to be a dependent pulse sequence in the following manner, and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect: and determining pulse values corresponding to the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence. Based on the pulse values, an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at a first code length and an expected value at a second code length, the second code length being substantially larger than the first code length, are determined. And if the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect. The first threshold interval is determined based on the average value, and the expected value belongs to the first threshold interval.
In another embodiment, the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by: and determining a second probability and a third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the optical pulse signal sequence of a third code length. The second probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal of the third code length is monitored under the condition of no post-pulse effect, and the third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal of the third code length is monitored under the condition of post-pulse effect. And determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second probability and the third probability and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In a further embodiment, the determining unit determines the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence in the following manner: and determining sequences of the optical pulse signal sequences based on the third probability and the optical pulse signal sequences with the third code length. From the sequence, the transmission loss of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by the alzhuma inequality. And determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the transmission loss and the second probability.
According to a third aspect of embodiments of the present disclosure, there is provided a quantum key security assessment apparatus comprising: a memory for storing instructions; a processor; the instructions for invoking the memory store perform any of the quantum key security assessment methods described above.
According to a fourth aspect of embodiments of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform any one of the quantum key security assessment methods described above.
The technical scheme provided by the embodiment of the disclosure can comprise the following beneficial effects: according to the quantum key security assessment method, the security of the quantum key sent from the sender to the receiver can be determined according to the influence of the post-pulse effect and based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence in the process of sending the optical pulse signal sequence, and the accuracy of detecting the quantum key security is further improved, so that the obtained assessment result is more accurate.
It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the disclosure.
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The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the disclosure and together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the disclosure.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a quantum key security assessment method according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating a graph according to an exemplary embodiment.
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a variation of bias according to an exemplary embodiment.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method of determining that an optical pulse signal is a dependent pulse train, according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of determining a first detection rate, according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a quantum key security assessment device, according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 7 is a block diagram of a quantum key security assessment device, according to an example embodiment.
Detailed Description
Reference will now be made in detail to exemplary embodiments, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the accompanying drawings, the same numbers in different drawings refer to the same or similar elements, unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the following exemplary examples are not representative of all implementations consistent with the present disclosure. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatus and methods consistent with some aspects of the present disclosure as detailed in the accompanying claims.
In the related art, in the existing quantum communication protocol, a measuring device independent quantum key distribution (Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution, MDI-QKD) scheme has strong practicability, however, in the MDI-QKD system, when a sender sends a quantum key to a receiver through an optical pulse signal sequence, a pulse effect (post-pulse effect) generated by the sent optical pulse signal can influence the detection of an optical pulse detector, and further influence the independence among the optical pulse signals, so that the security assessment of the quantum key is influenced.
In view of this, the disclosure provides a method for evaluating the security of a quantum key in an optical pulse signal sequence, which can detect the optical pulse signal sequence of the non-independent pulse sequence under the condition that the acquired optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be the non-independent pulse sequence and the post-pulse effect exists, and further determine the security of the quantum key in the optical pulse signal sequence based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence in combination with the condition that the post-pulse effect exists, so that the obtained evaluation result is more accurate, and the true transmission result can be reflected more closely.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a quantum key security assessment method according to an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 1, the quantum key security assessment method includes the following steps S11 to S12.
In step S11, a sequence of optical pulse signals for which quantum key security is to be determined is acquired.
In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the optical pulse signal sequence includes a quantum key transmitted by the sender to the receiver.
In step S12, in response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect, security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the first detection rate at which the optical pulse signal sequence is detected.
In the embodiment of the disclosure, in order to determine whether an acquired optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect in a process of transmitting the optical pulse signal sequence to a receiver, the independence of the optical pulse signal sequence is detected, and when the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to have the post-pulse effect in a process of transmitting, the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be a non-independent pulse sequence.
In an example, a statistical fluctuation analysis mathematical model created based on a markov chain may be used to detect an optical pulse signal sequence, so as to determine whether a post-pulse effect exists in the transmission process of the optical pulse signal sequence, thereby determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence when the post-pulse effect is determined to exist. By analyzing the statistical fluctuation of the optical pulse signals, the attenuation state of the optical pulse signals in the transmission process can be determined, and whether the optical signal pulses are mutually independent or not can be further determined. In one example, if a markov chain is formed between two randomly adjacent optical pulse signals, it is characterized that there is a post-pulse effect between each optical pulse signal in the optical pulse signal sequence, and therefore, there is a post-pulse effect during transmission. Therefore, the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse signal. In another example, if no markov chain is formed between two randomly adjacent optical pulse signals, it is characterized that there is no post-pulse effect between the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence, and therefore, there is no post-pulse effect during transmission. Therefore, the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse signal.
In the process of transmitting the quantum key from the sender to the receiver, the probability of receiving the quantum key in the case of not being monitored is much larger than the probability in the case of being monitored. Moreover, the existence of the post-pulse effect also affects the probability of detecting the quantum key, thereby affecting the accuracy of determining the security of the quantum key. Therefore, when the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be an independent pulse sequence and has a post-pulse effect, the optical pulse signal sequence can be determined based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence by combining the influence caused by the post-pulse effect, so that the determined quantum key is more reasonable and accurate in safety. The first detection rate is understood to be the maximum probability that the receiving party can detect the optical pulse signal.
According to the implementation, when the acquired optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be the non-independent pulse sequence and the post-pulse effect exists, the optical pulse signal sequence of the non-independent pulse sequence is detected, and then the post-pulse effect exists is combined, the safety of the quantum key in the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the first detection rate of the detected optical pulse signal sequence, and then the obtained assessment result is more accurate and is more attached to the real transmission result.
In an embodiment, if the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be an independent pulse sequence, the security of the quantum key may be determined based on a Chernoff bound (Chernoff bound).
In another embodiment, for intuitively observing the security of the quantum key, the first detection rate may be substituted into a related calculation formula of MDI-QKD, and then numerical simulation is performed by using simulation analysis software such as MATLAB or Python, to obtain a graph of the security of the quantum key corresponding to different code lengths. In an implementation scenario, a graph of the security of quantum keys at different code lengths may be shown in fig. 2. Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating a graph according to an exemplary embodiment. Wherein the abscissa represents transmission loss, the ordinate represents security of quantum key, AI represents statistical fluctuation analysis by applying Azuma inequality, and the broken line 1 represents that the code length of the optical pulse signal sequence is n=5×10 10 Security of quantum key when the solid line 2 indicates that the code length of the optical pulse signal sequence is n=10 12 Security of the quantum key at that time. The code length range of the optical pulse signal sequence is N=N total ∈{5×10 10 ,10 12 }。
In yet another embodiment, the first detection rate may be understood as a probability that the optical pulse signal sequence deviates during transmission from the sender to the receiver. Therefore, the code length in the optical pulse signal sequence is n=10 12 In this case, numerical simulation is performed by simulation analysis software such as MATLAB or Python, and a schematic diagram of the deviation change obtained correspondingly can be shown in fig. 3. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a variation of bias according to an exemplary embodiment. Wherein the abscissa represents the transmission loss, the ordinate represents the deviation, and the solid line 3 represents the deviation variation.
In still another embodiment, in determining the security of the quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence, the determination may be made according to any one or more of a lower decoy state detection rate bound, a lower vacuum state count rate bound, and a lower vacuum state detection rate bound, in addition to the determination based on the first detection rate. The lower bound of the detection rate of the decoy state can be understood as the minimum probability that the optical pulse signal sequence detects an attack in the process of transmitting the quantum key. The lower limit of the vacuum state count rate is understood to be the minimum probability that the optical pulse signal sequence detects the number of pulses of the vacuum during the process of transmitting the quantum key. The vacuum state detection rate lower bound is understood to be the minimum probability that an optical pulse signal sequence detects a null pulse in the process of transmitting a quantum key.
The following examples will specifically describe the process of determining the optical pulse signal as a non-independent pulse train, and the presence of post-pulse effects in the optical pulse signal.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method of determining that an optical pulse signal is a dependent pulse train, according to an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 4, the method for determining the optical pulse signal as the dependent pulse train includes the following steps.
In step S21, a pulse value corresponding to each optical pulse signal in the optical pulse signal sequence is determined.
In the embodiment of the disclosure, the pulse value corresponding to each optical pulse signal in the received optical pulse signal sequence may be detected by an optical pulse detector. In the detection process, if an optical pulse signal is detected, the pulse value is recorded as 1. If no optical pulse signal is detected, the pulse value is recorded as 0. For example: in the optical pulse signal sequence with the code length of 5, the optical pulse signals are detected at the 1 st, 3 rd, 4 th and 5 th bits, and the optical pulse signals are not detected at the 2 nd bit, and the pulse values corresponding to the 1 st, 2 nd, 3 rd, 4 th and 5 th bits are respectively as follows: 1. 0, 1.
In step S22, an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the first code length and an expected value at the second code length are determined based on the pulse values.
In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the second code length is much larger than the first code length, which can be understood that the first code length is a limited code length, and the second code length is a wireless code length, that is, the value corresponding to the second code length approaches infinity. In one example, the average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the first code length satisfies the formula: m is the first code length, i is [1, m]The ith bit length between the two, X i The pulse value corresponding to the i-th bit code length is indicated. In another example, the expected value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the second code length satisfies the formula: />n is the second code length, i is [1, m]The ith bit length between the two, X i The pulse value corresponding to the i-th bit code length is indicated. The expected value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the second code length may be understood as the true average value of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In step S23, if the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is less than or equal to the first threshold interval, it is determined that the optical pulse signal sequence is a non-independent pulse sequence, and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect.
In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the first threshold interval may be understood as a fault tolerance interval in which the presence of a post-pulse effect of the optical pulse signal sequence is detected. When the first threshold interval is set, the determination may be made based on the average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the first code length, and in order for the determined fault tolerance interval to belong to the reasonable interval, the expected value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the second code length should be included when the first threshold interval is determined. The absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is used for representing the difference between the average value and the true average value of the optical pulse signal sequence in the limited code length. The first probability is a probability for determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence. And if the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value meets the first probability, characterizing that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect in the transmission process. The first probability may be a specific probability value or a probability range. If the first probability is smaller than or equal to the first threshold interval, the characterization determines that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect, and the optical pulse signal sequence is in a fault-tolerant range, so that the optical pulse signal sequence can be determined to be the non-independent pulse sequence, and the optical pulse signal sequence has the post-pulse effect.
In an example, if the first probability is greater than the first threshold interval, the characterization determines that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect, and that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence, is error-tolerant, and therefore, the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be an independent pulse sequence.
In one embodiment, it is also possible to determine whether the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent sequence by constructing a mathematical model of statistical fluctuation analysis. Wherein the mathematical model of statistical fluctuation analysis is constructed based on a Markov chain, the input of the model is an optical pulse signal sequence, and the output is a first probability.
In one implementation, the process of determining whether an input is an optical pulse signal sequence or not is an independent pulse sequence by analyzing a mathematical model of statistical fluctuation is as follows:
the average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the first code length is as follows:m is the first code length, i is [1, m]The ith bit length between the two, X i The pulse value corresponding to the i-th bit code length is indicated. The expected value of the optical pulse signal sequence at the second code length is: />n is the second code length. In order to determine whether a post-pulse effect exists between any two adjacent optical pulse signals, the probability of mutual independence between the current optical pulse signal and the previous optical pulse signal is respectively determined. If the probability that the pulse value corresponding to the current optical pulse signal is s under the condition that the pulse value corresponding to the previous optical pulse signal is t occurs is the same as the probability that the pulse value corresponding to the current optical pulse signal is s, determining that all the optical pulse signals are mutually independent. If the probability that the pulse value corresponding to the current optical pulse signal is s under the condition that the pulse value corresponding to the previous optical pulse signal is t occurs is different from the probability that the pulse value corresponding to the current optical pulse signal is s, determining each optical pulse signal Are mutually independent. The probability formula for determining that any two adjacent optical pulse signals are mutually and non-independently satisfied can be:it can be further determined that the dependent relationship between the randomly adjacent light pulse signals forms a markov chain. Wherein, the first probability is expressed by xi>0, wherein the first threshold interval is represented by epsilon being full, epsilon is more than or equal to 0, and the fault tolerance interval corresponding to epsilon is +.>Based on the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value being smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a non-independent pulse sequence, and the conditional probability inequality satisfied by the pulse effect after the optical pulse signal sequence exists is as follows: />Wherein, epsilon and xi can be customized according to experience values.
In an embodiment, the determination of the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence may be as shown in fig. 5. Fig. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of determining a first detection rate, according to an example embodiment.
In step S31, the second probability and the third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence are determined based on the optical pulse signal sequence of the third code length.
In an embodiment of the disclosure, the second probability is a probability that the optical pulse signal of the third code length is monitored without post-pulse effects. The third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is monitored under the condition of post-pulse effect. If the second probability is to The third probability is expressed in +.>Representing, then second probability->The expression of (2) is +.>Third probability->The expression of (2) is +.>The relation between the second probability and the third probability is: />Wherein p is ap For the probability of generating a rear pulse at the same time each time an optical pulse signal is transmitted.
In step S32, a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In an embodiment of the disclosure, the first detection rate may be a probability that the optical pulse signal sequence deviates in a process of being transmitted from the transmitting side to the receiving side. The total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence may be the same as or greater than the third code length. Based on the second probability, the third probability and the total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence, it can be determined that in the process that the sender sends all the optical pulse signal sequences to the receiver, the receiver obtains the maximum probability of deviation of the quantum key from the received optical pulse signal sequence due to the influence of the post-pulse effect, that is, determines the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In an embodiment, the optical pulse signal sequence may be determined to satisfy the sequence based on the second probability and the third probability, and the first detection rate may be obtained by using an alzhuma (Azuma) inequality. For example: the total detection number of the light pulse signals which can be detected by the receiver is S n The representation is made of a combination of a first and a second color,third probability->The expression of (2) is +.>Therefore, the conditional expectation expression of the optical pulse signal with the third code length is:
wherein when n approaches infinity, the conditional expectation value E is +.>The formula is as follows:
and, it can be known from the formula that the optical pulse signal sequence satisfies the definition of sequence under the influence of the post-pulse effect, M n Is a sequence. Further, by the determined sequence M n The first detection rate is determined using the Azuma inequality. Sequence M n The procedure for introducing the Azuma inequality may be as follows: />Wherein (1)>ξ>0 and ε is not less than 0. Thus, the first detection rate->The expression of (2) is: />Wherein P is z It can be understood that the optical pulse signal passes through the horizontal basis groupProbability of N μ For transmitting the total code length of the optical pulse signal to the sender, S n <N μ 。
In another embodiment, to improve accuracy in assessing quantum key security, the lower decoy state detection rate bound, the lower vacuum state count rate bound, and the lower vacuum state detection rate bound may also be determined based on the second probability and a total code length of the optical pulse signal transmitted by the sender. Wherein, the expression of the lower bound of the detection rate of the decoy state isThe expression of the lower limit of the vacuum state count rate is +.>The expression of the lower limit of the vacuum state detection rate is
In yet another embodiment, the obtained first detection rate, the lower limit of the decoy state detection rate, the lower limit of the vacuum state count rate and the lower limit of the vacuum state detection rate are substituted into a related calculation formula of MDI-QKD, and numerical simulation is performed by simulation analysis software such as MATLAB or Python to obtain a graph of the security corresponding to the quantum key under different code lengths, and further the security corresponding to the quantum key under different code lengths is intuitively obtained by the graph.
In an implementation scenario, a statistical fluctuation analysis mathematical model created based on a markov chain may be constructed in advance, and then an optical pulse signal sequence to be evaluated for quantum key security may be brought into the statistical fluctuation analysis mathematical model, so as to determine whether the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse optical signal sequence. Detecting the optical pulse signal sequence by an optical pulse detector, and respectively determining the average value of the optical pulse signal sequence under the first code lengthAnd the desire +.f when the second code length approaches infinity>If the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect in the transmission process, the optical pulse signal sequence is a non-independent pulse sequence, and a probability formula satisfied between any two adjacent optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence is: / >Wherein the conditional probability inequality is: />The fault tolerance interval corresponding to epsilon is +.>The values of ε and ζ can be customized based on empirical values.
After the optical pulse signal sequence is determined to be an independent pulse sequence and the post-pulse effect exists, the second probability and the third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence are respectively determined based on the optical pulse signal sequence with the third code length, and then the optical pulse signal sequence is processed . For example: assume thatM 0 =e, when the condition expectation value E is n approaching infinity +.>Is a true value of (c). Further, sequence M of the optical pulse signal sequence is obtained based on the following formula n 。
To the determined sequence M n Substituting into Azuma inequality to obtain
The sequence M is characterized n Satisfy Azuma inequality, the first detection rate is determined +.>Lower bound of decoy detection rate>Vacuum state count rate lower bound->And a lower limit of the vacuum state detection rate->Wherein (1)>ξ>0 and ε is not less than 0.
Substituting the obtained first detection rate, the lower limit of the decoy state detection rate, the lower limit of the vacuum state counting rate and the lower limit of the vacuum state detection rate into a related calculation formula of the MDI-QKD, performing numerical simulation through simulation analysis software such as MATLAB or Python, and the like to obtain a graph of the corresponding safety of the quantum key under different code lengths, and further intuitively obtaining the corresponding safety rate of the quantum key under different code lengths through the graph.
Based on the same conception, the embodiment of the disclosure also provides a quantum key security assessment device.
It can be appreciated that, in order to implement the above-mentioned functions, the quantum key security assessment device provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure includes a hardware structure and/or a software module that perform respective functions. The disclosed embodiments may be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software, in combination with the various example elements and algorithm steps disclosed in the embodiments of the disclosure. Whether a function is implemented as hardware or computer software driven hardware depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the solution. Those skilled in the art may implement the described functionality using different approaches for each particular application, but such implementation is not to be considered as beyond the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure.
Fig. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a quantum key security assessment device, according to an example embodiment. Referring to fig. 6, the quantum key security assessment apparatus 100 includes an acquisition unit 101 and a determination unit 102.
An acquisition unit 101 for acquiring an optical pulse signal sequence to be determined as quantum key security, the optical pulse signal sequence including a quantum key transmitted from a sender to a receiver.
A determining unit 102, configured to determine, in response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect, security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence based on a first detection rate at which the optical pulse signal sequence is detected.
In one embodiment, the determining unit 102 determines that the optical pulse signal sequence is a non-independent pulse sequence in the following manner, and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect: and determining pulse values corresponding to the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence. Based on the pulse values, an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at a first code length and an expected value at a second code length, the second code length being substantially larger than the first code length, are determined. If the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence, and the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect. The first threshold interval is determined based on the average value, and the expected value belongs to the first threshold interval.
In another embodiment, the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined in the following manner: the second probability and the third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence are determined based on the optical pulse signal sequence of the third code length. The second probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is monitored under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has no post-pulse effect, and the third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is monitored under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has the post-pulse effect. A first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
In a further embodiment, the determining unit 102 determines the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second probability and the third probability and the total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence in the following manner: a sequence of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined based on the third probability and the optical pulse signal sequence of the third code length. From the sequence, the transmission loss of the optical pulse signal sequence was determined by the alzhima inequality. And determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the transmission loss and the second probability.
The specific manner in which the various modules perform the operations in the apparatus of the above embodiments have been described in detail in connection with the embodiments of the method, and will not be described in detail herein.
Fig. 7 is a block diagram illustrating a quantum key security assessment device, according to an example embodiment. For example, quantum key security assessment apparatus 200 may be a mobile phone, computer, digital broadcast terminal, messaging device, game console, tablet device, medical device, fitness device, personal digital assistant, or the like.
Referring to fig. 7, quantum key security assessment device 200 may include one or more of the following components: a processing component 202, a memory 204, a power component 206, a multimedia component 208, an audio component 210, an input/output (I/O) interface 212, a sensor component 214, and a communication component 216.
The processing component 202 generally controls overall operation of the quantum key security assessment device 200, such as operations associated with display, telephone calls, data communications, camera operations, and recording operations. The processing component 202 may include one or more processors 220 to execute instructions to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described above. Further, the processing component 202 can include one or more modules that facilitate interactions between the processing component 202 and other components. For example, the processing component 202 may include a multimedia module to facilitate interaction between the multimedia component 208 and the processing component 202.
The memory 204 is configured to store various types of data to support operation at the quantum key security assessment device 200. Examples of such data include instructions for any application or method operating on the quantum key security rating device 200, contact data, phonebook data, messages, pictures, video, and the like. The memory 204 may be implemented by any type or combination of volatile or nonvolatile memory devices such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic memory, flash memory, magnetic or optical disk.
The power component 206 provides power to the various components of the quantum key security assessment device 200. The power components 206 may include a power management system, one or more power sources, and other components associated with generating, managing, and distributing power for the quantum key security assessment device 200.
The multimedia component 208 comprises a screen providing an output interface between the quantum key security rating device 200 and the user. In some embodiments, the screen may include a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) and a Touch Panel (TP). If the screen includes a touch panel, the screen may be implemented as a touch screen to receive input signals from a user. The touch panel includes one or more touch sensors to sense touches, swipes, and gestures on the touch panel. The touch sensor may sense not only the boundary of a touch or slide action, but also the duration and pressure associated with the touch or slide operation. In some embodiments, the multimedia component 208 includes a front-facing camera and/or a rear-facing camera. When the quantum key security assessment device 200 is in an operational mode, such as a photographing mode or a video mode, the front camera and/or the rear camera may receive external multimedia data. Each front camera and rear camera may be a fixed optical lens system or have focal length and optical zoom capabilities.
The audio component 210 is configured to output and/or input audio signals. For example, the audio component 210 includes a Microphone (MIC) configured to receive external audio signals when the equivalent key security assessment apparatus 200 is in an operational mode, such as a call mode, a recording mode, and a voice recognition mode. The received audio signals may be further stored in the memory 204 or transmitted via the communication component 216. In some embodiments, audio component 210 further includes a speaker for outputting audio signals.
The I/O interface 212 provides an interface between the processing assembly 202 and peripheral interface modules, which may be keyboards, click wheels, buttons, etc. These buttons may include, but are not limited to: homepage button, volume button, start button, and lock button.
The sensor assembly 214 includes one or more sensors for providing a state assessment of various aspects of the quantum key security assessment device 200. For example, the sensor assembly 214 may detect the on/off state of the quantum key security rating device 200, the relative positioning of the components, such as the display and keypad of the quantum key security rating device 200, the sensor assembly 214 may also detect the change in position of the quantum key security rating device 200 or a component of the quantum key security rating device 200, the presence or absence of a user's contact with the quantum key security rating device 200, the orientation or acceleration/deceleration of the quantum key security rating device 200, and the change in temperature of the quantum key security rating device 200. The sensor assembly 214 may include a proximity sensor configured to detect the presence of nearby objects in the absence of any physical contact. The sensor assembly 214 may also include a light sensor, such as a CMOS or CCD image sensor, for use in imaging applications. In some embodiments, the sensor assembly 214 may also include an acceleration sensor, a gyroscopic sensor, a magnetic sensor, a pressure sensor, or a temperature sensor.
The communication component 216 is configured to facilitate communication between the quantum key security assessment apparatus 200 and other devices in a wired or wireless manner. The quantum key security assessment device 200 may access a wireless network based on a communication standard, such as WiFi,2G or 3G, or a combination thereof. In one exemplary embodiment, the communication component 216 receives broadcast signals or broadcast related information from an external broadcast management system via a broadcast channel. In an exemplary embodiment, the communication component 216 further includes a Near Field Communication (NFC) module to facilitate short range communications. For example, the NFC module may be implemented based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, infrared data association (IrDA) technology, ultra Wideband (UWB) technology, bluetooth (BT) technology, and other technologies.
In an exemplary embodiment, the quantum key security assessment apparatus 200 may be implemented by one or more Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), digital Signal Processors (DSPs), digital Signal Processing Devices (DSPDs), programmable Logic Devices (PLDs), field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic elements for performing any of the quantum key security assessment methods described above.
In an exemplary embodiment, a non-transitory computer readable storage medium is also provided, such as a memory 204, comprising instructions executable by the processor 220 of the quantum key security assessment device 200 to perform the above-described method. For example, the non-transitory computer readable storage medium may be ROM, random Access Memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, optical data storage device, etc.
It is further understood that the term "plurality" in this disclosure means two or more, and other adjectives are similar thereto. "and/or", describes an association relationship of an association object, and indicates that there may be three relationships, for example, a and/or B, and may indicate: a exists alone, A and B exist together, and B exists alone. The character "/" generally indicates that the context-dependent object is an "or" relationship. The singular forms "a," "an," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
It is further understood that the terms "first," "second," and the like are used to describe various information, but such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one type of information from another and do not denote a particular order or importance. Indeed, the expressions "first", "second", etc. may be used entirely interchangeably. For example, first information may also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information, without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
It will be further understood that "connected" includes both direct connection where no other member is present and indirect connection where other element is present, unless specifically stated otherwise.
It will be further understood that although operations are depicted in the drawings in a particular order, this should not be understood as requiring that such operations be performed in the particular order shown or in sequential order, or that all illustrated operations be performed, to achieve desirable results. In certain circumstances, multitasking and parallel processing may be advantageous.
Other embodiments of the disclosure will be apparent to those skilled in the art from consideration of the specification and practice of the disclosure disclosed herein. This application is intended to cover any adaptations, uses, or adaptations of the disclosure following, in general, the principles of the disclosure and including such departures from the present disclosure as come within known or customary practice within the art to which the disclosure pertains. It is intended that the specification and examples be considered as exemplary only, with a true scope and spirit of the disclosure being indicated by the following claims.
It is to be understood that the present disclosure is not limited to the precise arrangements and instrumentalities shown in the drawings, and that various modifications and changes may be effected without departing from the scope thereof. The scope of the present disclosure is limited only by the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (6)
1. The quantum key security assessment method is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
acquiring an optical pulse signal sequence of which the quantum key is to be determined to be safe, wherein the optical pulse signal sequence comprises a quantum key sent to a receiver by a sender;
in response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that a post-pulse effect exists for the optical pulse signal sequence, determining a security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence based on detecting a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence;
the determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect comprises:
determining pulse values corresponding to all the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence;
determining an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at a first code length and an expected value of a second code length based on the pulse value, the second code length being substantially greater than the first code length;
if the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence and a post-pulse effect exists in the optical pulse signal sequence;
The first threshold interval is determined based on the average value, and the expected value belongs to the first threshold interval;
the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by the following method, which comprises the following steps:
determining a second probability and a third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the optical pulse signal sequence of a third code length;
the second probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is detected under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has no post-pulse effect, and the third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is detected under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has the post-pulse effect;
and determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second probability and the third probability and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
2. The quantum key security assessment method of claim 1, wherein determining the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence comprises:
determining sequence of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the third probability and the optical pulse signal sequence of the third code length;
Determining transmission loss of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the sequence through an alzhima inequality;
and determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the transmission loss and the second probability.
3. A quantum key security assessment device, the quantum key security assessment device comprising:
an acquisition unit, configured to acquire an optical pulse signal sequence of which quantum key security is to be determined, where the optical pulse signal sequence includes a quantum key sent from a sender to a receiver;
a determining unit configured to determine, in response to determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that a post-pulse effect exists in the optical pulse signal sequence, security of a quantum key included in the optical pulse signal sequence based on a first detection rate at which the optical pulse signal sequence is detected;
the determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is a dependent pulse sequence and that the optical pulse signal sequence has a post-pulse effect comprises:
determining pulse values corresponding to all the optical pulse signals in the optical pulse signal sequence;
determining an average value of the optical pulse signal sequence at a first code length and an expected value of a second code length based on the pulse value, the second code length being substantially greater than the first code length;
If the first probability of the absolute difference between the average value and the expected value is smaller than or equal to a first threshold interval, determining that the optical pulse signal sequence is an independent pulse sequence and a post-pulse effect exists in the optical pulse signal sequence;
the first threshold interval is determined based on the average value, and the expected value belongs to the first threshold interval;
the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence is determined by the following method, which comprises the following steps:
determining a second probability and a third probability of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the optical pulse signal sequence of a third code length;
the second probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is detected under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has no post-pulse effect, and the third probability is the probability that the optical pulse signal with the third code length is detected under the condition that the optical pulse signal with the third code length has the post-pulse effect;
and determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second probability and the third probability and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence.
4. A quantum key security assessment device according to claim 3, wherein said determining unit is adapted to determine the first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the second and third probabilities and a total code length of the optical pulse signal sequence in the following way:
Determining sequence of the optical pulse signal sequence based on the third probability and the optical pulse signal sequence of the third code length;
determining transmission loss of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the sequence through an alzhima inequality;
and determining a first detection rate of the optical pulse signal sequence according to the transmission loss and the second probability.
5. An electronic device, the electronic device comprising:
a memory for storing instructions; and
a processor for invoking the instructions stored in the memory to perform the quantum key security assessment method of any of claims 1-2.
6. A computer readable storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by a processor, perform the quantum key security assessment method of any of claims 1-2.
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