CN113422668A - Cooperative communication transmission method based on crisp-resistant relay - Google Patents
Cooperative communication transmission method based on crisp-resistant relay Download PDFInfo
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- CN113422668A CN113422668A CN202110661292.3A CN202110661292A CN113422668A CN 113422668 A CN113422668 A CN 113422668A CN 202110661292 A CN202110661292 A CN 202110661292A CN 113422668 A CN113422668 A CN 113422668A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
- H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
- H04K3/224—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring with countermeasures at transmission and/or reception of the jammed signal, e.g. stopping operation of transmitter or receiver, nulling or enhancing transmitted power in direction of or at frequency of jammer
- H04K3/226—Selection of non-jammed channel for communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
- H04B7/14—Relay systems
- H04B7/15—Active relay systems
- H04B7/155—Ground-based stations
- H04B7/15528—Control of operation parameters of a relay station to exploit the physical medium
- H04B7/15542—Selecting at relay station its transmit and receive resources
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
- H04B7/14—Relay systems
- H04B7/15—Active relay systems
- H04B7/155—Ground-based stations
- H04B7/15528—Control of operation parameters of a relay station to exploit the physical medium
- H04B7/1555—Selecting relay station antenna mode, e.g. selecting omnidirectional -, directional beams, selecting polarizations
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
- H04B7/14—Relay systems
- H04B7/15—Active relay systems
- H04B7/155—Ground-based stations
- H04B7/15564—Relay station antennae loop interference reduction
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
- H04K3/22—Countermeasures against jamming including jamming detection and monitoring
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/06—Selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS]; Services to user groups; One-way selective calling services
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
Abstract
A cooperative communication transmission method based on an anti-fragile relay is used for different interference adaptability communications of a communication system, wherein the communication system comprises an information source, an information sink (a primary user, a secondary user 1 and a secondary user 2), the anti-fragile relay, an enemy jammer and an enemy eavesdropper, and the anti-fragile relay re-encodes and transmits a source end signal to be transmitted by the information source after analyzing the type of the enemy jammer, so that a better communication effect is achieved. Compared with the traditional anti-interference method, the method realizes the communication gain relative to the non-interference condition by utilizing the existence of the enemy jammer.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of mobile communication, and develops research on a cooperative communication transmission method based on an anti-brittle relay in order to solve the problems that the traditional anti-interference mode is strong in directivity, high in complexity, extremely hardened in equipment, incapable of providing higher protection and the like.
Background
Electromagnetic interference is a persistent interference threat of wireless communication, and with the continuous development of modern technologies, the complexity of interference is continuously increased, the current main methods for dealing with such interference are interference detection and interference mitigation, and the increase of the interference complexity means the complexity of a coping strategy is also correspondingly increased, unfortunately, the interference complexity increase by a small extent may need to be solved along with the increase of the complexity of an anti-interference device, which causes extreme hardening of wireless devices, thereby sacrificing communication performance and failing to provide more advanced interference protection. Therefore, in order to avoid such a tendency, it is considered to introduce the use of interferers into wireless communication.
Brittleness resistance is a term proposed by nasimm tarel in 2012, and brittleness resistance refers to a system that has increased functionality, elasticity, or robustness due to errors, faults, attacks. The anti-brittleness idea is applied to the communication field, namely 'benefit from interference', and the communication capacity is improved by utilizing communication interference, communication cheating, network attack and the like existing in the communication field. The concept of brittleness resistance is fundamentally different from the concepts of elasticity (ability to recover from failure) and robustness (ability to resist failure). The elasticity can resist impact and keep unchanged; the resistance to brittleness will become better.
While elastic systems can also resist harsh conditions relative to a brittle system, the elastic system performance never exceeds the baseline, and a brittle system does so. Cognitive systems typically incorporate manual computational processes that can perform actions based on their own goals and perception of the world, and can learn from experience. In the wireless domain, cognition is typically discussed in the context of cognitive radio, which can perform well under various harsh conditions. The anti-brittleness system may of course contain cognitive components, but cognitive systems are only resistant to brittleness if they satisfy the ability to raise some aspect from a negative condition.
As the complexity of communication systems and jammers increases, reactive interference may become a greater threat in military and other critical areas. The combination of vulnerability resistance may improve not only the protection of the radio but also the performance under harsh conditions.
Therefore, a transmission method is proposed that applies the anti-brittleness concept in wireless communication, where the pressure source is a jammer, improving the communication capacity by spoofing and utilizing an enemy jammer.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a cooperative communication transmission method based on an anti-fragile relay, which overcomes the problems in the prior art and improves the communication capability of the own party by utilizing the interference of the enemy.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention for solving the technical problems is as follows: a cooperative communication transmission method based on an anti-fragile relay is used for different interference adaptability communications of a communication system, the communication system comprises an information source, an information sink, the anti-fragile relay, an enemy jammer and an enemy eavesdropper, the anti-fragile relay recodes a source end signal to be sent by the information source and sends the source end signal to the information sink after analyzing the type of the enemy jammer, the information sink comprises a master user and a plurality of secondary users, and the specific method comprises the following steps:
step 1, detection stage
Step 1.1, periodically sending signals which are known by an information source, an information sink and the anti-crisp relay and do not carry any useful information, namely consensus signals to channels through a preset channel, wherein the channel comprises a channel 1-channel n, the frequency of the channel 1-channel n is different, and different channels are mutually orthogonal and do not interfere with each other;
step 1.2, a master user carries out delay estimation on a mixed signal of a consensus signal sent by the brittle-resistant relay and an interference signal sent by an enemy jammer, the working frequency band and the interference type of the enemy jammer are analyzed and determined by comparing the signal characteristics of the consensus signal and the interference signal and the channel where the consensus signal and the interference signal are located, and the analysis process is carried out in a machine learning mode;
step 1.3, the master user carries out periodic broadcasting through a Beacon frame or an enhanced Beacon frame, information of an enemy jammer working frequency range and an interference type of a microcontroller in the information source is transmitted to an anti-brittle relay to serve as a reference for coding when the signals are sent, meanwhile, the Beacon frame is subjected to digital signature and public key encryption, and the anti-brittle relay decrypts the received broadcast signals from the master user and extracts the information for use when the information is subsequently recoded;
Step 2.1, the source sends a source end signal to the anti-brittle relay;
2.2, the brittle-resistant relay recodes the source end signal by utilizing the information about the working frequency band and the interference type of the enemy jammer carried in the broadcast signal returned by the main user, so that the source end signal is converted into a relay signal with deception, and the relay signal is transmitted to a corresponding channel according to the working frequency band information of the enemy jammer by a transmitter with the function of beamforming at the brittle-resistant relay;
step 2.3, after receiving the relay signal with deception, the enemy jammer recodes the received relay signal with deception according to the set interference type and sends the recoded relay signal to the channel, the signal sent by the enemy jammer becomes an available signal without interference function, and the enemy jammer serves as a relay node;
and 2.4, after the main user receives the mixed signal of the deceptive relay signal and the available signal, separating the deceptive relay signal and the available signal through delay estimation analyzed in the detection stage and the type of an enemy jammer, and reducing the mixed signal to a source end signal to the maximum extent in a maximum ratio combining mode.
The Beacon frame control field is modified, anti-crisp information interaction is added, an eavesdropper is prevented from intercepting information and modifying related data, and a digital signature and a public key encryption algorithm are added to the Beacon frame.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: compared with the traditional anti-interference strategy in which the wireless equipment is extremely hardened and has poor adaptability to different interferences, the method can better adapt to the interferences of different reactive interference machines and make corresponding adjustments through machine learning, thereby improving the communication quality of the own party, expanding the communication range, optimizing the resource allocation and reducing the communication quality of eavesdroppers of enemies.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic view of a communication system scenario based on a fragile relay according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a modified view of the frame structure of the Beacon control field according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The process of the present invention is further illustrated below with reference to specific examples.
It is to be understood that the described embodiments are merely exemplary of the invention, and not restrictive of the full scope of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In a communication system shown in fig. 1, there are an information source, an information sink (a primary user, a secondary user 1, a secondary user 2 … …), an anti-fragile relay, an enemy jammer, and an enemy eavesdropper, and the anti-fragile relay re-encodes a source-end signal to be sent by the information source and sends the encoded signal to the information sink after analyzing the type of the enemy jammer, so as to achieve a better communication effect, and the specific process is as follows: as shown in fig. 2, the flow chart of the present invention, the specific method of the present invention is as follows:
first, detecting stage
(1) The anti-crisp relay periodically sends signals which are known by an information source, an information sink and the anti-crisp relay and do not carry any useful information, namely common identification signals to the channels through preset channels (the frequencies of the channels 1-n are different, so that the different channels are mutually orthogonal and do not interfere with each other).
(2) The master user carries out delay estimation on the received mixed signal (the mixture of the consensus signal sent by the anti-brittle relay and the interference signal sent by the enemy jammer) through a microcontroller in the master user, namely the master user estimates the time difference between the received consensus signal and the interference signal. The working frequency band and the interference type of an enemy jammer are determined by comparing the signal characteristics (peak-to-average ratio, cross correlation and the like) of the consensus signal and the interference signal and the channel where the consensus signal and the interference signal are located, and the analysis process is carried out in a machine learning mode.
(3) The master user carries out periodic broadcasting through a Beacon frame or an enhanced Beacon frame, an analysis result (an enemy jammer working frequency range and an interference type) of a microcontroller in the information source is transmitted to the anti-crisp relay to serve as a reference for coding when the signal is sent, meanwhile, the Beacon frame is subjected to digital signature and public key encryption to reduce the information stealing capability of an eavesdropper on the enemy, and the anti-crisp relay decrypts a received analysis result broadcasting signal from the master user and extracts the information for subsequent use.
Second, using stage
(1) And the source sends the source end signal to the anti-crisp relay.
(2) The anti-fragile relay recodes the source end signal by utilizing the information about the working frequency band and the interference type of the square jammer carried in the broadcast signal returned by the main user, so that the source end signal is converted into a fraudulent relay signal. And transmitting the information into a corresponding channel according to the working frequency band information of the enemy jammer by a transmitter with a beam forming function at the brittle-resistant relay.
(3) After receiving the relay signal with deception, the enemy jammer re-encodes the received relay signal with deception according to the set interference type and sends the re-encoded relay signal to the channel, and the signal sent by the enemy jammer becomes an available signal without interference function. At the moment, the enemy jammer can serve as a relay node, the communication range is expanded, and the probability that an enemy eavesdropper receives own information is reduced.
(4) After the master user receives the mixed signal of the deceptive relay signal and the available signal, the deceptive relay signal and the available signal can be accurately separated through the delay analyzed in the detection stage and the type of the enemy jammer, and the mixed signal is restored to the source end signal to the maximum extent in a maximum ratio combining mode, so that the aim of improving the communication quality is fulfilled.
The method is different from the traditional anti-interference method, has stronger adaptability to different types of interference, and better deals with different types of interference through a machine learning mode.
An enemy jammer can be utilized through a deceptive relay signal formed by the brittle relay beam, so that the enemy jammer can serve as a self-party relay node, and the communication transmission range is expanded. Meanwhile, under the condition that the communication quality of the master user is guaranteed to be reliable enough, different deceptive relay signals are sent to different channels to achieve communication with users in different frequency bands, the resource allocation problem is optimized, and the frequency spectrum efficiency is improved.
The Beacon frame control field is modified, as shown in figure 3, an anti-brittle information interaction function is added, and in order to prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting information and changing related data, the digital signature and public key encryption algorithm are added to the Beacon frame to reduce the possibility that the eavesdropper of an enemy intercepts the information.
Example 1
As shown in fig. 1, in the communication system, there are an information source, an information sink (primary user, secondary user 1, secondary user 2), an anti-fragile relay, an enemy jammer, and an enemy eavesdropper, and after analyzing the type of the enemy jammer, the anti-fragile relay re-encodes and transmits a source end signal to be transmitted by the information source, thereby achieving a better communication effect. The invention has the beneficial effects that: compared with the traditional anti-interference method, the method realizes the communication gain relative to the non-interference condition by utilizing the existence of the enemy jammer, and comprises the following steps:
in this example, because the channel state is not ideal, the anti-brittle relay cannot transmit signals to the secondary user 1 and the secondary user 2, the information source can only communicate with the anti-brittle relay, the enemy includes two enemy jammers working at different frequency bands and having different interference types and an enemy eavesdropper, and the enemy eavesdropper knows the types of the enemy jammers and the working frequency bands; (the type of enemy jammer 1: the received signal amplitude is expanded to A times and then retransmitted; the type of enemy jammer 2: the received signal frequency is expanded to K times and then retransmitted; the jammer types are numbered by binary numbers).
(1) The anti-brittle relay periodically sends the consensus signals to the channels through preset channels (the channels are 1-4; the frequencies of the channels are different, so that the different channels are mutually orthogonal and do not interfere with each other, and the channels are numbered through two-bit binary numbers), and the aim is to enable a master user to receive a mixed signal containing the consensus signals sent by the anti-brittle relay and interference signals sent by an enemy jammer, separate the consensus signals from the interference signals through a microcontroller at the master user, analyze and integrate the types and the working frequency bands of the enemy jammers, and feed back interaction information to the anti-brittle relay through Beacon broadcast signals.
(2) Modification of Beacon Control field frame structure is shown in FIG. 3, the invention sets B3-B4 bits in BA Control to carry enemy jammer type information, B5-B6 bits represent channels where corresponding enemy jammers are located, and binary numbers represent different types of enemy jammers and different channels. In order to reduce the probability of interception of the broadcast signal, the broadcast signal is digitally signed and public key encrypted.
(3) The source sends a source end signal to the anti-crisp relay, and the anti-crisp relay recodes the source end signal through a broadcast signal received from a master user to convert the source end signal into a relay signal with deception. If the signal sent to the enemy jammer 1 is changed into 1/A times to be sent; the frequency of a signal sent to the enemy jammer 2 is widened to be 1/K times and sent, and meanwhile, the frequency spectrum efficiency is improved by combining with physical layer grid coding.
(4) The enemy jammer receives the deceptive relay signal, re-encodes the relay signal according to the set interference type and transmits the recoded relay signal to a channel, and at the moment, the interference signal which originally has the interference effect is changed into an available signal which does not have the interference function and carries source end signal information.
(5) The delay between the relay signal and the interference signal mainly comprises the delay on the channel distance and the delay of an interference machine, a main user end has two conditions after receiving the mixed signal, the first condition is that the delay is too small, and the symbols are overlapped to cause that a main user of the same-frequency signal cannot distinguish, at the moment, if the signal-to-noise ratio of the interference signal is very high, the anti-vulnerability gain can be obtained without orthogonal time-frequency performance, because the combination is not needed, the available signal can be directly regarded as a source end signal at the main user; the second case is that the delay is large enough, the primary user can orthogonally receive the relay signal with deception and the available signal, and independently separate and demodulate the signal, and then the vulnerability can be resisted and the probability of receiving the correct signal can be improved by the mode of maximal ratio combination. Meanwhile, different interference types can be analyzed more accurately and more quickly in a machine learning mode.
(6) The eavesdropping end is deceived and utilized by the enemy interference machine, so that the signal obtained by the enemy eavesdropper through signal demodulation is actually not the source end signal which the information source wants to transmit, and the eavesdropping capability of the enemy is reduced.
(7) The secondary user 1 and the secondary user 2 cannot receive signals with large enough signal-to-noise ratio due to non-ideal channel states, and after the signals are added into the anti-crisp relay, the enemy jammer is deceived to serve as a relay node of the enemy, and the sent signals are transmitted to the secondary user 1 and the secondary user 2 as available signals, so that the communication range is expanded.
(8) Under the condition of ensuring that the communication quality of the master user is reliable enough, the communication with the users in different frequency bands is realized by sending different deception signals to different channels, so that the problem of resource allocation is optimized, and the frequency spectrum efficiency is improved.
The invention is suitable for the communication environment with enemy interference and eavesdroppers, and can greatly improve the own communication performance and reduce the eavesdropping capability of the enemy.
Claims (2)
1. A cooperative communication transmission method based on an anti-crisp relay is characterized in that: the method is used for different interference adaptability communication of a communication system, the communication system comprises a signal source, a signal sink, an anti-crisp relay, an enemy jammer and an enemy eavesdropper, the anti-crisp relay is used for recoding a source end signal to be sent by the signal source and sending the recoded source end signal to the signal sink after analyzing the type of the enemy jammer, the signal sink comprises a main user and a plurality of secondary users, and the specific method comprises the following steps:
step 1, detection stage
Step 1.1, periodically sending signals which are known by an information source, an information sink and the anti-crisp relay and do not carry any useful information, namely consensus signals to channels through a preset channel, wherein the channel comprises a channel 1-channel n, the frequency of the channel 1-channel n is different, and different channels are mutually orthogonal and do not interfere with each other;
step 1.2, a master user carries out delay estimation on a mixed signal of a consensus signal sent by the brittle-resistant relay and an interference signal sent by an enemy jammer, the working frequency band and the interference type of the enemy jammer are analyzed and determined by comparing the signal characteristics of the consensus signal and the interference signal and the channel where the consensus signal and the interference signal are located, and the analysis process is carried out in a machine learning mode;
step 1.3, the master user carries out periodic broadcasting through a Beacon frame or an enhanced Beacon frame, information of an enemy jammer working frequency range and an interference type of a microcontroller in the information source is transmitted to an anti-brittle relay to serve as a reference for coding when the signals are sent, meanwhile, the Beacon frame is subjected to digital signature and public key encryption, and the anti-brittle relay decrypts the received broadcast signals from the master user and extracts the information for use when the information is subsequently recoded;
step 2, utilization stage
Step 2.1, the source sends a source end signal to the anti-brittle relay;
2.2, the brittle-resistant relay recodes the source end signal by utilizing the information about the working frequency band and the interference type of the enemy jammer carried in the broadcast signal returned by the main user, so that the source end signal is converted into a relay signal with deception, and the relay signal is transmitted to a corresponding channel according to the working frequency band information of the enemy jammer by a transmitter with the function of beamforming at the brittle-resistant relay;
step 2.3, after receiving the relay signal with deception, the enemy jammer recodes the received relay signal with deception according to the set interference type and sends the recoded relay signal to the channel, the signal sent by the enemy jammer becomes an available signal without interference function, and the enemy jammer serves as a relay node;
and 2.4, after the main user receives the mixed signal of the deceptive relay signal and the available signal, separating the deceptive relay signal and the available signal through delay estimation analyzed in the detection stage and the type of an enemy jammer, and reducing the mixed signal to a source end signal to the maximum extent in a maximum ratio combining mode.
2. The cooperative communication transmission method based on the fragile relay as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the Beacon frame control field is modified, anti-crisp information interaction is added, an eavesdropper is prevented from intercepting information and modifying related data, and a digital signature and a public key encryption algorithm are added to the Beacon frame.
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