CN113371057B - Motor control device - Google Patents
Motor control device Download PDFInfo
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- CN113371057B CN113371057B CN202110205597.3A CN202110205597A CN113371057B CN 113371057 B CN113371057 B CN 113371057B CN 202110205597 A CN202110205597 A CN 202110205597A CN 113371057 B CN113371057 B CN 113371057B
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- motor
- failure
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B62—LAND VEHICLES FOR TRAVELLING OTHERWISE THAN ON RAILS
- B62D—MOTOR VEHICLES; TRAILERS
- B62D5/00—Power-assisted or power-driven steering
- B62D5/04—Power-assisted or power-driven steering electrical, e.g. using an electric servo-motor connected to, or forming part of, the steering gear
- B62D5/0457—Power-assisted or power-driven steering electrical, e.g. using an electric servo-motor connected to, or forming part of, the steering gear characterised by control features of the drive means as such
- B62D5/0481—Power-assisted or power-driven steering electrical, e.g. using an electric servo-motor connected to, or forming part of, the steering gear characterised by control features of the drive means as such monitoring the steering system, e.g. failures
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B62—LAND VEHICLES FOR TRAVELLING OTHERWISE THAN ON RAILS
- B62D—MOTOR VEHICLES; TRAILERS
- B62D5/00—Power-assisted or power-driven steering
- B62D5/04—Power-assisted or power-driven steering electrical, e.g. using an electric servo-motor connected to, or forming part of, the steering gear
- B62D5/0457—Power-assisted or power-driven steering electrical, e.g. using an electric servo-motor connected to, or forming part of, the steering gear characterised by control features of the drive means as such
- B62D5/046—Controlling the motor
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B62—LAND VEHICLES FOR TRAVELLING OTHERWISE THAN ON RAILS
- B62D—MOTOR VEHICLES; TRAILERS
- B62D5/00—Power-assisted or power-driven steering
- B62D5/06—Power-assisted or power-driven steering fluid, i.e. using a pressurised fluid for most or all the force required for steering a vehicle
- B62D5/30—Safety devices, e.g. alternate emergency power supply or transmission means to ensure steering upon failure of the primary steering means
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
- H02P—CONTROL OR REGULATION OF ELECTRIC MOTORS, ELECTRIC GENERATORS OR DYNAMO-ELECTRIC CONVERTERS; CONTROLLING TRANSFORMERS, REACTORS OR CHOKE COILS
- H02P29/00—Arrangements for regulating or controlling electric motors, appropriate for both AC and DC motors
- H02P29/02—Providing protection against overload without automatic interruption of supply
- H02P29/024—Detecting a fault condition, e.g. short circuit, locked rotor, open circuit or loss of load
- H02P29/028—Detecting a fault condition, e.g. short circuit, locked rotor, open circuit or loss of load the motor continuing operation despite the fault condition, e.g. eliminating, compensating for or remedying the fault
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
- Transportation (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Power Steering Mechanism (AREA)
- Steering Control In Accordance With Driving Conditions (AREA)
- Control Of Electric Motors In General (AREA)
- Control Of Ac Motors In General (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a motor control device. In the motor control device adopting the redundancy structure, even if signal communication failure occurs between the control parts, the auxiliary operation can be continued. In a motor control device for driving an electric motor by a control unit (CPU) provided for a plurality of control systems, when a communication failure between central control units is determined based on the communication states of a control signal via a 1 st communication unit and a watchdog signal via a 2 nd communication unit, auxiliary control of the electric motor is continued by a control system that normally operates among the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to a motor control device for electric power steering, for example, having a redundant configuration including a plurality of motor control circuits.
Background
With the progress of automatic driving of a vehicle, it is demanded to continue automatic driving even if a component of an electronic control unit (Electronic Control Unit: ECU) fails, and for example, it is demanded that a steering device (electric power steering device) during automatic driving can continue steering even if a failure occurs.
The electric power steering apparatus is constituted by a motor control apparatus as an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), but for safety requirements and the like, fault detection is important. For this reason, for example, in the electronic control device of patent document 1, abnormality information based on a monitoring result of an execution cycle of a task periodically executed by a main microcomputer is communicated via a clock monitoring signal line and a calculation monitoring signal line to a clock monitoring circuit provided in a monitoring circuit that monitors clock abnormality of the main microcomputer and a calculation monitoring circuit that monitors abnormality of a calculation circuit of the main microcomputer.
In addition, in the electric power steering apparatus, the following redundant configuration is conventionally known: by providing two sets of inverter circuits for independently driving two sets of coil windings provided in the motor and by using a control circuit other than the inverter circuits as a dual system, even when an abnormality (failure) occurs in one system, motor control can be continued by the other system operating normally.
For example, patent document 2 discloses a motor control device as follows: each electronic component of the two systems is independently provided for each system, and a redundant structure of a complete dual system in which the two systems are composed of two independent element groups is adopted, and signal communication between a plurality of microcomputers is enabled.
Patent document 1: japanese patent No. 5477654
Patent document 2: japanese patent laid-open publication No. 2019-4682
In the electronic control device of patent document 1, when an abnormality of the main microcomputer is detected, a reset signal is outputted to restart the main microcomputer, or a drive permission signal of the pre-driver is turned off for a drive circuit of the motor to stop the pre-driver drive. Therefore, there is a problem in that steering assist cannot be continued when a failure occurs.
The motor control device described in patent document 2 immediately stops the assistance by the microcomputer itself when an abnormality occurs in communication between the microcomputers. That is, when the stop determination unit determines that the operation of the microcomputer itself is to be stopped when the inter-microcomputer communication or the communication means is abnormal, the motor drive by the microcomputer itself is stopped. Thus, even if the device has a redundant structure, when an abnormality occurs in communication between the microcomputers, an assist failure occurs in which assist based on degeneracy of one system cannot be continued.
Disclosure of Invention
The present application has been made in view of the above-described problems, and an object of the present application is to provide a motor control device that uses a redundant configuration including a plurality of systems, and that can continue motor control even when a signal communication failure occurs between control units.
As one means for achieving the above object and solving the above problems, the following structure is provided. That is, the application according to claim 1 is a motor control device including a plurality of control systems, the motor control device driving an electric motor by a central control unit provided for each control system, the motor control device including: a 1 st communication unit capable of communicating control signals between the 1 st control system and the central control unit of the 2 nd control system of the plurality of control systems; a 2 nd communication unit capable of transmitting and receiving an abnormality monitoring signal between the central control units; and a failure determination unit that determines whether or not there is a communication failure between the central control units based on the communication states of the control signal and the abnormality monitoring signal, wherein when the failure determination unit determines that the communication failure has occurred, drive control of the electric motor is continued by a control system that is normally operated from among the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system.
An exemplary application according to claim 2 is an electric power steering control device including a central control unit provided for each of a plurality of control systems, the electric power steering control device assisting a steering wheel operation of a driver of a vehicle or the like, the electric power steering control device including: an electric motor that assists steering of the driver; and the motor control device according to the application 1 described above is used to control the driving of the electric motor.
An exemplary application according to claim 3 is an electric power steering system including the electric power steering control device according to the exemplary application according to claim 2.
According to the present application, in the motor control device having the redundancy structure, when a signal communication failure occurs between the control units, the failure part can be specified at low cost, and the motor control corresponding to the specified failure part can be continued.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of an electric power steering system in which a motor control unit for electric power steering is mounted.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an electric power steering control device (EPS) as a motor control unit of the embodiment.
Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing a mutual communication structure between CPUs.
Fig. 4 is a flowchart showing an example of control processing in the motor control unit.
Fig. 5 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of the TXD line as an abnormality of the communication IC.
Fig. 6 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in the inter-CPU communication due to a failure of the RXD line as an abnormality of the communication IC.
Fig. 7 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of CPU-1.
Fig. 8 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of CPU-2.
Fig. 9 is a sequence diagram showing a failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (1).
Fig. 10 is a sequence diagram showing a failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (2).
Fig. 11 is a sequence diagram showing the failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (3).
Fig. 12 is a diagram showing steering assist control of the motor control unit in the case where the torque sensor of the system 2 fails.
Fig. 13 is a diagram showing steering assist control of the motor control unit in the case where the torque sensor of the 1 st system fails.
Description of the reference numerals
1: a motor control unit; 1a, 1b: a motor control device; 2: a steering wheel; 3: a rotation shaft; 4: a reduction gear; 6: a pinion gear; 7: a rack shaft; 9a, 9b: a torque sensor; 10: an electric power steering system; 11a, 11b: an angle sensor; 12a, 12b: a control unit (CPU); 13a, 13b: an inverter control unit; 14a, 14b: an inverter circuit; 15: an electric motor; 15a, 15b: a three-phase winding; 16a, 16b: a clock oscillation section; 19a, 19b: CANI/F;20a, 20b: a power supply section; 21a, 21b: a power management unit; 24a, 24b: an IG voltage detection unit; 27H, 27L: a CAN signal line; 27Ha, 27Hb: CAN-H line; 27La, 27Lb: CAN-L line; 29a, 29b: a Battery (BT) voltage monitoring unit; 30. 30a, 30b: isolating the IC;31: an ignition switch (IG-SW); BT: and a battery.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Fig. 1 is a schematic configuration of an electric power steering system in which an electric power steering control device (EPS) as a motor control unit according to an embodiment of the present invention is mounted. As shown in fig. 1, the electric power steering system 10 includes motor control devices 1a and 1b corresponding to two control systems constituting a motor control unit, a steering wheel 2 as a steering member, a rotary shaft 3 connected to the steering wheel 2, a pinion 6, a rack shaft 7, and the like.
The rotation shaft 3 is engaged with a pinion 6 provided at the front end thereof. The rotation of the rotation shaft 3 is converted into linear motion of the rack shaft 7 by the pinion 6, and the pair of wheels 5a, 5b provided at both ends of the rack shaft 7 are steered to an angle corresponding to the displacement amount of the rack shaft 7.
The rotation shaft 3 is provided with torque sensors 9a and 9b for detecting steering torque when the steering wheel 2 is operated, and the detected steering torque is transmitted to the motor control unit 1. The motor control unit 1 generates a motor drive signal based on signals such as steering torque obtained by the torque sensors 9a and 9b and a vehicle speed from a vehicle speed sensor (not shown), and outputs the signal to the electric motor 15 for electric power steering.
An assist torque for assisting steering of the steering wheel 2 is outputted from the electric motor 15 to which the motor drive signal is inputted, and the assist torque is transmitted to the rotary shaft 3 via the reduction gear 4. As a result, the rotation of the rotation shaft 3 is assisted by the torque generated by the electric motor 15, thereby assisting the steering operation of the driver.
Next, the motor control unit of the present embodiment will be described. Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an electric power steering control device (EPS) as a motor control unit of the present embodiment. As shown in fig. 2, the motor control unit 1 has a redundant structure constituted by two control systems (motor control devices 1a, 1 b) having the same structural elements (circuit components).
The redundant configuration is not limited to two systems, and may be developed to a redundant configuration composed of a plurality of systems such as three systems and four systems.
The motor control devices 1a and 1b are constituted by a 1 st system and a 2 nd system which are independent of each other, and the 1 st system and the 2 nd system have control units (CPUs) 12a and 12b, respectively. The motor control devices 1a and 1b have a double inverter structure including an electric motor 15 and two sets of inverter circuits 14a and 14b, wherein the electric motor 15 has a structure in which two sets of three-phase windings (Ua, va, wa) 15a and three-phase windings (Ub, vb, wb) 15b are coaxially provided, and the two sets of inverter circuits 14a and 14b supply drive currents to the two sets of three-phase windings, respectively. The electric motor 15 is, for example, a three-phase brushless DC motor.
The electric motor 15 is provided with rotation sensors (angle sensors) 11a and 11b for detecting the rotational position of the rotor of the motor, corresponding to the three-phase windings 15a and 15b, respectively. Output signals from the rotation sensors 11a, 11b are sent to the CPUs 12a, 12b as rotation information, respectively.
The motor control devices 1a, 1b independently drive the electric motor 15 based on sensor outputs from sensors, drive and control signals, and the like, respectively. Here, the configuration part including the motor control device 1a and the three-phase winding 15a is set as the 1 st system, and the configuration part including the motor control device 1b and the three-phase winding 15b is set as the 2 nd system.
The motor control device 1a constituting the 1 st system includes: a control unit (CPU) 12a, which is configured by, for example, a microprocessor, and is responsible for controlling the entire apparatus; an inverter control unit 13a that generates a motor drive signal based on a control signal from the CPU 12a and functions as an FET drive circuit; and an inverter circuit 14a as a motor driving section that supplies a driving current to three-phase windings (Ua, va, wa) 15a of the electric motor 15.
The motor control device 1b constituting the 2 nd system has, like the motor control device 1 a: a control unit (CPU) 12b that controls the entire apparatus; an inverter control unit 13b that generates a motor drive signal based on a control signal from the CPU 12b and functions as an FET drive circuit; and an inverter circuit 14b that supplies a prescribed drive current to three-phase windings (Ub, vb, wb) 15b of the electric motor 15.
The control units (CPU) 12a and 12b execute control operations, calculation operations, and the like based on operation clocks of predetermined frequencies output from the clock oscillation units 16a and 16b, respectively. In addition, the clock frequency may be multiplied in the control units (CPU) 12a and 12 b.
The CPUs 12a and 12b of the motor control devices 1a and 1b are configured to be capable of real-time communication with each other via an isolation IC 30 (details will be described later). The motor control devices 1a and 1b perform data communication with other control units (ECU) by a CAN protocol via CAN signal lines (CAN communication buses) 27H and 27L connected to an in-vehicle network (CAN (Controller Area Network, controller area network)) that transmits and receives various information of the vehicle.
The CAN signal lines 27H and 27L are two-wire communication lines each composed of a CAN-H line 27Ha and a CAN-L line 27La constituting the 1 st system, and a CAN-H line 27Hb and a CAN-L line 27Lb constituting the 2 nd system.
The power supply for driving the motor is supplied from the external battery BT to the inverter circuit 14a via a filter, not shown, that absorbs noise and the like contained in the supplied power supply to smooth the power supply voltage. Similarly, the power supply for driving the motor is supplied from the external battery BT to the inverter circuit 14b via a filter and a power relay, not shown.
The inverter circuit 14a is a FET bridge circuit composed of semiconductor switching elements (FETs) corresponding to the three-phase windings (Ua, va, wa) 15a of the electric motor 15, respectively. The inverter circuit 14b is a semiconductor switching element (FET) bridge circuit that is formed by semiconductor switching elements (FETs) corresponding to the three-phase windings (Ub, vb, wb) 15b of the electric motor 15.
These switching elements (FETs) are also called power elements, and semiconductor switching elements such as MOSFETs (Metal-Oxide Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor: metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistors) and IGBTs (Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor: insulated gate bipolar transistors) are used.
One end of an ignition switch (IG-SW) 31 is connected to the battery BT, and the other end is connected to the power management units 21a, 21b of the power units 20a, 20b, respectively. The other end of the IG-SW 31 is also connected to the IG voltage detecting units 24a and 24 b.
The power supply management units 21a and 21b activate the power supply units 20a and 20b when an ignition switch (IG-SW) 31 is turned on. The power supply units 20a and 20B convert a battery voltage +b supplied from the battery BT into a predetermined voltage (for example, a voltage +5v of a logic level), and supply operation power as control circuits for the control units (CPU) 12a and 12B, BT voltage monitoring units 29a and 29B, inverter control units 13a and 13B, and the like.
The IG voltage detecting units 24a and 24b AD-convert the Ignition (IG) voltage values, and input the converted digital voltage values to the CPUs 12a and 12b as actual voltage values of the IG voltages of the 1 st and 2 nd systems. The IG voltage detecting units 24a and 24b may be disposed in the CPUs 12a and 12b, respectively.
The Battery (BT) voltage monitoring units 29a and 29B receive the battery voltage (+b) of the battery BT, perform AD conversion, and input the converted digital voltage value as the Battery (BT) voltage value to the CPUs 12a and 12B. The Battery (BT) voltage monitoring unit 29 determines whether or not the battery voltage value is equal to or higher than a predetermined voltage value (whether or not a voltage value that enables the control circuit or the like to operate is satisfied).
Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing a mutual communication structure between the CPUs 12a, 12 b. As shown in fig. 3, a pair of communication lines (TXD line, RXD line) for asynchronous serial communication of control information and the like and a pair of communication lines (WDP 1 line, WDP2 line) for exchanging WDP (watchdog pulse) signals are provided between the CPUs 12a, 12 b. The number of signal lines required for communication can be minimized, and a low-cost structure can be realized.
The communication system via the TXD line and the RXD line is UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transceiver) and is configured to enable real-time mutual communication between the CPUs 12a and 12 b. The UART has a structure with a smaller number of signal lines than the clock synchronization method.
As shown in fig. 3, the isolation IC 30 (see fig. 1) that electrically isolates the CPU 12a, 12b is composed of an isolation IC 30a that electrically isolates the TXD line and the RXD line and an isolation IC 30b that electrically isolates the WDP1 line and the WDP2 line.
The isolation ICs 30a and 30b are semiconductor circuit elements capable of transmitting high-frequency signals while maintaining electrical insulation between the input side and the output side of the communication paths (TXD line, RXD line, WDP1 line, WDP2 line) described above. By isolating the ICs 30a, 30b, propagation of faults to the counterpart system can be prevented.
In the example shown in fig. 3, for example, isolation ICs having a total of two channel numbers of 2 are arranged corresponding to a pair of communication lines (TXD line, RXD line) and a pair of communication lines (WDP 1 line, WDP2 line) in order to prevent a common cause of failure, but the present invention is not limited thereto. For example, four isolation ICs having a channel number of 1 may be disposed on separate communication lines. By disposing an isolation IC for each signal line, more complicated failure determination (double failure or the like) can be made.
Next, the operation of the motor control unit according to the present embodiment will be described. Fig. 4 is a flowchart showing an example of control processing in the motor control unit 1.
When the power supply units 20a and 20b generate +5v and supply power to the CPUs 12a and 12b, in step S11 of fig. 4, OS start processing is performed. That is, an Operating System (OS) stored In a storage unit (not shown) In advance is started, and based on the voltage detection results of IG voltage detection units 24a and 24b, control units (CPUs) 12a and 12b of the respective systems of motor control unit 1 confirm that the state (IG state) of an ignition switch of the own System is IG-on, confirm a checksum In the storage unit (not shown) storing a control program or the like, perform Self-diagnosis based on a diagnostic function BIST (build-In Self-Test) of CPUs 12a and 12b, initialize functions of the CPUs, confirm a reset operation of an external Watchdog (WD) not shown, and the like.
In step S12 after the OS is started, a watchdog signal is transmitted and received between the CPUs 12a and 12 b. In the subsequent step S13, the CPUs 12a, 12b each start inter-CPU communication.
In step S15, an initial diagnostic sequence is started in each system. Then, in step S16, as the initial diagnosis a, for example, the presence or absence of a short-circuit fault of the inverter circuit is diagnosed by a current detection unit not shown.
The CPU of each system determines the state of the other system in step S17. When it is determined that the partner system has shifted to the predetermined failure operation state, the initial diagnosis of the own system is stopped in step S35.
When the partner system is not in the failure operation state, the CPU of each system starts inter-CPU communication diagnosis with the CPU of the partner system in step S18. Here, since the inter-CPU communication diagnosis is started to some extent after the initial diagnosis is performed, the initial diagnosis B is performed (for example, whether or not there is an overcurrent to the electric motor is determined) in step S19 after the initial diagnosis a is performed and after the inter-CPU communication diagnosis is started.
In the motor control unit of the present embodiment, in consideration of, for example, a voltage drop due to a start (cranking) causing only other systems to reset and communication between CPUs to be impossible, at step S20, waiting for at least the Worst Time (Worst Time) required for other systems to start OS restart is started. Then, in the subsequent step S21, the CPU of each system determines whether or not the inter-CPU communication with the CPU of the counterpart system is established.
If there is no UART timeout, UART checksum abnormality, UART survival counter (alive counter) abnormality, or the like, for example, it is determined that the inter-CPU communication is normal. However, when UART timeout and WD abnormality occur simultaneously, for example, in the case where other system reset and UART and WD cannot transmit due to startup, the UART timeout and WD may not be regarded as abnormality.
If the inter-CPU communication between the systems is not established (no in step S21), the CPU 12a or 12b determines whether or not both the UART and WD are in the unreceived state in step S22. When either UART or WD is received, in step S23, a failure mode determination (failure diagnosis) described later is performed. In the subsequent step S25, a malfunction operation (1) corresponding to the malfunction mode determined in step S23 is performed. The details of the malfunction (1) will be described later.
On the other hand, if it is determined in step S22 that neither UART nor WD has been received, it is determined in step S27 whether or not the time accumulated from the start of the Operating System (OS) has elapsed. When the worst time (for example, 200 ms) required for the OS start-up has elapsed, it is determined that there is a problem in the initial diagnostic sequence, and communication diagnosis (failure of the counterpart system) by the two systems cannot be performed, and the operation proceeds to the failure operation (2) of step S29, and control using the own system is performed.
If the accumulated worst time has not elapsed (no in step S27), the process returns to the process of determining whether or not the communication with the CPU of the counterpart system is established (step S21).
If it is determined in step S21 that the inter-CPU communication is established, in step S28, for example, a deviation diagnosis for a predetermined sensor class is performed as the initial diagnosis C. Then, the initial diagnostic sequence is ended in step S31, and normal control (steering assist control) is started in step S33.
As described above, each system is independently started, and a spare communication line for handshake is not required, so that the motor control unit can be configured at a low cost.
Further, by taking the worst time into consideration and starting the inter-CPU communication diagnosis in the middle of the initial diagnosis sequence, it is possible to grasp the presence or absence of a failure in the inter-CPU communication as early as possible. Further, since the control is performed in consideration of the lapse of the accumulation time after each system is started alone, it is possible to wait before the timing at which the two systems can reliably communicate.
Next, a control operation (failure handling processing) corresponding to a failure in communication between CPUs in the motor control unit of the present embodiment will be described. In the following description, the CPUs 12a and 12b are referred to as CPU-1 and CPU-2, respectively, the inverter control unit 13a and the inverter circuit 14a are referred to as INV-1, and the inverter control unit 13b and the inverter circuit 14b are referred to as INV-2.
< processing for handling failure in case of abnormality of communication IC >)
The following describes the fault handling processing in the case where it is determined that an abnormality has occurred in the communication IC (isolation IC 30) as a fault mode in the fault diagnosis of step S23 shown in fig. 4, in the normal assist control of step S33 and in the inter-CPU communication diagnosis of each of the fault operation of steps S25 and S29 and the fault operation thereafter. The failure mode here includes, in addition to an abnormal operation of the circuit elements as the isolation IC 30, a disconnection or adhesion failure of the TXD line or the RXD line.
Fig. 5 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of the TXD line as an abnormality of the communication IC. Fig. 6 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in the inter-CPU communication due to a failure of the RXD line.
As shown in fig. 5, in the case where the TXD line, which is a communication path between CPUs, is faulty and the RXD line, WDP1 line, WDP2 line, which is another communication path, are normal, in step S41, since the information from CPU-1 is interrupted, CPU-2 detects a communication abnormality with CPU-1. Then, in step S43, the CPU-2 notifies the CPU-1 of the detection of the communication abnormality, and in step S45, the operation of the INV-2 is stopped.
The CPU-1 receives the communication abnormality notification from the CPU-2 (step S43), and in step S47, performs steering assist control for maintaining 50% of the motor output at normal time by INV-1, as the above-described faulty operation (1). This is the auxiliary control of the motor drive continued by one of the two systems.
On the other hand, as shown in fig. 6, when the RXD line, which is the communication path between the CPUs, is faulty and the TXD line, WDP1 line, and WDP2 line, which are other communication paths, are normal, in step S51, the CPU-1 detects a communication abnormality with the CPU-2 due to an interruption of information from the CPU-2. Then, in step S53, the CPU-1 notifies the CPU-2 of the detection of the communication abnormality.
When there is an abnormality in communication with the CPU-1, the CPU-2 stops the operation of the INV-2 in step S55. In contrast, in step S57, the CPU-1 performs steering assist control for maintaining 50% of the motor output at the normal time by INV-1, and operates as the above-described failure (1). In this case, too, the malfunction operation of the motor drive is continued by one of the two systems is performed.
< processing for handling failure in case of CPU abnormality >)
The failure handling processing in the case where an operation abnormality of the CPU itself is determined as a failure mode of inter-CPU communication will be described.
Fig. 7 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of CPU-1. Fig. 8 is an example of a failure handling processing sequence in the case where an abnormality occurs in inter-CPU communication due to a failure of CPU-2.
When the signal output from the TXD line and the signal output from the WDP1 line are stopped due to a failure of the CPU-1, for example, as shown in fig. 7, a normal signal is transmitted from the CPU-2 operating normally through the RXD line and the WDP2 line.
In this case, since the control information from the other CPU (CPU-1) is interrupted and the watchdog pulse WDP1 indicating whether or not the CPU-1 is operating is not output from the CPU-1, the CPU-2 detects that an abnormality in the operation of the CPU-1 has occurred in step S61.
Accordingly, when the CPU-1 fails, the CPU-2 performs steering assist control to maintain 50% of the motor output at normal time by the INV-2 in step S63, and operates as the above-described failure (1).
Further, the CPU-1 detects an abnormality of itself in step S65, and stops the operation of the INV-1 in step S67.
When the CPU-2 fails, the signal output from the RXD line is stopped, and the signal output from the WDP2 line is also stopped, as shown in fig. 8. In this case, since the CPU-1 operates normally, a normal signal is transmitted through the TXD line and the WDP1 line.
Since the control information from the other CPU (CPU-2) is interrupted and the watchdog pulse WDP2 indicating whether or not the CPU-2 is operating is not output from the CPU-2, the CPU-1 detects that an abnormality in the operation of the CPU-2 has occurred in step S71.
Accordingly, when the CPU-2 fails, the CPU-1 performs steering assist control to maintain 50% of the motor output at normal time by the INV-1 in step S73, and operates as the above-described failure (1).
On the other hand, the CPU-2 detects an abnormality of itself in step S75, and stops the operation of the INV-2 in step S77.
In addition, regarding the failure of the CPU, the detection result such as a reset operation abnormality or an operation abnormality of the output operation unit detected by a watchdog timer (WDT) provided inside the CPU or an external watchdog timer, a memory abnormality based on a confirmation result of a checksum for a control program or the like, an abnormality detected by a diagnostic function BIST of the CPU, a clock abnormality detected by a clock monitoring function of the CPU, or the like may be notified to the CPU operating normally by CAN communication.
Fault handling in case of CPU clock exception
The fault handling process in the case where an abnormality of a clock signal (abnormality of an operation clock of the CPU) supplied from the outside to the CPU is determined as a fault mode of inter-CPU communication will be described. Here, the on-vehicle network (CAN) of the motor control device 1a shown in fig. 2 is set to be CAN-1, and the on-vehicle network (CAN) of the motor control device 1b is set to be CAN-2. The clock oscillators 16a and 16b are respectively CLK-1 and CLK-2.
Fig. 9 to 11 show the fault handling processing corresponding to the degree of abnormality (for example, deviation of clock cycle) occurring in the clock signal supplied from CLK-1 to CPU-1.
Clock anomaly (1) >
Fig. 9 is a sequence diagram showing a failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (1). Fig. 9 is a failure handling processing sequence in the following case: communication between the CPU-1 and the CPU-2 via the TXD line, the RXD line, the WDP1 line and the WDP2 line is normal, but a CAN signal between the CAN-1 and the CPU-1 is stopped, and the operation stop of the CAN-1 is detected (step S81), and the CAN-2 is normal.
As described above, since the operation of CAN-1 requiring a high-precision operation clock is stopped even if the inter-CPU communication is normal, the CPU-1 determines in step S83 that a clock signal output from the clock oscillating unit 16a (CLK-1) and supplied to CAN-1 or the like has a deviation of, for example, 2% as a clock failure.
In the above case, CAN-2 receiving the supply of CLK-2 independent of CLK-1 is not affected by clock anomalies of CLK-1 even if CPU-1 detects anomalies of CAN-1. Therefore, CAN-2 operates normally, so CPU-1 receives CAN information from CPU-2 via the RXD line (step S87).
According to the above CAN information, even if there is a clock abnormality (1), that is, a deviation of 2% occurs in the clock signal, for example, the CPU-1 performs normal control (100% assist control) by INV-1 in step S85.
On the other hand, since CAN-2 is normal, normal control (assist control of 100%) is performed by CPU-2 through INV-2 in step S88.
< clock anomaly (2) >)
Fig. 10 is a sequence diagram showing a failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (2). That is, the failure handling processing sequence of fig. 10 handles the following cases: communication between the CPU-1 and the CPU-2 via the TXD line and the RXD line is stopped, and even if communication via the WDP1 line and the WDP2 line is normal, the CAN signal between the CAN-1 and the CPU-1 is stopped, and the operation stop of the CAN-1 is detected (step S91), and the CAN-2 is normal.
In this case, as shown by the broken line in fig. 10, communication via the TXD line and the RXD line is stopped, and the operation of CAN-1 is stopped, so that CPU-1 determines in step S92 in fig. 10 that the clock signal output from CLK-1 has a deviation of, for example, 5% as a clock failure.
Then, the CPU-1 intentionally stops the WDP1 transmitted to the CPU-2 in step S93. Then, the CPU-1 stops the operation of INV-1 in step S95.
On the other hand, since WDP1 from CPU-1 is stopped as described above, CPU-2 detects an abnormality in communication between CPUs and an abnormality in WDP1 in step S97. Therefore, the CPU-2 performs steering assist control to maintain 50% of the motor output at the normal time by INV-2 in step S99.
< clock anomaly (3) >)
Fig. 11 is a sequence diagram showing the failure handling process at the time of clock anomaly (3). In the case of the clock abnormality (3), as shown by the broken line in fig. 11, communication via the TXD line, the RXD line, and the WDP1 line is stopped, and the CAN signal between CAN-1 and CPU-1 is also stopped, and the operation of CAN-1 is stopped.
On the other hand, CAN-2, which receives a supply of CLK-2 independent of CLK-1, is not affected by clock anomalies of CLK-1, so CAN-2 operates normally, WDP2 is also normal.
In the above case, the CPU-1 determines in step S101 of fig. 11 that the clock signal output from CLK-1 generates, for example, a 20% deviation as a clock failure. Then, the CPU-1 stops the operation of INV-1 in step S103.
In the case where the clock skew is 20% as described above, the clock monitoring function of the CPU detects a clock abnormality and resets the clock, so that the communication between the CPUs and the communication of the WDP signal are stopped, but the failure system detects the abnormality before the communication is stopped.
On the other hand, since the transmission information (TXD) from the CPU-1 is interrupted and the watchdog pulse WDP1 is not output, the CPU-2 detects an abnormality of the CPU-1 in step S105. Therefore, the CPU-2 performs steering assist control to maintain 50% of the motor output at the normal time by INV-2 in step S107.
The failure handling process in the case where a deviation of, for example, 2%, 5%, or 20% is generated from the clock signal supplied from CLK-2 to CPU-2 is the same as the failure handling process described above for the clock abnormality in CPU-1. That is, the operation of CAN-2 is stopped due to the clock abnormality, and CPU-1 performs assist control for maintaining 50% of the motor output at the normal time by INV-1.
Accordingly, the illustration and description of the failure handling process in the case where there is an abnormality in the clock signal supplied from CLK-2 are omitted.
In each of the above-described failure handling processes corresponding to the failure in the inter-CPU communication, in the steering assist control for maintaining 50% of the motor output at the time of normal, for example, motor control is performed such that the characteristic of the same slope as the output characteristic (the slope of the characteristic curve) of the motor at the time of 100% steering assist with all the systems being normal is limited to 50% (limited) of the output characteristic.
In this way, when the failure is handled, the assist control can be performed with the motor output at normal times (normal times) up to 50% at maximum, and the change in responsiveness due to the change in the slope of the output characteristic at the time of assist can be avoided.
In the motor control unit of the present embodiment, when a failure occurs in another sensor class, for example, a torque sensor, which is not directly associated with the inter-CPU communication, the system to which the torque sensor belongs is stopped, and assist control by another system is performed, or 100% steering assist is continued based on information detected by the torque sensor of the other system.
Fig. 12 is a diagram showing steering assist control of the motor control unit in the case where the torque sensor of the system 2 fails. As shown in fig. 12 (a), when the torque sensor is not faulty, the motor control device 1a of the 1 st system transmits the target torque Tt1 calculated by the CPU 12a from the instruction torque Tq1 to the CPU 12b of the motor control device 1b of the 2 nd system by the inter-CPU communication. In the motor control device 1b of the 2 nd system, the CPU 12b calculates the target torque Tt2 from the inputted instruction torque Tq 2.
In this case, the CPU 12a of the 1 st system performs drive control of the electric motor 15 using the target torque Tt1, and the CPU 12b of the 2 nd system performs assist control of driving the electric motor 15 by selecting any one of the target torque Tt1 transmitted from the 1 st system through inter-CPU communication and the target torque Tt2 calculated by the CPU 12b by the selection unit.
On the other hand, as shown in fig. 12b, when the torque sensor of the 2 nd system fails, the CPU 12a transmits the target torque Tt1 calculated from the input instruction torque (steering torque) Tq1 to the CPU 12b of the motor control device 1b of the 2 nd system through inter-CPU communication in the motor control device 1a of the 1 st system.
Thus, the 1 st system performs drive control of the electric motor 15 based on torque control information based on the target torque Tt1 calculated in the own system, and the 2 nd system performs assist control of driving and controlling the electric motor 15 by using the target torque Tt1 calculated in the 1 st system as torque control information.
Fig. 13 is a diagram showing steering assist control of the motor control unit in the case where the torque sensor of the 1 st system fails. Fig. 13 (a) shows steering assist control of the motor control unit in the case where the torque sensor has not failed, as in fig. 12 (a).
As shown in fig. 13 (b), when the torque sensor of the 1 st system fails, the control device 1a of the 1 st system does not calculate the target torque by the CPU 12 a. In this way, in the motor control device 1b of the 2 nd system, the CPU 12b calculates the target torque Tt2 from the inputted instruction torque Tq 2. As a result, the motor control device 1b of the 2 nd system performs assist control for maintaining, for example, 50% of the motor output at the time of normal operation.
As described above, the motor control device according to the present embodiment is constituted by the 1 st and 2 nd control systems, and drives the electric motor by a control unit (CPU) provided for each of the plurality of control systems, and has the following structure: when a communication failure between the central control units is determined based on the communication states of the control signal via the 1 st communication unit and the watchdog signal via the 2 nd communication unit, the assist control of the electric motor is continued by the control system that normally operates among the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system.
Thus, in the motor control device employing the redundancy configuration, the CPU communication and the transmission/reception of the watchdog signal (WDP) between the control units (CPUs) of the plurality of control systems are used together, and even when the communication between the CPUs is interrupted, the failure can be monitored with each other.
Even if one control system is determined to be in the failure mode, the operation state can be reliably shifted to the failure operation state by continuing the assistance of the drive control of the electric motor by the other control system that is normal in accordance with the failure mode (failure portion).
Further, by a control system configured to determine that a failure has occurred due to an abnormality in an operation clock of a control unit (CPU) based on whether or not communication based on a TXD line, a RXD line, and a CAN communication unit has stopped, it is easy to determine a failure mode (failure location) based on CAN communication requiring a high-precision operation clock. In addition, even when communication by the 1 st communication unit is stopped, a failure CAN be determined by CAN communication.
For example, in the motor control device for electric power steering, by controlling the driving of the electric motor by the motor control device having the above-described redundant configuration, even if one control system fails, the driving of the electric motor can be controlled by the other control system, and steering assist can be continued.
In addition, for example, in the electric power steering system including the electric power steering motor control device, even if one control system of the electric power steering control device fails, the steering assist can be continued by the other control system, similarly to the above.
The present invention is not limited to the above embodiment, and various modifications can be made. The following describes modifications.
Modification 1 >
When communication by the 1 st communication means (TXD line, RXD line) is stopped, or when communication by the 2 nd communication means (WDP 1 line, WDP2 line) is stopped, for example, auxiliary control may be issued to the motor control device of the 1 st system.
When it is impossible to determine which of the plurality of control systems has failed to stop communication, the motor control device of the 1 st system performs the assist control, thereby enabling reliable failure operation. In addition, when one of the plurality of control systems is used as a master system and the other system is used as a slave system, the auxiliary control (failure operation) can be reliably performed by any of the master and slave control systems at the time of failure.
Modification 2 >
The control system that has failed may also be determined using a Controller Area Network (CAN) communication on the side of the control system that is different from the control system based on the CAN communication stop of the CAN. This allows the operation to be changed to the CAN communication with normal operation to determine the failure mode (failure location), and thus the assist CAN be continued.
Claims (24)
1. A motor control device is composed of a plurality of control systems, and drives an electric motor by a central control unit provided for each control system,
the motor control device comprises:
a 1 st communication unit capable of communicating control signals between the 1 st control system and the central control unit of the 2 nd control system of the plurality of control systems;
a 2 nd communication unit capable of transmitting and receiving an abnormality monitoring signal between the central control units; and
a failure determination unit that determines whether or not there is a communication failure between the central control units based on communication states of the control signal and the abnormality monitoring signal,
when the failure determination unit determines that the communication failure has occurred, the drive control of the electric motor is continued by a control system that is normally operated from among the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system,
The communication failure includes at least a failure of the central control unit, a failure of a communication integrated circuit element constituting the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit, a disconnection or adhesion failure of the 1 st communication unit, a disconnection or adhesion failure of the 2 nd communication unit, and a failure caused by an abnormal operation clock of the central control unit.
2. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
when communication between the central control units based on the 1 st communication unit is stopped and communication based on the 2 nd communication unit is normal, the failure determination unit determines that the failure is caused by an abnormality of an operation clock of the central control unit or a disconnection or adhesion failure of the 1 st communication unit.
3. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the failure determination unit determines that the central control unit is failed when communication between the central control unit based on the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit is stopped.
4. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the failure determination unit determines that the disconnection or adhesion failure of the 2 nd communication unit is caused when communication between the central control portions based on the 1 st communication unit is normal and communication based on the 2 nd communication unit is stopped.
5. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the failure determination unit delegates drive control of the electric motor to the 1 st control system in a case where communication based on the 1 st communication unit is stopped or in a case where communication based on the 2 nd communication unit is stopped.
6. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
when the communication failure is determined, drive control of the electric motor is delegated to either one of the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system.
7. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the central control unit of the 1 st control system and the central control unit of the 2 nd control system are individually activated at the time of activation, and wait before the timing at which these central control units can communicate with each other.
8. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit communicates the control signal through asynchronous communication.
9. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit are respectively composed of two-wire signal wires.
10. The motor control device according to claim 9, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit have an isolation unit that performs electrical insulation at each of the signal lines or at each of the communication units.
11. The motor control device according to claim 1, wherein
The anomaly monitoring signal is a watchdog pulse signal.
12. A motor control device is composed of a plurality of control systems, and drives an electric motor by a central control unit provided for each control system,
the motor control device comprises:
a 1 st communication unit capable of communicating control signals between the 1 st control system and the central control unit of the 2 nd control system of the plurality of control systems;
a 2 nd communication unit capable of transmitting and receiving an abnormality monitoring signal between the central control units; and
a failure determination unit that determines whether or not there is a communication failure between the central control units based on communication states of the control signal and the abnormality monitoring signal,
when the failure determination unit determines that the communication failure has occurred, the drive control of the electric motor is continued by a control system that is normally operated from among the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system,
The motor control device further includes a CAN communication unit configured to be able to communicate with the central control unit,
the failure determination means determines a control system in which a failure due to an abnormal operation clock of the central control unit has occurred, based on whether or not communication by the 1 st communication means and the CAN communication unit has stopped.
13. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
the failure determination unit delegates drive control of the electric motor to the 1 st control system in a case where communication based on the 1 st communication unit is stopped or in a case where communication based on the 2 nd communication unit is stopped.
14. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
when the communication failure is determined, drive control of the electric motor is delegated to either one of the 1 st control system and the 2 nd control system.
15. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
when the CAN communication on the 1 st control system side is stopped, the drive control of the electric motor by the 1 st control system is stopped, and when the CAN communication on the 2 nd control system side is stopped, the drive control of the electric motor by the 2 nd control system is stopped.
16. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
the failure determination unit determines the control system in which the failure occurred using CAN communication on the side of the control system different from the control system in which the CAN communication is stopped.
17. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
the central control unit of the 1 st control system and the central control unit of the 2 nd control system are individually activated at the time of activation, and wait before the timing at which these central control units can communicate with each other.
18. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit communicates the control signal through asynchronous communication.
19. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit are respectively composed of two-wire signal wires.
20. The motor control device according to claim 19, wherein,
the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit have an isolation unit that performs electrical insulation at each of the signal lines or at each of the communication units.
21. The motor control device according to claim 12, wherein
The anomaly monitoring signal is a watchdog pulse signal.
22. An electric power steering control device having a central control portion provided for each of a plurality of control systems, the electric power steering control device assisting a steering wheel operation of a driver of a vehicle, wherein,
the electric power steering control device includes:
an electric motor that assists steering of the driver; and
a unit that performs drive control of the electric motor by the motor control device according to any one of claims 1 to 21.
23. An electric power steering system having the electric power steering control apparatus according to claim 22.
24. A method for determining a failure location in a motor control device comprising a plurality of control systems, wherein an electric motor is driven by a central control unit provided for each of the control systems,
the method for determining a failure location in the motor control device includes the steps of:
when communication between the central control units is stopped by the 1 st communication unit capable of communicating control signals and communication between the central control units is normal by the 2 nd communication unit capable of transmitting/receiving abnormality monitoring signals, it is determined that the central control units have failed due to abnormality of operation clocks or that the 1 st communication unit has failed to be disconnected or stuck;
When communication between the central control portion based on the 1 st communication unit and the 2 nd communication unit is stopped, determining that the central control portion is faulty; and
when communication between the central control units based on the 1 st communication unit is normal and communication based on the 2 nd communication unit is stopped, disconnection or adhesion failure of the 2 nd communication unit is determined.
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| JP2022038846A (en) * | 2020-08-27 | 2022-03-10 | 株式会社デンソー | Steering system |
| CN115214765A (en) * | 2022-01-04 | 2022-10-21 | 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 | Redundant power-assisted steering system and vehicle |
| CN116176691A (en) * | 2023-03-16 | 2023-05-30 | 浙江犀重新能源汽车技术有限公司 | Steering power assisting system of electric mining truck and electric mining truck |
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