CN113141344A - Internet of vehicles privacy protection communication method based on true random number - Google Patents
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- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/06—Protocols specially adapted for file transfer, e.g. file transfer protocol [FTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
Abstract
The invention provides a vehicle networking privacy protection communication method based on true random numbers, which mainly comprises the following steps: 1) and the authority center performs initialization and generates necessary parameters. 2) The vehicle makes a registration request with an authority center to obtain important parameters. 3) And encrypting the information by using the true random number generated by the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage and the obtained parameters and uploading the information to the cloud server. 4) And other vehicles download the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypt the ciphertext to obtain data. The true random number not only has good statistical properties, but also meets the unpredictability, the true random number extracted based on the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage has high safety as an important parameter for generating a ciphertext, and the ciphertext attribute-based encryption scheme with hidden access strategies is designed to hide the attributes of the vehicle, so that the effect of protecting the privacy of the vehicle is achieved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to an intelligent network automobile, an in-automobile communication technology and cryptography, in particular to the field of vehicle networking.
Background
With the integration of computer technology, network technology and automobile industry, intelligent networked automobiles have become the focus of future competition, and the continuous development of intelligent networked automobiles means that the automobile networking is integrated with wireless communication technology through intelligent equipment carried by intelligent automobiles, so that information interaction between automobiles and people, automobiles, roads and information network platforms is realized, the accident risk is reduced, the traffic operation efficiency is improved, and a more comfortable driving environment is provided. Although the internet of vehicles provides great convenience for intelligent transportation and our lives, it also faces a serious information security challenge.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a vehicle networking privacy protection communication scheme based on a true random number, which achieves the purpose of realizing fine-grained access control while realizing the protection of vehicle networking data privacy.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme:
a vehicle networking privacy protection communication method based on a true random number comprises the following steps: (1) and initializing the authority center to generate important parameters. (2) The vehicle authenticates with the authority center. (3) The random number is extracted based on the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage. (4) The vehicle generates a private key SK according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and the attribute set S of the vehicle. (5) The vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads the data to the cloud server. (6) And the vehicle node downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext conforms to the access strategy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained through successful decryption.
Further, the authority center in step (1) initializes and generates important parameters, and the steps are as follows:
step 1.1 authoritative center inputs safety parameter lambda, selects an addition group G and a multiplication group G with the order of p and the generator of G1And defines a bilinear map e G → G1。
Step 1.2 authoritative center randomly selects y, theta, alpha, beta E to ZpGenerating a common parameter PK ═ ((p, G, G)1,e),θ,α,β,e(g,g)y) And master key MK ═ y.
Step 1.3 the authoritative center broadcasts the common parameters in the network.
Further, the vehicle in the step (2) authenticates to the authority center, and the steps are as follows:
step 2.1 the vehicle node initiates a registration application to the authority center and sends a signature and a certificate.
And 2.2, the authority center verifies the legality of the identity of the vehicle node through the signature and the certificate, and sends a master key MK (y) for generating a decryption private key to the vehicle node with the legal identity.
Further, the step (3) extracts a random number based on the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage, and comprises the following steps:
and 3.1, analyzing the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage, and finding that the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage is a random process with Markov characteristics.
And 3.2, acquiring the voltage noise of the vehicle-mounted power supply by using the oscilloscope, and setting the acquisition period of the oscilloscope to be 1s, wherein the period not only ensures that useful data are not seriously lost, but also ensures proper variable quantity.
And 3.3, converting the sampling value obtained by the oscilloscope into a digital sequence by using an analog-to-digital converter, wherein different threshold values are set according to different environments, and generating a digital signal 0 or 1 by comparing the sampling value with the threshold values.
Step 3.4 post-processing the obtained digital signal in order to make the digital sequence subject to uniform distribution and having good statistical properties. In order to improve the efficiency, the obtained digital signals are subjected to exclusive-or operation by adopting a simple exclusive-or chain, then the obtained data are subjected to hash operation, the processed data, namely the final random number, are stored in a random number pool, and the extraction of vehicle nodes is waited.
Further, in the step (4), the vehicle generates a private key according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and the attribute set S of the vehicle, and the steps are as follows:
step 4.1 to protect the privacy of the vehicle, attribute a is checkediHash by e S and record as H (a)i)。
Step 4.2 vehicle node selects a random number t E ZpAnd calculate D1＝gy+βt,D2＝gt。
Step 4.3 vehicle node selects a random number t for each attributei∈ZpAnd calculate
Step 4.4, the private key SK of the vehicle node is constructed according to the following formula:
further, in the step (5), the vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads the data to the cloud server, and the steps are as follows:
step 5.1 the vehicle node records the random number generated from the vehicle supply voltage as r and calculates C ═ Me (g, g)yr,C1＝gr。
Step 5.2 vehicle node for each leaf node a of the Access Tree PiSelecting a random number ki∈ZpAnd calculate
And 5.3, carrying out hash operation on the nodes of the access tree P and recording as the access tree P'.
Step 5.4 the vehicle node generates the ciphertext according to the following formula
Further, the vehicle node in step (6) downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext conforms to the access policy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained through successful decryption, and the steps are as follows:
and 6.1, the vehicle node performs Hash operation on elements in the attribute set S of the vehicle node, matches the elements with the access numbers, and decrypts the ciphertext CT according to the following formula to obtain the plaintext M if the requirement of the access tree can be met.
The vehicle node obtains the ciphertext M ═ C/B.
The invention provides a vehicle networking privacy protection communication method based on true random numbers, which has the following beneficial effects:
1) the random number r which is an important part for generating the ciphertext is a true random number, is an unbiased and unpredictable value, does not depend on a mathematical algorithm for generating the random number, is a natural signal taking the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage as an entropy source, and not only has good statistical characteristics, but also meets the unpredictability.
2) The encryption transmission of the data of the Internet of vehicles is realized, and the overhead brought by data sharing fine-grained access control is reduced.
3) And the attributes of the vehicle nodes are subjected to Hash operation, so that the privacy of the vehicle nodes is protected.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a vehicle networking privacy preserving communication method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of a system model of the present invention;
Detailed Description
The technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the drawings of the embodiment of the present invention.
The invention provides a vehicle networking privacy protection communication method based on true random numbers. The method for protecting the privacy of the Internet of vehicles with hidden access strategies is designed by utilizing the fact that a true random number is generated by the voltage of a vehicle-mounted power supply with the Markov characteristic and combining the principle of an attribute-based encryption algorithm. The generated unpredictable true random number is used as an important parameter during encryption, so that the safety of an encryption algorithm can be well guaranteed, and the privacy of the vehicle is protected by hiding the attribute of the vehicle and in a ciphertext.
As shown in FIG. 1, the present invention is performed according to the following steps (all symbols in the present invention are shown in Table 1):
TABLE 1 Primary symbol definitions
TABLE 1
| (symbol) | Description of the invention |
| PK | Common parameter |
| MK | Master key |
| q | Order of group |
| g | Generating element of group |
| S | Attribute collection |
| ai | Properties |
| M | Plaintext |
| G | Additive group |
| G1 | Multiplicative group |
| CT | Cipher text |
| Di | Private key composition |
| y,θ,α,β,t,ti,ki | Random integer |
| SK | Private key |
| P,P′ | Access tree |
| Vn | Effective value of noise voltage |
| V | Instantaneous value of noise voltage |
| r | True random number |
1. Initializing the authority center to generate important parameters
Before the vehicle carries out data sharing, the authority center carries out initialization, generates important parameters and broadcasts partial parameters.
The first step is as follows: inputting a safety parameter lambda into an authoritative center, and selecting an addition group G and a multiplication group G with the order of p and G1And defines a bilinear map e G → G1。
The second step is that: step 2.2 authoritative center randomly selects y, theta, alpha, beta E to ZpGenerating a common parameter PK ═ ((p, G, G)1,e),θ,α,β,e(g,g)y) And master key MK ═ y.
The third step: the authoritative center broadcasts the common parameters in the network.
2. Vehicle authentication to an authority center
The vehicle node initiates registration to an authority center, and the authority center verifies the identity of the vehicle node and sends important parameters to the vehicle node with legal identity.
The first step is as follows: the vehicle node initiates a registration application to the authority center and sends a signature and a certificate.
The second step is that: the authority center verifies the validity of the identity of the vehicle node through the signature and the certificate, and sends a master key MK which is used for generating a decryption private key to the vehicle node with the legal identity.
3. Extracting true random number based on vehicle-mounted power supply voltage
When the vehicle node needs to upload data to the cloud server, a true random number is extracted according to a vehicle-mounted power supply and is used as an important part for ciphertext generation.
The first step is as follows: and analyzing the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage, and finding that the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage is a random process with Markov characteristics.
The random excitation input of the microcosmic traffic environment and the external network environment of the intelligent networked automobile in the driving process stimulates the random interaction and migration of network resources (physical information and energy) in the automobile between the ECU node and the environment (the traffic environment and the network environment), and the interaction and the migration of the information act on the vehicle-mounted power supply system together, so that the power supply voltage noise shows the characteristic of random change. Studies on noise show that: the distribution rule of the noise voltage conforms to normal distribution, and the probability density of the noise voltage is as follows:
in the formula: v is the instantaneous value of the noise voltage, VnIs an effective value of the noise voltage. Vehicle voltage noise is a good source of entropy.
The second step is that: the voltage noise of the vehicle-mounted power supply is acquired by using the oscilloscope, and the acquisition period of the oscilloscope is set to be 1s, so that the period not only ensures that useful data are not seriously lost, but also ensures proper variable quantity.
The third step: sampling values obtained by the oscilloscope are converted into a digital sequence by an analog-to-digital converter, wherein different threshold values are set according to different environments, and a digital signal 0 or 1 is generated by comparing the sampling values with the threshold values.
The fourth step: in order to make the digital sequence subject to a uniform distribution and having good statistical properties, the resulting digital signal is post-processed. In order to improve the efficiency, the obtained digital signals are subjected to exclusive-or operation by adopting a simple exclusive-or chain, then the obtained data are subjected to hash operation, the processed data, namely the final random number, is stored in a random number pool, and the extraction of vehicle nodes is waited.
4. The vehicle generates a private key SK according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and the attribute set S of the vehicle.
The first step is as follows: to protect the privacy of the vehicle, attribute a is selectediHash by e S and record as H (a)i)。
The second step is that: the vehicle node selects a random number t ∈ ZpAnd calculate D1＝gy+βt,D2＝gt。
The third step: vehicle node selects a random number t for each attributei∈ZpAnd calculate
The fourth step: the private key SK of the vehicle node is constructed according to the following formula:
5. the vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads the data to the cloud server.
And the vehicle node encrypts a plaintext according to the set access tree, hides the access strategy therein, and uploads the access strategy to the cloud server.
The first step is as follows: the vehicle node records a true random number generated from the vehicle power supply voltage as r, and calculates C ═ Me (g, g)yr,C1＝gr。
The second step is that: the vehicle node is each leaf node a of the access tree PiSelecting a random number ki∈ZpAnd calculate
The third step: and carrying out hash operation on the nodes of the access tree P and recording as the access tree P'.
The fourth step: the vehicle node generates a ciphertext according to the following formula
6. And the vehicle node downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext conforms to the access strategy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained through successful decryption.
And other nodes download the ciphertext from the cloud server, perform matching calculation on the attribute set of the nodes and the access strategy, and if the attribute set meets the requirement of the access tree, decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext.
The first step is as follows: and the vehicle node performs Hash operation on elements in the attribute set S of the vehicle node, matches the elements with the access number, and decrypts the ciphertext CT according to the following formula to obtain a plaintext M if the requirement of the access tree can be met.
The vehicle node obtains the ciphertext M ═ C/B.
In summary, the method of the present invention comprises the steps of: (1) and initializing the authority center to generate important parameters. (2) The vehicle authenticates with the authority center. (3) And extracting a true random number based on the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage. (4) The vehicle generates a private key SK according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and the attribute set S of the vehicle. (5) The vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads the data to the cloud server. (6) And the vehicle node downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext conforms to the access strategy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained through successful decryption.
Claims (7)
1. A vehicle networking privacy protection communication method based on a true random number is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) initializing an authority center to generate important parameters;
(2) the vehicle authenticates to an authority center;
(3) extracting a true random number based on the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage;
(4) the vehicle generates a private key SK according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and the attribute set S of the vehicle;
(5) the vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads data to the cloud server;
(6) and the vehicle node downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext conforms to the access strategy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained through successful decryption.
2. The Internet of vehicles privacy protection communication method based on the true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein the authority center performs initialization to generate important parameters in step (1), and the steps are as follows:
step 1.1 authoritative center inputs safety parameter lambda, selects an addition group G and a multiplication group G with the order of p and the generator of G1And defines a bilinear map e G → G1；
Step 1.2 authoritative center randomly selects y, theta, alpha, beta E to ZpGenerating a common parameter PK ═ ((p, G, G)1,e),θ,α,β,e(g,g)y) And the master key MK ═ y;
step 1.3 the authoritative center broadcasts the common parameters in the network.
3. The method for protecting the privacy of the internet of vehicles based on the true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein the vehicle is authenticated to the authority center in step (2), and the steps are as follows:
step 2.1, the vehicle node initiates a registration application to an authority center and sends a signature and a certificate;
and 2.2, the authority center verifies the legality of the identity of the vehicle node through the signature and the certificate, and sends a master key MK (y) for generating a decryption private key to the vehicle node with the legal identity.
4. The Internet of vehicles privacy protection communication method based on the true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step (3) is to extract the random number based on the vehicle power voltage, and the steps are as follows:
step 3.1, analyzing the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage, and finding that the change process of the vehicle-mounted power supply voltage is a random process with Markov characteristic;
step 3.2, acquiring voltage noise of the vehicle-mounted power supply by using an oscilloscope, and setting the acquisition period of the oscilloscope to be 1s, wherein the period not only ensures that useful data are not seriously lost, but also ensures proper variable quantity;
step 3.3, converting the sampling value obtained by the oscilloscope into a digital sequence by using an analog-to-digital converter, wherein different threshold values are set according to different environments, and generating a digital signal 0 or 1 by comparing the sampling value with the threshold values;
and 3.4, in order to make the digital sequence obey uniform distribution and have good statistical characteristics, carrying out post-processing on the obtained digital signal, in order to improve the efficiency, carrying out XOR operation on the obtained digital signal by adopting a simple XOR chain, carrying out Hash operation on the obtained data, storing the processed data, namely the final random number into a random number pool, and waiting for the extraction of the vehicle node.
5. The method for protecting privacy of car networking based on true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step (4) the vehicle generates the private key according to the successfully obtained master key MK, the PK obtained in the broadcast and its attribute set S, and comprises the following steps:
step 4.1 to protect the privacy of the vehicle, attribute a is checkediHash by e S and record as H (a)i)；
Step 4.2 vehicle node selects a random number t E ZpAnd calculate D1＝gy+βt,D2＝gt；
Step 4.3 vehicle node selects a random number t for each attributei∈ZpAnd calculate
Step 4.4, the private key SK of the vehicle node is constructed according to the following formula:
6. the Internet of vehicles privacy protection communication method based on the true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step (5), the vehicle information sender encrypts the message M according to the access tree P, PK and MK and uploads the data to the cloud server, and the steps are as follows:
step 5.1 the vehicle node records the random number generated from the vehicle supply voltage as r and calculates C ═ Me (g, g)yr,C1＝gr；
Step 5.2 vehicle node for each leaf node a of the Access Tree PiSelecting a random number ki∈ZpAnd meterCalculating out
Step 5.3, carrying out Hash operation on the nodes of the access tree P, and recording the nodes as the access tree P';
step 5.4 the vehicle node generates the ciphertext according to the following formula
7. The Internet of vehicles privacy protection communication method based on the true random number as claimed in claim 1, wherein in the step (6), the vehicle node downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server and decrypts the ciphertext, if the ciphertext conforms to the access policy of the vehicle sender, the plaintext can be obtained by successfully decrypting the ciphertext, and the steps are as follows:
step 6.1, the vehicle node performs hash operation on elements in the attribute set S of the vehicle node and matches the elements with the access number, and if the requirements of the access tree can be met, the vehicle node decrypts the ciphertext CT according to the following formula to obtain a plaintext M:
the vehicle node obtains the ciphertext M ═ C/B.
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| CN115242410A (en) * | 2022-09-22 | 2022-10-25 | 合肥工业大学 | Vehicle-interior network identity authentication method based on quantum random number generator |
| CN115801259A (en) * | 2022-11-10 | 2023-03-14 | 上海零数众合信息科技有限公司 | Affair supervision method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| TWI806804B (en) * | 2021-12-23 | 2023-06-21 | 國立陽明交通大學 | Device with multiple hardware signatures from a single puf circuit source and related methods, systems and applications |
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