CN113364600B - Certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data - Google Patents

Certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data Download PDF

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CN113364600B
CN113364600B CN202110916420.4A CN202110916420A CN113364600B CN 113364600 B CN113364600 B CN 113364600B CN 202110916420 A CN202110916420 A CN 202110916420A CN 113364600 B CN113364600 B CN 113364600B
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CN113364600A (en
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张晓均
王鑫
唐伟
王文琛
薛婧婷
刘庆
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Southwest Petroleum University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
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Abstract

The invention discloses a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity, which comprises the following steps: s1, initializing a system; s2, the user blocks and encrypts the data file to obtain a ciphertext data block, and homomorphic signatures of the ciphertext data block are generated to form a signature set; the user generates integrity audit auxiliary information, sends the ciphertext data block and the signature set to the cloud server, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor; s3, a third party auditor generates challenge information, sends the challenge information to a cloud server and generates a pre-calculated value; s4, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor; and S5, verifying the correctness of the audit certification response information by the third party auditor by using the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity. The invention is designed based on a certificateless cryptosystem, and can effectively avoid key escrow and complex certificate management.

Description

Certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and particularly relates to a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
Background
In the big data age, data is the most valuable resource. Big data can help us to analyze problems, discover laws about the development of things, and use these laws to solve practical problems. However, if we want to make better use of the data, it is necessary firstly to obtain as much data information as possible, and secondly to process the data efficiently. Due to the wide source, variety of types and large amount of data, data acquisition requires many storage devices to store data and sufficient computing power to perform data processing. Although the terminal device is continuously updated and upgraded, the performance is greatly improved, but the storage capacity and the computing power of the terminal device cannot meet the requirements of mass data storage and processing. Cloud computing technology helps terminal devices to get rid of these limitations, and further development is achieved. Cloud computing and cloud storage services have facilitated our lives to be more intelligent and automated.
All data need to be secured at the beginning of creation, but not at the last stage of data storage, only the security measures to strengthen the latter have been proven to be irreparable. The data leakage event may increase by 100% in the coming years unless the data is secured at its source, so that the confidentiality of the data file needs to be guaranteed. These generated data files typically need to be uploaded to the cloud platform in real time within the administrative scope of the owner, and the cloud server may be untrusted, tamper with the outsourced data or return incorrect query results, which may affect the availability of the outsourced data. In order to save storage space, an economically driven cloud server may delete portions of data content that users rarely access while trying to trick users into keeping their data intact. In addition, an adversary may also tamper with the outsourced data for some malicious economic or political purpose. Therefore, the integrity of the data on the cloud server is important on the basis of ensuring the confidentiality of the data on the cloud server. In most cases, the user does not want the real identity of the user to be mastered by others, and the user is always unwilling to upload some data closely related to the real identity of the user, which affects the use of the cloud storage system by the cloud user, and the user tends to use a pseudo identity to use the cloud storage service.
Most of the current typical cloud storage data integrity auditing systems need expensive computing overhead. In practical applications, an auditor generally needs to complete the public integrity verification quickly and notify the user of the audit result as needed. A severe lag may be unacceptable because audit requests may be concentrated within a particular time period. For example, an auditor is assigned to check multiple files simultaneously, which would be advantageous if the computational costs associated with the auditor-side verification could be reduced. Therefore, the identity privacy protection performance is designed, the data confidentiality and integrity are guaranteed, and the light-weight public auditing method for the cloud storage data integrity has important application value.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome one or more defects in the prior art and provides a certificateless-based public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: the certificateless public auditing method for the integrity of cloud storage data comprises the following steps:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user;
s2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage;
s3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; generating a pre-calculated value by a third party auditor according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving audit certification response information returned by the cloud server;
s4, generating audit certification response information: after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor;
s5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
Preferably, the S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirement
Figure 789440DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 441002DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
all are q factorial cyclic groups;
s102, selecting a q factorial method circulation group by a key generation center PKG
Figure 158422DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
A generator ofg, and from q order finite fields
Figure 225735DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
A non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculated
Figure 446632DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 3515DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
is the system master public key;
s103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKG
Figure 739390DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
And
Figure 610394DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 13694DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
is a bit string of an arbitrary length,
Figure 679161DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
is of fixed length
Figure 371174DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
A bit string of (a);
s104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function
Figure 842606DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Wherein
Figure 38095DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
The following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messages
Figure 202361DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
And scalar coefficients
Figure 116090DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Equation of
Figure 125634DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
If true;
s105, the public parameter of the PKG publishing system of the key generation center
Figure 441209DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
；
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q order
Figure 510796DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
A non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated
Figure 911822DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
；
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component two
Figure 725057DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
Wherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,
Figure 895138DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
is the sign of the exclusive or operation,
Figure 135627DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,
Figure 23948DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
is the true identity of the user;
s108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous identity of the user as
Figure 640874DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And using the system master private key
Figure 665462DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
And a hash function
Figure 342431DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Computing a signed first private key
Figure 452470DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
；
S109. the key generation center PKG will
Figure 341928DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
Sending the data to a user;
s110. user receives
Figure 548919DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
Then, the equation is verified
Figure 334472DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
If the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signature
Figure 728544DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Otherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key
Figure 687273DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
；
S111, user limited domain from q order
Figure 686453DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
A non-zero random number x is selected as a second private key of the signature, and a verification public key is calculated
Figure 439645DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
And obtaining the signature private key of the user
Figure 524276DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
。
Preferably, the S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namely
Figure 286696DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Wherein the identity of the data file F is
Figure 140382DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
，
Figure 64476DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
Representing blocks of data files;
s202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data file
Figure 433140DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
To a
Figure 671355DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Wherein C represents an encrypted data file,
Figure 707444DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
representing a ciphertext data block;
s203. the user selects the q-order finite field
Figure 536860DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Four different random coefficients are selected
Figure 596083DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
And deriving n seeds:
Figure 434726DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
user sets integrity audit assistance information
Figure 59742DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
；
S204. for
Figure 505463DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
The user utilizes the private signature key
Figure 848720DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
Computing each ciphertext data block
Figure 491054DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Based on certificateless homomorphic signatures
Figure 173839DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
And sets a signature set
Figure 876216DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
；
S205. user sends
Figure 644451DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
And storing the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a cloud server, and sending the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a third party auditor TPA for storage.
Preferably, the S3 includes:
s301, after receiving a request of a user for checking the integrity of cloud data, a third party auditor TPA collects the cloud data
Figure 824897DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
Randomly selecting a subset containing c elements
Figure 627768DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
；
S302. for each subscript
Figure 235467DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
From q order finite fields
Figure 553316DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
In randomly selecting matching coefficient
Figure 475135DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
；
S303, sending challenge information to third party auditor TPA
Figure 194830DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
Sending the data to a cloud server;
s304, before the third party auditor TPA returns the audit certification response information, the third party auditor TPA generates a pre-calculated value I
Figure 176692DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure 981837DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
。
Preferably, the S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge information
Figure 707348DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Then, the cloud server calculates the combined information block of the challenged ciphertext data block
Figure 484811DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
And aggregate signatures
Figure 699891DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
；
S402, the cloud server sends audit certification response information
Figure 664436DEST_PATH_IMAGE063
And giving the third party auditor TPA.
Preferably, the S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response information
Figure 990376DEST_PATH_IMAGE064
Then, the pre-calculated value one is used
Figure 419083DEST_PATH_IMAGE065
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure 742748DEST_PATH_IMAGE066
Checking and validating equation
Figure 256906DEST_PATH_IMAGE067
If the verification formula is established, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns false;
and S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
Preferably, in S2, after the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to the third-party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, the signature sets, and the integrity audit auxiliary information at the local client.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) the method is designed based on a certificateless cipher system, can effectively avoid key escrow, and does not need complex management of public key infrastructure on public key certificates;
(2) the method of the invention designs a certificateless homomorphic signature by combining with a homomorphic hash function, which is beneficial for a third party auditor to carry out public integrity audit on the data file stored in the cloud;
(3) in the signature generation stage, a user needs to design integrity audit auxiliary information, and according to the characteristic of a homomorphic hash function, all index operations in the subsequent integrity audit stage can be optimized into two index operations, so that the calculation cost of a third party auditor is greatly reduced, and a lightweight performance advantage is formed;
(4) the method of the invention effectively ensures the confidentiality of the user data file and simultaneously realizes the conditional anonymity of the user identity;
(5) when the malicious users abuse the cloud storage system, the system can successfully identify the real identities of the malicious users, and further revoke the access authority and the storage service of the malicious users to the cloud storage system.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the following embodiments, and it should be understood that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without inventive effort based on the embodiments of the present invention, are within the scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the embodiment provides a certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data, including:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; and the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user.
Specifically, the S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirement
Figure 589798DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 873012DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
are all q factorial cyclic groups.
S102, selecting a q factorial method circulation group by a key generation center PKG
Figure 898737DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
And generates a primitive g and a finite field from order q
Figure 634612DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
A non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculated
Figure 505616DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 643336DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
is the system master public key.
S103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKG
Figure 371121DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
And
Figure 797554DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
wherein, in the step (A),
Figure 268986DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
is a bit string of an arbitrary length,
Figure 464476DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
is of fixed length
Figure 363161DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
The bit string of (2).
S104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function
Figure 73628DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Wherein
Figure 20856DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
The following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messages
Figure 133168DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
And scalar coefficients
Figure 140439DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Equation of
Figure 603781DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
This is true.
S105, the public parameter of the PKG publishing system of the key generation center
Figure 354699DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
。
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q order
Figure 321518DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
A non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated
Figure 562007DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
。
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component two
Figure 247066DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
Wherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,
Figure 801675DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
is the sign of the exclusive or operation,
Figure 888580DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,
Figure 768811DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
is the true identity of the user.
S108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous identity of the user as
Figure 675587DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And using the system master private key
Figure 768308DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
And a hash function
Figure 975299DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Computing a signed first private key
Figure 495273DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
。
S109. the key generation center PKG will
Figure 889345DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
And sending the data to the user.
S110. user receives
Figure 848074DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
Then, the equation is verified
Figure 112833DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
If the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signature
Figure 69288DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Otherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key
Figure 216235DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
；
S111, user limited domain from q order
Figure 447497DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
A non-zero random number x is selected as a second private key of the signature, and a verification public key is calculated
Figure 97921DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
And obtaining the signature private key of the user
Figure 490856DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
。
S2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; and the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage.
Specifically, the S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namely
Figure 859520DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Wherein the identity of the data file F is
Figure 97735DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
，
Figure 868245DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
Representing blocks of data files.
S202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data file
Figure 963240DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
To a
Figure 22463DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Wherein C represents an encrypted data file,
Figure 861106DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
representing a block of ciphertext data.
S203. the user selects the q-order finite field
Figure 486122DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Four different random coefficients are selected
Figure 955281DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
And deriving n seeds:
Figure 298537DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
the user finishes settingIntegrity audit assistance information
Figure 940871DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
。
S204. for
Figure 889236DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
The user utilizes the private signature key
Figure 529296DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
Computing each ciphertext data block
Figure 94269DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Based on certificateless homomorphic signatures
Figure 274715DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
And sets a signature set
Figure 77586DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
。
S205. user sends
Figure 685284DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
And storing the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a cloud server, and sending the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a third party auditor TPA for storage.
In some embodiments, in S2, after the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to the third-party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, the signature sets, and the integrity audit auxiliary information at the local client, so as to save the local storage space of the user.
S3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; and the third party auditor generates a pre-calculated value according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving the audit certification response information returned by the cloud server.
Specifically, the S3 includes:
s301, after receiving a request of a user for checking the integrity of cloud data, a third party auditor TPA collects the cloud data
Figure 3133DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
Randomly selecting a subset containing c elements
Figure 924953DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
。
S302. for each subscript
Figure 644647DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
From q order finite fields
Figure 626510DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
In randomly selecting matching coefficient
Figure 431655DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
。
S303, sending challenge information to third party auditor TPA
Figure 953903DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
To the cloud server.
S304, before the third party auditor TPA returns the audit certification response information, the third party auditor TPA generates a pre-calculated value I
Figure 465787DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure 415288DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
。
S4, generating audit certification response information: and after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to the third-party auditor.
Specifically, the S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge information
Figure 442150DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Then, the cloud server calculates the combined information block of the challenged ciphertext data block
Figure 971352DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
And aggregate signatures
Figure 400059DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
。
S402, the cloud server sends audit certification response information
Figure 723724DEST_PATH_IMAGE063
And giving the third party auditor TPA.
S5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
Specifically, the S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response information
Figure 237882DEST_PATH_IMAGE064
Then, the pre-calculated value one is used
Figure 367512DEST_PATH_IMAGE065
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure 588409DEST_PATH_IMAGE066
Checking and validating equation
Figure 145292DEST_PATH_IMAGE067
And if the verification formula is established, the TPA of the third party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third party auditor returns false.
And S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
The correctness derivation process of this embodiment is as follows:
because of the fact that
Figure 146746DEST_PATH_IMAGE069
And
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE070
the integrity audit correctly pushes the process to:
Figure 322529DEST_PATH_IMAGE071
。
the foregoing is illustrative of the preferred embodiments of this invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise form disclosed herein and that various other combinations, modifications, and environments may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the concept as disclosed herein, either as described above or as apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. And that modifications and variations may be effected by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

Claims (7)

1. Public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data based on certificateless is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user;
s2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage;
s3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; generating a pre-calculated value by a third party auditor according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving audit certification response information returned by the cloud server;
s4, generating audit certification response information: after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor;
s5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
2. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 1 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirement
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
are all made ofA q factorial cyclic group;
s102, selecting a q factorial method circulation group by a key generation center PKG
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
And generates a primitive g and a finite field from order q
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
A non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculated
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
Wherein, in the step (A),
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
is the system master public key;
s103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKG
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
And
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
wherein, in the step (A),
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
is a bit string of an arbitrary length,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
is of fixed length
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
A bit string of (a);
s104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash function
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Wherein
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
The following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messages
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
And scalar coefficients
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
Equation of
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
If true;
s105, the public parameter of the PKG publishing system of the key generation center
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
；
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q order
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
A non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
；
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component two
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
Wherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
is the sign of the exclusive or operation,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
is the true identity of the user;
s108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous body of the userIs prepared from
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And using the system master private key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
And a hash function
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Computing a signed first private key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
；
S109. the key generation center PKG will
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
Sending the data to a user;
s110. user receives
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
Then, the equation is verified
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
If the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signature
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Otherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
；
S111, user limited domain from q order
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
A non-zero random number x is selected as a second private key of the signature, and a verification public key is calculated
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
And obtaining the signature private key of the user
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
。
3. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 2 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namely
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Wherein the identity of the data file F is
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
，
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
Representing blocks of data files;
s202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data file
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
To a
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Wherein C represents an encrypted data file,
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
representing a ciphertext data block;
s203. the user selects the q-order finite field
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
Four different random coefficients are selected
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
And lead outn seeds:
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
user sets integrity audit assistance information
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
；
S204. for
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
The user utilizes the private signature key
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
Computing each ciphertext data block
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE048
Based on certificateless homomorphic signatures
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
And sets a signature set
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
；
S205. user sends
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
And storing the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a cloud server, and sending the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a third party auditor TPA for storage.
4. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 3 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S3 includes:
s301, after receiving a request of a user for checking the integrity of cloud data, a third party auditor TPA collects the cloud data
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
Randomly selecting a subset containing c elements
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
；
S302. for each subscript
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
From q order finite fields
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
In randomly selecting matching coefficient
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
；
S303, sending challenge information to third party auditor TPA
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
Sending the data to a cloud server;
s304, before the third party auditor TPA returns the audit certification response information, the third party auditor TPA generates a pre-calculated value I
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
。
5. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 4 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge information
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Then, the cloud server calculates the combined information block of the challenged ciphertext data block
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
And aggregate signatures
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
；
S402, the cloud server sends audit certification response information
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE063
And giving the third party auditor TPA.
6. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 5 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response information
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE064
Then, the pre-calculated value one is used
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE065
And a pre-calculated value of two
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE066
Checking and validating equation
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE067
If the verification equation is established, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns false;
and S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
7. The certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity based on claim 1 characterized in that in S2, after the user sends all ciphertext data blocks and signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity auditing auxiliary information to the third party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, signature sets and integrity auditing auxiliary information at the local client.
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