CN113098684B - Intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method and system - Google Patents
Intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN113098684B CN113098684B CN202110327332.0A CN202110327332A CN113098684B CN 113098684 B CN113098684 B CN 113098684B CN 202110327332 A CN202110327332 A CN 202110327332A CN 113098684 B CN113098684 B CN 113098684B
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 19
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 9
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 125000004122 cyclic group Chemical group 0.000 claims description 9
- 239000000126 substance Substances 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 abstract description 8
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 abstract description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 abstract description 2
- 201000004569 Blindness Diseases 0.000 description 1
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3257—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using blind signatures
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
Abstract
The application discloses a method and a system for traceable blind signature facing to a smart grid, wherein the method comprises the following steps: initializing system parameters of the smart power grid; generating a private key and a public key of a signer according to the system parameters, and calculating a blind signature for the related data of the smart grid of the user; based on a private key and a public key of a signer, a user and the signer perform information interaction to obtain a blinded signature, and finally obtain a message signature pair through blind removing operation, wherein the message refers to related data of the smart grid; and (4) verifying the message signature pair, if the verification is passed, considering that the related data of the user smart grid has authenticity, namely the related data is indeed authorized by a signer, and otherwise, considering that the data is unauthorized. According to the blind signature calculation method and device, the blind factors are added in the blind signature calculation process, so that a malicious signer cannot associate blind signatures from the public signature list, the blind signatures cannot be traced, the privacy protection capability of smart grid application can be enhanced, and the wide application of the blind signature technology in the smart grid is promoted.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and relates to an untraceable blind signature method and system for an intelligent power grid.
Background
Smart grids are modern power delivery systems that rely primarily on two-way communications, information, and software to optimize control and implement advanced grid functions. Although the smart grid can provide fine-grained consumption monitoring and promote a plurality of residential power generation sites to participate in distributed energy transactions, privacy leakage problems such as identity information and grid data exist, and the development of the smart grid is restricted by the privacy leakage problems.
The blind signature is a special digital signature, and can ensure that a signer can generate a correct digital signature without knowing a message, so that data privacy protection of a smart grid and other similar application scenes is supported. Although the existing blind signature schemes have completeness, unforgeability and blindness and can provide certain privacy protection capability, most blind signature schemes are difficult to support the untraceability, that is, a malicious signer can successfully trace an original message corresponding to the blind signature through an open message signature, so that the blind signature still faces the risk of privacy disclosure in the application process.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the defects in the prior art, the method and the system for the traceable blind signature facing the smart grid are provided, and can be used for protecting data privacy in the identity authentication process of the smart grid, providing identity authentication and effectively protecting privacy of signature messages.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
an untraceable blind signature method facing a smart grid, the method comprising the steps of:
step 1: initializing system parameters of the smart power grid;
step 2: generating a private key and a public key of a signer according to the system parameters, and calculating a blind signature for the related data of the smart grid of the user;
and step 3: based on a private key and a public key of a signer, a user and the signer perform information interaction to obtain a blinded signature, and finally obtain a message signature pair through blind removing operation, wherein the message refers to related data of the smart grid;
and 4, step 4: and (4) verifying the message signature pair obtained in the step (3), if the verification is passed, considering that the related data of the user smart grid is authentic, namely obtaining the authorization of a signer, and otherwise, considering that the data is unauthorized.
The invention further comprises the following preferred embodiments:
preferably, in step 1, a security parameter λ is input, and λ bits are randomly selectedThe large prime number of length yields p, q and
determining an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ ax + b, selecting a q-order addition cycle group from E at all rational points (including the infinity point O)
And from
Randomly selecting a generator P and a secure hash function
Finally outputting system parameters
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
to represent
A set of all rational points of the upper elliptic curve E;
o represents an infinite point on the elliptic curve E;
p represents a large prime number of λ bit length;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
a and b represent
The element (E) defines an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ax+b；
Preferably, in step 2, system parameters PP are input and randomly selected
Calculating Q as xP, and outputting a private key x and a public key Q of the signer;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
Preferably, in step 3, the user interacts with the signer as follows:
step 301: a signer randomly selects k from the [2, q-1], calculates R '═ kP, and then sends R' to a user;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
step 302: the user randomly selects alpha, beta E [2, q-1]Calculating
And m' ═ h beta-1+ α (mod q), then send m' to the signer;
wherein mod n represents a modulo n operation; x is the number ofR，yRRespectively as the abscissa and ordinate of R; alpha and beta are blinding factors;
q is the public key of the signer;
step 303: the signer calculates s ' ═ k-m ' x (mod q) and sends s ' to the user;
wherein x is the private key of the signer;
step 304: the user calculates s ═ s' β + α (mod q) and obtains a message signature pair (m, σ ═ h, s));
wherein m is the message to be signed.
Preferably, in step 4, a message signature pair to be verified (m, σ ═ h, s)) is input, and calculation is performed
Wherein m is a message to be signed, sigma is a signature, and h and s are respectively a hash value and a partial signature; x is the number ofR″，yR"the abscissa and ordinate, respectively, of R";
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
q is the public key of the signer;
if h is h', then it indicates that σ is a valid signature of m; otherwise, the signature σ is invalid.
Preferably, the smart grid related data is divided into meter data and equipment information.
The invention also discloses an untraceable blind signature system facing the smart grid, which comprises:
the initialization module is used for initializing system parameters;
the key generation module is used for generating a private key and a public key of the signer according to the system parameters;
the signature module is used for carrying out information interaction between the user and the signer based on the private key and the public key of the signer to obtain a message signature pair;
and the verification module is used for verifying the message signature pair obtained by the signature module.
The beneficial effect that this application reached:
1. according to the blind signature calculation method and device, blind factors alpha and beta are added in the blind signature calculation process, so that a malicious signer cannot associate a blind signature from an open signature list, the blind signature calculation method and device have the non-traceability, the privacy protection capability of smart grid application can be enhanced, and the wide application of the blind signature technology in the smart grid is promoted;
2. the application can prove the security under a random oracle model and has the characteristics of high security, high calculation efficiency and simple realization.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of an untraceable blind signature method for a smart grid according to the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of information interaction between a user and a signer according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present application is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereby.
As shown in fig. 1, the invention provides a smart grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method, which comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing system parameters of the smart power grid;
inputting a security parameter lambda, randomly selecting a large prime number with the bit length of lambda to generate p, q and
determining an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ ax + b, selecting a q-order addition cycle group from E at all rational points (including the infinity point O)
And from
Randomly selecting a generator P and a secure hash function
Finally outputting system parameters
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
to represent
A set of all rational points of the upper elliptic curve E;
o represents an infinite point on the elliptic curve E;
p represents a large prime number of λ bit length;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
a and b represent
The element (E) defines an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ax+b；
Step 2: generating a private key and a public key of a signer according to the system parameters, and calculating blind signatures for the electricity meter data, the equipment information and other related smart grid data of the user;
inputting system parameters PP, and randomly selecting
Calculating Q as xP, and outputting a private key x and a public key Q of the signer;
and step 3: based on a private key and a public key of a signer, a user and the signer perform information interaction, and after a blind signature is obtained, a message signature pair can be finally obtained through blind removing operation, wherein the message can be ammeter data, equipment information and the like of an intelligent power grid system;
as shown in fig. 2, the user interacts with the signer as follows:
step 301: a signer randomly selects k from the [2, q-1], calculates R '═ kP, and then sends R' to a user;
step 302: the user randomly selects alpha, beta E [2, q-1]Calculating
And m' ═ h beta-1+ α (mod q), then send m' to the signer;
wherein x isR,yRRespectively as the abscissa and ordinate of R; alpha and beta are blinding factors;
step 303: the signer calculates s ' ═ k-m ' x (mod q) and sends s ' to the user;
step 304: the user calculates s ═ s' β + α (mod q) and obtains a message signature pair (m, σ ═ h, s));
and m is a message to be signed, namely the related data of the smart grid to be signed.
And 4, step 4: and (4) verifying the message signature pair obtained in the step (3), if the verification is passed, determining that the related data of the user smart grid is authentic, namely the related data is indeed authorized by the signer, otherwise, determining that the data is unauthorized.
Input message signature pair to be verified (m, σ ═ h, s)), and calculation
Wherein m is related data of the smart grid to be signed, sigma is a signature, and h and s are respectively a hash value and a partial signature; x is the number ofR″,yR"the abscissa and ordinate, respectively, of R";
if h is h', then it indicates that σ is a valid signature of m; otherwise, the signature σ is invalid.
The blind signature system of the intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method comprises:
the initialization module is used for initializing system parameters;
the key generation module is used for generating a private key and a public key of the signer according to the system parameters;
the signature module is used for carrying out information interaction between the user and the signer based on the private key and the public key of the signer to obtain a message signature pair;
and the verification module is used for verifying the message signature pair obtained by the signature module.
The present applicant has described and illustrated embodiments of the present invention in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, but it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the above embodiments are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention, and the detailed description is only for the purpose of helping the reader to better understand the spirit of the present invention, and not for limiting the scope of the present invention, and on the contrary, any improvement or modification made based on the spirit of the present invention should fall within the scope of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. An untraceable blind signature method facing a smart grid is characterized in that:
the method comprises the following steps:
step 1: initializing system parameters of the smart power grid;
step 2: generating a private key and a public key of a signer according to the system parameters, and calculating a blinded signature for the related data of the smart grid of the user;
and step 3: based on a private key and a public key of a signer, a user and the signer perform information interaction to obtain a blinded signature, and finally obtain a message signature pair through blind removing operation, wherein the message refers to related data of the smart grid;
and 4, step 4: verifying the message signature pair obtained in the step 3, if the verification is passed, considering that the related data of the user smart grid is authentic, namely obtaining the authorization of a signer, otherwise, considering that the data is unauthorized;
in step 1, inputA security parameter lambda, randomly selecting a large prime number of lambda bit length to generate p, q and
determining an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ ax + b, q-order addition cycle group selected at all rational points from E including the point O at infinity
And from
Randomly selecting a generator P and a secure hash function
Finally outputting system parameters
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
to represent
A set of all rational points of the upper elliptic curve E;
o represents an infinite point on the elliptic curve E;
p represents a large prime number of λ bit length;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
a and b represent
The element (E) defines an elliptic curve E: y2＝x3+ax+b；
in step 2, inputting system parameters PP and randomly selecting
Calculating Q as xP, and outputting a private key x and a public key Q of the signer;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
in step 3, the user and the signer perform the following interactions:
step 301: a signer randomly selects k from the [2, q-1] to calculate R '═ kP, and then R' is sent to a user;
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
step 302: the user randomly selects alpha, beta E [2, q-1]Calculating R ═ α P + β R' - α β Q ═ xR,yR),
And m' ═ h beta-1+ α (mod q), then send m' to the signer;
wherein mod n represents a modulo n operation; x is the number ofR,yRRespectively as the abscissa and ordinate of R; alpha and beta are blinding factors;
q is the public key of the signer;
step 303: the signer calculates s ' ═ k-m ' x (mod q) and sends s ' to the user;
wherein x is the private key of the signer;
step 304: the user calculates s ═ s' β + α (mod q) and obtains a message signature pair (m, σ ═ h, s));
wherein m is a message to be signed;
in step 4, a message signature pair to be verified is input (m, σ ═ h, s)), and R ″ ═ hQ + sP ═ x is calculatedR″,yR″),
Wherein, m is the message to be signed, sigma is the signature, h and s are respectively a hash value and a partial signature; x is the number ofR″,yR″Respectively the abscissa and ordinate of R';
p represents a cyclic group
A generator of (2);
q is the public key of the signer;
if h is h', then it indicates that σ is a valid signature of m; otherwise, the signature σ is invalid.
2. The smart grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method according to claim 1, wherein:
the related data of the smart grid are divided into electric meter data and equipment information.
3. The blind signature system of the intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method according to any one of claims 1-2, wherein:
the system comprises:
the initialization module is used for initializing system parameters;
the key generation module is used for generating a private key and a public key of the signer according to the system parameters;
the signature module is used for carrying out information interaction between the user and the signer based on the private key and the public key of the signer to obtain a message signature pair;
and the verification module is used for verifying the message signature pair obtained by the signature module.
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| US6636969B1 (en) * | 1999-04-26 | 2003-10-21 | Lucent Technologies Inc. | Digital signatures having revokable anonymity and improved traceability |
| CN103780385B (en) * | 2012-10-23 | 2017-02-15 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | Blind signature method based on elliptic curve and device thereof |
| WO2018119670A1 (en) * | 2016-12-27 | 2018-07-05 | 深圳大学 | Method and device for certificateless partially blind signature |
| CN108898031A (en) * | 2018-07-17 | 2018-11-27 | 济南浪潮高新科技投资发展有限公司 | A kind of block chain design method of the Proxy Signature based on ECC algorithm |
| CN109981295B (en) * | 2019-03-31 | 2022-07-08 | 南京信息工程大学 | Method for realizing limited anonymity under intelligent power grid environment |
| CN112491556B (en) * | 2020-11-26 | 2022-05-06 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Block chain agent blind signature generation method |
| CN112511314B (en) * | 2020-11-26 | 2022-03-22 | 中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所 | Recoverable message blind signature generation method based on identity |
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