CN112491556A - Block chain agent blind signature generation method - Google Patents

Block chain agent blind signature generation method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN112491556A
CN112491556A CN202011342702.XA CN202011342702A CN112491556A CN 112491556 A CN112491556 A CN 112491556A CN 202011342702 A CN202011342702 A CN 202011342702A CN 112491556 A CN112491556 A CN 112491556A
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signature
signer
message
user
proxy
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CN112491556B (en
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文义红
杨伊
何德彪
罗敏
王士成
李峰
许建凯
陈金勇
徐小刚
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CETC 54 Research Institute
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0884—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by delegation of authentication, e.g. a proxy authenticates an entity to be authenticated on behalf of this entity vis-à-vis an authentication entity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3257—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using blind signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a block chain agent blind signature generation method, and belongs to the technical field of information security. The method comprises the steps of firstly, generating system parameters of a whole agent blind signature scheme through a system initialization algorithm; then, the user generates a public and private key pair by himself, and obtains the public and private key pair of the original signer and the public and private key pair of the proxy signer; the original signer authorizes the proxy signer, after the authorization is successful, the user blinds the message through the blinding factor and sends the message to the proxy signer, the proxy signer signs the blinded message through the signature private key and sends the blinded message to the user, the user blindly obtains the signature of the message for the blinded signature, and the verifier can recover the message and verify the signature when verifying the signature. The invention uses blind factors to destroy the linear relation between the final signature message and the intermediate value in the signature process, thereby ensuring the blindness and the untraceability of the blind signature scheme of the invention.

Description

Block chain agent blind signature generation method
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and particularly relates to a block chain agent blind signature generation method.
Background
With the continuous development of network technology, digital signatures are widely used. The digital signature can verify the integrity and authenticity of data sources and information and the non-repudiation of the signature, can solve the problems of counterfeiting, repudiation, impersonation, falsification and the like in a network, and is an electronic signature technology which is most commonly applied, has the most mature technology and has the strongest operability at present. However, in some specific scenarios such as electronic election, when the original signer cannot sign, the original signer needs to authorize the agent to sign, and the owner of the message does not want the agent to know the specific content of the message, and the signer only wants to let others know that the original signer signs the message. With the promotion of the requirement of protecting privacy, the proxy blind signature scheme comes into play.
The blockchain is a distributed shared account book and a database, and has the characteristics of decentralization, non-tampering, traceability, collective maintenance, public transparency and the like, and the characteristics ensure the integrity and transparency of the blockchain. Based on these characteristics, the blockchain has a rich application scenario. However, in some specific blockchain application scenarios, such as decentralized electronic election, anonymity needs to be guaranteed, and meanwhile, when the user cannot operate, the user needs to be successfully authorized to operate the application by the agent, so as to ensure the normal operation of the application. However, such a method is still lacking in the prior art.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a block chain proxy blind signature generation method, which can authorize an original signer to sign when the original signer cannot sign, and simultaneously ensure that the proxy signer does not know the content of the signature.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a blind signature generation method for a blockchain agent comprises the following steps:
s1, system initialization:
(101) the certificate authority selects a group of additive cycles of order prime q
Figure BDA0002798984260000011
And multiplication loop group
Figure BDA0002798984260000012
Wherein the elements
Figure BDA0002798984260000013
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure BDA0002798984260000014
Generating element, element of
Figure BDA0002798984260000015
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure BDA0002798984260000016
Generator of (2), bilinear pair
Figure BDA0002798984260000017
(102) Given a security parameter k, the certificate authority selects four hash functions
Figure BDA0002798984260000018
Figure BDA0002798984260000019
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002798984260000021
{0,1}*is a character string with any length consisting of 0 and 1,
Figure BDA0002798984260000022
denotes a length l consisting of 0, 11The character string of (a) is,
Figure BDA0002798984260000023
denotes a length l consisting of 0, 12The character string of (1);
(103) key generation center public system parameters:
Figure BDA0002798984260000024
s2, key generation:
the user randomly selects a number
Figure BDA0002798984260000025
And set as its own private key, the public key is Qu＝suP2Then the original signer's public-private key pair is(s)o，Qo) The public and private key pair of the proxy signer is(s)p，Qp)；
S3, authorization:
computing an authorization Q for a proxy signer by an original signerw：
Qw＝(so+H1(Mw,IDp,Qp))-1P1，
Wherein M iswAs an authorization book, IDpIs the identity information of the proxy signer;
s4, authorization verification and proxy blind signature key generation:
proxy signer verification equation e (P)1,P2)＝e(Qw,H1(Mw,,IDp,Qp)P2+Qo(ii) a If the equation is true, the authorization is accepted and D is calculatedop＝spQw；
S5, agent blind signature generation:
(501) signer generates random numbers
Figure BDA0002798984260000026
Calculating R ═ rP1And sending R to the user;
(502) after receiving the R, the user randomly selects alpha,
Figure BDA0002798984260000027
and (3) calculating:
Figure BDA0002798984260000028
Figure BDA0002798984260000029
v′＝α-1(v+β)
and sending v' to the proxy signer; wherein m is the message to be signed, | | | represents the concatenation of character strings,
Figure BDA00027989842600000210
representing an exclusive or operation;
(503) after the proxy signer receives v ', S ═ (r + v') D is calculatedopAnd sending S' to the user;
(504) after receiving S ', the user calculates the signature value S ═ α S' + β P1And outputs the signature (S, v, M) of the message M to be signedw)；
S6, signature verification:
verifier computation
Figure BDA0002798984260000031
And
Figure BDA0002798984260000032
judgment equation
Figure BDA0002798984260000033
If yes, the verification is passed; otherwise, the verification is not passed; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002798984260000034
representing the left end l of the extraction string u1The value of the individual bits is then,
Figure BDA0002798984260000035
indicating the right end l of the extraction string u2A value of one bit.
The invention adopts the technical scheme to obtain the beneficial effects that:
1. most of the prior proxy blind signatures with message recovery do not have the untraceability of signatures, and a proxy signer can determine the user information of the signature through the intermediate value transmitted in the signature process, namely the proxy signer can determine which signature is signed by retaining the data. The invention can complete the successful authorization of the original signer to the proxy signer, simultaneously uses the blind factor to blindly the original message and destroys the linear relation between the signature and the intermediate value, so that the user can obtain the correct signature, the verifier can recover the original message and successfully verify the signature, but the proxy signer can not know the original message, thereby ensuring the blindness and the irretrievable traceability of the method.
2. The invention introduces the agent blind signature in the block chain application system to realize authorization and confusion service, thereby not only providing an audit certificate for improper behaviors, but also ensuring that the original message is invisible to an agent, thereby ensuring the legal anonymity of users.
In summary, the invention is a proxy blind signature generation method with message recovery suitable for block chain application, which uses a blind factor to destroy the linear relation between the final signature message and the intermediate value in the signature process, thereby ensuring the blindness and untraceability of the blind signature scheme of the invention.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a signature flow of a proxy blind signature generation method in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and the detailed description.
As shown in fig. 1, a block chain proxy blind signature generation method is implemented by an original signer OrignalSigner, a proxy signer ProxySigner and a User, in a signature process, the original signer OrignalSigner firstly authorizes the proxy signer ProxySigner, after the authorization is successful, the User blindly changes a message, the proxy signer ProxySigner signs the blinded message, then the User outputs a signature, and finally a verifier can recover the original message while verifying whether the signature is correct. Which comprises the following steps:
initializing a system:
this step is performed by the certificate authority CA, mainly to generate system parameters for the whole proxy blind signature scheme. The concrete mode is as follows:
given a security parameter k, CA selects four hash functions
Figure BDA0002798984260000041
Figure BDA0002798984260000042
CA selects addition cycles of order prime q
Figure BDA0002798984260000043
And multiplication loop group
Figure BDA0002798984260000044
Wherein the elements
Figure BDA0002798984260000045
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure BDA0002798984260000046
Generating element, element of
Figure BDA0002798984260000047
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure BDA0002798984260000048
The generator of (1). Bilinear pairings
Figure BDA0002798984260000049
Key generation center KGC discloses system parameters:
Figure BDA00027989842600000410
and (3) key generation:
the step is executed by a User, and is used for generating a private and public key pair of the User. The concrete mode is as follows:
the user randomly selects a number
Figure BDA00027989842600000411
And set as its own private key, the public key is Qu＝suP2. The original signer's public-private key pair is(s)o，Qo) The public and private key pair of the proxy signer is(s)p，Qp)。
Authorization:
this step is performed by the original Signer for generating an authorization Q to the proxy Signer ProxySignerw. The concrete mode is as follows:
original Signer original Signal computation Qw＝(so+H1(Mw,IDp,Qp))-1P1Wherein M iswCorresponding to the authorization book.
Authorization verification and proxy blind signature key generation:
this step is performed by the proxy signer ProxySigner for verifying the authorization QwAnd if the verification is passed, the authorization is accepted. The concrete mode is as follows:
proxy signer ProxySigner verification equation
e(P1,P2)＝e(Qw,H1(Mw,,IDp,Qp)P2+Qo. If the equation is true, the authorization is accepted.
Proxy signer ProxySigner computation Dop＝spQw
Agent blind signature generation:
this step is essentially the generation of a signature (S, v, M) of the message M to be signedw). In the process of generating the signature, the User uses blinding the message M by using a blinding factor, and then the proxy signer ProxySigner signs the blinded message and the signature (S, v, M) of the Userw). The concrete mode is as follows:
signer generates random numbers
Figure BDA0002798984260000051
Calculating R ═ rP1And sending R to a User;
after the user receives R, randomly select
Figure BDA0002798984260000052
And (3) calculating:
Figure BDA0002798984260000053
Figure BDA0002798984260000054
v′＝α-1(v+β)
and sends v' to the proxy signer ProxySigner;
after v ' is received by the proxy signer ProxySigner, S ' ═ D (r + v ') is calculatedopAnd sending S' to a User;
after receiving S ', the User calculates the signature value S ═ α S' + β P1And outputs the signature (S, v, M)w)。
Signature verification:
this step is mainly used for the Verifier to verify the message M signature (S, v, M)w) The validity of (2). The concrete mode is as follows:
verifier calculation
Figure BDA0002798984260000055
And
Figure BDA0002798984260000056
judgment equation
Figure BDA0002798984260000057
If yes, the verification is passed; otherwise, the verification is not passed.
The method is executed by an original signer, an agent signer and a user together, in the signing process, the original signer firstly authorizes the agent signer, after the authorization is successful, the user blinds the message, the agent signer signs the blinded message, then the user outputs the signature, and finally a verifier can recover the original message while verifying whether the signature is correct.
The invention can complete the successful authorization of the original signer to the proxy signer, simultaneously uses the blind factor to blindly the original message and destroys the linear relation between the signature and the intermediate value, so that the user can obtain the correct signature, the verifier can recover the original message and successfully verify the signature, but the proxy signer can not know the original message, thereby ensuring the blindness and the irretrievable traceability of the scheme of the invention.

Claims (1)

1. A blind signature generation method for a blockchain agent is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, system initialization:
(101) the certificate authority selects a group of additive cycles of order prime q
Figure FDA0002798984250000011
Figure FDA0002798984250000012
And multiplication loop group
Figure FDA0002798984250000013
Wherein the elements
Figure FDA0002798984250000014
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure FDA0002798984250000015
Generating element, element of
Figure FDA0002798984250000016
Is an additive cyclic group
Figure FDA0002798984250000017
Generator of (2), bilinear pair
Figure FDA0002798984250000018
(102) Given a security parameter k, the certificate authority selects four hash functions
Figure FDA0002798984250000019
Figure FDA00027989842500000110
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA00027989842500000111
{0,1}*is a character string with any length consisting of 0 and 1,
Figure FDA00027989842500000112
denotes a length l consisting of 0, 11The character string of (a) is,
Figure FDA00027989842500000113
denotes a length l consisting of 0, 12The character string of (1);
(103) key generation center public system parameters:
Figure FDA00027989842500000114
s2, key generation:
the user randomly selects a number
Figure FDA00027989842500000115
And set as its own private key, the public key is Qu＝suP2Then the original signer's public-private key pair is(s)o，Qo) The public and private key pair of the proxy signer is(s)p，Qp)；
S3, authorization:
computing an authorization Q for a proxy signer by an original signerw：
Qw＝(so+H1(Mw,IDp,Qp))-1P1，
Wherein M iswAs an authorization book, IDpIs the identity information of the proxy signer;
s4, authorization verification and proxy blind signature key generation:
proxy signer verification equation e (P)1,P2)＝e(Qw,H1(Mw,,IDp,Qp)P2+Qo(ii) a If the equation is true, the authorization is accepted and D is calculatedop＝spQw；
S5, agent blind signature generation:
(501) label (Bao)Celebrity generated random numbers
Figure FDA00027989842500000116
Calculating R ═ rP1And sending R to the user;
(502) after receiving the R, the user randomly selects alpha,
Figure FDA00027989842500000117
and (3) calculating:
Figure FDA00027989842500000118
Figure FDA0002798984250000021
v′＝α-1(v+β)
and sending v' to the proxy signer; wherein m is the message to be signed, | | | represents the concatenation of character strings,
Figure FDA0002798984250000022
representing an exclusive or operation;
(503) after the proxy signer receives v ', S ═ (r + v') D is calculatedopAnd sending S' to the user;
(504) after receiving S ', the user calculates the signature value S ═ α S' + β P1And outputs the signature (S, v, M) of the message M to be signedw)；
S6, signature verification:
verifier computation
Figure FDA0002798984250000023
And
Figure FDA0002798984250000024
judgment equation
Figure FDA0002798984250000026
If yes, the verification is passed; otherwise, the verification is not passed; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002798984250000027
representing the left end l of the extraction string u1The value of the individual bits is then,
Figure FDA0002798984250000025
indicating the right end l of the extraction string u2A value of one bit.
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Cited By (3)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113098684A (en) * 2021-03-26 2021-07-09 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 Intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method and system
CN114389808A (en) * 2022-01-26 2022-04-22 南京邮电大学 Open ID protocol design method based on SM9 blind signature
CN115348033A (en) * 2022-08-12 2022-11-15 四川启睿克科技有限公司 Short identity-based designated verifier proxy signature method

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CN106559211A (en) * 2016-11-22 2017-04-05 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 Secret protection intelligence contract method in a kind of block chain
CN106899412A (en) * 2017-03-30 2017-06-27 北京链银博科技有限责任公司 A kind of block chain method for secret protection, apparatus and system
CN109359483A (en) * 2018-10-19 2019-02-19 东北大学秦皇岛分校 A kind of privacy of user anonymity guard method based on block chain

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN104333453A (en) * 2014-10-20 2015-02-04 西安电子科技大学 Partially blind signature method based on identity
CN106559211A (en) * 2016-11-22 2017-04-05 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 Secret protection intelligence contract method in a kind of block chain
CN106899412A (en) * 2017-03-30 2017-06-27 北京链银博科技有限责任公司 A kind of block chain method for secret protection, apparatus and system
CN109359483A (en) * 2018-10-19 2019-02-19 东北大学秦皇岛分校 A kind of privacy of user anonymity guard method based on block chain

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113098684A (en) * 2021-03-26 2021-07-09 国网河南省电力公司电力科学研究院 Intelligent power grid-oriented untraceable blind signature method and system
CN114389808A (en) * 2022-01-26 2022-04-22 南京邮电大学 Open ID protocol design method based on SM9 blind signature
CN114389808B (en) * 2022-01-26 2023-07-21 南京邮电大学 OpenID protocol design method based on SM9 blind signature
CN115348033A (en) * 2022-08-12 2022-11-15 四川启睿克科技有限公司 Short identity-based designated verifier proxy signature method

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