CN113031020B - Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks - Google Patents
Satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/22—Multipath-related issues
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/35—Constructional details or hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
- G01S19/37—Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain
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- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract
The invention discloses a satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks, and belongs to the technical field of satellite navigation. The method is based on the traditional satellite navigation receiver, realizes the identification and detection of signals existing in the space through an original multiple access correlation peak identification tracking mode, judges the signal domain characteristics of pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler and the like of the space aiming at all signals of the same satellite and the information characteristics of ephemeris, clock error and the like, determines whether deception signals exist in the space or not according to the check and judgment of the signal domain and the information domain of the multiple access correlation peak, outputs the related detection information of the deception signals, and completes the real-time detection of the deception interference of the satellite navigation receiver. The invention has good detection effect, wide application range and good popularization and application value.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of satellite navigation, in particular to a satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks.
Background
With the development of global satellite navigation systems, satellite navigation receivers have become the space-time reference of people's daily life, and the satellite navigation receivers play a vital role in various fields of communication, navigation, finance, civil aviation and traffic. Meanwhile, deception jamming aiming at satellite navigation also occurs. The deception jamming is mainly aimed at the working characteristics and design weak links of the satellite navigation receiver, and gradually becomes a natural enemy of the satellite navigation receiver due to good concealment and high jamming efficiency. Any deception jamming comprises two links of deception signal generation and deception signal transmission, so the deception jamming is divided into generation deception and forwarding deception according to a generation mode, and is divided into single-antenna deception and multi-antenna deception according to a transmission mode. The two combined spoofing patterns are more diverse. In practical application, deception jamming patterns are complex and changeable, jamming types are not single, and the traditional deception jamming detection method is effective for a certain deception jamming pattern, and has certain limitations:
1. the deception jamming detection method based on the signal power detects the existence of deception signals through the power of the deception signals, but due to the influence of factors such as antenna types, antenna attitudes, multipath influence and the like, a great false alarm probability exists;
2. the deception jamming detection method based on signal Doppler utilizes the dynamic difference of a satellite navigation receiver relative to a satellite and a deception jamming carrier to carry out deception jamming detection, and when the satellite navigation receiver has smaller dynamic state or the emission mode is deception with multiple antennas, the method has larger limitation;
3. the method realizes identification of the deception jamming by utilizing estimation of residual errors in positioning calculation, is effective only for deception of 1 or 2 satellites, and has no capability when generating type single-antenna deception exists.
How to detect deception jamming in real time through a related algorithm based on self equipment becomes a key of wide application of a satellite navigation receiver under the condition that no external auxiliary means is added to a multi-style satellite navigation deception signal.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to avoid the defects in the background art and provides a satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks, which solves the problem and difficulty that the satellite navigation receiver has a single application scene for resisting deception jamming, and improves the anti-jamming performance of the satellite navigation receiver and the usability and integrity of the satellite navigation receiver in a complex electromagnetic environment.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks comprises the following steps:
(1) sequentially capturing the received space navigation signals by using a capturing engine of a receiver according to the satellite number, setting a related peak recording threshold according to a capturing threshold of the receiver after completing the satellite capturing, and storing and recording the number, the size and the position of all current related peaks;
(2) judging the number of correlation peaks, if the number of correlation peaks is more than one, defining correlation peaks except the tracking correlation peaks of the main branch of the receiver as multiple-access correlation peaks, and sequencing the positions of the multiple-access correlation peaks according to the size;
(3) sequentially transferring the multiple access correlation peaks into an independent signal identification tracking loop, and respectively carrying out independent tracking, measurement and demodulation on each correlation peak to obtain pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each correlation peak;
(4) checking and judging pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock difference of each correlation peak obtained by a signal identification and tracking loop and pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock difference obtained by main branch tracking of a receiver, and judging as a multipath signal if the pseudo-range observed quantity, the carrier observed quantity and the Doppler deviation of the two correlation peaks are all in a threshold range and the ephemeris and the clock difference of the two correlation peaks are all the same; otherwise, judging that a deception signal exists;
(5) and outputting deception signal alarm information after all the correlation peaks are identified, and finishing the real-time online detection of satellite navigation deception interference.
Further, in the step (1), in the signal capturing process, the receiver searches for a signal correlation peak of each visible satellite in the whole carrier doppler-pseudo code phase two-dimensional uncertain range, sets a correlation peak detection threshold according to the capturing sensitivity, detects all correlation peaks in the capturing range, and records doppler information and pseudo code phase information of all correlation peaks.
Further, in step (3), performing independent signal identification and tracking processing on the multiple access correlation peaks in step (2), processing each multiple access correlation peak signal component in a tracking manner with the same tracking processing manner as the receiver, the same parameters such as integration time and loop bandwidth according to the identification number of the reserved spoofed signals, and obtaining the tracking, measurement and demodulation results of each correlation peak in real time, thereby obtaining pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each multiple access correlation peak.
Compared with the background technology, the invention has the following advantages:
1. the invention is a comprehensive deception jamming detection method, is not limited to single deception jamming based on signal power, signal Doppler, autonomous integrity of a receiver and the like, is effective to various deception jamming, and has good detection effect and high detection success rate.
2. The invention has good detection effects on generative deception, regenerative deception, single-antenna deception, multi-antenna deception, organizational deception and the like through the whole processes of signal capture, signal tracking and signal demodulation, and has good deception scene adaptability.
3. The invention does not need multiple receivers, array antennas, extra environmental support, change of receiver hardware and external auxiliary information, only adds an independent identification tracking loop on a baseband signal processing algorithm, and has low environmental dependence and simple engineering realization.
4. The invention is suitable for all satellite navigation systems, is suitable for all signals such as public signals, authorized signals and the like, has wide application range and has good popularization and application values.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic block diagram of spoof interference detection in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of spoof interference detection in an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and the detailed description.
A satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks comprises the following steps:
(1) on the basis of a traditional satellite navigation receiver design framework, a capture engine of the receiver is used for sequentially capturing received space navigation signals according to satellite numbers, after satellite capture is completed, a related peak recording threshold value is set according to a capture threshold value of the receiver, and the number, the size and the position of all current related peaks are stored and recorded;
(2) judging whether the number of the correlation peaks is less than or only one, if so, indicating that the satellite does not exist in the current signal or the satellite does not have deception interference, and if the number of the correlation peaks is more than one, sequencing the positions of the correlation peaks except the correlation peaks tracked by the main branch of the receiver according to the sizes, and taking the positions as the input of subsequent deception signal identification tracking;
(3) sequentially switching each correlation peak into an independent tracking loop for signal identification, and respectively carrying out independent tracking, measurement and demodulation on each correlation peak to obtain information such as signal pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris, clock error and the like of each correlation peak;
(4) checking and judging the information of signal pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris, clock error and the like of each correlation peak acquired by a signal identification loop and the information of signal pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris, clock error and the like acquired by the main branch of a receiver, and judging the signals to be multipath signals if the signal parameter pseudo-range observed quantity, the carrier observed quantity and the Doppler deviation of the two correlation peaks are in a certain threshold range and the information parameter ephemeris, clock error and the like are completely the same; and if the deviation of pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity and Doppler of the two correlation peaks exceeds a threshold value or the information parameter ephemeris, clock error and the like are different, judging that a deception signal exists.
Outputting deception signal alarm information until all the correlation peaks are identified, and completing the real-time online detection of satellite navigation deception interference.
In the step (1), in the signal capturing process, the receiver searches signal correlation peaks of each visible satellite in the whole carrier Doppler-pseudo code phase two-dimensional uncertain range, sets a correlation peak detection threshold according to the capturing sensitivity, detects all correlation peaks in the capturing range, and records Doppler information and pseudo code phase information of all correlation peaks.
In the step (2), if no correlation peak signal is detected in the whole Doppler-pseudo code phase two-dimensional range, no signal is indicated, if a unique correlation peak signal is detected, the satellite is a really existing signal, the rationality of the signal needs to be judged through the autonomous integrity of a receiver, if a plurality of correlation peak signals are detected, the risk of deception signals exists, deception interference identification needs to be carried out, correlation peaks except for a receiver main tracking correlation peak in the detected correlation peak signals are defined as multiple access correlation peaks, sorting is carried out according to the size of the multiple access correlation peaks, Doppler information and pseudo code phase information of the deception correlation peaks stored in the step (1) are used as input of identification and tracking of the deception correlation peaks, and the deception correlation peaks and the pseudo code phase information are transferred to an interference real-time identification stage.
In the step (3), independent signal identification and tracking processing is respectively carried out on the multiple access correlation peaks in the step (2), according to the identification number of the reserved deceptive signals, a tracking processing mode which is the same as that of a receiver and has the same parameters of integration time, loop bandwidth and the like is used for processing the signal component of each multiple access correlation peak, the tracking, measurement and demodulation result of each correlation peak is obtained in real time, and the information of pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris, clock error and the like of each multiple access correlation peak is obtained.
In the step (4), the tracking, measurement and demodulation results obtained by the signal tracking of the receiver are checked and compared with the tracking, measurement and demodulation results of the multiple access correlation peak obtained in the step (3), if the signal parameters of the two correlation peaks are within a certain threshold range, the pseudo-range observed quantity, the carrier observed quantity and the Doppler deviation are indicated to be homologous signals, possibly multipath signals and also possibly deceptive signals, and if the pseudo-range observed quantity is larger or the carrier observed quantity is larger or the Doppler deviation is overlarge, deceptive signals exist; if the deviation of the signal parameters is within a certain threshold range, data such as ephemeris and clock error of the information parameters output by tracking two related peaks are verified, if the information parameters are completely the same, the data are multipath signals, and if the information parameters are different, deception signals exist. And outputting the detection result as the alarm information of the deception signal until all the multiple access correlation peaks are identified and detected. And finally, finishing the real-time detection of the deception jamming of the satellite navigation receiver.
The method adopts a comprehensive deception jamming detection mode aiming at the defects of single current deception jamming detection mode, single deception jamming adaptation scene, high false alarm detection and false alarm rate and the like. Specifically, all correlation peaks which are acquired by a specified satellite and are higher than a set threshold value are acquired in a satellite navigation receiver acquisition engine, and a main tracking signal is determined to be switched into tracking according to a receiver strategy; then recording and storing all correlation peaks except the main tracking correlation peak of the receiver, and sequentially carrying out independent tracking, measurement and message demodulation on the stored correlation peaks according to the sizes of the correlation peaks; and checking and comparing the threshold of the pseudo-range difference value of the pseudo-range of the independent tracking result, the observation information such as telegraph text and the like and the pseudo-range difference value of the main tracking signal with the telegraph text parameter information, judging whether the multi-correlation peak existing in the received signal is a deception signal or not, and continuously identifying other satellites from the acquisition engine in a circulating manner until the correlation peak of the satellite is identified. The method is not limited to deception interference of a certain pattern, and is effective in generative deception, forwarding deception, single-antenna deception, multi-antenna deception and combination of the patterns.
The following is a more specific example:
referring to fig. 1 and 2, a satellite navigation spoofing interference detection method based on multiple correlation peaks is based on a traditional design framework of a satellite navigation receiver, the correlation peaks of all signals of each satellite are identified in a capture engine according to a preset threshold, other multiple-access correlation peaks are recorded and stored except the correlation peak tracked by a receiver owner, the multiple-access correlation peaks are identified and tracked respectively at the same time, information such as pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each correlation peak is obtained, the identification information is checked and compared with the information of the receiver owner tracking correlation peak, the relationship between the signals of the multiple-access correlation peaks and the signals of the owner tracking correlation peaks is determined, and the signals are identified as multipath signals or multipath signals. And finally, outputting the identification result as deception signal alarm information in real time.
In the specific embodiment, a regenerative multi-antenna spoofing pattern of a GPS L1 frequency point may be selected as the spoofing pattern, and the specific method includes the following steps:
step 1, capturing the number 6 stars by using a capturing engine in a satellite navigation receiver, obtaining the correlation peaks of two number 6 stars according to a preset capturing threshold value after completing the satellite capturing, and recording the number, the position and the size of the correlation peaks;
step 2, judging that the number of the correlation peaks is more than 1, and performing subsequent tracking, demodulation and positioning processing on the receiver by taking the correlation peak with a large correlation peak value as a main tracking correlation peak according to a receiver strategy; using the multiple access correlation peak as the input of the subsequent deception signal detection identification;
step 3, switching the multiple-address correlation peaks into an independent tracking loop identified by deceptive signals, and respectively carrying out independent tracking, measurement and demodulation on the correlation peaks to obtain information such as signal pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each correlation peak;
and 4, checking and judging information such as signal pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock error obtained by the receiver main tracking branch and information obtained by the deception signal identification branch, finding that the pseudo-range observed quantity and Doppler of two tracking loops have serious overproof, judging that the deception signal of No. 6 stars exists in a space signal due to the fact that the ephemeris and the clock error information are completely different, and outputting the deception signal information in real time to finish deception interference detection of the satellite navigation receiver.
In a word, on the basis of a traditional satellite navigation receiver, the method realizes the identification and detection of signals existing in the space through an original multiple access correlation peak identification tracking mode, judges the signal domain characteristics of pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler and the like and the information characteristics of ephemeris, clock error and the like of the space aiming at all signals of the same satellite, determines whether deception signals exist in the space or not according to the check and judgment of the signal domain and the information domain of the multiple access correlation peak, outputs the related detection information of the deception signals, and completes the real-time detection of deception interference of the satellite navigation receiver.
The method is particularly suitable for the problem that the satellite navigation receiver cannot be normally positioned or positioned and deviated due to the influence of deception interference when the satellite navigation receiver works in a complex deception interference environment, solves the problem and difficulty that the satellite navigation receiver has a single application scene of resisting the deception interference, and improves the anti-interference performance of the satellite navigation receiver and the usability and integrity of the satellite navigation receiver in the complex electromagnetic environment.
Claims (3)
1. A satellite navigation deception jamming detection method based on multiple correlation peaks is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) sequentially capturing the received space navigation signals by using a capturing engine of a receiver according to the satellite number, setting a related peak recording threshold according to a capturing threshold of the receiver after completing the satellite capturing, and storing and recording the number, the size and the position of all current related peaks;
(2) judging the number of correlation peaks, if the number of correlation peaks is more than one, defining correlation peaks except the tracking correlation peaks of the main branch of the receiver as multiple-access correlation peaks, and sequencing the positions of the multiple-access correlation peaks according to the size;
(3) sequentially transferring the multiple access correlation peaks into an independent signal identification tracking loop, and respectively carrying out independent tracking, measurement and demodulation on each correlation peak to obtain pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each correlation peak;
(4) checking and judging pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock difference of each correlation peak obtained by a signal identification and tracking loop and pseudo-range observed quantity, carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock difference obtained by main branch tracking of a receiver, and judging as a multipath signal if the pseudo-range observed quantity, the carrier observed quantity and the Doppler deviation of the two correlation peaks are all in a threshold range and the ephemeris and the clock difference of the two correlation peaks are all the same; otherwise, judging that a deception signal exists;
(5) and outputting deception signal alarm information after all the correlation peaks are identified, and finishing the real-time online detection of satellite navigation deception interference.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the satellite navigation spoofing interference detection method based on the multiple correlation peaks comprises the following steps: in the step (1), in the signal capturing process, the receiver searches signal correlation peaks of each visible satellite in the whole carrier Doppler-pseudo code phase two-dimensional uncertain range, sets a correlation peak detection threshold according to the capturing sensitivity, detects all correlation peaks in the capturing range, and records Doppler information and pseudo code phase information of all correlation peaks.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the satellite navigation spoofing interference detection method based on the multiple correlation peaks comprises the following steps: in the step (3), independent signal identification and tracking processing is respectively carried out on the multiple access correlation peaks in the step (2), according to the identification number of the reserved deceptive signals, a tracking processing mode which is the same as that of a receiver and has the same parameters of integration time, loop bandwidth and the like is used for processing the signal component of each multiple access correlation peak, and the tracking, measurement and demodulation results of each correlation peak are obtained in real time, so that the pseudo-range observed quantity, the carrier observed quantity, Doppler, ephemeris and clock error of each multiple access correlation peak are obtained.
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| CN115201861B (en) * | 2022-07-21 | 2024-05-10 | 中山大学 | Satellite navigation spoofing detection method, system, computer device and storage medium |
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