CN112953955B - Multi-party quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention provides a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus excellenceThe protocol is changed, and the problem of realizing distributed consensus under the condition that malicious nodes exist is solved. The realization method comprises the following steps: 1) Protocol parameters are initialized. 2) And designing a node integration mechanism and selecting a command node. 3) And broadcasting the consensus information. 4) A triplet is formed. 5) A quantum tripartite byzantine consensus protocol is performed. 6) And updating the node integrals. 7) And circulating 2) to 6). 8) A consensus was reached. The invention improves the protocol fault tolerance by using a quantum method, and ensures that the tolerable malicious nodes are counted
Is lifted to
By executing the protocol for multiple times, the node parameters are continuously optimized and the malicious node integral is reduced, so that the problem of randomness of selecting the commander nodes and the problem of communication resource waste caused by the fact that the malicious nodes are continuously selected as the commander nodes are solved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of distributed consensus protocols and quantum computing, in particular to a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol.
Background
The blockchain attracts a great deal of attention as a distributed system and an emerging technology for realizing a distributed ledger, and since the problem of the byzantine consensus has been an important research subject of the distributed system, the research on the byzantine consensus protocol can be applied to the field of blockchains. Among the various core components of the blockchain technology, consensus protocols are key to blockchain security and performance. The design of consensus protocols greatly affects the performance of blockchain systems, including transaction capability, scalability, and fault tolerance.
The practical Byzantine protocol PBFT (practical Byzantine fault tolerance) is a common method for solving the mutual recognition of Byzantine, but still has disadvantages, mainly embodied in that the number of malicious nodes which can be accommodated is small. Therefore, fitzi et al pioneering a quantum solution for the simplest (only three-party) Byzantine consensus BA (Byzantine agent) problem, and then the team designs a Detectable BA (DBA) protocol with unconditional safety to contain malicious nodes
Raise to->
And N is the total number of nodes. Then, on the basis of the research of Fitzi team, the research related to the fieldThe results are successively proposed, and a more practical quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is designed.
The research result of the quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is rich, but the quantum Byzantine consensus protocol has defects. The protocol proposed by Fitzi et al is difficult to extend to the case of multiple nodes (N > 3), and the security of the whole protocol is threatened along with the increase of the number of nodes; the Lide Xue et al improves on the Fitzi-based protocol to be suitable for the multi-node consensus, but still has the following problems: 1) The selection of the commander nodes has the problem of randomness, and the maliciousness of the commander nodes is not pre-judged, so that the malicious nodes are probably selected at a high probability to block the consensus process; 2) If the malicious nodes are continuously selected as the command nodes, the communication cost is greatly increased in consideration of the communication traffic required to be exchanged in the multiple rounds of consensus process.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention designs a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol. For solving the following problems: 1) The upper limit of the number of the malicious nodes which can be accommodated in the Byzantine consensus protocol is improved; 2) The problem of randomly selecting a commander node in a quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is solved; 3) The problem of increased communication traffic caused by malicious nodes being elected as commander nodes continuously is solved. In order to improve the upper limit of the number of the receivable malicious nodes, the invention introduces a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol for completing a consensus process; in order to solve the problem of randomness of selection of the commander nodes, an integral mechanism is introduced, the integral mechanism relates to the operation of adding and subtracting the nodes, and the design of the integral mechanism can reduce the possibility that malicious nodes are selected as the commander nodes and solve the problem of increased communication traffic.
The invention provides a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol, which comprises the following specific contents:
step 1: initializing each node N i A parameter;
step 2: selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as N c Preparing for subsequent consensus;
and 3, step 3: n is a radical of hydrogen c Broadcasting the consensus information to all the nodes;
and 4, step 4: selecting cooperative nodes based on node integrals to form multiple triple combinations (N) c ，N s ，N si )；
And 5: (N) c ，N s ，N si ) Executing a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol, comprising the following processes:
(1)N c ，N s ，N si three parties share a group of quantum entangled states, and the correlation of the measurement results of the group of quantum entangled states is used as pre-sharing information;
(2)N c will agree with the message m c And pre-shared information is sent to N respectively s And N si ；
(3)N si The consensus message m received by the user is transmitted c And pre-shared information to N s ；
(4)N s By comparing own local information with information obtained from the process (3), for N c And N si Judging the integrity of the node;
(5) If N is present s Discovery of N c Is a dishonest or malicious node, N s Will voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(N c ，N s )，s>S is N s The meaning of the report message is N c The node is a dishonest or malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e. I s ＝I s ∪{N c ，N s }；
(6) If N is present s Discovery of N si Is a dishonest or malicious node, N s Will give up with N si Executing three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol and no longer reacting with N within time period t si And (4) cooperation.
And 6: node N i Receiving the publish message, for N c Node Subtraction and Pair N s Node bonus and update 'isolated' set I i ；
And 7: step 1 to step 6 are circulated when N is i When no report message is received, go to step 8;
and 8: obtaining a final consensus message, comprising the following processes:
(1) If N is present i Not in the isolated set, broadcasting the consensus message to all nodes in the isolated set;
(2) If N is present i In the 'isolated' set, the message set M of the self is counted i The number of messages (from consensus messages outside the "isolated" set), the largest number of messages being the final consensus message.
Step 1, initializing N i The node parameters include the following:
(1) "isolated" set I i = { }, the "isolation" set is used to store the commander node N for each round of the protocol execution process c And node N broadcasting report messages s ；
(2)N i Nodal integral s i ；
(3) Counter r i ＝0，r i Representing the number of times of changing the commander node before the final consensus message is obtained;
(4) Message set M i = { }, for storing the message received in the consensus process;
step 2, selecting the commander node comprises the following processes:
(1) Randomly selecting a node as an alternative commander node, and marking as N c ', and N c ' not belonging to the "isolated" set;
(2) Each node N i Receive N c ' node information, N i Node to save locally N c 'node's integral is compared with a preset threshold, above which N is agreed c ' as commander node, and sends self-signed acknowledgement message to N c ' a node; if the integral is below the threshold, N i No information is sent;
(3)N c ' node counts the number of received acknowledgement messages, if the number reaches 2t, then N c ' can be used as the command node of the wheel and is marked as N c (ii) a If not, turning to the step 1;
step 3, the broadcasting of the consensus message comprises the following processes:
(1)N c the format of the broadcast message is:<consensus message, 2t signature confirmation messages>Broadcasting to all nodes;
(2) The node verifies the 2t signatures and receives the consensus information;
step 4, the selecting of the cooperative node comprises the following processes:
(1) If N is present s Node "isolation" set I s The number of the other nodes is more than 3,N s Removing nodes which do not cooperate any more in the time period t in the step 5 by the nodes, otherwise, turning to the step 6;
(2)N i will N c And N s Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I i ＝I i ∪{N c ，N s }；N i Receive about N c Counting the number of the messages and recording as x;
(3) Randomly selecting m nodes from the nodes higher than the threshold value as cooperative nodes;
step 6, the pair of N c Node deduction, comprising the following processes:
(1)N i will N c And N s Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I i ＝I i ∪{N c ，N s }；
(2)N i Receive information about N c Counting the number of the messages and recording as x;
(3)N i according to the formula
To N c The nodes are subjected to division reduction;
(4) Updating locally saved N c Integral of (1);
step 6, the pair of N s Node adding, comprising the following processes:
(1) Will N c And N s Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I i ＝I i ∪{N c ，N s }
(2)N i Receive information about N c In the form of a plurality of published messages<(N c ，N s )，s s >；
(3)N i Verification of N s After verification, for N s Adding 1 to the score of the node;
(4) Updating locally saved N s Integral of (1);
(5) Update r i A value of (i), i.e. r i ＝r i +1。
Different from the existing treatment method, the invention has the beneficial effects that: information sharing among nodes is realized by utilizing quantum entanglement state, and the upper limit of the number of the contained malicious nodes is further increased
Is increased to>
In the existing quantum Byzantine consensus protocol, the selection mode of the command node is too random, the integrity and the correctness of the command node cannot be guaranteed, once a malicious node is continuously selected as the command node, the consensus process is hindered, a large amount of waste of system resources is caused, and the communication overhead is increased; according to the point mechanism designed by the invention, the nodes divide down the malicious commander nodes in proportion according to the number of the received report messages, and meanwhile, the condition that the malicious nodes intentionally broadcast the report messages and corrupt the honest commander nodes is fully considered, so that even if the honest nodes are changed into the malicious nodes by the slight voice, the points can be quickly increased through point adding operation, the commander nodes participating in the next round of consensus process are selected, and in addition, the points are stimulated to actively broadcast the malicious node identities through point adding operation, and the malicious node behaviors are limited.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of protocol execution of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary implementation of a protocol according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the commander node selection of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the operation of the present invention for the subtraction.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and are used for illustration only, and should not be construed as limiting the patent. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein the overall flow chart of the present invention is shown in fig. 1, and the specific implementation schematic diagram of the present invention is shown in fig. 2.
Step 1: and initializing parameters. s i ＝100，I i ＝{}，r i ＝0，M i ＝{}，i∈{0，1，2，3，4，5}，N 0 Is a malicious node;
step 2: selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as N c ；
As shown in FIG. 3, the system randomly generates an Id number as an alternative commander node N c ', then broadcasts the node's identity to the full network node N i ，N i After receiving broadcast information, inquiring locally stored N c ' and comparing the integral with a preset threshold, and agreeing to N if the integral is higher than the threshold c ' become a commander node and send a confirmation message with a signature to N c ' node, if below threshold, do nothing; n is a radical of c ' node is selected as commander node N after receiving 2t confirmation messages c . In this example, N 0 Is selected as the commander node.
And step 3: n is a radical of 0 Broadcast consensus message m 0 The node of the whole network is provided;
and 4, step 4: n is a radical of i The nodes select cooperative nodes according to local node integrals, and a plurality of triple combinations (N) are formed by combining specific examples, as shown in step 4 of FIG. 2 0 ，N 1 ，N 2 )，(N 0 ，N 1 ，N 3 )，(N 0 ，N 2 ，N 4 )，(N 0 ，N 3 ，N 5 )....；
And 5: the triple in the step 4 executes a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol;
as shown in step 5 of fig. 2: zxfoom N 1 Discovery of N 0 Dishonest or malicious nodes, N 1 Will voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(N 0 ，N 1 )，s 1 >，s 1 Is N 1 The meaning of the message is N 0 The node is a malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e., I 1 ＝I 1 ∪{N 0 ，N 1 }。
Step 6: node N 2 ～N 5 Receiving the publish message, for N 0 Node Subtraction and Pair N 1 Node bonus and update 'isolated' set I 2 ～I 5 ；
With N in conjunction with FIG. 4 2 For the sake of example, the operation of the division is described, which comprises the following steps:
(1)N 2 will N 0 And N 1 Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I 2 ＝I 2 ∪{N 0 ，N 1 }；
(2)N 2 Statistics received about N 0 The number of the plurality of published messages is recorded as x;
(3)N 2 according to the formula
To N 0 The nodes are subjected to division reduction;
(4) Updating locally saved N 0 Is calculated.
With N 2 For example, the adding and dividing operation is illustrated, and comprises the following processes;
(1)N 2 will N 0 And N 1 Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I 2 ＝I 2 ∪{N 0 ，N 1 }；
(2)N 2 Receiving gateIn N 0 In the form of a plurality of published messages<(N 0 ，N 1 )，s 1 >；
(3)N 2 Verification of N 1 After verification, for N 1 Adding 1 to the score of the node;
(4) Updating locally saved N 1 Is calculated.
And 7: circulating the step 1 to the step 6; until no more report messages are received;
and 8: with N 5 For example, when N is 5 When no report message is received any more, the following operations are executed:
(1) If N is present 5 Not in the "isolated" set, will agree on the message m 5 Broadcast to all nodes in the "isolated" set;
(2) If N is present 5 In the 'isolation' set, counting the message set M of the self 5 The number of messages in (consensus messages broadcast from nodes outside the "isolated" set), and the message with the largest number of messages is the final consensus message.
Claims (7)
1. A multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization method comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: initializing each node N i The parameters of (1);
step two: selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as N c Preparing for subsequent consensus;
step three: n is a radical of c Broadcast consensus message m c Giving all the nodes;
step four: the other nodes select cooperative nodes according to the node integrals to form a plurality of triple combinations (N) c ，N s ，N si )；
Step five: (N) c ，N s ，N si ) A method of performing a three-party quantum byzantine consensus comprising the steps of:
(1)N c ，N s ，N si three parties share a set of quantum entangled states, the correlation of the measurement results of the set of quantum entangled states being used as pre-sharing informationInformation;
(2)N c will agree with the message m c And pre-shared information is sent to N respectively s And N si ；
(3)N si The consensus message m received by the user is transmitted c And pre-shared information to N s ；
(4)N s By comparing own local information with information obtained from the process (3), for N c And N si Judging the integrity of the node;
(5) If N is present s Discovery of N c Is a malicious node, N s Will voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(N c ，N s )，s>S is N s The meaning of the report message is N c The node is a malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e., I s ＝I s ∪{N c ，N s }；
(6) If N is present s Discovery of N si Is a malicious node, N s Will give up with N si Executing a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus method and no longer reacting with N within a time period t si Collaborate;
step six: node N i Receiving and counting report messages, for N c Node Subtraction and Pair N s Node bonus and update 'isolated' set I i ；
Step seven: step one to step six are circulated, when N i When no report message is received any more, turning to the step eight;
step eight: obtaining a final consensus message, comprising the following processes:
(1) If N is present i Not in the isolated set, broadcasting the consensus message to all nodes in the isolated set;
(2) If N is present i In the 'isolated' set, the message set M of the self is counted i The number of consensus messages from outside the "isolated" set is included, the largest number of messages being the final consensus message.
2. According to claim1 the multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization method is characterized in that N is adopted in the step one i The node parameter initialization comprises the following parts:
(1) "isolated" set I i The "isolated" set is used to store the node N whose method performs the broadcast report message in each round of consensus s And the reported commander node N c ；
(2)N i Nodal integral s i ；
(3) Counter r i ＝0，r i Representing the number of change rounds of the commander node before the final consensus is obtained;
(4) Message set M i For storing messages received during the consensus process.
3. The multiparty quantum byzantine consensus optimization method according to claim 1, wherein the selection of the commander node in the step two comprises the following steps:
s1: randomly selecting a node as an alternative commander node, and marking as N c ', and N c ' not belonging to the "isolated" set;
s2: each node N i Receive N c ' node information, N i Node N to be locally stored c 'node's integral is compared with a preset threshold, above which N is agreed c ' as commander node, and sends self-signed acknowledgement message to N c ' node; if the integral is below the threshold, N i No information is sent;
S3：N c ' node counts the number of received acknowledgement messages, if the number reaches 2t, then N c ' can be used as the command node of the wheel and is marked as N c (ii) a And if the time does not reach 2t, turning to the step one.
4. The method for optimizing the consensus of the multi-party quantum Byzantine as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step three of broadcasting the consensus message comprises the following steps:
S1：N c broadcastingThe message format is:<consensus message m c 2t signature confirmation messages>Broadcasting to all nodes;
s2: and the node verifies the 2t signatures and receives the consensus information.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting of the cooperative node in step four comprises the following steps:
s1: if N is present s Node "isolation" set I s The number of the nodes except the nodes is more than 3, the Ns nodes remove the nodes which do not cooperate any more in the time period t in the step five, otherwise, the step eight is carried out;
s2: after multiple rounds of consensus, N s The node holds the integral state of all nodes, N s Screening out nodes higher than a threshold value by the nodes;
s3: and randomly selecting k nodes from the nodes higher than the threshold value as cooperative nodes.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein N is the number of pairs in step six c The node deduction method comprises the following steps:
S1：N i will N c And N s Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I i ＝I i ∪{N c ，N s }；
S2：N i Receive information about N c The number of the statistical messages is recorded as x;
S3：N i according to the formula
To N c The nodes are subjected to division reduction;
s4: updating locally saved N c Is calculated.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein step six comprises a multiparty quantum byzantine consensus optimization methodTo N s The node scoring comprises the following steps:
s1: will N c And N s Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I i ＝I i ∪{N c ，N s }；
S2：N i Receive information about N c In the form of a plurality of published messages<(N c ，N s )，s s >；
S3：N i Verification of N s After verification, for N s Adding 1 to the score of the node;
s4: updating locally saved N s Integral of (1);
s5: update r i A value of (i), i.e. r i ＝r i +1。
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