CN112953955A - Multi-party quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention provides a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol, which solves the problem of realizing distributed consensus under the condition of malicious nodes. The realization method comprises the following steps: 1) protocol parameters are initialized. 2) And designing a node integral mechanism and selecting a commander node. 3) And broadcasting the consensus message. 4) A triplet is formed. 5) A quantum tripartite byzantine consensus protocol is performed. 6) And updating the node integrals. 7) And circulating 2) to 6). 8) A consensus was reached. The invention improves the protocol fault tolerance by using a quantum method, and ensures that the tolerable malicious nodes are counted
Is lifted to
By multiple executionsThe protocol continuously optimizes the node parameters and reduces the malicious node points, so that the problem of randomness of selecting the commander nodes and the problem of communication resource waste caused by the fact that the malicious nodes are continuously selected as the commander nodes are solved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of distributed consensus protocols and quantum computing, in particular to a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol.
Background
The blockchain attracts a great deal of attention as a distributed system and an emerging technology for realizing a distributed ledger, and since the problem of the byzantine consensus has been an important research subject of the distributed system, the research on the byzantine consensus protocol can be applied to the field of blockchains. Among the various core components of the blockchain technology, consensus protocols are key to blockchain security and performance. The design of consensus protocols greatly affects the performance of blockchain systems, including transaction capability, scalability, and fault tolerance.
The practical Byzantine protocol pbft (practical Byzantine fault tolerance) is a common method for solving the mutual recognition of the Byzantine, but still has disadvantages, mainly embodied in that the number of malicious nodes which can be accommodated is small. Therefore, Fitzi et al pioneering a quantum solution for the simplest (three-party) Byzantine consensus BA (Byzantine agent) problem, and then the team designs a Detectable BA (DBA) protocol with unconditional safety to contain malicious nodes
Is improved to
And N is the total number of nodes. Later, on the basis of the research of the Fitzi team, research results related to the field are proposed one after another, and a more practical quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is designed.
The research result of the quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is rich, but the quantum Byzantine consensus protocol has defects. The protocol proposed by Fitzi et al is difficult to extend to the case of multiple nodes (N > 3), and the security of the whole protocol is threatened along with the increase of the number of nodes; the Lide Xue et al improves on the Fitzi-based protocol to be suitable for the multi-node consensus, but still has the following problems: 1) the selection of the commander nodes has the problem of randomness, and the maliciousness of the commander nodes is not pre-judged, so that the malicious nodes are probably selected at a high probability to block the consensus process; 2) if the malicious nodes are continuously selected as the commander nodes, the communication cost is greatly increased in consideration of the communication traffic needing to be exchanged in the multi-round consensus process.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention designs a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol. For solving the following problems: 1) the upper limit of the number of the malicious nodes which can be accommodated in the Byzantine consensus protocol is improved; 2) the problem of randomly selecting a commander node in a quantum Byzantine consensus protocol is solved; 3) the problem of increased communication traffic caused by malicious nodes being elected as commander nodes continuously is solved. In order to improve the upper limit of the number of the receivable malicious nodes, the invention introduces a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol for completing a consensus process; in order to solve the problem of randomness of selection of the commander nodes, an integral mechanism is introduced, the integral mechanism relates to the operation of adding and subtracting the nodes, and the design of the integral mechanism can reduce the possibility that malicious nodes are selected as the commander nodes and solve the problem of increased communication traffic.
The invention provides a multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol, which comprises the following specific contents:
step 1: initializing each node NiA parameter;
step 2: selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as NcPreparing for subsequent consensus;
and step 3: n is a radical ofcBroadcasting the consensus information to all the nodes;
and 4, step 4: selecting cooperative nodes based on node integrals to form multiple triple combinations (N)c，Ns，Nsi)；
And 5: (N)c，Ns，Nsi) Executing a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol, comprising the following processes:
(1)Nc，Ns，Nsithree parties share a group of quantum entangled states, and the correlation of the measurement results of the group of quantum entangled states is used as pre-sharing information;
(2)Ncwill agree with the message mcAnd pre-shared information is sent to N respectivelysAnd Nsi；
(3)NsiThe consensus message m received by the user is transmittedcAnd pre-shared information to Ns；
(4)NsBy comparing own local information with information obtained from the process (3), for NcAnd NsiJudging the integrity of the node;
(5) if N is presentsDiscovery of NcIs a dishonest or malicious node, NsWill voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(Nc，Ns)，s>S is NsThe meaning of the report message is NcThe node is a dishonest or malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e. Is＝Is∪{Nc，Ns}；
(6) If N is presentsDiscovery of NsiIs a dishonest or malicious node, NsWill give up with NsiExecuting three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol and no longer keeping with N in time period tsiAnd (4) cooperation.
Step 6: node NiReceiving the publish message, for NcNode Subtraction and Pair NsNode bonus and update 'isolated' set Ii；
And 7: step 1 to step 6 are circulated when N isiWhen no report message is received, go to step 8;
and 8: obtaining a final consensus message, comprising the following processes:
(1) if N is presentiNot in the isolated set, broadcasting the consensus message to all nodes in the isolated set;
(2) if N is presentiIn the 'isolated' set, the message set M of the self is countediThe number of messages (from consensus messages outside the "isolated" set), the largest number of messages being the final consensus message.
Step 1, initializing NiThe node parameters include the following:
(1) "isolated" set IiThe method comprises the steps that { }, an isolation set is used for storing a commander node N of each round in a protocol execution processcAnd node N broadcasting report messagess；
(2)NiNodal integral si；
(3) Counter ri＝0，riRepresenting the number of times of changing the commander node before the final consensus message is obtained;
(4) message set MiThe device comprises a message receiving module, a message sending module and a message sending module, wherein the message receiving module is used for receiving messages in a common identification process;
step 2, selecting the commander node comprises the following processes:
(1) randomly selecting a node as an alternative commander node, and marking as Nc', and Nc' not belonging to the "isolated" set;
(2) each node NiReceive Nc' node information, NiNode N to be locally storedc'node's integral is compared with a preset threshold, above which N is agreedc' as commander node, and sends self-signed acknowledgement message to Nc' node; if the integral is below the threshold, NiNo information is sent;
(3)Nc' node counts the number of received acknowledgement messages, if the number reaches 2t, then Nc' can be used as the command node of the wheel and is marked as Nc(ii) a If not, turning to the step 1;
step 3, the broadcasting of the consensus message comprises the following processes:
(1)Ncthe format of the broadcast message is:<consensus message, 2t signature confirmation messages>Broadcasting to all nodes;
(2) the node verifies the 2t signatures and receives the consensus information;
step 4, the selecting of the cooperative node comprises the following processes:
(1) if N is presentsNode "isolation" set IsThe number of nodes other than the node is more than 3, NsRemoving nodes which do not cooperate any more in the time period t in the step 5 by the nodes, otherwise, turning to the step 6;
(2)Niwill NcAnd NsJoin its own "isolated" set, i.e. Ii＝Ii∪{Nc，Ns}；NiReceive information about NcCounting the number of the messages and recording as x;
(3) randomly selecting m nodes from the nodes higher than the threshold value as cooperative nodes;
step 6, the pair of NcNode deduction, comprising the following processes:
(1)Niwill NcAnd NsJoin its own "isolated" set, i.e. Ii＝Ii∪{Nc，Ns}；
(2)NiReceive information about NcCounting the number of the messages and recording as x;
(3)Niaccording to the formula
To NcThe nodes are subjected to division reduction;
(4) updating locally saved NcIntegral of (1);
step 6, the pair of NsNode adding, comprising the following processes:
(1) will NcAnd NsJoin its own "isolated" set, i.e. Ii＝Ii∪{Nc，Ns}
(2)NiReceive information about NcIn the form of a plurality of published messages<(Nc，Ns)，ss>；
(3)NiVerification of NsAfter verification, for NsAdding 1 to the score of the node;
(4) updating locally saved NsIntegral of (1);
(5) update riA value of (i), i.e. ri＝ri+1。
Different from the existing treatment method, the invention has the beneficial effects that: information sharing among nodes is realized by utilizing quantum entanglement state, and the upper limit of the number of the contained malicious nodes is further increased
Is increased to
In the existing quantum byzantine consensus protocol,the selection mode of the commander node is too random, integrity and correctness of the commander node cannot be guaranteed, once malicious nodes are continuously selected as the commander node, the consensus process is hindered, a large amount of waste of system resources can be caused, and communication overhead is increased; according to the point mechanism designed by the invention, the nodes divide down the malicious commander nodes in proportion according to the number of the received report messages, and meanwhile, the condition that the malicious nodes intentionally broadcast the report messages and corrupt the honest commander nodes is fully considered, so that even if the honest nodes are changed into the malicious nodes by the slight voice, the points can be quickly increased through point adding operation, the commander nodes participating in the next round of consensus process are selected, and in addition, the points are stimulated to actively broadcast the malicious node identities through point adding operation, and the malicious node behaviors are limited.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of protocol execution of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary implementation of a protocol according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the commander node selection of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the operation of the present invention for the subtraction.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and are used for illustration only, and should not be construed as limiting the patent. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The present invention will be further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein the overall flow chart of the present invention is shown in fig. 1, and the specific implementation schematic diagram of the present invention is shown in fig. 2.
Step 1: and initializing parameters. si＝100，Ii＝{}，ri＝0，Mi＝{}，i∈{0，1，2，3，4，5}，N0Is a malicious node;
step 2:selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as Nc；
As shown in FIG. 3, the system randomly generates an Id number as an alternative commander node Nc', then broadcasts the node's identity to the full network node Ni，NiAfter receiving broadcast information, inquiring locally stored Nc' integrate and compare at a predetermined threshold, above which N is agreedc' become a commander node and send a confirmation message with a signature to Nc' node, if below threshold, do nothing; n is a radical ofc' node is selected as commander node N after receiving 2t confirmation messagesc. In this example, N0Is selected as the commander node.
And step 3: n is a radical of0Broadcast consensus message m0Giving the nodes of the whole network;
and 4, step 4: n is a radical ofiThe nodes select cooperative nodes according to local node integrals, and a plurality of triple combinations (N) are formed by combining specific examples, as shown in step 4 of FIG. 20，N1，N2)，(N0，N1，N3)，(N0，N2，N4)，(N0，N3，N5)....；
And 5: the triple in the step 4 executes a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol;
as shown in step 5 of fig. 2: n is a radical of1Discovery of N0Dishonest or malicious nodes, N1Will voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(N0，N1)，s1>，s1Is N1The meaning of the message is N0The node is a malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e., I1＝I1∪{N0，N1}。
Step 6: node N2～N5Receiving the publish message, for N0Node Subtraction and Pair N1Node bonus and update 'isolated' set I2～I5；
With N in conjunction with FIG. 42For example, the division operation is illustrated, and comprises the following processes:
(1)N2will N0And N1Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I2＝I2∪{N0，N1}；
(2)N2Statistics received about N0The number of the plurality of published messages is recorded as x;
(3)N2according to the formula
To N0The nodes are subjected to division reduction;
(4) updating locally saved N0Is calculated.
With N2For example, the adding and dividing operation is illustrated, and comprises the following processes;
(1)N2will N0And N1Join its own "isolated" set, i.e. I2＝I2∪{N0，N1}；
(2)N2Receive information about N0In the form of a plurality of published messages<(N0，N1)，s1>；
(3)N2Verification of N1After verification, for N1Adding 1 to the score of the node;
(4) updating locally saved N1Is calculated.
And 7: circulating the step 1 to the step 6; until no more report messages are received;
and 8: with N5For example, when N is5When no report message is received any more, the following operations are executed:
(1) if N is present5Not in the "isolated" set, will agree on the message m5Broadcast to all nodes in the "isolated" set;
(2) if N is present5In the 'isolated' set, the message set M of the self is counted5The number of messages in (consensus messages broadcast from nodes outside the "isolated" set), the message with the largest number of messages being the final consensusAnd (5) identifying the message.
Claims (7)
1. A multiparty quantum Byzantine consensus optimization protocol, comprising the steps of:
the method comprises the following steps: initializing each node NiThe parameters of (1);
step two: selecting a commander node according to the node integral and marking as NcPreparing for subsequent consensus;
step three: n is a radical ofcBroadcast consensus message mcGiving all the nodes;
step four: the other nodes select cooperative nodes according to the node integrals to form a plurality of triple combinations (N)c，Ns，Nsi)；
Step five: (N)c，Ns，Nsi) Executing a three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol, comprising the following processes:
(1)Nc，Ns，Nsithree parties share a group of quantum entangled states, and the correlation of the measurement results of the group of quantum entangled states is used as pre-sharing information;
(2)Ncwill agree with the message mcAnd pre-shared information is sent to N respectivelysAnd Nsi；
(3)NsiThe consensus message m received by the user is transmittedcAnd pre-shared information to Ns；
(4)NsBy comparing own local information with information obtained from the process (3), for NcAnd NsiJudging the integrity of the node;
(5) if N is presentsDiscovery of NcIs a malicious node, NsWill voluntarily broadcast a report message to all nodes in the format of<(Nc，Ns)，s>S is NsThe meaning of the report message is NcThe node is a malicious node and updates its own "isolated" set, i.e., Is＝Is∪{Nc，Ns}；
(6) If N is presentsDiscovery of NsiIs a malicious node, NsWill give up with NsiExecuting three-party quantum Byzantine consensus protocol and no longer keeping with N in time period tsiAnd (4) cooperation.
Step six: node NiReceiving and counting report messages, for NcNode Subtraction and Pair NsNode bonus and update 'isolated' set Ii；
Step seven: step one to step six are circulated, when N isiWhen no report message is received, turning to step eight;
step eight: obtaining a final consensus message, comprising the following processes:
(1) if Ni is not in the isolated set, broadcasting the consensus message to all nodes in the isolated set;
(2) if N is presentiIn the 'isolated' set, the message set M of the self is countediThe number of messages (from consensus messages outside the "isolated" set), the largest number of messages being the final consensus message.
2. The multiparty quantum byzastidine consensus optimization protocol of claim 1, wherein N is defined in step oneiThe node parameter initialization comprises the following parts:
(1) "isolated" set IiThe "isolated" set is used to store the node N that the protocol performs the broadcast report message in each round of consensussAnd the reported commander node Nc；
(2)NiNodal integral si；
(3) Counter ri＝0，riRepresenting the number of change rounds of the commander node before the final consensus is obtained;
(4) message set MiAnd the message is used for storing the message received in the consensus process.
3. The multiparty quantum byzantine consensus optimization protocol according to claim 1, wherein the selection of the commander node in the second step comprises the following steps:
s1: randomly choose oneThe node is used as an alternative commander node and is marked as Nc', and Nc' not belonging to the "isolated" set;
s2: each node NiReceive Nc' node information, NiNode N to be locally storedc'node's integral is compared with a preset threshold, above which N is agreedc' as commander node, and sends self-signed acknowledgement message to Nc' node; if the integral is below the threshold, NiNo information is sent;
S3：Nc' node counts the number of received acknowledgement messages, if the number reaches 2t, then Nc' can be used as the command node of the wheel and is marked as Nc(ii) a And if the time does not reach 2t, turning to the step one.
4. The multiparty quantum byzastine consensus optimization protocol of claim 1, wherein the step of broadcasting the consensus message in step three comprises the steps of:
S1：Ncthe format of the broadcast message is:<consensus message mc2t signature confirmation messages>Broadcasting to all nodes;
s2: and the node verifies the 2t signatures and receives the consensus information.
5. The multiparty quantum byzantine consensus optimization protocol according to claim 1, wherein said selection of cooperative nodes in step four comprises the steps of:
s1: if N is presentsNode "isolation" set IiThe number of nodes other than the node is more than 3, NsRemoving the nodes which are no longer cooperative in the time period t in the step five of the claim 1, otherwise, turning to the step eight in the claim 1;
s2: after multiple rounds of consensus, NsThe node holds the integral state of all nodes, NsScreening out nodes higher than a threshold value by the nodes;
s3: and randomly selecting k nodes from the nodes higher than the threshold value as cooperative nodes.
6. The multiparty quantum byzastidine consensus optimization protocol of claim 1, wherein in step six, N is selectedcThe node deduction method comprises the following steps:
S1：Niwill NcAnd NsJoin its own "isolated" set, i.e. Ii＝Ii∪{Nc，Ns}；
S2：NiReceive information about NcThe number of the statistical messages is recorded as x;
S3：Niaccording to the formula
To NcThe nodes are subjected to division reduction;
s4: updating locally saved NcIs calculated.
7. The multiparty quantum byzastidine consensus optimization protocol of claim 1, wherein in step six, N is selectedsThe node scoring comprises the following steps:
s1: will NcAnd NsJoin its own "isolated" set, i.e. Ii＝Ii∪{Nc，Ns}；
S2：NiReceive information about NcIn the form of a plurality of published messages<(Nc，Ns)，ss>；
S3：NiVerification of NsAfter verification, for NsAdding 1 to the score of the node;
s4: updating locally saved NsIntegral of (1);
s5: update riA value of (i), i.e. ri＝ri+1。
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