CN112829714A - Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle - Google Patents
Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN112829714A CN112829714A CN202110262437.2A CN202110262437A CN112829714A CN 112829714 A CN112829714 A CN 112829714A CN 202110262437 A CN202110262437 A CN 202110262437A CN 112829714 A CN112829714 A CN 112829714A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- signal
- fob key
- wake
- control unit
- electronic control
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
- B60R25/248—Electronic key extraction prevention
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/30—Detection related to theft or to other events relevant to anti-theft systems
- B60R25/34—Detection related to theft or to other events relevant to anti-theft systems of conditions of vehicle components, e.g. of windows, door locks or gear selectors
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a relay attack defense method, a PEPS system and a vehicle, wherein the method comprises the following steps: a user touches or presses a trigger switch on a vehicle door handle to wake up an electronic control unit of the PEPS system; the electronic control unit drives at least three LF antennas to send LF wake-up signals of all channels, the LF wake-up signals of all channels are sent in a random sequence, and an FOB key feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals; the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF21 and sends an RF inquiry signal, the RF inquiry signal is loaded with encryption information and relevant information of each channel, the FOB key judges whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct or not after receiving the RF inquiry signal, if so, the FOB key feeds back the response signal RF22, otherwise, the FOB key does not act; and the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF22 with correct encryption, authorizes the FOB key and unlocks the vehicle door, and otherwise, the vehicle door is still locked. The method can defend against the malicious attack of the relay and improve the safety and the theft prevention of the PEPS system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of relay attack prevention, and particularly relates to a relay attack prevention method, a PEPS system and a vehicle.
Background
The application of the PEPS (Passive Entry Passive Start) system improves the convenience of a user, and under the condition of carrying a valid key, the user touches or presses a trigger switch on a vehicle door handle to wake up the PEPS system to drive and send an LF (Low frequency) signal, and after an authorized FOB key is searched in a valid distance range, the vehicle door can be unlocked. Typically within 0.7m to 1m of the above-mentioned distance, i.e. within a short distance over which the user's view and motion can be controlled;
the relay attack is that a third party relay attack system 11 intervenes in an electronic control unit 12 of the PEPS system, and the relay system amplifies and forwards signals between a vehicle body and an FOB key, so that the search distance of the FOB key 13 is considered to be maliciously enlarged, and thus the vehicle is unlocked even if an authorized key is far beyond a nominal effective distance, as shown in fig. 1;
due to the application of third-party malicious relay technology, the possibility that the general PEPS system is potentially attacked exists, and the vehicle is at risk of being stolen.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a relay attack defense method and a PEPS system.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
on one hand, the invention discloses a method for defending relay attack, which specifically comprises the following steps:
a user touches or presses a trigger switch on a vehicle door handle to wake up an electronic control unit of the PEPS system;
the electronic control unit drives at least three LF antennas to send LF wake-up signals of all channels, the LF wake-up signals of all channels are sent in a random sequence, and an FOB key feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals;
the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF21 and sends an RF inquiry signal, the RF inquiry signal is loaded with encryption information and relevant information of each channel, the FOB key judges whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct or not after receiving the RF inquiry signal, if so, the FOB key feeds back the response signal RF22, otherwise, the FOB key does not act;
and the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF22 with correct encryption, authorizes the FOB key and unlocks the vehicle door, and otherwise, the vehicle door is still locked.
On the basis of the technical scheme, the following improvements can be made:
preferably, the LF wake-up signal of each channel is loaded with ID data and at least three segments of signal strengths, where at least one segment of signal strength is a standard signal strength, and the rest are signal strengths after random modulation.
Preferably, the signal intensity after random transposition is different from the standard signal intensity.
Preferably, after receiving the RF interrogation signal, the FOB key determines the RF interrogation signal according to the following sequence:
1) judging whether the encryption algorithm is correct or not;
2) judging whether the sending sequence of each channel is correct or not;
3) and judging whether the difference value between the signal intensity of each section on each channel LF awakening signal is within a preset range.
Preferably, after receiving the RF challenge signal, the FOB key further includes the following determination:
4) and judging whether the distance between the FOB key and the vehicle calculated by using the standard signal intensity of each channel is within a preset range.
Preferably, LF antennas of different channels transmitting the LF wake-up signal are arranged at different locations on the vehicle.
In another aspect, the invention discloses a PEPS system, comprising: an electronic control unit and an FOB key for performing any of the above-described relay attack defense methods.
Preferably, the electronic control unit includes:
a CAN transceiver;
the door handle triggering module is electrically connected with a triggering switch on a vehicle door handle;
an RF transceiver module electrically connected to the RF antenna;
the LF driving module is electrically connected with the LF antennas of each channel;
and the main controller is electrically connected with the CAN transceiver, the door handle triggering module, the RF transceiver module and the LF driving module respectively.
In another aspect, the present disclosure discloses a vehicle including any of the PEPS systems described above.
The invention discloses a relay attack defense method, a PEPS system and a vehicle, which can defend malicious attacks of relays and improve the safety and the theft prevention of the PEPS system.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and for those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without inventive efforts.
Fig. 1 is a signal block diagram between an electronic control unit and a FOB key of a PEPS system during a relay attack provided by the prior art.
Fig. 2 is a flowchart of a method for defending against relay attack according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a signal block diagram between the electronic control unit and the FOB key of the PEPS system according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of an electronic control unit of the PEPS system according to the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 shows LF wake-up signals of three channels according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is a second flowchart of a method for defending against relay attack according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Wherein:
11-attack system, 12-electronic control unit of PEPS system, 13-FOB key;
21-electronic control unit of PEPS system, 211-master, 212-CAN transceiver, 213-door handle trigger module, 214-RF transceiver module, 215-LF driver module, 22-FOB key.
Detailed Description
Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
The expression "comprising" an element is an "open" expression which merely means that there are corresponding parts, which should not be interpreted as excluding additional parts.
In order to achieve the object of the present invention, in some embodiments of a method for defending against relay attack, a PEPS system, and a vehicle, as shown in fig. 2 and 3, the method for defending against relay attack specifically includes the following steps:
the user touches or presses a trigger switch on the door handle of the vehicle to wake up the electronic control unit 21 of the PEPS system;
the electronic control unit 21 drives at least three LF antennas to transmit LF wake-up signals of all channels, the LF wake-up signals of all channels are transmitted in a random sequence, and the FOB key 22 feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the response signal RF21 and sends an RF inquiry signal, the RF inquiry signal is loaded with encryption information and relevant information of each channel, the FOB key 22 judges whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct or not after receiving the RF inquiry signal, if so, the FOB key 22 feeds back the response signal RF22, otherwise, the FOB key 22 does not act;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the correctly encrypted response signal RF22, authorizes the FOB key 22 and unlocks the vehicle door, otherwise the vehicle door remains locked.
In order to further optimize the implementation effect of the invention, in other embodiments of the method for defending against relay attack, the rest characteristic techniques are the same, except that the LF wake-up signal of each channel is loaded with ID data and at least three segments of signal strengths, at least one segment of signal strength is standard signal strength, and the rest is signal strength after random modulation.
Further, the signal intensity after random transposition is different from the standard signal intensity.
Further, after receiving the RF interrogation signal, the FOB key 22 determines the RF interrogation signal in the following order:
1) judging whether the encryption algorithm is correct or not;
2) judging whether the sending sequence of each channel is correct or not;
3) and judging whether the difference value between the signal intensity of each section on each channel LF awakening signal is within a preset range.
Further, after receiving the RF challenge signal, the FOB key 22 also includes the following determinations:
4) it is determined whether the distance between the FOB key 22 and the vehicle calculated using the standard signal strength of each channel is within a preset range.
In order to further optimize the implementation effect of the invention, in other embodiments of the method for defending against relay attack, the rest of the characteristic techniques are the same, except that LF antennas of different channels for sending LF wake-up signals are arranged at different positions on the vehicle.
The invention also discloses a PEPS system, comprising: an electronic control unit 21 and a FOB key 22 for performing the relay attack defense method disclosed in any of the above embodiments.
In order to further optimize the implementation of the invention, in other embodiments of the PEPS system, the remaining features are the same, except that, as shown in fig. 4, the electronic control unit 21 comprises:
a CAN transceiver 212;
a door handle trigger module 213 electrically connected to a trigger switch on a vehicle door handle;
an RF transceiver module 214 electrically connected to the RF antenna;
the LF driving module 215 is electrically connected with the LF antennas of all channels;
the master 211 is electrically connected to the CAN transceiver 212, the door handle trigger module 213, the RF transceiver module 214, and the LF driving module 215, respectively.
The invention also discloses a vehicle comprising the PEPS system disclosed by any embodiment.
The various embodiments above may be implemented in cross-parallel.
In order to better explain the present invention, two specific examples are described below, but the present invention is not limited to only the following specific examples.
In a specific embodiment, the method for defending against relay attack specifically includes the following steps:
the user touches or presses a trigger switch on the door handle of the vehicle to wake up the electronic control unit 21 of the PEPS system;
the electronic control unit 21 drives the three LF antennas to transmit LF wake-up signals of all channels, the LF wake-up signals of all channels are transmitted in a random sequence, and the FOB key 22 feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the response signal RF21 and sends an RF inquiry signal, the RF inquiry signal is loaded with encryption information and relevant information of each channel, the FOB key 22 judges whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct or not after receiving the RF inquiry signal, if so, the FOB key 22 feeds back the response signal RF22, otherwise, the FOB key 22 does not act;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the correctly encrypted response signal RF22, authorizes the FOB key 22 and unlocks the vehicle door, otherwise the vehicle door remains locked.
In this particular embodiment, three LF antennas are driven, one being the LF antenna of the primary driver side door handle, one being the LF antenna of the secondary driver side door handle, the other being an antenna mounted within the vehicle bumper.
In a second specific embodiment, as shown in fig. 5 and 6, the method for defending against relay attack specifically includes the following steps:
the user touches or presses a trigger switch on the door handle of the vehicle to wake up the electronic control unit 21 of the PEPS system;
the electronic control unit 21 drives the three LF antennas to transmit LF wake-up signals of each channel, the LF wake-up signals of each channel are transmitted in a random sequence, ID data and three-segment signal strength RSSI are loaded to the LF wake-up signals of each channel, the LF wake-up signals are RSSIn0, RSSIn1 and RSSIn2 respectively, n is the number of the channels, RSSIn0 is standard signal strength, RSSIn1 and RSSIn2 are signal strength after random modulation, the signal strength RSSIn1 and RSSIn2 after random modulation are different from the standard signal strength RSSIn0, and the FOB key 22 feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the response signal RF21 and transmits an RF challenge signal, the RF challenge signal is loaded with encryption information and related information of each channel, and after the FOB key 22 receives the RF challenge signal, the determination of the RF challenge signal is performed according to the following sequence:
1) judging whether the encryption algorithm is correct or not;
2) judging whether the sending sequence of each channel is correct or not;
3) judging whether the difference value between the signal intensity of each section on each channel LF awakening signal is within a preset range or not;
4) whether the distance r between the FOB key 22 and the vehicle calculated by using the standard signal strength of each channel is within a preset range is determined, wherein: r ═ f (RSSI10, RSSI20, RSSI 30);
judging whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct, if so, feeding back a response signal RF22 by the FOB key 22, otherwise, not operating the FOB key 22;
the electronic control unit 21 receives the correctly encrypted response signal RF22, authorizes the FOB key 22 and unlocks the vehicle door, otherwise the vehicle door remains locked.
In this particular embodiment, three LF antennas are driven, one being the LF antenna of the primary driver side door handle, one being the LF antenna of the secondary driver side door handle, the other being an antenna mounted within the vehicle bumper. The distance r between the FOB key 22 and the vehicle weight can be calculated by a four-point positioning algorithm using the standard signal strength RSSInO of the respective channel signal strength.
The invention discloses a method for defending against relay attack, a PEPS system and a vehicle, wherein the sending sequence of each channel is not sent according to a fixed sequence, but sent randomly according to the change of a random number; furthermore, the two modulated signal strengths RSSIn1 and RSSIn2 on each LFF wake-up signal are not unique and are generated according to the variation of random numbers, in other words, the driving power of the PEPS electronic control unit 21 is not fixed when driving the LF antenna for signal transmission, but needs to be purposely converted to achieve the target signal strength.
When a third-party relay system intervenes in the PEPS system, the LF awakening signal, the RF inquiry signal, the RF21 signal and the RF22 signal in the process are distorted to a certain extent, so that one or more conditions in the judgment conditions are not met, the third-party relay system is screened out, the malicious attack of the relay is prevented, and the safety and the theft prevention of the PEPS system are improved.
The above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical concept and features of the present invention, and the purpose thereof is to enable those skilled in the art to understand the content of the present invention and implement the present invention, and not to limit the scope of the present invention, and all equivalent changes or modifications made according to the spirit of the present invention should be covered in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. A method for defending against relay attack is characterized by comprising the following steps:
a user touches or presses a trigger switch on a vehicle door handle to wake up an electronic control unit of the PEPS system;
the electronic control unit drives at least three LF antennas to send LF wake-up signals of all channels, the LF wake-up signals of all channels are sent in a random sequence, and an FOB key feeds back a response signal RF21 after receiving the LF wake-up signals;
the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF21 and sends an RF inquiry signal, the RF inquiry signal is loaded with encryption information and relevant information of each channel, the FOB key judges whether the encryption algorithm and the sending sequence of each channel are correct or not after receiving the RF inquiry signal, if so, the FOB key feeds back the response signal RF22, otherwise, the FOB key does not act;
and the electronic control unit receives the response signal RF22 with correct encryption, authorizes the FOB key and unlocks the vehicle door, and otherwise, the vehicle door is still locked.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the LF wake-up signal of each channel is loaded with ID data and at least three segments of signal strength, at least one segment of signal strength being a standard signal strength and the rest being a randomly modified signal strength.
3. The method of defending against relay attacks according to claim 2, wherein the randomly transposed signal strength is different from the standard signal strength.
4. The method for defending against relay attack according to claim 2, wherein the FOB key determines the RF challenge signal according to the following sequence after receiving the RF challenge signal:
1) judging whether the encryption algorithm is correct or not;
2) judging whether the sending sequence of each channel is correct or not;
3) and judging whether the difference value between the signal intensity of each section on each channel LF awakening signal is within a preset range.
5. The method for defending against relay attack according to claim 3, wherein the FOB key, after receiving the RF challenge signal, further comprises the following judgment:
4) and judging whether the distance between the FOB key and the vehicle calculated by using the standard signal intensity of each channel is within a preset range.
6. The method of any of claims 1-5, wherein LF antennas of different channels transmitting the LF wake-up signal are located at different locations on a vehicle.
A PEPS system, comprising: an electronic control unit and a FOB key for performing the method of defending against relay attacks according to any one of claims 1 to 6.
8. The PEPS system according to claim 7, wherein the electronic control unit comprises:
a CAN transceiver;
the door handle triggering module is electrically connected with a triggering switch on a vehicle door handle;
an RF transceiver module electrically connected to the RF antenna;
the LF driving module is electrically connected with the LF antennas of each channel;
and the master controller is electrically connected with the CAN transceiver, the door handle triggering module, the RF transceiver module and the LF driving module respectively.
9. Vehicle, characterized in that it comprises a PEPS system according to claim 7 or 8.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110262437.2A CN112829714A (en) | 2021-03-08 | 2021-03-08 | Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110262437.2A CN112829714A (en) | 2021-03-08 | 2021-03-08 | Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN112829714A true CN112829714A (en) | 2021-05-25 |
Family
ID=75929895
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202110262437.2A Pending CN112829714A (en) | 2021-03-08 | 2021-03-08 | Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN112829714A (en) |
Citations (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20060125600A1 (en) * | 2004-11-18 | 2006-06-15 | Alain Brillon | Method and device for protecting a motor vehicle |
| CN102363422A (en) * | 2010-06-21 | 2012-02-29 | 胡夫·许尔斯贝克和福斯特有限及两合公司 | Key remote controller and method for exchanging signals between motor car-side control device and key remote controller |
| CN102419431A (en) * | 2010-09-24 | 2012-04-18 | 株式会社东海理化电机制作所 | Communication terminal position judging device |
| CN102785634A (en) * | 2011-05-16 | 2012-11-21 | 欧陆汽车有限责任公司 | Method and apparatus for access and/or starting verification |
| CN104401294A (en) * | 2014-11-28 | 2015-03-11 | 东风汽车公司 | Control method for preventing intelligent key from being accidently locked in vehicle |
| CN105365773A (en) * | 2014-08-30 | 2016-03-02 | 上海汽车集团股份有限公司 | Vehicle keyless entry method and system |
| CN107284412A (en) * | 2016-04-11 | 2017-10-24 | 阿尔卑斯电气株式会社 | Keyless access system and mobile unit |
| JP2019027057A (en) * | 2017-07-26 | 2019-02-21 | カルソニックカンセイ株式会社 | Keyless entry system and vehicle side device |
| CN109844823A (en) * | 2016-10-12 | 2019-06-04 | 株式会社电装 | The positioning of PEPS portable device |
| CN111775888A (en) * | 2020-06-05 | 2020-10-16 | 联合汽车电子有限公司 | Intelligent key, and method and system for preventing relay attack |
| CN112009422A (en) * | 2019-05-31 | 2020-12-01 | 长城汽车股份有限公司 | Antenna system of PEPS system, key searching method, PEPS system and vehicle |
-
2021
- 2021-03-08 CN CN202110262437.2A patent/CN112829714A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20060125600A1 (en) * | 2004-11-18 | 2006-06-15 | Alain Brillon | Method and device for protecting a motor vehicle |
| CN102363422A (en) * | 2010-06-21 | 2012-02-29 | 胡夫·许尔斯贝克和福斯特有限及两合公司 | Key remote controller and method for exchanging signals between motor car-side control device and key remote controller |
| CN102419431A (en) * | 2010-09-24 | 2012-04-18 | 株式会社东海理化电机制作所 | Communication terminal position judging device |
| CN102785634A (en) * | 2011-05-16 | 2012-11-21 | 欧陆汽车有限责任公司 | Method and apparatus for access and/or starting verification |
| CN105365773A (en) * | 2014-08-30 | 2016-03-02 | 上海汽车集团股份有限公司 | Vehicle keyless entry method and system |
| CN104401294A (en) * | 2014-11-28 | 2015-03-11 | 东风汽车公司 | Control method for preventing intelligent key from being accidently locked in vehicle |
| CN107284412A (en) * | 2016-04-11 | 2017-10-24 | 阿尔卑斯电气株式会社 | Keyless access system and mobile unit |
| CN109844823A (en) * | 2016-10-12 | 2019-06-04 | 株式会社电装 | The positioning of PEPS portable device |
| JP2019027057A (en) * | 2017-07-26 | 2019-02-21 | カルソニックカンセイ株式会社 | Keyless entry system and vehicle side device |
| CN112009422A (en) * | 2019-05-31 | 2020-12-01 | 长城汽车股份有限公司 | Antenna system of PEPS system, key searching method, PEPS system and vehicle |
| CN111775888A (en) * | 2020-06-05 | 2020-10-16 | 联合汽车电子有限公司 | Intelligent key, and method and system for preventing relay attack |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Gmiden et al. | An intrusion detection method for securing in-vehicle CAN bus | |
| KR101771376B1 (en) | Vehicle control system to prevent relay attack | |
| US9728025B2 (en) | Portable device, communication device, and communication system | |
| US10475268B2 (en) | Vehicular electronic key system with determination of transmission strength adjustment | |
| US7365633B2 (en) | Vehicle remote control apparatus and vehicle remote control system using the same | |
| US7724125B2 (en) | Remote keyless entry system for a vehicle and a method of controlling a vehicle function by the same | |
| US11305732B2 (en) | Vehicle access system | |
| US9965912B2 (en) | On-vehicle apparatus control system, on-vehicle control device, and portable machine | |
| US20060077042A1 (en) | Method for avoiding an unauthorized access to passive access-authorization system of a motor vehicle | |
| EP2492876B1 (en) | Electronic key system | |
| US20140215567A1 (en) | Communication system and communication device | |
| US20140240090A1 (en) | Solutions for Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless ENTRY and GO | |
| JP2004131935A (en) | Remote control device for car | |
| CN110199327B (en) | Method for securing access | |
| WO2017098726A1 (en) | Vehicle-mounted device, portable device, and vehicle wireless communication system | |
| KR102225967B1 (en) | Defense of a relay attack | |
| CN108297830A (en) | For protecting method and apparatus of the system for making Vehicular system passively unlock from relaying site attack | |
| WO2017098721A1 (en) | On-vehicle device, mobile device, and wireless communication system for vehicles | |
| CN112829714A (en) | Relay attack defense method, PEPS system and vehicle | |
| CN109147097A (en) | Automobile no-key Verification System | |
| JP6278410B2 (en) | In-vehicle device control system, in-vehicle control device, portable device | |
| US20200067898A1 (en) | System and method for preventing accomplishment of unauthorized communication | |
| US20210268992A1 (en) | Transmission control device, portable device, vehicle system, transmission control method, control method, and control program product | |
| JP6284503B2 (en) | In-vehicle device control system | |
| CN116634439A (en) | Relay attack prevention method for PEPS controller system |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |
Application publication date: 20210525 |